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I. Program Engineering and
Integration Summary

SECTION I. PROGRAM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION SUMMARY
A. Introduction
The Skylab program achieved a major step in the development of the
nation's manned space technology. The Skylab workshop, shown in Figure
I.A-I represents the first multidisciplined laboratory in a space pro-
gram to provide capabilities for solar and stellar astronomy, space phy-
sics, materials processing, biomedical evaluation and investigation of
space technology. This spectrum of scientific applications and techno-
logy development activity was conducted and controlled by three-man crews.
In terms of the breadth of experimentation and the quantity and quality
of data, the efficiency of Skylab was considered excellent.
Man was the key to this efficiency. Through his efforts failure of
potential catastrophic proportions, the loss of the meteoroid protection
panel during the first minute after launch, was overcome. The failure
resulted in the loss of one electrical power generating solar panel,
ability to fully extend another, and the loss of solar thermal protection
for the Orbital Workshop (OWS) habitation area. A solar sun shade para-
sol furnished by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) was erected, the remsin-
ing solar panel was extended and the nominal mission plan regained.
Ultimately, a second solar sun shade furnished by the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) was erected and utilized throughout the remainder
of the Skylab mission for OWS thermal protection. Figure I.A-2 depicts
the final operational configuration of Skylab.
Also, through cre_member efforts, diverse experiments were activa-
ted from their protected launch stowage condition. The crew was able to
operate this varied complement of experiments throughout the flight and
meet the desired objectives. Judgement played a critical role in the
conduct of key experiments through recognition of important transient
events such as solar flares and local environmental conditions. The crew
adapted to the orbital environment, and then demonstrated man's ability
to exploit it, permitting the durations of the second and third visits to
be extended to 59 days and 84 days from the initially planned 56 days.
The Skylab missions demonstrated the teamwork concept on the part of
multl-organizations with diverse interests. Investigation of the comet
Kohoutek during the third visit demonstrated an ability to introduce in
"real time" into an ongoing mission, observations of a comet which was
not part of the original mission planning. This flexibility is a credit
to the Skylab crews, mission operations and support personnel, equipment
design and the Scientific Community.
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B. Program Objectives
The Skylab program was conceived to conduct scientific investiga-
tions in a low earth orbit. Briefly the program can be divided into
four broad categories summarized as follows:
i. Biomedical and Behavioral Performance. To determine and
evaluate man's physiological responses and aptitudes in space under
zero-gravity conditions and his postmission adaptation to the ter-
restrial environment, through a series of progressively longer missions,
and determine the increments by which mission duration could be in-
creased.
2. Man-Machine Relationships. To develop and evaluate efficient
techniques using man for sensor operation, data selection and evalua-
tion, manual control, maintenance and repair, assembly and set-up,
and mobility involved in various operations.
3. Long Duration Systems Operations. To develop techniques
for increasing systems life, for enduring long habitability periods
and for maintaining extended mission control, plus investigate and
develop techniques for inflight test and qualification of advanced
subsystems.
4. Experiments. To conduct solar astronomy, earth resources,
science, technology, and applications experiments that involve man
when his contribution will improve the quality and/or yield of the
results.
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C. Skylab Evolution
The evolution of Skylab encompassedmore than a decade of effort
by NASAand Industry personnel. Manyobstacles were overcome, which
required the efforts of all participants to achieve all the original
goals.
The first documentedreport to suggest the use of an S-IVB stage
as a space laboratory occured in November 1962 and served as a cata-
lyst to formalize ideas that had yet to be published. By early 1965,
center program analysts and development personnel were using such
terms as "spent stage" and "wet" workshop in reference to the pos-
sibility of purging propellant from an S-IVB stage in space and con-
verting the stage to a space laboratory. Interest and activities
increased and by August 1965, National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) Headquarters announced the establishment of an
Apollo Application Program (AAP) office, which replaced the old
Apollo Extension Systems Program. Effort accelerated on the concept
of converting a spent S-IVB stage to a space laboratory and in De-
cember 1965 Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) received formal go-
ahead to develop the Orbital Workshop (OWS). Additional consideration
was given to the use of Gemini subsystems on the airlock splice experi-
ment.
The first officially released schedule for AAP reflected a
requirement for the launch of twenty-six Saturn IB and nineteen
Saturn V launches. These launches involved three S-IVB/Spent Stage
Experiment Support Modules (SSESM), three Saturn V Workshops, and
four Apollo Telescope Mounts (ATMs) in addition to five lunar mis-
sions and two synchronous orbit missions. There were several schedule
iterations during the "wet" workshop period that lasted through June
1969 and primarily reflected funding constraints through a reduced
number of launches. Initially mission duration was set at a nominal
14 days with extended missions of up to 45 days.
Initially the AAP launch configuration consisted of a SSESM
mounted on the forward end of a S-IVB stage and a Command and Service
Module (CSM). Most experiments were biomedical and would be carried
and performed in the Command Module (CM). Astronauts would enter the
passivated S-IVB spent stage through the SSESM and activities primarily
would amount to familiarization with zero-g locomotion in a controlled
and enclosed environment. The crew would be quartered in the CSM.
Basic AAP concepts remained unchanged until December 1966 with
the advent of a rendezvous and docking requirement in space using a
Lunar Module (LM)/ATM configuration. Additionally, this new concept
provided for the major step of making the S-IVB habitable by passivat-
ing and pressurizing the hydrogen tank in orbit. A two-gas atmosphere
of oxygen and nitrogen replaced the S-IVB/SSESM one-gas oxygen system
and incorporated a shirt-sleeve environment. At this time the require-
1-5
ments for the Airlock Module (AM) and Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA)
were identified. Crewquarters were to be established in the S-IVB
purged propellant tank with the storage of habitability equipment in
the MDA.
Primary activities through the remainder of the "wet" workshop
era reflected considerable changeand addition of experiment require-
ments, the addition of solar array wings to the OWSfor increased
power capability, emphasis on the need for integration of payload
requirements, elimation of lunar missions and conceptual studies
involving the substitution of a "dry" for a "wet" workshop program.
Additionally the announcementof specific basic objectives for AAP
was made. The objectives were as follows:
Long-duration space flights of menand systems, based on
unique capabilities of manhabitability, biomedical, and
behavioral consideration and systems development.
Scientific investigations in earth orbit based on solar
astronomy, earth observation, and stellar astronomy.
Applications in earth orbit based on meteorology, earth
resources, and communications.
The MSFCwas assigned the managerial responsibility for the AMand
Lunar Explorer Module (LEM)to establish a satisfactory balance
betweenApollo and AAPand to place design integration under a
single NASAcenter.
In July 1969 NASAheadquarters announcedthe decision to con-
vert from the "wet" to "dry" workshop configuration with significant
changes identified as follows:
Multiple Docking Adapter
Delete Orbital Workshop (OWS)experiment storage
Add Apollo Telescope Mount controls and displays
Airlock Module
Add total mission atmospheric gas storage
Delete scientific airlock
Shroud configuration changed
Add Apollo Telescope Mount deployment mechanism
Orbital Workshop
Substitute cold gas attitude control system for old
hot gas system
Preinstall all equipment, expendables, and experiments
Add scientific airlock
Lunar Module Ascent Stage
Deleted
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The launch configuration for Skvlab and the CSMare represented
in Figure I.C-I.
With the "dry" workshop decision finalized, emphasis was directed
toward establishing a technical baseline for system definition and
design purposes. The release of the Cluster Requirements Specifica-
tion (CRS) provided such a baseline and detailed design of the AAP
systems proceeded on an expedited basis.
In February 1970 NASA Headquarters officially redesignated the
AAP as the Skylab Program. Figure l.A-1 depicts the on-orbit Skylab
cluster configuration as designed and essentially consisting of the
ATM, MDA, OWS, AM and CSM.
Final design, manufacturing, qualification testing, and hardware
acceptance were the primary Skylab events from January 1970 through
September 1972. Selection of Skylab prime and backup crews also
occurred during this period and names were released as follows:
Skylab Mission i:
Prime
Charles Conrad, Jr.
Joseph Kerwin
Paul Weitz
Backup
Russell Schweichart
Story Musgrave
Bruce McCandless
Skylab Mission 2: Alan Bean
Owen Garriott
Jack Lousma
Vance Brand
William Lenoir
Don Lind
Skylab Mission 3: Gerald Carr
Edwin Gibson
William Pogue
Same as Mission 2
With the arrival of the AM/MDA at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in
early October 1972, all modules came under KSC control and the final
verification program was in full swing. The successful completion
of the verification program culminated in the launch of the Skylab
during May 1973.
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D. Management Philosophy and Techniques
Although Skylab inherited much of its basic equipment and techno-
logy from Apollo and the programs that preceded it, the challenges it
had to face were new and significantly more complex. Skylab embraced
an unprecedented diversity of objectives, sophistication and variety of
experiments. It was the first time that the development of an inhabited
space vehicle had been physically and organizationally separated from
the crew and mission-operations group.
To deal with these factors, a new division of responsibilities was
instituted. MSFC was assigned hardware systems integration; JSC was
assigned integration of mission and crew operations in addition to hard-
ware responsibility for the Command and Service Module (CSM) and assign-
ed experiments, and KSC was responsible for launch operations. Program
offices established at the three centers came under overall management
and direction of the Skylab Program Director in the Office of Manned
Space Flight (OSMF).
MSFC had specific responsibility for developing elements of the
flight hardware and related software, as follows:
- Saturn IB and Saturn V.
- OWS, Airlock Module (AM), and Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA).
- Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM).
- Payload Shroud (PS) for the Workshop.
- Assigned experiments.
Technical management was effected primarily through issue of coordinated
requirements and performance specifications, operation of intercenter
technical panels, and a series of formal reviews on a module and system
basis.
A Skylab Program Specification called out the overall hardware per-
formance requirements. It was issued and controlled by the Program
Director. The specification control of systems, hardware, and test re-
quirements was derived from program objectives. The translation of these
objectives into specifications governing system definition, hardware de-
sign, and test and checkout criteria required a technical evaluation ef-
fort that involved conceptual and cost trade-offs, and, ultimately, im-
plementation through contractual action with affected contractors. The
Cluster Requirements Specification served as the controlling specifica-
tion for system level requirements and was used as a baseline for devel-
opment and/or finalization of Contract End Item (CEI) specifications for
the modules, experiments, and associated ground support systems control-
led by the center. Test and Checkout Requirements Specification Documents
1-9
(TCRSDs)were derived from the CRSand appropriate CEIs. The documents
included module level TCRSDsas well as an integrated TCRSDfor the test-
ing program at KSC. The CRSalso served as a controlling specification
for the development of Interface Control Documents(ICDs) between inter-
facing contractors.
The control of program specifications and ICDs was effected through
a comprehensiveconfiguration managementprogram tailored after the sys-
tem used on the Saturn program. Documentswere baselined contractually
and the configuration managementand change integration system provided
rigid control and assessment techniques to assure compatibility between
all affected program elements for any given change action.
The following intercenter technical panels formulated and document-
ed intercenter interfaces and resolved related technical problems as
necessary: Mechanical, Electrical, Instrumentation and Communications,
Mission Requirements, LaunchOperations, Test Planning, and Mission
Evaluation. The panels were either jointly chaired by the hardware-
development centers or a designated lead center.
Each Skylab experiment, module and major subsystemwas subjected to
the following formal reviews: The Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR),
Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Design
Certification Review (DCR), Configuration Inspection (CI), Certification
of Flight Worthiness (COFW),Crew SystemsReviews and Flight Readiness
Reviews (FRRs).
The PRRwas the earliest formal review of the various concepts con-
sidered and of the concept selected to meet the mission objectives. It
provided a meansto insure coordinated understanding of the basic per-
formance requirements throughout the entire program structure. During
a PRR,each responsible organization element from the total Skylab organ-
ization had the opportunity to submit formal Review Item Discrepancies
(RIDs) for resolution. Each RID was formally acted on by the PRRboard.
Design was then initiated.
The PDRwas a technical review of the basic design approach conduc-
ted early in the detailed design phase. The CDRwas a technical review
of the specifications anddrawings conducted when the detail design was
substantially complete. In addition to the review of the end item de-
sign itself, its compatibility with other portions of the system was
examined. Formal submittal and resolution of RIDs was also part of the
PDRand CDRactivities.
The DCRwas conducted at the module level to provide assurance that
hardware design was acceptable and compatible with program requirements.
The CI was an examination of the manufactured end-items against
the specification requirements, released engineering drawings, and test
results. It was conducted in two parts: before final system test, when
the configuration and overall status of the equipment and its Ground
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Support Equipment, as well as qualification test data, were examined; and
shortly before delivery, when final systems test data and acceptance test
data were examined.
The COFWcertified that each flight stage and module constituted a
complete and qualified item of hardware before shipment. The basis for
certification was contained and maintained (traceable) in the acceptance
data.
Crew SystemsReviewswere conducted on a continuous basis through-
out the program to assure compatibility betweenSkylab crews and oper-
ational systems on a man/machine basis.
The FRR was conducted at the module and cluster levels and stressed
the operational readiness of the Skylab systems to perform as required
during the mission.
Based on Apollo experience, effective use of special reviews was
employed throughout the program. The Skylab Systems/Operations Compat-
ibility Assessment Review (SOCAR) emphasized the total compabibilit\'
between design, development, test, and integration and operational
aspects on a total systems basis and provided necessary insight to eval-
uate program needs and follow-on actions. Significant results were
realized in assessment of hardware systems versus mission documentation
and thus provided a high confidence in the operational readiness of the
Skylab. Independent hardware reviews conducted late in the program
through senior NASA individuals were vital in establishing confidence
that design requirements were met and that hardware would function in a
successful manner. These special reviews provided sufficient overall
visibility to make final determination that launch schedules and mission
objectives could be met.
Mission operations at JSC were conducted through the Flight Opera-
tions Management Room (FOMR) with MSFC involvement through a senior man-
agement representative. The official MSFC position as the result of
problems or potential problems identified throughout the mission was
formally presented in the FOMR and included MSFC representation as part
of the decision making process. Mission support activities at MSFC were
structured by system discipline through the Mission Support Groups (MSGs)
and at the contractor level to assure that all action requests received
a timely and well organized evaluation. Responses were finalized through
the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) and transmitted to JSC
as a formal MSFC position. Contractors were required to provide contin-
uous support to the various MSGs locally and at the contractors facility
to minimize response times as critical items developed.
The program director, or his deputy, chaired the Flight Management
Team. Team members included Headquarters representatives and senior Center
management and operations personnel. They provided program decisions based
upon recommendations and options provided by the Flight Control/Support
Team. MSFC participation on both teams was a vital part of the decision
making process and contributed greatly to the overall success of Skylab.
I-II
E. Mission Definition
The definition of the Skylab program mission is identified below
and includes mission objectives, Skylab Rescue (SL-R) mission, and
the mission profile.
I. Mission Ob iectives.
a. SL-I/SL-2 Mission. The objectives for the SL-I/SL-2
mission, as assigned by the OMSF, follow.
(I) Establish the Skylab Orbital Assembly in Earth Orbit
Operate the Orbital Assembly (SWS plus CSM) as
a habitable space structure for up to 28 days
after SL-2 launch.
Obtain data for evaluating the performance of
the orbital assembly.
Obtain data for evaluating crew mobility and
work capability in both intravehicular and
extravehicular activity.
(2) Obtain Medical Data on the Crew for Use in Extend-
ing the Duration of Manned Space Flights
Obtain medical data for determining the effects
on the crew which result from a space flight of
up to 28 days duration.
Obtain medical data for determining if a sub-
sequent Skylab mission of up to 56 days dura-
tion is feasible and advisable.
(3) Perform In-Flight Experiments
Obtain solar astronomy data for continuing
and extending solar studies beyond the limits
of earth-based observations.
Obtain earth resources data for continuing and
extending multisensor observation of the earth
from low earth orbit.
Perform the assigned scientific, engineering,
technological and Department of Defense (DOD)
experiments.
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Do
as follows:
SL-3 Mission. The objectives for the SL-3 mission were
(i) Perform Unmanned Saturn Workshop Operations
Obtain data for evaluating the performance
of the unmanned Saturn Workshop (SWS)
Obtain solar astronomy data by unmanned ATM
observations
(2) Reactivate the Skylab Orbital Assembly in Earth Orbit
- Operate the orbital assembly (SWS plus CSM)
as a habitable space structure for up to
56 days after the SL-3 launch
- Obtain data for evaluating the performance of
the orbital assembly
Obtain data for evaluating crew mobility and
work capability in both intravehicular and
extravehicular activity
(3) Obtain Medical Data on the Crew for Use in Extending
the Duration of Manned Space Flights
Obtain medical data for determining the effects
on the crew which result from a space flight
of up to 56 days of duration
Obtain medical data for determining if a sub-
sequent Skylab mission of greater than 56 days
duration is feasible and advisable
(4) Perform In-Fllght Experiments
Obtain ATM solar astronomy data for continuing
and extending solar studies beyond the limits
of earth-based observations
Obtain earth resources data for continuing and
extending multisensor observation of the earth
from the low earth orbit
Perform the assigned scientific, engineering,
technology and DOD experiments.
c. SL-4 Mission. The planned mission objectives for SL-4
were basically the same as those stated for SL-3. The opportunities
mentioned previously, however, presented ample justification for exten-
sion of the mission and the attainment of more data.
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2. SL-R Mission. The SL-R mission was unique to this program. No
previous space program provided the capability to rescue spacemen. The
SL-R mission was planned a_" a contingency mission to provide for the
safe return to earth of the Skylab crew in the event that the docked CSM
should fail and be unsafe for return. The next in-line CSM would be
used as the SL-2 or SL-3 rescue vehicle; the backup CSM would be used
for SL-4.
Installation of a field modification kit was required if a rescue
situation occurred. The SL-R CSM would be launched with two crewmen,
rendezvous and dock with the SWS, and return safely to earth with five
crewmen. Without compromising the above goals, accomplishment of the
following would have been considered:
- Return selected experiment payload data,
Perform a diagnosis of the CSM failure,
Configure the SWS for revisit.
3. Mission Profile. Planned profiles for the Skylab missions are
briefly stated as follows:
a. SL-I/SL-2 Mission.
(i) Workshop Launch and Insertion into Orbit. The Work-
shop, incorporating the modified S-IVB, ATM, MDA, and AM was to be in-
serted into an orbit of approximately 235 x 235 n-mi. and 50 ° inclina-
tion and configured to await arrival of the manned CSM.
(2) CSM Launch and Insertion into Orbit. Nominal launch
of the CSM was to be on the day following the Workshop launch. The CSM
was to be inserted into an orbit of approximately 81 x 120 n-mi.
(3) CSM Rendezvous and Dock with the Workshop. The CSM
was to enter a phasing orbit, rendezvous with the Workshop and dock to
the MDA axial port. The CSM Service Propulsion System and Reaction Con-
trol System was to be used for rendezvous maneuvers.
(4) Workshop Operations. The crew was to activate the
Workshop, configure the CSM systems for dependent operation and conduct
experiments to demonstrate the SWS habitability. The mission was to be
conducted for a period of up to 28 days with emphasis on medical experi-
ments designed to test the effects of prolonged space flight. The ATM
equipment was to be activated and its operation verified. Other experi-
ments were to be conducted as assigned.
(5) Workshop in Storage Mode. Near the completion of the
mission, the Workshop was to be placed in an operating mode suitable for
storage.
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(6) CSMDeorbit and Recovery. The CSM was to separate from
the Workshop using the Service Module (SM) Reaction Control System. The
SM Service Propulsion System was to perform the nominal deorbit burn with
the SM Reaction Control System available as backup.
b. Revisit Missions (SL-3, SL-4).
(I) CSM Launch and Insertion into Orbit. The CSM was to
be inserted into an orbit of approximately 81 x 120 n-mi.
(2) CSM Rendezvous and Dock with the Workshop. The CSM
was to enter a phasing orbit, rendezvous with the Workshop and dock to
the MDA axial port. The CSM Service Propulsion System and Reaction Con-
trol System was to be used for rendezvous maneuvers.
(3) Workshop Operations. The crew was to reactivate the
Workshop, configure the CSM systems for dependent operation and obtain
solar astronomy data using the ATM. Biomedical and other assigned ex-
periments were to be performed.
(4) Workshop in Storage Mode. Near the completion of each
mission, the Workshop was to be placed in an operating mode suitable for
storage.
(5) CSM Deorbit and Recovery. The CSM was to separate
from the Workshop using the Service Module (SM) Reaction Control System.
The SM Service Propulsion System was to perform the nominal deorbit burn
with the SM Reaction Control System available as backup.
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F. SystemsDesign
Utilization of existing design technology and hardware was
maximized on the Skylab program; however, new and complex requirements
necessitated the application of new technology to various system ele-
ments. Fromthe initial concepts of systems design through the verifica-
tion and operational phases, the final success of Skylab was a direct
result of effective systems integration techniques utilized by center
management.
i. Preliminary Design. This period essentially encompassed
the time frame between official program start in December 1965 through
the decision to convert from the "wet" to "dry" workshop configuration
in July 1969. Conceptual trade-offs were performed involving technical
and cost considerations to define systems configurations for each Sky-
lab iteration during this phase. Preliminary system design effort
utilizing existing hardware from previous programs, primarily Apollo,
progressed for many system elements. Detailed hardware design, however,
developed at a slower pace since much of the total system had not been
baselined.
2. Formal Design. Systems design entered a new phase with the
decision to proceed with the "dry" workshop configuration in July 1969.
Much of the effort performed during the preliminary design phase was
still valid but extensive effort was required to establish a systems
design compatible with "dry" workshop requirements. Following this
decision, the development and baselining of the CRS resulted in a single
document defining system level requirements and criteria for systems
design. The formalization of the CRS as a single specification to con-
trol design responsibilities initiated the formal systems design phase.
Individual Contract End Item specifications were aligned with CRS
requirements and detail hardware and system element design efforts
proceeded at the module and experiment levels under individual con-
tractor and center controls.
As hardware design developed, the utilization of formal reviews
was emphasized and brought into focus the need to assure the compati-
bility of the total Skylab system. Participation in these reviews was
extended to manufacturing, quality, test and mission requirements per-
sonnel in addition to key center and contractor personnel involved in
the hardware definition. Preliminary Design Reviews and Critical De-
sign Reviews were performed and emphasized the compliance of the hard-
ware against appropriate specif£cations. Compatibility of interface
requirements with other hardware and system elements was stressed and
required participation by other affected contractors. Ultimately the
CDRs resulted in the release of baselined engineering and subsequent
control through the configuration control system managed at the center
level.
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3. DesiKn Verification. The initial design verification was
accomplished through PDR and CDR activities during the formal design
period and essentially assured hardware qualification and specifica-
tion compliance. As the process of system build-up proceeded, the
ultimate verification process was two-fold. Functional compatibility
of the total system and its elements was demonstrated through a com-
prehensive testing program conducted at the end item, module, and
experiment levels and ultimately through integrated testing of the
total cluster at KSC. Emphasis was also placed on verification of
the crew system interfaces with the system elements and was demon-
strated through regularly scheduled crew system reviews conducted
at contractor facilities and at key times during KSC activities.
Extensive use of simulators provided further confidence that system
design was compatible with crew capabilities. Secondly, the concept
of formal program reviews was continued following the experience
gained on Apollo with these reviews proving invaluable in establish-
ing the necessary confidence that the total Skylab systems design
was compatible with program objectives. Design Certification Re-
views (DCRs), Spacecraft Acceptance Reviews (SARs), SOCARs, Hardware
Integrity Reviews (HIRs), and Flight Readiness Reviews (FRRs) were
the more significant activities conducted and respectively stressed
design acceptability and formal acceptance of the hardware; total
systems compatibility between hardware, software, and crew personnel;
special review of critical hardware elements; and overall final
readiness of the total system from a functional and operational
aspect to meet launch and mission criteria. These reviews involved
high level center and contractor management and technical personnel
and were beneficial during the final evaluation process in determin-
ing system design acceptability and readiness for the Skylab missions.
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G. Program Summary
Skylab was the first space laboratory and contained facilities and
systems that were extremely sophisticated and represented the latest
technological innovations. Basic systems were required to provide elec-
trical power generation and distribution, environmental control, atti-
tude control of the cluster, instrumentation, communications, caution
and warning for crew safety, and crew habitability support. These sys-
tems were designed to support an eight-month mission with five of those
manned. Laboratory facilities were provided to acco_odate diverse ex-
periments covering astronomy, earth resources, scientific investigations,
biomedical evaluation, technology and special applications. This hard-
ware was contained in five different major hardware elements (modules)
which were manufactured by different contractors.
The integration of all requirements and hardware into a configura-
tion that successfully fulfilled program objectives was a major MSFC
responsibility. These Systems Engineering and Integration activities
involved extensive participation of crew systems in the design review
and testing of hardware, the integration of experiments into the respec-
tive modules, and the integration of the modules into an operational
cluster. Additionally, close relationship with and involvement of flight
operations personnel was required to assure compatibility of the Skylab
systems and flight operations planning. The following summary identifies
the effectiveness of the major hardware elements (module and experiments),
crew systems, and Systems Engineering and Integration activities.
i. Airlock Module. The AM was designed and fabricated by the
Eastern Division of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC-ED),
who also fabricated the ATM Deployment Assembly (DA) and Fixed Airlock
Shroud (FAS). See Figure I.G-I for basic AM configuration. The origin-
al concept of the AM was to provide an interconnecting tunnel and air-
lock between the CSM and the OWS. As the program matured, expanded re-
quirements were imposed and ultimately basic features were provided as
follows:
Interconnecting passage between the MDA and OWS
Airlock, hatch and support system for extravehicular activity
Purification of the Skylab atmosphere
- Environmental control of the Skylab atmosphere (cooling only
for the MDA and OWS)
- Atmospheric supply and control
A_ launch support and orbital deployment provisions
- Electrical Power control and distribution
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- Real- and Delayed-time data
Cluster caution and warning
Commandsystem link with ground network
Very High Frequency (VHF) ranging link for CSMrendezvous
Controls and displays
- Teleprinter
- Experiment installation of D024 sample panels
- Experiment antennas for Earth Resources Experiment Package(EREP), and radio noise burst monitor
- Structural support of the ATM,AM, MDA,and FAS
In support of these basic features, system design capabilities were
provided as follows:
a. Structures and Mechanical
(i) The AMconfiguration included four basic structural
sections. The sections were the Structural Transition Section (STS),
which included the radiators, the tunnel assembly, the flexible tunnel
extension assembly, and the support truss assemblies.
(a) The STSprovided the structural transition from
the MDAto the Airlock Tunnel. The STSstructure was a pressurized alum-
inum, welded cylinder 47 inches long and 120 inches in diameter of stres-
sed skin and semimonocoqueconstruction. The STSbulkhead provided the
transition from 120 to 65 inches diameter to mate with the tunnel assem-
bly. Machined rings were used to makea typical flanged, bolted inter-
face. Four double-pane glass STSviewing ports allowed visibility. Each
window was protected when not in use by an external, removeable cover
assembly, actuated from inside the STSby a manual crank. The cover
served a dual purpose: to minimize meteoroid impacts on the glass, and
to minimize heat loss from the cabin area.
The Airlock Module Radiator panels served as a meteoroid shield for
part of the pressure vessel skin in addition to their basic function as
space radiators. Radiators were mounted on both the STSand MDA. To min-
imize development and thermal testing, the panels were designed of the
samematerials and detail construction used on the Gemini radiator.
(b) The tunnel assembly was a pressurized semimonoco-
que aluminum cylinder 65 inches in diameter and 153 inches long. Two
internal circular bulkheads with mating hatches divided the tunnel assem-
bly into three compartments. Hatch seals and latching mechanismswere
provided in the bulkheads.
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The forward compartment was 31 inches long and interfaced with
the STS section. It provided support for stowage containers,
tape recorders, and miscellaneous equipment.
- The center (lock) compartment was 80 inches long and included a
modified Gemini crew hatch for ingress/egress during Extravehi-
cular Activity (EVA).
- There were two internal hatches, located forward and aft. One
hatch was used for EVA.
(c) The flexible tunnel extension assembly was a flex-
ible convolute metallic bellows 42.5 inches inside diameter by 13 inches
long and formed a pressurized passageway between the AM and OWS.
(d) There were four truss assemblies of similar basic
design. Minor modifications were required on each truss assembly to sup-
port miscellaneous equipment. The trusses were fusion welded aluminum
tubes. Nitrogen tanks were mounted on gimbals to isolate them from truss
deflections and resulting loads.
(2) The DA consisted of two aluminum tube truss assemblies
connected by a pair of trunnion joints, which allowed the upper truss
assembly to rotate 90° to deploy the ATM. The DA also supported wire
bundles, experiments, antennas, and miscellaneous equipment. The lower
truss assembly was made up of bipods, with the base of the bipods attach-
ed to the top ring of the FAS. A framework atop the upper truss assembly
provided mounts for the four ATM attachment points (rigidizing mechan-
sims). These rigidizing mechanisms attached to the ATM trhough four
adapter fittings. During ground operations and launch, the ATM was sup-
ported by the PS but loosely attached to the DA by the rigidizing mechan-
ism in a floating position. Following PS separation, the springs in each
rigidizing mechanism retracted and rigidly attached the ATM to the DA.
On the ground, alignment of the ATM was provided by the DA attachments at
the rigidizing mechanisms. The DA rotation system provided a means of
rotating the ATM from its launch position to its in-orbit configuration.
The rotating system consisted of the following major components.
- Two release mechanisms each redundantly released the upper
truss to allow rotation.
- Two trunnions provided the pivots to rotate the upper truss.
- Two deployment reels provided the redundant means to pull
(rotate) the A_i into the deployed position.
- The latch mechanism was used to retain the A_4/DA in the
deployed position.
(3) The FAS was a ring-stlffened, thlck-skinned cylinder
approximately 80 inches in height and 260 inches in diameter. Inter-
costals distributed concentrated loads introduced by the DA, AM and
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oxygen (02) tank support points. Twodoors were provided in the FAS; one
for access to the FAS interior and the AMEVAhatch during ground opera-
tions and the other for access to ground umbilical connectors. Four an-
tennas; two deployable discones, and two Ultra High Frequency (UHF) an-
tennas were mounted on the FAS. The FASstructure also contained egress
handrails, work platform, film cassette tree supports, film transfer boom
(also called TEE), a TEEhook stowage box and lights.
b. Environmental/Thermal Control Systems (ECS/TCS). The AM
ECS/TCSconsisted of the following subsystems:
(i) A gas system permitted prelaunch purge, stored high-
pressure 02 and Nitrogen (N2) and regulated pressure and distribution for
cabin atmosphereand other uses.
(2) The atmospheric control system provided moisture re-
moval, carbon dioxide and odor removal, ventilation, and cabin gas cool-
ing. Moisture was removedfrom the cluster atmosphereby condensing heat
exchangers and molecular sieves. Carbondioxide and odor were also re-
movedby the molecular sieve system. Ventilation was provided by fans
and condensing heat exchanger compressors. Gas cooling was provided by
the condensing and cabin heat exchangers.
(3) The condensate system provided the capability of re-
moving atmospheric condensate from the condensing heat exchangers, stor-
ing it, and disposing of it. In addition the condensate system provided
the capability of removing gas from the liquid gas separator and dispos-
ing of it as well as providing a vacuumsource for servicings/deservicings.
(4) The suit cooling system provided astronaut cooling dur-
ing EVAand Intervehicular Activity (IVA) by circulating temperature-
controlled water through the umbilical, Liquid Cooled Garment (LCG), and
Pressure Control Unit (PCU) of the astronaut's suit.
(5) The active cooling system consisted of two separate,
redundant loops for active cooling of the suit cooling module, atmos-
pheric control modules, selected experiment modules and coldplate-mounted
electrical/electronic equipment.
(6) The ATMControl and Display (C&D) panel and EREPcool-
ing system provided cooling to the ATMC&Dpanel and to EREPcomponents
by circulating water to the equipment.
(7) The passive thermal system used thermal coating, ther-
mal curtains, and insulation material to control the gain and loss of
heat both internally and externally.
c. The Electrical Power System (EPS). The EPShoused by the
AMcontained eight nickel-cadmium batteries and their charger/regulators
to power the manyelectrical devices aboard the Skylab. These batteries
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provided up to 3,830 watts of power every orbit and were recharged by
the OWSSolar Array.
Power Conditioning Group (PCG)outputs were applied to the various
AMEPSbuses by appropriate control switching provided on the STS instru-
ment panel or by ground control via the AMDigital CommandSystem. Each
PCGprovided conditioned power to using equipment and recharged the bat-
teries during the daylight period. A switching arrangement permitted
the powering of all eight PCGsfrom one solar array throughout the Sky-
lab missions.
d. Sequential System. The Sequential System of the Airlock
controlled mission events to establish the initial orbital configuration
of Skylab. Using commandsfrom the launch vehicle Instrumentation Unit
(IU), backed by a commandcapability from the ground, the following
events were planned to follow launch:
- PS jettison
- Discone antenna deployment
- DAactivation to position the ATM
- OWSand A_ solar wing deployment
- Venting operations
- OWSradiator shield jettison
- Attitude control transfer
Although the Airlock sequential system functioned as required, an
OWSmeteoroid shield malfunction prevented automatic deployment of the
OWSsolar wings.
e. Instrumentation System. The Airlock Instrumentation System
sensed, conditioned, multiplexed, and encoded vehicle, experiment, and
biomedical data for transmission to ground stations in either real time
or recorded delayed time. In addition, it provided data for onboard dis-
plays, and through hardllne, enabled readout during ground checkout. The
system included the following subsystems:
- Oxygen Partial Pressure Sensing System
- Dew Point Sensor
- Quartz Crystal Microbalance Contamination Monitor
- Acoustic Noise Measuring System
- Signal Conditioning Packages
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- Carbon Dioxide Transducers
- Flowmeters
- Temperature Sensors
f. CommunicationsSystem. The CommunicationsSystem transmit-
ted and received voice, instrumentation data, and television data between
crewmembersin the Skylab and on EVA; crewmembersand ground tracking sta-
tions; Skylab systems and ground tracking stations, and between Skylab and
the rendezvousing CSM. The CommunicationsSystem consisted of the follow-
ing subsystems:
(i) Audio-System. Used in conjunction with the Apollo
Voice CommunicationsSystem to provide communications amongthe three
crewmenand between Skylab and the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Net-
work (STDN).
(2) Digital CommandSystem (DCS). A sophisticated, auto-
matic commandsystem that provided the STDNwith real-time commandcap-
abilities for the AM, OWS,and MDA. The DCSpermitted control of exper-
iments, antennas, and cluster system functions.
(3) Teleprinter. In conjunction with the AMreceiver/
decoders, the teleprinter provided paper copies of data transmitted by
the STDN.
(4) Time Reference System (TRS). Provided time correlation
to the PCMData System, automatic reset of certain DCScommands,automa-
tic control of the redundant DCSreceiver/decoders, and timing data to
the EREPand onboard displays in the AMand OWS.
(5) Telemetry Transmission System. Used in conjunction
with the Airlock Antenna System, the Telemetry System provided Radio
Frequency (RF) transmission capability to the STDNduring prelaunch,
launch, and orbit for real-time data, delayed-time data, delayed-time
voice, and emergencyvoice (during rescue transmission), in both stabil-
ized and unstablized vehicle attitudes. The system included four telem-
etry transmitters, three of which could be operated simultaneously during
orbital phases.
(6) Antenna System. Consisted of a modified Gemini Quadri-
plexer, two modified Gemini UHFStub Antennas, four RF Coaxial Switches,
two Antenna Booms, two Discone Antennas, and a helical VHFRanging Antenna.
(7) RendezvousSystems. Consisted of a VHFRanging System
and four tracking lights. The systems facilitated rendezvous of CMswith
the SWS. The Airlock Equipment comprised a VIiF Transceiver Assembly, a
Ranging Tone Transfer Assembly and a VIIF Ranging Antenna.
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g. Caution and Warning (C&W)System. The system monitored
critical Skylab parameters and provided the crew with audio/visual alerts
to imminent hazards and out-of-specification conditions that could lead
to hazards. Emergencysituations resulted in a Klaxon horn sounding
throughout the Skylab vehicle. C&Wconditions were brought to the crew's
attention through crew earphones and speaker/intercom panels.
parameters involved:
- MDA/STSfire
- AMaft compartment fire
OWSforward/experiment/crew compartment fire
- Rapid change in vehicle pressure
Warning parameters included:
- Low 02 partial pressure
- Primary and Secondarycoolant flow failure
- AMand ATMregulated power bus out-of-speclfication
- Cluster attitude control failure
- EVAsuit cooling out-of-specification
- AMand CSMcrew alerts
Caution parameters consisted of:
Emergency
- Mole sieve overtemperature, high carbon dioxide content,
flow failure, and sequencing
- OWSventilation out-of-speclfication
- Rapid condensate tank pressure change
- Primary and Secondary coolant temperature out-of-speclfica-
tion
- C&W system bus voltage out-of-specification
-_ EPS voltages out-of-specification
- ATM attitude control system malfunctions
- A_4 coolant system malfunctions
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h. Crew Systems. The Airlock functioned as a nerve center for
monitoring and operating manycomplex vehicle systems automatically or
by the crew.
(i) STS-Primary crew controls for AM systems:
EPS
EPS;- Molecular Sieve
AtmosphereFans
Coolant Control
Condensate System
- IVA Control Panel
- Flight Logbook and Records
- Cluster C&WMonitor System
- 02/N2 GasDistribution System
(2) Lock Compartment- EVA/IVAOperations
- EVA/IVAControl Panels
- Internal and EVALighting Controls
- CompartmentPressure Displays
- VacuumSource
(3) Aft Compartment
- OWSEntry Lighting
- Thermal Fan and Valve Control
- M509Recharge Station
(4) Other AMCrew Systems included the following:
- Mobility Aids
- Communications; Placement of internal voice
communications
Stowage
i. Experiments. The experiments and experiment support equip-
ment which were mounted on the Airlock are as follows:
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(I) D024Thermal Control Coatings. Evaluated selected
thermal control coatings exposed to near-earth space environment.
(2) S193Microwave Radiometer Scatterometer/Altimeter.
Determined land/sea characteristics from active/passive microwave mea-
surements.
(3) $230 Magnetospheric Particle Collection. Measured
fluxes and composition of precipating magnetospheric ions and trapped
particles.
(4) Radio Noise Burst Monitor. Permitted prompt detection
of solar flare activity.
(5) M509 Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) Bottle Recharge Station.
Supporting hardware for recharging three OWS-stowed GN 2 bottles.
The successful Airlock System performance during the Skylab Program
indicates the effectiveness of the design, fabrication, and test activi-
ties that preceded the flight mission. It also indicates the effective-
ness to the mission support activity in responding to discrepant condi-
tions and providing real-time workaround plans.
The major conclusion that can be drawn from a program point of view
is that the Airlock program philosophy of maximum use of existing, quali-
fied space hardware with extensive use of system engineering analysis and
previous test results to identify the minimum supplemental test program
that was required to complete system verification was proved as a valid,
economical approach to a successful mission.
All Airlock systems were fully operational at the end of the mission.
The system discrepancies that remained were relatively insignificant and
had no effect on the capability to adequately support all mission objec-
tives.
2. Multiple Docking Adapter. The MDA structure was fabricated by
MSFC and outfitted by Martin Marietta Aerospace. It was originally con-
ceived to extend the capability of the OWS to allow selected spacecraft
to rendezvous and dock with the laboratory. After that initial concept,
the functional capability of the MDA was expanded to satisfy additional
requirements as the program evolved. Refer to Figure I.G-2 for the gen-
eral MDA configuration. The MDA provided three basic capabilities; a
docking facility, an environmentally controlled work and storage area,
and an interface between the SWS elements and the CSM. Specific features
in these categories were as follows:
Docking Facility. An axial docking port was provided for nor-
mal CSM docking and a radial docking port was provided for
emergency rescue or backup docking use.
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Environmentally Controlled Work and Stowage Area. The environ-
mentally controlled work and stowage area capabilities and fea-
tures were:
A pressurized passageway between the docked CSM
and the AM/OWS
Work stations to support crew operations
Mounting and operation facility for experiments
Mounting and operation facility for the Am C&D
Console
Control and monitoring for the Radio Noise Burst
Monitor (RNBM) and Proton Spectrometer
Crew intercommunication and C&W facility
Mounting and operation of the 16 mm Data
Acquisition Camera (DAC)
Passive Thermal Control (External insulation)
Active Environmental Control (atmospheric ven-
tilation, orbital venting, and external radiators)
Optical windows
Meteoroid protection
MDA lighting
Structural mounting (external) for the L-Band
Antenna
Signal conditioning and instrumentation sensors
Stowage for cluster hardware and commodities
Interface between SWS Elements and the CSM. The MDA provided a
physical interface between the SWS and the CSM to accomplish
the following:
Access between the CSM and the AM/OWS
Distribute electrical power to the CSM
Transfer of control, instrumentation, television
(TV), and communication signals between the MDA/
AM/OWS and the CSM.
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To satisfy the basic functions imposed on the MDA,system design
capabilities were provided as follows:
a. Structures. The MDAwas a i0 foot diameter, 17.3 foot long
pressure vessel that weighed approximately 14,000 pounds fully equipped.
The MDAhad two docking ports, one primary and one backup, designed for
docking the CSM. External and internal mountings were provided for earth
viewing experiment sensors. Film stowage vaults, equipment stowage con-
tainers, tape recorders, and TV equipment were installed internally.
Controls and displays for EREPand ATMexperiments were installed in the
MDA. Work stations and mountings for scientific experiments performed
inside the MDAwere also provided. The MDAexterior structure consisted
of radiator panels, meteoroid shields, insulation blankets, an electrical
wiring tunnel, an L-Band truss for supporting the Inverter/Lighting Con-
trol Assembly (I/LCA), Proton Spectrometer, S194L-Band Antenna and the
S194 Electronics, structural support for EREPexperiments S191and S192,
orientation lights, and docking targets.
The structure also contained four windows to provide viewing capa-
bilities for Earth Resources Experiments. The windows were designed to
meet optical requirements of the experiments and to provide MDApressure
integrity.
b. Thermal Control. Thermal control of the MDAwas provided by
a combination of passive and active subsystems. The passive subsystems
limited the heat loss from the MDAinterior to a value that would allow
the active subsystem to control the internal temperature. The passive
subsystem consisted of insulation blankets, fiberglas standoffs, paints,
coatings, and low-emissivity aluminized Mylar tape. The active thermal
control subsystem consisted of wall heaters, and thermostats, docking
port heaters and thermostats, and a self-contained subsystem that control-
led S190window and frame temperatures. Temperatures within the MDAwere
also controlled by the air circulation subsystemand coolant loops.
c. Environmental Controls. The mechanical environmental con-
trol system included five major subsystems: ventilation, MDA/CSMhatch
pressure equalization, MDAvent, M512experiment vent, and ATMC&Dpanel/
EREPcooling.
The ventilation subsystem consisted of fans and ducts. Three STS/MDA
ducts provided cooled atmosphere from the STSinto the MDA. A mol sieve
duct introduced purified (carbon dioxide removed) atmosphere from the AM
to the MDA. Fans for these ducts were located in the AMand atmosphere
circulation in the MDAwas provided by two fan/shroud/diffuser assemblies
that controlled the air velocity at the crew stations. One additional
fan/shroud/diffuser assembly was coupled to a flexible duct to circulate
ambient MDAatmosphere to the CSM.
The MDA/CSMhatch pressure equalization subsystemprovided a means
of equalizing the atmospheric pressure between the CSMand the M_DAafter
CSMdocking and before SWSentry. Each docking port hatch was equipped
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with a visual differential pressure gage and a manually-operated valve.
Equalization of pressure across the hatch was achieved by opening the
valve.
During launch, the MDAinternal atmospherewas vented through the
MDAvent subsystem. The venting was accomplished by two motor operated
vent valves connected in series for closure redundancy. The internal
valve opening was capped by the astronauts after entry into the MDA
using a special sealing device.
The vent subsystem for experiment M512, Materials Processing in
Space, provided a means of venting the experiment chamber to space.
Venting was accomplished through two manually operated valves connected
in series for redundancy. Experiment M512 battery venting to space was
provided by an additional valve on the venting control panel.
The ATM C&D Panel/EREP coolant subsystem provided a flow of inhib-
ited water coolant to electronic cold plates in the A_ C&/)/EREP system.
A manually operated four-port selector valve provided the means of direc-
ting the coolant to only the ATM C&D Panel or to both this panel and the
EREP system. The coolant carried the heat generated by the electronic
equipment to the AM where the heat was transferred through the AM heat
exchanger to the AM coolant system.
d. Electrical. The MDA Electrical System operated within the
overall cluster power systems and distributed electrical power for the
functional operation of MDA systems and docked CSM systems. The M])A re-
ceived all its electrical energy across the AM interface from the OWS/AM
and ATM power systems.
Specific features of the electrical system included electrical in-
terconnections and circuit breaker control between MDA electrical compon-
ents and between the MDA and other module interfaces. Power was provided
for interior lights, external running lights, heaters, utility outlets,
fans, and MDA experiments.
e. Instrumentation and Communication (I/_C). The I&C system of
the MDA operated as part of the overall ATM, AM, and CSM systems to per-
form telemetry, TV, audio and C&W functions in the MDA. More specific-
ally, these functions consisted of astronaut-to-astronaut voice commun-
ications, biomedical monitoring, fire detection sensing and warning, MDA
statusing and environmental monitoring, portable TV camera coverage, and
ATM TV camera operation.
The functions were accomplished by four subsystems within the I&C
system. The communications subsystem consisted of three speaker intercom
assemblies, which provided an audio interface and an information transfer
link to the AM data acquisition subsystem, communicated temperature (both
internal and external), pressure, and video selector switch position data
through the MDA to the AM for transmission.
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The TV subsystem consisted of a TV input station, a video selector
switch, and a video tape recorder. The system provided an input inter-
face for the portable TV camera, conditioned video signals from the TV
cameraor ATMcamera, and provided for real-time TV transmission or re-
cording of video and audio data for subsequent replay.
The C&Wsubsystem performed fire sensing detection and provided
visual and audible signals that warned of potentially hazardous condi-
tions in the orbital assembly. These signals were provided through the
speaker intercom assemblies.
f. Experiments. The MDAprovided support and operating facil-
ities for the EREPexperiments, corollary experiments, manufacturing-in-
space experiments, and the ATMC&DConsole. The EREPconsisted of the
SI90A Multispectral Scanner, S193Microwave Radiometer/Scatterometer/Al-
timeter, S194L-Band Radiometer, EREPC&DPanel, and two Tape Recorders.
Corollary experiments included the S009 Nuclear Emulsion Experiment,
RNBM,and the Proton Spectrometer.
g. Crew Systems. The MDACrew Systems provided for the pro-
tection, comfort, and assistance of the crewmanand consisted of crew
operational equipment and stowage containers. The crew operational equip-
ment included flight data file, tools, a fire extinguisher, an 02 pack
and mask, speaker intercoms and communication headsets, portable equipment,
utility cables, cameras and accessories, maneuverability equipment, and
miscellaneous aids. The stowage containers and stowage provisions pro-
vided launch and orbital stowage of crew and experiment equipment.
The MDAflight data file included onboard data, launched on SL-I,
which was necessary to support inflight crew operations through SL-2,
SL-3, and SL-4 missions. The file consisted of checklists, logs, note
tablets, maps, star charts, update pads, schematics, and malfunction pro-
cedures.
Tools for operational and contingency use were located at strategic
points, such as contingency hatch opening tools which were mounted on the
axial hatch. Other tool kits and loose miscellaneous hand tools were
available in the MDAcontingency tool containers.
Mission performance of the _ was considered excellent. The fol-
lowing summarypresents specific performance commentsagainst the three
basic capabilities provided by the MDA.
Docking Facility. The MDAaxial docking port facility was used
by each CSMcrew in accessing the orbiting laboratory. There
were no anomalies reported in the operations of this port facil-
ity. The first crew experienced somedifficulty in obtaining a
hard dock with the MDAbut this was resolved in real-time and
corrected through CSMprobe and docking procedure modifications.
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The MDAradial docking port was not used during the mission.
Environmentally Controlled Work and StowageArea. The perform-
ance of the MDAin providing accessible work stations, crew
protection and comfort, and adequate stowage for designated
hardware was within specified limits. The environment was,
with the exception of a brief period early in the mission, with-
in the comfort zone of the crew. An exception occurred during
the employment of contingency thermal management techniques that
were imposed to alleviate the excessive temperatures in the OWS.
The high temperatures experienced were the direct result of OWS
Meteoroid Shield and Solar Array failures, which occurred during
launch. The remainder of the MDA, as a work and stowage area,
had been verified before launch. This effort proved to be sat-
isfactory because no significant comments were received from
the three crews that would suggest poor access, limited work
envelopes, limited stowage, inadequate electrical interfaces,
or potentially dangerous conditions existed in the MDA.
Interface between the SWS Element and the CSM. The MDA inter-
faces with the SWS and the axially docked CSM were nominal
throughout the Skylab mission with no problems reported.
3. Orbital Workshop. The OWS was designed and fabricated by the
Western Division of the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC-WD)
and was a converted S-IVB/IB stage from the Apollo program. The general
configuration of the OWS is shown in Figure I.G-3. The function of the
OWS was to provide primary living and working accommodations for the crew,
experiment laboratory accommodations, stowage for supplies, and approxi-
mately one-half of the Skylab electrical power. Specifically, the OWS
contained the following features:
Internal;
Crew habitation area for sleeping, food, water, and waste
management,
Areas for recreation and experimentation,
Facilities for stowage of supplies.
External;
A Meteoroid Shield system designed to increase the probability
of no pressure loss equal to or greater than 0.995 from the
habitation area.
A Solar Array System designed to provide electrical power to
the AM power distribution and control system.
A Thruster Attitude Control System designed to provide primary
attitude control through the A_M control moment gyroscopes (CMG)
spinup and backup/supplemental attitude control and CMG desat-
uration, for maneuvers, and docking transients.
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Figure I.G-3 Orbital Workshop
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System design capabilities were provided to support OWSfunctions
as follows:
a. Structural System. The OWSstructural system was a modi-
fied S-IVB/IB stage. It consisted of a forward skirt, propellant tanks,
an aft skirt, a thrust structure, and a main tunnel. The skirts and
main tunnel served the samefunction for the OWSas they did for the
S-IVB, i.e., to carry structural loads and accommodateexternally mount-
ed equipment and plumbing/wiring. The thrust structure had no J2 engine
thrust loads to transmit, but otherwise it was used similarly to its
S-IVB use. It carried loads and accommodatedinstallation of additional
equipment and integration hardware external to the OWS.
Modification of the S-IVB propellant tanks for the OWSwas muchmore
involved. A larger, reusable entry hatch replaced the S-IVB hatch in the
forward domeof the Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) tank. A side panel was added to
the LH2 tank for ground access only and provided entry into the tank for
modifications, installations, and checkout. Three other apertures were
included to provide an orbital viewing window and to accomodate two
scientific airlocks (SALs) which provided the capability to deploy ex-
periments external to Skylab.
internally, the LH 2 tank modification consisted first of fully
"papering" the polyurethane tank wall insulation with aluminum foil to
fireproof the habitation area. A pair of grid floors that enclosed the
crew quarters were installed and crew quarters that consisted of a ward-
room, waste management and sleep compartments, and a medical experiment
compartment were included.
The S-IVB Liquid Oxygen (LOX) tank was converted to a waste tank
for the disposition of Skylab trash. The tank was compartmented with
screens; one compartment used to collect liquid waste that was vented
overboard through a nonpropulsive vent. The co,_,on bulkhead between the
habitation area and the waste tank was reworked at the center for the in-
stallation of a trash lock through which trash was passed by the Skylab
crews.
b. Meteoroid Shield System. A shield for the OWS habitation
area protection against meteoroid penetration was afforded. The proba-
bility against pressure loss from penetration was equal to or greater
than 0.995. The shield, made from aluminum sheet, was pretensioned
against the tank wall for launch and ascent. It was to be released on
orbit by ordnance severance of tie-down straps and was to deploy to a
standoff distance from the tank wall of five inches. The deployment was
to have been accomplished by energy stored in torsion bar springs instal-
led at the forward and aft skirts. The shield, which after deployment
would envelope the habitation area, had thermal coatings to provide pas-
sive thermal control for the Workshop.
c. Environmental/Thermal Control Subsystem. The ECS/TCS de-
sign was based on passive thermal control of the OWS environment with
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augmentation by convective heating and cooling of the atmosphere during
mannedphases and radiative heating of the internal structure during un-
mannedphases. The ECT/TCSwas thus madeup of two basic subsystems: an
active TCSincluding ventilation and a passive TCS.
The passive TCSconsisted of optical property control of the OWS
interior and exterior surfaces, High Performance Insulation (HPI) on the
forward dome, polyurethane insulation lining on the inside of the OWS
pressure shell, and heat pipes attached to structural penetrations of the
interior insulation. The exterior surface finishes and the HPI blanket
controlled the net energy balance between the OWSand the external space
environment. The heat transfer rates from the habitation area to the
meteoroid shield, and from the forward and aft domeareas, were regulated
by surface finish control. Also, the interior habitation area wall temp-
eratures were mademore uniform with optical property control of these
surfaces and with heat pipes.
The active TCSprovided continuous control of the OWSinternal
environment during periods of astronaut habitation. The cabin gas temp-
erature was controlled by cabin gas heat exchangers in the AM and by
three convective heaters. Reconstituted air from the AMwas mixed with
recirculated air in the OWS. Before habitation, radiant heaters main-
tained temperatures above the minimumlevels to satisfy food and film
storage requirements.
d. Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS). For most of the
eight-month long Skylab mission, the primary source of attitude control
was the three CMGslocated on the ATM. The CMGsprovided the pointing
accuracy and stability necessary for manySkylab astronomical and Earth
Resources experiments, and maintained the solar inertial attitude neces-
sary for the Skylab solar arrays. A propulsive attitude control system
(ACS) was needed to provide control during CMGspinup (the first ten hours
of the mission), to handle docking transients and large maneuversbeyond
the capability of the CMGs,to desaturate the CMGswhen necessary, and to
provide a contingency capability in case of CMGfailure. The system-
designated TACSprovided over 81,000 pound/secondof impulse. A high
thrust level of 50 poundswas required at the start of the mission for
separation transients, a 20 pound thrust minimumwas required for each of
the three dockings with Apollo CMs, and a i0 poundminimumwas specified
for the rest of the mission. The system was a blow-down system using GN2
as the propellant. Twomodules of three thrusters each, 180° apart on
the OWSaft skirt used quad-redundant values for each thruster.
e. Solar Array System (SAS). The SASfor OWSwas madeup of
two wings, each consisting of a beamfairing and three wing sections.
Each section contained ten identical active solar panels for a total of
30 panels per wing or 60 for the complete system. The system supplied
electrical power to the AMfor distribution to equipment requiring power.
The SASprovided an average of 10,496 watts between51 and 125 volts dur-
ing the sunlit portion of each orbit.
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For launch and ascent of SL-I the SASbeamfairings that housed the
array were stowed snugly against the OWSmeteoroid shield/tank structure.
A GN2 ground purge was introduced into the beamfairings to insure an
atmosphere environment around the stowed array of 50 percent relative
humidity or less. During launch the beamfairings were vented to pre-
clude over-pressurization of the structural fairings.
After insertion of SL-I in orbit, planned operation was to have
been that an ordnance severance system would release the SASbeamfair-
ings for deployment. The deployment was to have been accomplished with
a viscously dampedspring actuator. Subsequently, the wing sections
were to have been released and deployed from the beamfairing by similar
systems. The beamfariings and wing section were to have been mechanic-
ally latched in the deployed positions.
f. Electrical PowerDistribution System (EPDS). The EPDSpro-
vided the meansfor power distribution from the AM to all OWSloads.
Powerwas distributed externally to the TACS, Instrumentation, etc., and
through OWS feed-throughs to redundant buses routed to an electrical power
and control console. In turn, the power was routed from the console to
systems/equipment and experiments internal to OWS. The console in con-
junction with remote control panels contained switches, circuit breakers,
and indicators to permit crew control of power distribution to end items.
The EPDS received 25.5 to 30 Vdc from the AM and supplied 24 to 30 Vdc to
the end items. Wiring to end items was electrically protected with cir-
cuit breakers and physically protected from damage and fire by metallic
trough-shaped conduits.
g. lllumination System. An illumination system in the OWS was
provided to allow for normal and emergency crew activities and experiment
operations. The system consisted of general illumination lighting, ini-
tial entry and emergency lighting, and auxiliary lighting.
For general illumination, there were 42 floodlights; 18 in the for-
ward compartment with 8 on the forward dome and I0 on the forward walls,
4 in the wardroom, 3 in the waste management compartment, 3 in the sleep
compartment, and 14 in the experiment area. For redundancy, one-half the
lights in each area were on Bus I and the remainder on Bus 2.
For initial crew entry into OWS and for emergencies, a lighting sys-
tem was provided to control 8 of the 18 lights in the forware compartment.
The floodlights illuminated regardless of the position of their remote or
integral light switch. The initial entry lighting was controlled by a
single switch in the aft compartment of the AM and the emergency lighting
was enabled by the simultaneous failure of both OWS buses that automatic-
ally supplied emergency power to the initial entry and emergency light
system. Two portable_ high intensity lights 3 each containing 4 permanently
installed fluroescent lamps, were supplied for special illumination.
h. Communication, Data Acquisition, and Command System. The
OWS communications system provided capability for audio communication
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between Skylab crewmenand between the crew and ground control. It also
provided accommodationsfor video transmission from Skylab to ground con-
trol and the acquisition of biomedical data on the crewmen. Ten Speaker
Intercom Assemblies (SIAs) were located throughout OWSand comprised the
principal hardware of the system. The SIAs used two channels, either of
which could be connected to a crewman's communication umbilical. Fur-
ther, they included the capability for push-to-talk, push-to-transmit,
and voice record selection by a crewman. Each SIA also included an audio
device for C&Wtones.
The OWSData Acquisition System consisted of a portion of the SWS
PCMTelemetry System, onboard displays and ground checkout support mea-
surements. Low-level and high-level multiplexers, signal conditioning
equipment, and decoders were located in the forward skirt of the OWS.
Signal conditioning equipment, and decoders were located in the forward
skirt of the OWS. Signal conditioning equipment for transducers instal-
led aft on OWSwere mountedin the aft skirt.
The OWSCommandSystem provided automatic commandcapability for
the first 7.5 hours of the mission. This was for control of tank pres-
sures, thruster attitude control, solar array, meteoroid shield, and
refrigeration system radiator shield deployment, the activation of the
refrigeration system, and certain AM/ATM/MDAfunctions. The design used
the S-IVB mainline switch selector, which _eceived commandinput logic
from the IU. The AMDigital CommandSystem served as backup.
i. Caution and Warning (C&W)System. The C&Wsystem for the
OWSwas an integral part of the system for Skylab. The system provided
visual displays and audible tones when selected parameters would reach
out-of-tolerance conditions. The parameters selected were those that
could jeopardize the crew, compromisemission objectives, or, if not
responded to in time, result in the loss of a system. The monitored
parameters were categorized as Caution, Warning, or Emergencyparameters.
The system was monitored in the AM. The OWSprovided redundant displays
for crew scanning when they were in the experiment compartment. The OWS
C&Wpanel was primarily a repeater station that displayed the condition
of selected cluster parameters. Six emergency, _wo caution, and two
warning parameters were displayed.
j. Habitability Support System. The OWSHabitability Support
System consisted of the following subsystems.
(i) Waste ManagementSystem (WMS). The waste management
collection module housed the equipment used to collect feces and urine.
Feces was collected in a bag using airflow into the bag to simulate
gravity. The air entered the bag, passed through a hydrophobic filter
and subsequently through an odor filter and blower and was exhausted in-
to the Waste ManagementCompartment(WMC). Urine was collected in a re-
ceiver and hose similar to an aircraft relief tube. A centrifugal sep-
arator separated the air from the urine. Air passed through the same
odor control filter and blower as did the feces collection air and the
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urine was pumped by the separator into a four liter storage bag. To
obtain samples to be returned for the medical experiment, the feces were
vacuum-dried in a waste processor and a urine sample of 120 ml was ex-
tracted from the storage bag and then placed in a freezer for storage.
A vacuum cleaner was included in the waste management equipment. The
same blower used in the collection module was used for suction. The
vacuum cleaner used a bag similar in operation to the fecal bag. The
trash airlock was used to dispose of trash from the cabin into the waste
tank. Trash was placed in a standard disposal bag, inserted in the air-
lock, the lid was closed, the trash was ejected into the waste tank.
(2) Water Management System. Water was stored in ten, 600-
pound capacity stainless steel tanks. The tanks contained an integral
stainless steel expulsion bellows, fill and drain ports, iodine and sam-
ple ports, level indicators, and shutoff valves. The water was trans-
ferred by Teflon-lined hoses to the wardroom for drinking water and to
the WMC for personal hygiene water. In both compartments, the water was
heated to the desired temperature. There was also a chiller in the WMC
to supply chilled water for drinking. The hot water in the wardroom was
used for food reconstitution and dispensers were available for both hot
and chilled water. The water in each water storage tank was initially
purified by using iodine as a biocide and the purity was maintained by
periodically injecting iodine in the water. A portable water tank with
a 26 pound capacity was provided for contingency water supply and also
to support the water network fill and flush during activation.
(3) Personal Hygiene System. Personal hygiene equipment
was provided for the maintenance of health and personal cleanliness. A
personal hygiene module was provided to store supplies required by the
crewmen and dispensers for utility tissues, wash cloths, towels, and
chemically treated cotton pads were also provided. The capability to
dry wash cloths and towels was available.
(4) Body Cleansing System. Body cleansing was accomplished
both by the shower and by sponging with wash cloths. A wash cloth
squeezer was provided with the wash cloths. The shower contained an en-
closure with a continuous airflow as a gravity substitute for moving
water from the crewmen. A water bottle was filled from the WMC water
dispenser and attached to the ceiling at the shower location. The water
remaining after the shower was vacuumed and passed through a centrifugal
air/liquid separator. The air was then filtered and pumped through a
blower into the cabin.
(5) Food Management System. The food management subsystem
consisted of equipment and supplies required for storage and consumption
of foods. Food was stored in food boxes, galley trays, food freezers,
and a food chiller. A galley, components of the food table, and food
trays were provided for preparation and serving of food and chilled
drinks. Food cans and beverage packs were grouped in menu form in food
overcans. A heater tray was available to heat the food during prepara-
tion of the meal.
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(6) Sleep Support System. Sleep restraints were provided
for each crewmanand they provided thermal comfort and body restraints.
The sleep restraints were mounted on frames in the sleep compartments.
(7) Suit Drying System. The suit drying equipment, which
consisted of a blower, hose, and desiccant bags, was provided to remove
moisture from inside the pressure suits after each suited operation.
Pressure suits were dried at three suit-drying stations located in the
OWSforward compartment. Drying was accomplished by installing a suit
in the drying station, which consisted of portable foot restraints and
a hanger strap that suspendedthe suit between the floor and the water
ring foot restraints. The blower unit forced drying air through a hose
and in the suit. Moisture was dried by the air and collected by the
desiccant bags. The desiccant bags were subsequently dried in the WMC
waste processor.
(8) Refrigeration System. The OWSrefrigeration system
was a low temperature thermal control system that used Coolanol-15 as
the refrigerant in a closed loop circuit. Heat was dissipated through
a ground heat exchanger cooled by ground equipment during prelaunch oper-
ations and by a radiator, which was externally mountedat the aft end of
OWS,for orbital operations. The system provided food freezers and chil-
lers for food and water in support of habitability and urine freezers and
chillers in support of the biomedical experiment. The system had dual
coolant loops and redundant componentsto provide reliability and con-
trolled temperatures through a range of plus 42°F to minus 20°F.
(9) Atmosphere Control System. The OWS,which was pres-
surized to 26 psia with N2 in both the crew habitation area and waste
tank for launch was vented after orbit insertion. The habitation area
was then repressurized to 5 psia with 02 to provide the desired breath-
ing atmosphere. The circulated cabin gas was reconstituted in the AM.
The ventilation ducts, each with a circulation fan cluster, routed re-
constituted air to a plenum chamber located to the rear of the aft floor
in the OWSfor diffusion through floor diffusers into the cabin.
k. StowageSystem. Stowagecapability for provisions was in-
cluded throughout the OWS. Twenty-five standardized stowage containers
in the forward domeand 16 standard stowage lockers located in the vari-
ous areas accommodatedgeneral provisions such as clothing, sleeping re-
straints, urine collection bags, etc. For ambient food storage, ii con-
tainers in the forward compartment and two galley cabinets were provided.
Five food freezers, three in the forward compartment and two in the ward-
roomwere installed. A refrigerator for perishable food was located in
the wardroomand a urine freezer was included in the WMC. The total
stowage capability of the 210 containers onboard was 580 ft 3.
i. Experiment Accommodations. For OWSexperiments, hardware
accommodationsnecessary to integrate experiment equipment and perform
the experiments were provided. These consisted of structural attach-
ments, electrical cabling, pressurization and vacuumplumbing, and stowage
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restraints. A pair of scientific airlocks antisolar and solar, were in-
stalled in the cylindrical tank walls of the habitation area in the for-
ward compartment to provide visual and physical access to the outside.
The vacuumaccess for the waste managementsystem was through the waste
tank to use the nonpropulsive venting system of the waste tank. Vacuum
provisions were provided to accommodatethe metabolic activity and lower
body negative pressure experiments.
The overall performance of the OWSsystems was considered exception-
al throughout the Skylab missions. A major anomaly occurred during the
launch of SL-I when the Meteoroid Shield failed and resulted in the loss
of Solar Array Wing Number2 and failure of Solar Array Wing Number i to
deploy. Additionally, this anomaly caused excessive temperatures during
the initial days of the mission but no permanentdamagewas experienced
by critical systems. Successful deployment of the JSC parasol (sun
shade) relieved the high temperature condition and subsequent deployment
of Solar Array Wing NumberI normalized the power capability sufficiently
to allow near nominal mission performance. No other functional system
failures were caused by the loss of the Meteoroid Shield. Minor anomal-
ies were experienced in the Experiment AccommodationsSystem but were not
considered significant and were overcomethrough workaround procedures.
4. Apollo Telescope Mount. The ATM was designed and developed as
an inhouse center responsibility. The primary function of the ATM through
its experiments was to provide high resolution data of the entire solar
disk, corona, and other features of interest. Refer to Figure I.G-4 for
general ATM configuration. Additionally, other prime functions of the
ATM were to provide approximately one-half of the electrical power for
the SWS using the SAS and to provide attitude control and stabilization
for the orbital assembly. Major system elements of the ATM are summar-
ized as follows:
a. Structure and Mechanical System. The ATM Structure and
Mechanical system provided for the mounting of all ATM equipment and the
ATM experiment canister and the means of mounting the ATM to the rigidiz-
ing frame. The rigidizing frame was mounted to the ATM-DA, which deploy-
ed the ATM in orbit. It also provided the mechanisms to unlock and fine
point the canister, operate the canister sun shield aperture doors, un-
lock the film retrieval doors, and finally, it provided mechanical aids
for astronaut EVA.
b. Thermal Control System. The ATM TCS was designed to main-
tain all temperature sensitive hardware, which included electromagnetic
equipment and experiments, within an acceptable temperature range through-
out the Skylab mission by assuring that an acceptable thermal balance was
maintained between waste heat dissipation and the varying space environ-
ment. Two types of thermal control techniques were used. Passive thermal
control management consisting of insulation, low-conductance mounts,
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reflective/nonreflective surface coatings and thermostatically controlled
heaters were used for rack mounted equipment that generally had broad
allowable temperature bands. An active TCSconsisting of coolant fluid
and associated pumps, radiators, and controls was required for the exper-
iment canister to eliminate experiment temperature fluctuations and gra-
dients that would adversely affect the scientific data. In addition,
individual experiment heaters, canister and spar insulation and surface
coatings contributed to the canister thermal control.
c. Electrical Power and Network System. The ATMelectrical
power and networks system was a combination of the ATMSAS, 18 charger/
battery/regulator modules (CBRMs), transfer buses, switch selectors and
power, control, measuring, and logic distributors. The transfer buses
were designed to transfer power from the ATMto the rest of the cluster,
as required to meet the overall requirements of the cluster. The ATM
power system could be operated independently or in parallel with the OWS/
AM power system, which produced a sharing capability of 2500 watts in
either direction.
d. Electrical Power System (Solar Array). The A2_iSolar Array
consisted essentially of 18 independent photovoltoic power generating
systems (solar panels) divided amongfour wing assemblies. Each wing
contained four full panels and one half panel. Each panel contained 20
solar cell modules and was capable of supplying its respective CBRM580
watts. Each solar cell module contained either 684 type A cells, or 228
type B cells. The ATMsolar wings, whendeployed, were locked within
five degrees of a plane perpendicular to the All main axis. The solar
array was comprised of two major sections, the electrical (power gener-
ating) section and the mechanical (structural and deployment) section.
The solar wing cinching system and wing deployment system were essen-
tially one-time operational systems with the primary purpose of deploying
the wings from the folded cinched launch configuration to the deployed
orbital configuration.
The solar wing mounting structures provided the basic support for
the entire wing assembly and were the interface to the All rack. The in-
board half panel interfaced with the mounting structure through five
hinge points at the ATMsun end, and the inboard scissors arms interfaced
with the mounting structure through two sliders and tracks. The wing
assembly five solar panels were tightly cinched against the mounting
structure forming an integral package that could be handled and trans-
ported independently of other All hardware.
e. Instrumentation and Communication(IbC) System. The ATMI&C
Systemwas designed to perform ATMdata processing and transmission, pro-
vide commandcontrol of All Subsystemsand experiments, and aid in exper-
iment operations and pointing for solar data acquisition. This system
consisted of the following subsystems:
- ATM data subsystem
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- ATMDCS
- ATMTV subsystem
f. Attitude and Pointing Control System (APCS). The APCSwas
designed to provide three-axis attitude stabilization in the required
operational attitudes, to ensure controlled operational maneuversof the
Skylab and to provide pointing control in support of the A_Mexperiments.
A CMGsystem and a TACS(see paragraph l.G.3.d) provided the torques
necessary for attitude control and maneuvering of the Skylab. The TACS
was used to assist the CMGwhen the Skylab attitude control or maneuver-
ing requirements exceeded the CMGmomentumstorage capacity and for the
purpose of desaturating the CMGwhen the CMGstored momentumwas at or
near maximumcapacity.
The APCSwas designed for two basic modesof operation: solar iner-
tial (SI) and Z-local vertical (Z-LV). All other attitude modeswere
attained by maneuvering or offsetting from the two basic attitudes.
g. Control and Display System. The ATMC&DConsole was a rack-
mounted console that provided a man-machineinterface for the operation
and monitoring of the ATMsystems. The console consisted of nine panel
assemblies, each of which contained various C&Dsections. The panel
assemblies were comprised of the ATMexperiments and supporting systems.
Commandsto the ATMsystems were provided by toggle and rotary switches,
the Manual Pointing Controller, and the DAS. All critical switch func-
tions were redundantly wired or were redundantly available through the
DAS. Monitoring of system parameters was accomplished by the use of
status lights, meter confidence lights, alert lights, dual scale verti-
cal meters, time-shared digital displays, and TV displays. Controls were
available for power distribution, overload protection, lamp testing,
parametric selection, and console lighting.
Coolant control for the C&Dconsole was provided by a liquid water
coolant loop. The system was designed to reduce and maintain average
console temperatures at approximately 85°F and operate at a maximumloop
pressure drop of 3.0 psi at 220 ibm/hour flow. The coolant loop was an
open cycle cold rail system, fluid being supplied externally by the AM
coolant system. Coldrails were structurally integrated in the console
structure. The console frame served as an intermediate heat sink, trans-
ferring componentheat loads to the coolant loop for removal from the
console.
Equipment ancillary to the C&Dconsole consisted of an I/LCA, a
Backup Inverter-Lighting Control Assembly (BI-LCA) System, an EVACanis-
ter Rotation Control Panel, and a DASBackup Panel.
h. ATMExperiments
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(i) ATMExperiment S052. Experiment S052, White Light
Coronographwas an externally occulted white light coronograph designed
to block out the image of the sun's disk and take white light pictures of
the solar corona in the visible region of the electromagnetic spectrum
centered about 5400A.
The experiment's TV camera allowed the astronaut to makevisual ob-
servations of the corona that aided in the determination of the most
opportune times to obtain photographs using the film camera.
(2) ATMExperiment S054. Experiment S054, X-Ray Spectro-
graphic Telescope was a slitless spectrograph consisting of grazing in-
cidence telescope and a transmission grating, designed to obtain X-ray
images, spectra, digital intensity data, and white light image of the
entire solar disk.
(3) ATM Experiment S055A. Experiment S055A, Extreme Ultra-
Violet (XUV) Scanning Polychromator/Spectroheliometer was an XUV multi-
channel photoelectric spectroheliometer, designed to obtain XUV images
and spectra of small portions of the solar disk.
(4) ATM Experiment S056. Experiment S056, X-Ray Telescope
was a grazing incidence X-ray telescope with pulse height analyzer, de-
signed to obtain X-ray filter images of the solar disk and digital data
at I0 predetermined wavelength bands simultaneously.
(5) ATM Experiment S082A. Experiment S082A, XUV Spectro-
heliograph was a slitless XUV spectroheliograph, designed to obtain a
row of overlapping XUV images of full solar disk, each representing a
different wavelength.
(6) ATMExperiment S082B. Experiment S082B, XUV Spectro-
graph was an XUV spectrograph designed to obtain images of XUV spectra
lines, white light images of small portions of solar disk, and XUV image
of entire solar disk.
The XUV monitor provided a real-time image of the solar disk in the
wavelengths from 170 to 550 Angstrom Units (A) and pointed the spectro-
graph to solar units of interest.
(7) ATM Experiments Hydrogen-Alpha i and Alpha 2. The
Hydrogen-Alpha I was a telecentric Cassegrain telescope, designed to ob-
tain a 4.5 to 15.8 arc minute diameter of the H-a solar image. The tele-
scope's vidieon camera provided a visual display of the sun to the astro-
nauts, and its film camera recorded where the other instruments were
pointing throughout the mission.
The Hydrogen-Alpha 2 was a telecentric Cassegrain telescope, designed
to obtain a 7 to 35 arc minute diameter H-a solar image. The telescope's
vidicon camera provided the astronaut with a visual display of the sun.
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The ATMon Skylab provided data that indicated the performance of
the ATM, its experiments, the supporting systems, and the crew, had met
or exceeded the premission objectives. This conclusion is based on Sky-
lab mission performance and the evaluation of the systems and experiment
data. The excellence of the ATMground performance during the critical
early mission period provided ground personnel with the time and capabil-
ity to effect the changes required to continue the Skylab mission.
Due to the managementof the ATMsystems, workarounds and redundancy
designed into the ATMsystems, anomalies encountered during the Skylab
mission had no appreciable impact on the ability of the ATMto support
the mission objectives.
The ATMinstruments exhibited outstanding performance throughout the
entire Skylab mission. No major hardware problems occurred that signifi-
cantly impacted the operation of a single instrument. The outstanding
performance of the instruments was substantiated by commentsfrom the
Principal Investigators regarding the excellent quality of the scientific
data returned. Resolutions approximating one arc-second were attained on
muchof the solar imagery.
5. Payload Shroud. The PS was designed to provide an environmental
shield and aerodynamic fairing for the SWS forward of the FAS portion of
the AM, and was designed to support the ATM during prelaunch, launch, and
boost phases. The PS provided a noncontaminating separation system that
would jettison the PS from the Skylab Cluster during orbit.
General design features of the PS included the following major sys-
tem elements: Biconical nose and a 22-foot diameter aluminum cylinder
shell structure, separation system including the discrete latch system
and the longitudinal thrusting joint system_ electrical/ordnance system,,
instrumentation system, and nose cone purge duct system.
An all-aluminum, ring-stiffened, semimonocoque shell was selected
for the PS basic structure. The skin-thickness/ring-spacing parameters
were optimized to provide adequate strength, and provide the required
acoustical attenuation without need for special attenuation coatings.
A quad section radial separation approach was selected. A noncon-
taminating longitudinal thrusting joint device was selected for the
separation system. Discrete latches were needed for structural ties
across the two major ring frames: The PS base ring and the non-cylinder
intersection ring. Linear explosive devices were selected to provide the
power to actuate both the thrusting joint system and discrete latch sys-
tem. A Saturn-qualified electronics bridge wire system was selected for
the electrical/ordnance system.
A slide-off disconnect base attachment system was used; the PS quad-
section motions during the jettison event automatically disengage the PS
from the Airlock FAS. Lanyard electrical umbilicals, PS to FAS, automat-
ically disconnected during the jettison event.
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The PSwas designed to structurally support the ATMduring ground
operations and during flight prior to the PS jettison event. The ATM
structural support connection was designed such that the ATMoutrigger
support points were automatically released by PS quad-section motions
during the jettison event. Refer to paragraph ll.E.2.a for PS illus-
trative description.
6. Experiment Integration. The successful integration of exper-
iments in Skylab represented a major task of the center. The MSFC ex-
periment responsibility was two-fold: (i) the development of 51MSFC
corollary experiments from a conceptual phase through the delivery of
hardware and their ultimate integration in Skylab modules, and (2) the
integration of 29 JSC-supplied experiments in Skylab modules. Basically,
the integration responsibility included identification and analysis of
requirements, provisioning of facilities, assessment of compatibility
with Skylab systems, physical installation, and integration of test and
checkout requirements.
The successful implementation of the experiment program in Skylab
was demonstrated by the overall success of operation during the three
Skylab missions. More total experiment performances were accomplished
than had been envisioned in premission planning. Observations of comet
Kohoutek and additional science demonstrations were conceived and imple-
mented during the missions.
7. Crew Systems. The significance of man on the total Skylab pro-
gram is one of extreme importance. System hardware performance is en-
hanced and program objectives are guaranteed achievement when operators
who have the ability to think and reason, perform scheduled and unsched-
uled inflight maintenance, and provide system adjustments as required are
an integral planned part of the program.
The role of man throughout the Skylab program provided the necessary
insight to assure that man/system interfaces were compatible and practi-
cal. From the inception of hardware design concepts, crew system reviews
were conducted through all phases of hardware development, system buildup,
testing and finally as an operational system. The accumulative effect of
the NASA and contractor crew system personnel together with the astronauts
influence on the Skylab cluster design was in totality an exceedingly sig-
nificant contribution. When the crew system design changes are considered
individually, it is difficult to conclude that any single change made an
appreciable difference between success or failure of a specific mission
task. However, the accumulative inputs increased the "workability" of the
Skylab, saved time in task performance and most importantly gave the astro-
nauts the interior arrangement and man/system interfaces necessary to
mission success.
Both formal and informal means of implementing desired design changes
were accomplished through the issuance of a RID.
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Formal action was taken on the requested action by established deci-
sion making review boards. Informally, requested changes from the flight
crew or their representatives was implemented if it was a minor change
that did not affect the program schedule, was not a significant cost in-
crease, and did not adversely affect inflight task performance time. An
example of a significant design change requested by the flight crew was
the relocation of the ATMC&Dconsole in the M_DAinterface.
The flexibility and value of manas part of the system, with techni-
cal and planning support from crew system personnel on the ground, was
emphasizedduring the mission with the successful release of an OWSsolar
wing and the deployment of a sun shield to offset problems caused by an
anomalyduring launch. These efforts were instrumental in normalizing
electrical power capabilities and temperatures and allowing the continua-
tion of the mission. Another graphic exampleof the total teamwork con-
cept of crew and ground support organizations such as operations, scien-
tists, and contractors, was the rapid response to the advent of the comet
Kohoutek. The comet was detected during the unmannedperiod between SL-3
and SL-4. The SL-4 crew was briefed, trained, special comet experiments
provided, flight plans extensively revised and a successful program con-
ducted. All this was accomplished in a matter of days by concerted team
effort.
The ultimate objective of determining man's capability to survive
and function during extended periods of time in space was demonstrated
successfully and provides assurance that future mannedspace programs
can succeed.
8. Systems Engineering and Integration. The overall integration of
Skylab hardware was a responsibility of MSFC and involved extensive coor-
dination activities with the JSC, KSC, and the many Skylab contractors.
MSFC management effectively used the technical expertise provided by sys-
tems engineering personnel to assure that the integration of all require-
ments was accomplished in a timely and technically acceptable manner. This
effort involved engaging the flight crews in the design reviews and test-
ing of hardware having direct crew interfaces and utilizing to the fullest
the crew expertise on man/machine relationships. Flight Operations per-
sonnel were also involved to the greatest extent possible to assure com-
patibility between the systems and Flight Operations planning and inter-
faces.
Techniques that were successfully employed included technical trade-
offs to establish the feasibility of Skylab configurations particularly
in support of the decision to convert to the dry workshop. Extensive use
of technical teams organized as panel and subpanel working groups were in-
strumental in establishing and controlling requirements throughout the
program. The compatibility of hardware versus requirements was effective-
ly analyzed and implemented through scheduled and special reviews using
systems engineering personnel from the inception of design requirements
through FRRs. Control of functional and physical interfaces through
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formal documentation required a systems overview to assure compatibility
of interfacing Skylab systems. Formal configuration control of program
baseline documentation was technically managedby systems engineering and
provided technical impact assessment and compatibility review in support
of program management.
The significance of effective systems engineering and integration
efforts is best summarized by the timely identification and resolution
of program problems on a continuing basis throughout Skylab development.
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H. Conclusions
The successful Skylab program marked the end of the first era of
mannedspaceflight and laid the foundations of an expandedrole for the
future of man in space exploration. Skylab ended the era in which both
the United States and USSRspace programs sought to determine the limits
of man's useful performance in a space environment. Skylab answered
affirmatively the questions of man's ability to adapt to a space environ-
ment and the value of his contributions to space operations. It also
laid the foundations for future space operations by demonstrating the
basic feasibility of shuttle operations and the habitability and work-
ability of large long-duration space stations.
The most important contribution is the convincing manner in which
Skylab proved man's ability to adapt to long periods of space flight
without losing his normal capability to work effectively over a broad
spectrum of space laboratory activities. These ranged from the solar
panel and solar shield external repairs to a wide variety of internal
equipment and scientific experiment fixes that enabled the three Skylab
missions to exceed all of their prescribed workload parameters by wide
margins.
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II. Satum Workshop Systems

SECTION II. SATURN WORKSHOP SYSTEMS
A. Systems Approach
I. General. Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) played a
vital role in the successful achievement of Skylab Program objectives.
No previous program was as complex from a technical standpoint nor in-
volved so many contractor efforts to produce an effective end product.
The need for system integration was formally recognized as early as
May 1966, when study contracts for Apollo Applications Program (AAP)
experiment integration were awarded.
In July 1967 a contract for payload integration of experiments
and experimental support equipment on Apollo Applications spacecraft
was awarded to the Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC). In addition to
work involving the OWS and the ATM, integration of JSC experiments and
test integration planning and support for launch operations at KSC
were included.
From the time that AAP became a formal program in December 1965
through the decision to convert from a "wet" to "dry" workshop concept
in July 1969, the SE&I activities were primarily involved in study
efforts to establish program requirements, mission configurations, and
trade-offs on conceptual flight systems and system requirements. Addi-
tionally, attention was directed to the definition and integration of
experiment requirements for the AAP payloads. Evaluation of testing
requirements was somewhat low key during this period for total systems
had not been defined.
With the July 1969 decision to convert to Dry Workshop, SE&I
efforts were immediately directed towards preparation and release of
the Cluster Requirements Specification, RS003M00003. This document
resulted from a joint M_FC/JSC effort and represented the first formal
release of system level requirements. It provided a common baseline
controlled through level 2 (intercenter) change control and served as
a baseline for CEI Specifications, ICDs, and associated performance
criteria to assure a common development base. The decision to convert
to the Dry Workshop was based on a significant systems engineering
effort, which culminated in a formalized document entitled "Technical
Considerations, Saturn V Workshop Program Definition Sutdy." The
technical trade-off and feasibility study results included in the doc-
ument provided the necessary decision-making criteria for program man-
agement.
During the hardware development phase that followed the Dry Work-
shop decision, SE&I participated in PDRs and CDRs to assure the com-
patibility of baseline hardware with overall system requirements. With
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the integration of total hardware in the Saturn Workshop (SWS)modules,
SWS module build-up and ultimately a total SWS, reviews were expanded
to higher managerial levels. The SE&I assisted program management
with the technical aspects that resulted in meaningful, standardized
reviews and established a confidence level that mission objectives
could be successfully accomplished.
Acceptance Reviews, Design Certification Reviews (DCRs), SOCARs,
Hardware Integrity Reviews (HIRs), and Flight Readiness Reviews (FRRs)
were the significant technical reviews that involved SE&I support to
program management. These efforts were reflected in the overall suc-
cess of the Skylab missions.
The previous paragraphs relate the more significant areas of SE&I
participation. The following paragraphs discuss in more detail the
areas that involve system engineering and are considered critical in
the development of a successful Saturn Workshop and involve the type
of activity considered pertinent on future programs.
2. Conceptual Phase. The conceptual phase of the AAP/Skylab
Program encompassed the time frame between official program start (De-
cember 1965) through the decision to convert from a "wet" to a "dry"
workshop (July 1969). The role of systems engineering during this
conceptual phase centered around analysis of mission objectives (for
the various missions identified) in sufficient detail to develop con-
cepts of implementation. Activities during this phase included feasi-
bility studies and development of system requirements documents and
specifications and first-order system schedules and costs. A signifi-
cant SE&I contribution was realized in the dry workshop decision and
associated integration of payload requirements as follows:
a. Dry Workshop Concept. The center initiated conceptual
studies in October 1968 that involved the substitution of the "dry"
for the "wet" workshop program. The basic concept was proposed as a
standby Saturn IVB (S-IVB) stage stripped of existing hardware and one
substitute standby for the wet S-IVB.
b. Payload Integration and System Engineering. A letter
contract was definitized between the center and the M>IC for the Pay-
load Integration and Systems Engineering effort required to support
center responsibilities. The contract was awarded in January 1969 and
reflected the center's emphasis on strong systems engineering manage-
ment.
c. Dry Workshop Decision. In July 1969 it was decided to
convert from a "wet" workshop to a "dry" workshop concept. This deci-
sion was announced by NASA Administrator, Dr. Thomas O. Paine, and re-
flected the MSFC position as documented in a report entitled "Technical
Considerations, S-V Workshop Program Definition Study." The report was
the result of a strong system engineering effort that involved concep-
tual design and feasibility studies to determine the advantages/
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disadvantages of converting to the "dry" workshop concept. The study
recommended the "dry" workshop concept and significant advantages were
identified as follows:
(i) Total Payload Package. Simplification of the total
space vehicle by integration of systems into a total payload package,
outfitted and checked out onthe ground.
(2) Reliability. Increased reliability because of sim-
plification of hardware and astronaut operations.
(3) Earlier Experiments. Operation of experiments in
an earlier time frame with the improved probability of achieving mis-
sion success.
(4) Cost Reduction. Potential reductions in total pro-
gram cost due to hardware simplification.
d. Hardware Simplification. Primary hardware simplification
included the following:
(i) Propulsion. Eliminating the propulsive features of
S-IVB stage.
(2) Solar-inertial Attitude. Eliminating major in-orbit
pointing maneuvers by use of a solar-inertial attitude in all phases
of the mission.
(3) Interface Reductions. Reducing the interface func-
tions between the cluster and the CSM, which is mainly a ferry vehicle
for the crew.
(4) Ground Outfitting. Outfitting the workshop on the
ground, which allows complete assurance that everything is in working
order before launch and also reduces astronaut operations and require-
ments on the hardware to establish habitable crew quarters.
(5) Resupply Reduction. Reducing resupply and logistics
requirements by loading consumables and expendables into the S-V Work-
shop (WS) before launch.
(6) Quiescent Command and Service Module (CSM). Minimizing
the hardware modifications required on the CSM by maintaining it in a
quiescent stage during docked operations.
The probability of achieving total mission success was improved
by the requirement for fewer launches; elimination of the Lunar Module
(LM); elimination of propulsion, passivation, and activation functions
required by the Wet Workshop; earlier achievement of experiment and
program objectives; and ability to check out most systems and experi-
ments in their operating modes on the ground.
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During the several years encompassingthe conceptual phase of the
program, many iterations were involved. The role of systems engineer-
ing was considered of prime significance in the decision-making pro-
cess and culminated with a strong effort that supported the final de-
cision to proceed with the "dry" workshop concept.
3. Definition Phase. This phase of the AAP (Skylab) Program
consisted of the detailed definition of the total system including
flight hardware, support equipment, software and personnel. The phase
essentially began with the decision to convert to the "dry" workshop.
Products of this phase included development of cluster requirements,
operational definitions, more detailed trade studies, configuration
descriptions and preliminary hardware specifications.
The CRS was released during mid-1969 and was considered as the
single authority and baseline for all integrated system level design,
build, test, and performance requirements. The document was developed
through a joint MSFC/JSC effort and provided a single, viable working
document for all contractors and NASA centers to use. The implementa-
tion of this specification and a subsequent baseline through the Level
2 Configuration Control Board (CCB) provided a controlling document
for development of CEI Specifications, ICDs, and associated perform-
ance criteria to assure fully integrated systems, compatible with
mission objectives.
4. DesiKn Phase. The design phase of the program consisted of
the detail design and fabrication of each system element, evaluation
of the system through analysis and test, activation of the system,
and all other related activities required to support and use the sys-
tem. The complexity of the program, together with the involvement of
many contractors, necessitated rigid system level control to assure
physical compatibility of interfacing hardware, functional compatibil-
ity at the system level, and maximum confidence that mission objec-
tives would be met both operationally and as a man-machine interface.
During the design phase, the overall complexity of the program
became extremely critical from the standpoint of providing effective
controls and integration of requirements into a total Skylab system.
With a multitude of contractors providing many hardware elements,
program management recognized the need for an effective use of SE&I.
The primary areas of concentration that required System Engineering
expertise included interface requirements, configuration control, key
hardware milestone reviews, compatibility assessment reviews, special
reviews, system verification, and special analysis.
a. Interface Requirements. The tremendous complexity of
Skylab interfaces, with the dispersion of development and production
activities across the country, demanded accurately defined and tightly
controlled interfaces. It was soon learned that third-party custo-
dianship of ICD's could not accomplish this task in a timely manner.
Interface Control Documents between modules were defined after detailed
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system requirement ICDs had been agreed to between centers. Systems
ICDs were necessary where significant portions of the hardware were
supplied by more than one center. The systems level ICDs also proved
to be an effective way of performing a systems engineering evaluation
of changes late in the program and served as catalysts to initiate com-
patibility testing between the ground and airborne systems. Mainten-
ance was assigned to one party of the interface, under CCB management.
Interface Control Document changes were coordinated with all other
affected interfaces by the responsible party. Contractual require-
ments ensured that this work and related engineering change proces-
sing was accomplished expeditiously with management visibility.
b. Configuration Control. Comprehensive configuration man-
agement, implemented early, is essential for any program, and particu-
larly for one with complex interfaces and a variety of hardware and
documentation sources.
Configuration management and change integration for the SWS was a
responsibility of the systems engineering and integration activity at
MSFC. A change integration group was established early in the program
to develop necessary guidelines and support all Level 2 and 3 CCB
activities.
The system used by the Saturn program was successfully modified
and implemented for the SWS program. The system called for the assign-
ment of a single program control number (PCN) and a responsible change
integration engineer to each change. A computerized tracking and
accounting system which was also developed for the Saturn program,
became the working tool of the group. The system provided daily re-
ports on the status of changes, pointed out delinquencies, and identi-
fied all affected interfaces and modification kit status once hardware
was delivered.
An intercenter Change Integration Working Group (CIWG) was estab-
lished to coordinate hardware design changes occurring early in the
program. This group acted as a Level 2 preboard to screen all changes
and provide current status for total change activity that affected SWS
module interfaces, ground systems, and crew operations. A SWS Change
Review Board (CRB) was implemented locally and this MSFC board met
daily to review all new change requests and the progress of all changes
being worked at the center.
The following observations are made based on experience gained in
the SWS change integration activity.
(i) Change Control. Assignment of a single program-wide
tracking number and one responsible change integration engineer to each
change is an absolute necessity in a complex program having many changes
affecting many interfaces. This "cradle-to-grave" concept for change
tracking and integration responsibility ensured positive identification
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and coordination between all involved centers, contractors, projects,
and contract personnel.
(2) ChangeIntegration Working Group. The SWSCIWG
was madeup of representatives of the various technical systems disci-
plines and systems engineering and integration. Such a group proved
to be a primary tool for ensuring that early design was well coordin-
ated. This group must be established early and represent all involved
centers and hardware contractors.
(3) ChangeReview Board. This daily review board ensured
that changeswere being worked effectively and expeditiously with all
affected program elements. The board chairman should have Level 2 sig-
nature authority and each Level 3 organization should be represented on
the board by signature authority.
(4) Configuration Control Boards. The SWSLevel 2 CCB
was a primary function of the systems engineering and integration
activity. Representatives of that group also sat on Level 3 boards to
ensure proper coordination of changes at Level 2 and at other Level 3
boards. Requirements should be established for each Board, regardless
of level, to convene on at least a weekly basis. Attendance discipline
is mandatory for successful board operation. Alternate membersmust
be prepared to function responsibly when principal membersare absent.
Working changes outside a board meeting causes delays in disposition-
ing and issuing direction to contractors, It would be beneficial to
issue uniform direction to suppliers, especially when interfaces are
involved. Configuration Control Board Directive forms used by NASA
vary, and a standard form would aid recipient contractors in complying
with given direction regardless of the NASAsource. The MSFCDirec-
tive form and procedures for completion are recommended.
(5) Intercenter Subagreements. Early development and
implementation of change integration subagreementsbetween centers is
necessary to ensure that a closed loop system exists for identifying,
coordinating, and tracking changes that affect more than one center.
Necessary contractual direction must also be imposed as required to
ensure implementation of these subagreements.
(6) Coordination, Tracking, and Accounting. It should
be recognized that an established, well-organized change integration
group, which has acquired and developed the fundamental skills and
tools for coordinating and tracking complex systems changes, is a
natural source of similar support in other systems engineering and
integration activities. The SWSchange integration group, for example,
was used to coordinate and perform program tracking and accounting in
the following areas:
(a) ICD change status and indexing.
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deferred to KSC.
dination.
(b) Work remaining to be done in-plant, and work
(c) Crew procedure change status and coordination.
(d) Test change notice status and coordination.
(e) Program documentation status and change coor-
(f) Levels 2 and 3 CCB secretarial functions.
c. Key Hardware Milestone Reviews. The Skylab Program im-
plemented the key hardware milestone reviews (preliminary requirements,
preliminary design, critical design, design certification, acceptance)
as accomplished on previous programs. These reviews were on an end
item or module basis; however, due to the modular construction of Sky-
lab, end-to-end system reviews were required to ensure that the totally
integrated system would satisfy mission requirements. To accomplish
this, a cluster system review was instituted before the module CDRs to
ensure total system requirements were complete and being implemented.
The CRS was the foundation for this review. Additionally, module
level DCRs were conducted and served as inputs to the overall systems
level DCR. The foundation for certification of the cluster systems
was the results of the KSC integrated systems tests.
The module and cluster system reviews were structured by system
representatives from the Science and Engineering (S&E) technical dis-
ciplines. The Program Office co-chaired or chaired the individual
system review sessions.
Skylab experience has demonstrated that an effective design re-
view must not only emphasize the hardware, but should also include
the review of inflight repair possibilities, single failure points,
critical mechanisms, test plans, and test results. The reviews must
be scheduled in a timely manner with data packages being reviewed by
the pertinent disciplines before the actual review. Action items from
the reviews were documented on RID forms. Post review followup and
ultimate disposition of all RIDs was formalized and reported regularly.
High fidelity mockups have proved to be useful for these reviews, and
the importance of early availability of interface control documenta-
tion was clearly shown. Not only design personnel, but test and oper-
ations representatives should participate in design reviews.
Flight Readiness Reviews were held at the module, cluster, and
mission levels. These reviews emphasized the total readiness of a
particular configuration for flight. This system was used success-
fully on the Apollo Program and was of particular importance in deter-
min£ng successful operation of cluster systems. Problems or concerns
identified in FRRs were given maximum attention by program management
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and heavily involved systems engineering from a technical evaluation
and recommendationviewpoint.
d. Compatibility AssessmentReview. The SO¢_ARserved as a
mechanismfor establishing dialogue and working relationships between
the design, development, test, and integration and the operations per-
sonnel; facilitating a smooth transfer of pertinent data such as hard-
ware descriptions, performance characteristics, operational require-
ments, constraints, mission rules, and test history. Review and re-
vision of the mission plans, procedures, and documentation advanced the
operational readiness of Skylab significantly.
The SOCARwas conducted at the center level and provided program
managementwith the first significant data relative to the overall
integration and compatibility of program requirements on an implemen-
tation basis. Extensive technical review of all program requirements
as a function of a complete SWSentity and mission requirements was a
responsibility of SystemsEngineering and resulted in a high confidence
level that total mission requirements could be met. In essence, the
SOCARacted as a forcing function in bringing all elements of the pro-
gram into the proper perspective.
e. Special Reviews. The concept of review by "new eyes" was
extensively used. The reviews ranged from a systems review team headed
by the Deputy Associate Administrator to in-plant reviews of subtier
suppliers of critical items by teams composedof specialists from MSFC
and the prime contractors. Critical mechanismswere reviewed by an
intercenter group of senior managerial and technical personnel. Engine-
ering walkaround of the flight modules were patterned after the Apollo
practice of bringing to bear the experience of senior NASAindividuals
who had no direct hardware managerial responsibility.
A comprehensive HIR by teams of MSFCspecialists validated the
contractor's systems of translating requirements for SWSactivation
sequence to flight hardware. The teams' activities were audited by a
blue ribbon committee chaired from the laboratory director level.
Although a great deal of time was required for the preparation and
execution of these reviews, there is no doubt that they contributed
greatly to the overall success of the program.
f. SystemVerification. The Skylab Program TCRSDswere
developed in a "building block" concept. The TCRSDwas developed for
the modules to verify system operation in accordance with the Module
End Item Specification. Additionally, experiment checkout requirements
for on-module testing were included. These TCRSDswere the basis for
checkout procedures and factory acceptance testing. Such documents
are invaluable in establishing contractural compliance.
An integrated cluster systems TCRSDwas developed to define the
test and checkout requirements for the integrated Skylab cluster sys-
tems at the launch facility. This was accomplished by the formulation
of cluster systems test requirements review teams composedof technical
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experts from the NASAdesign organizations, systems engineering
organizations, program offices, KSCtest offices and contractors. On
technical agreement by each of the system teams, the integrated TCRSD
and the module TCRSDswere baselined and controlled by the Level 2 CCB.
These baselined TCRSDsprovided the technical basis for the final test
and checkout plans and procedures at KSC.
On delivery of the modules from the factory to KSC, representa-
tives from each of the system teams (both NASAand contractor) were
assigned to KSCto maintain the TCRSDs. Required changes to the
TCRSDswere implemented and controlled by the "test change notice"
system that was controlled and approved by the Level 2 CCBat KSC.
These teams and the Test ChangeNotice (TCN) board responded to the
KSCtest schedules.
g. Special Analysis. The complexity of the Skylab Program
yielded manyspecial problems and required the technical expertise of
specialized personnel. Systems engineering evaluation of the various
Skylab systems determined the need for analysis efforts in specific
areas. The following paragraphs are considered significant enough for
the benefit of future programs. Other analysis efforts were conducted
and are identified in future sections.
(i) Sneak Circuit Analysis. Sneak circuit analysis were
performed on systems to assure a high probability of freedom from un-
wanted current paths. Details of the analysis as performed on the Sky-
lab Program are detailed in Section II.F. This program yielded the
following results:
(a) Identified 44 sneak circuits.
(b) Identified a numberof components that were not
necessary for circuit operation.
(c) Identified errors in documentation.
tween modules.
(d) Verified electrical interfaces within and be-
(e) Key source for verification of operational
documentation (operational handbooks, schematics, and crew procedures).
(f) Provided a valuable tool for investigating real-
time operational problems and workaround.
(2) Corona. Early development of corona suppression
specifications that define pressure and voltage potential criteria can
preclude many post-design problems. Details of the corona analysis on
the Skylab Programmay be found in Section II.D.3.
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(3) Electromanetic Compatibility (EMC). Electromagne-
tic interference was not a problem with Skylab electronic devices.
This was achieved by comprehensive componentlevel testing, module
system testing, and total assembled system testing.
Early identification of EMCrequirements in the hardware design
and generation of a module EMCcontrol plan gave Skylab a basis for
testing to verify compatibility. An EMCcontrol group rigorously re-
viewed all waivers, test results, redesigns, and retest results asso-
ciated with EMC.
(4) Skylab Mission Contingency Analysis. Premission con-
tingency analysis can enhancereal-time response to emergencies, even if
the precise contingency has not been analyzed.
Certain anomalies and contingencies that occurred during the Sky-
lab i (SL-I) unmannedactivation sequencewere analyzed premission.
These analyses permitted rapid and accurate mission recovery action.
Additional details on the above analyses are provided in Section II.
D.I.
5. Summary. The ultimate success demonstrated by the Skylab
Program is the best indicator of the total effort involved. The role
of System Engineering in achieving this success is also best measured
by the final product performance. Specifically, with the total magni-
tude of hardware elements, numerous contractor involvement, and multi-
NASA center participation. The technical integration of total program
requirements that evolved from the conceptual phase and proceeding
through the definition, design, and mission performance phases is con-
sidered the most vital contribution by the Systems Engineering divi-
sion. The most significant recommendation for future programs in the
Systems Engineering area would be increased responsibility in this
integration role to assure more timely identification and implementa-
tion of critical requirements.
II-I0
B. Configuration Management
i. Objectives and Methodology. Past experience in undertaking
large complex development programs such as Skylab has proven that
effective means of control is required over the total product engineer-
ing, development, and procurement activities within the program. This
control is necessary to accurately define the identity and completion
status of the final product. Effective application of established con-
figuration management concepts, proven on previous DOD and NASA programs,
provided a successful method that would accurately define all Skylab
end items at any point in time. Accurate definition of these end items
enables program management to establish schedules, develop realistic
budget requirements, and accomplish effective change control through-
out the life of the program.
The first objective of the Configuration Management effort was to
establish baselines to serve as a reference for controlling subsequent
performance and design changes. Once these baselines were defined,
changes in requirements could be formally approved with assurance that
adequate consideration had been given to program impact with respect
to contract costs, schedules, and incentives, as well as mission capa-
bility. Figure ll.B-i identifies the Skylab flow with respect to Skylab
program phasing, and the types of changes required to each. Because
of the nature of the Skylab program development, baselines were not
provided for all elements at one specific time (such as end-of-the-
design phase), but were completed in an incremental manner as specific
end items were developed. A major configuration management task was
to identify the technical documentation defining the approved configur_
tion of the system or end item throughout the period when hardware/
software was acquired. Based on the design reviews performed, a baseline
for a given end item was established and the specific documentation con-
stituting that baseline recorded. The configuration of the end item at
any later date was traceable from the original baseline configuration
plus all the ensuing changes approved and incorporated since that time.
Therefore, the configuration of an end item was known, controlled, and
thoroughly documented at any given point in time.
The control of changes to Skylab performance and design baselines
was achieved through use of the multilevel CCB system shown in Figure
ll.B-2. Five levels of control were established, each of which had
specific criteria for submitting changes to the next higher level for
approval. Authority of the OMSF Level I CCB, and the Level II CCBs
(formed within each center) were established in NASA Handbook (NHB)
8040.1 issued in October 1969. Types of changes within the authority
of subordinate CCBs were defined in the respective center configuration
management plans. Additional requirements for submittal of changes to
OMSF Level I CCB and to the center CCBs were added from time to time by
OMSF directives. All changes to established Skylab baselines were sub-
mitted for approval to the appropriate CCB responsible for configuration
control. The CCB decision was recorded by means of a CCB Directive,
upon which the contracting officer issued the contractual authority for
II-Ii
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Level Approval Authority Baselines or Approves Changes To--
Level I CCB Program Level Requirements
Level II CCB
Level III CCB
Level IV CCB
Level V CCB
Apollo Applications
Program Director
Center Program Managers System Level Requirements
Project Managers
Resident Managers
Contractor or Marshall
Space Flight Center
Science & Engineering
Branch
End Item Level Requirements
Approves Classification of Class II
Changes
Approves Class II Changes
Figure II.B-2 Configuration Control Board Levels
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the contractor to effect the change. Engineering changes that resulted
in substantial cost savings, without compromising safety, performance,
or schedules, received a high order of consideration by the CCB during
the manufacturing activities preceeding Turnover Review. Subsequent
changes were minimized and approved only as necessary to correct safety
hazards, improve reliability, or to comply with established performance
requirements.
2. Documentation. Early in the development of the Configuration
Management (CM) system, specific guidelines were unavailable for the
Skylab Program. As a result, Saturn/Apollo Program Documents were used
as models for complementing the Change Integration and Configuration
Control Task. Later, CM requirements were imposed on the MSFC by NASA
Headquarters with the issuance of the following guideline documents:
- M-D ML 3200-084 Skylab Program Directive No. ILA, entitled
"Sequence and Flow of Hardware Development and Key Inspection
Points", dated October 14, 1970.
- Operating Instruction ML-AAI-8040.LA, entitled "Level I Con-
figuration Control Board", dated June ii, 1970.
- NASA Headquarters Bulletin NHB 8040. IA, entitled "Configura-
tion Management Requirements", dated June 1971.
- M-D ML 3200.137 Skylab Program Directive No. 34, entitled
"Skylab Program CCB Controls and Reporting Requirements",
dated January 19, 1971.
- M-D ML 3200.149 Skylab Program Directive No. 58, entitled
"Post Acceptance Change Control", dated July 6, 1972.
The initial Skylab documentation used was an MSFC planning document,
AAP, Program Directive Number MPD 8040.11 entitled "AAP Systems Integra-
tion and Configuration Management Manual", MM 8040.10 dated August I,
1969. This manual was revised to incorporate specific Skylab require-
ments because of the complexity of this multimodule program. The new
manual, MM 8040.IOA, entitled "Saturn/AAP/Engines Configuration Manage-
ment Manual (MSFC)", dated February 17, 1970, was thereafter used as
the guideline document. Based on this manual, Configuration Management
Standard CM-027-001-2H was prepared with the intent of contractually
imposing this document on all Skylab contractors, but actually was im-
posed on only the MDA Module CM effort. Each module contractor did,
however, submit his own CM plans.
As the program developed, additional documents were developed and
used for specific areas of CM disciplines, as discussed below:
a. Cluster Requirements Specification (CRS), RS003M00003.
The CRS was written and maintained by the Integration Contractor as
directed by MSFC. The AAP Program Specification SE-140-001-1 was used
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as the basis for development of the CRS. Both specifications were base-
lined and placed under Configuration Control during 1969. The CRSde-
fined performance and design integration requirements for the Skylab
program. As differences between the Program Specification and the CRS
were identified, action was initiated to resolve these differences
either by changing the CRSor by proposing changes to the Program Spec-
ification, thereby maintaining compatibility between the two specifica-
tions throughout the life of the Skylab program. A total of 68 CRS
ChangePackageswere initiated to either supplement or change require-
ments. Additionally, in February 1970, an MSFCmemowas prepared to
allow deviations to the CRSdocument. All such deviations becamepart
of the CRSas Appendix K.
b. Skylab Program StowageList I-SL-002. The StowageList
was developed and initiated as an MSFC/JSCInter-Center Documentand
was placed on contract in August 1970. This documentpresented the
following information:
(i) Weight data status and comparisons by identifying
both specification weights and estimated or actual weights;
(2) Quantities to be launched and their stowage loca-
tions by module;
by module;
(3) Inflight transfer quantities and stowage locations
(4) Deactivation stowage locations and quantities by
module, as well as commandmodule return stowage configuration;
(5) Cumulative quantity totals by module for all stowed
items during launch, active orbit, inactive orbit, and return.
The stowage list was prepared in computerized format and updated
monthly. Each revision contained an updated stowage list change log
that identified all approved and disapproved changes since the previous
revision.
Changesto the list were submitted by either an MSFCEngineering
ChangeRequest (ECR), Contractor Engineering ChangeRequest (ECP), or a
JSC Engineering Design ChangeRequest (EDCR)with an attached Stowage
List ChangeNotice (SLCN). This SLCNdefined both the existing criteria
and the proposed change criteria. All changes to the list were processed
through the integration contractor's ChangeIntegration Groupby Level IICCBaction.
c. Interface Control Document(ICD) Indentification Matrix,
IOM01840. This computerized matrix listed all ICDs for which MSFCwas
responsible and those which had an interface with other NASACenters.
For further details refer to paragraph ll.B.4.a, Skylab ICD Matrix,
herein.
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d. Test Checkout Requirements and Specifications Documents
(TCRSDs). The following TCRSDsdefined the test requirements, disci-
plines and constraints for Skylab modules and hardware:
(I) Integrated Systems, TM-OI2-O03-2H
(2) Orbital Workshop (OWS),IB83429
(3) Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), 50M02425
(4) Airlock Module/Multiple Docking Adapter (AM/MDA),
MDCE0122.
A Skylab procedure entitled "Test and Checkout Requirements and
Specification Document(TCRSD)Test ChangeNotice (TCN)", SL-EI 593-72
was written and issued on October I0, 1972. An MSFCTCNform was
designed for use in accomplishing all changes to the TCRSDs. A special
Configuration CCBwas established with membershipfrom MSFC,KSC, and
JSC. This Board functioned under Level II CCBauthority and was operated
by MSFCat KSC. Refer to paragraph ll.B.3.e for additional details of
the MSFCCMeffort conducted at KSC.
e. Configuration Identification Index and Modification Status
Reports. These reports were used to identify the approved (as-designed)
configuration of Skylab by entering all new and updated hardware changes
and those documentchanges that had a direct affect on the hardware.
The computerized reports, prepared, published, and maintained by the
Integration Contractors' ChangeIntegration Group for the MSFCProject
Offices, are identified as follows:
(i) OWS,CM-O20-001-2H
(2) Experiment Developmentand Payload Evaluation,
CM-020-005-2H
(3) M])A, CM-020-003-2H
(4) ATM, CM-O20-O04-2H
(5) AM, CM-O20-O02-2H
An additional report, the Electrical Support Equipment (ESE) docu-
ment, was published and maintained as a separate report for the SL-GS
Project Office.
f. Configuration Managementand Engineering Integration
Planning Documents. FromAugust 9, 1970 through May 1972, the Change
Integration Groupwas placed on special assignment to assist the MSFC
ProgramMmnagementOffice (Engineering and Integration Branch) in
preparation of Intercenter Agreements and Subagreementsrelated to the
Configuration Managementof MSFC-furnished equipment. This effort also
11-16
included documenting various MSFCpolicies and plans to implement the
criteria and requirements resulting from these agreements. Specific
items documentedinclude MSFCProgram Directives 8040.14Aand 8040.16,
titled "MSFCSkylab ProgramAcceptance Data Package (ADP)_IdatedJul_i i0,
1972, and "MSFCSkylab Program Pre-Delivery Turnover Reviews (PDTR)
dated May24, 1972, respectively. Other documentswere "MSFC/KSC on-
figuration ManagementSubagreements" (Marshall ManagementInstruction
MMI 1058.1), MSFCDesign Certification Review (DCR)Procedure, Procedure
for Skylab Certificate of Flight Worthiness, and JSC/MSFC/KSCInter-
Center Agreement on Skylab Program Flight CrewEquipment Handling at
KSC.
g. Open/Deferred WorkAccountability Procedure. A procedure
entitled "Use and Maintenance of the Skylab Open/Deferred Work Accounta-
bility System" (unnumbered)was written in April 1972, and final issue
madeon June 6, 1972.
This procedure described the use and maintenance of the special
Skylab Open/Deferred work status capability established in the Configura-
tion Management Accounting (CMA) system.
All open and deferred work affecting the Skylab Cluster hardware
was tracked using a modified version of the existing CMA system. Open
work was defined as those items that would be subject to tracking,
including:
(i) Nonconformances resulting from Customer Acceptance
Readiness Reviews (CARR);
(2) PDTRs ;
(3) Systems test and checkout activities;
(4) Retrofit Modifications (MOD Kits) and tests that
had been assigned to a new work location;
(5) Work resulting from Field Engineering Changes (FECs).
Deferred work was defined as items subject to tracking, including
the planned activities (work originally planned and scheduled for a
specific location) such as, installation of experiments and solar array
panels, scheduled tests at KSC, etc.
h. MSFC Crew Procedures Management Plan, Dated December 1972.
This plan was developed in conjunction with the JSC Skylab Crew Proce-
dures Management Plan, JSC-06842. The plan provided detailed guidelines
to all MSFC personnel involved in the Crew Procedures change review
activity. Details of this configuration function are delineated in para-
graph ll.B.3.f herein.
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3. Integration and Control Activity
a. Change Review Board. The operation of the MSFC CRB was
the responsibility of the Skylab Engineering and Integration Project
Office. Its primary functions were to:
(I) Review new change requests before entry into the
system;
(2) Review interface changes and assign the change to
the appropriate CCB;
(3) Review all requests for Level II action and schedule
dispositioning action;
(4) Review Level II Configuration Control Board Direc-
tives (CCBDs) before presentation to Level II CCB chairman;
(5) Act as focal point for all types of problem changes
(unresolved old changes currently in the system).
Upon receipt of a proposed change (contractor ECP, ECR, or EDCR),
the assigned responsible engineer presented the change to the CRB and
informed the board of its impact on hardware, schedules, program docu-
mentation, and its affect on other NASA Centers and contractors. After
the board reviewed the change, it was either accepted into the Standard
Change Integration and Tracking (SCIT) system Or disapproved. Upon
acceptance of a change, the CRB would assign responsibility to the
appropriate Change Board for further action.
Whenever Level III boards required Level II disposition of a change,
referrals were made to the CRB by a "Request for Level II Action." At
this time, the responsible engineer would present the change to the CRB
for Level II action and disposition scheduling. Upon completion, all
Level II CCBDs were presented to the CRB for review. The CRB would re-
view the CCBD, as presented by the responsible engineer, for completeness,
accuracy, identification of all affected contractors, cost and schedule
impacts, and identification of MOD/Kits, if required. After assurance of
compliance with these criteria, the CCBD was routed to the appropriate
Project Office for concurrence signature and ultimately to the Level II
CCB chairman for final approval.
The CRB also functioned as the focal point for any changes which
could not be dispositioned due to conflicts between contractors, inter-
face engineers, etc.
b. Level II CCB. The Level II CCB was established within
the MSFC Center by authority of the Skylab Program Director. The Level
II CCB conducted regularly scheduled meetings and was chaired by the
MSFC Program Manager, or a designated representative with decision-
making authority for the actions of the Board.
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All changes initiated by MSFC,MSFCcontractors, or other NASA
Centers, were submitted for Level II CCBapproval, coordination (changes
affecting other Centers) or referral to the Level I CCBfor changes
affecting Level I specifications or criteria. Engineering changes within
the criteria of the MSFCLevel II CCBactivity consisted of
(i) The CRSand Mission Requirements Document;
(2) Saturn IB or V launch vehicle interfaces;
(3) Level A ICDs (Center to Center);
(4) ICDs affecting three or more Project CCBs;
(5) The responsibilities of three or more Project Offices;
(6) Unresolved Project-Level CCBactions;
(7) EDCRsand ChangeRequests (CRs) received from
other Centers;
(8)
(9)
of other Centers;
(lO)
directives;
(ll)
Project funding authorizations;
Operational activities that are the responsibility
Controlled milestones listed in Skylab Program
Experiment Requirements Documents (ERDs) and Experiment
Integration Requirements Documents (EIRDs);
(12) The Stowage List, I-SL-O02;
(13) The TCRSDs for all modules;
(14) Flight control and redline measurements;
(15) Power Allocation Documents affecting flight modules
and JSC-developed hardware.
c. Level III CCB. The Level CCB was a function of each
Skylab Project Office. Its primary responsibilities were:
- Preparation of Level III CCBDs to provide direction to
applicable contractor;
- Review and disposition of changes covered by the following
criteria.
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(I) End item specifications and experiment design and
performance specifications;
(2) Instrumentation Programand ComponentsList (IP&CL)
for flight modules ( Flight control measurementswere controlled at
Level II by an ICD.);
(3) Changesaffecting only one project office (AM, MDA,
OWS,ATM, PS, Ground Support Equipment (GSE)and Experiments);
(4) TCRSDsfor each flight module;
(5) Changesto the applicable PowerAllocation Documents
affecting each flight module.
d. ChangeIntegration Group CCBSupport Activities. Whenever
a changewas received by the ChangeIntegration Group that was covered
by either Level II or Level III criteria, it was scheduled for initial
presentation at the next weekly CCBmeeting. The responsible engineer
prepared a PCNchange package that contained the change paper plus any
supporting data received up to that point. After the initial presenta-
tion of a change to the Board, the responsible engineer, in conjunction
with the project system engineer, wrote the disposition of the change.
A CCBDwas prepared reflecting the appropriate disposition (approved as
written, approved with changes, or disapproved). This CCBDwas then
resubmitted for final sign-off. Based on the CCBDdisposition, a Change
Order or Supplemental Agreementwas prepared for transmittal to the
applicable contractor.
e. MSFCIntegration and Control Activity at KSC. MSFC
Engineering and Contractor ChangeIntegration personnel, transferred
to KSCin September1972, were responsible for establishing and opera-
ting tlle Level II CCBand the TCNBoard Secretariats, and all related
configuration managementfunction, after hardware delivery to KSC.
(i) Level II CCBActivity. All CCBDsprepared at KSC
were prefixed with a 700 series number (Example 700-_2-0001) with the
term "Skylab Resident Office at KSC"identified in the CCBblock of the
directives.
Ground rules to define the basic operation of the Level II CCB
at KSCwere issued by MSFC,describing the responsibilities of the Sky-
lab Project Office on-site personnel and the interface between the CCB
and the KSCSpacecraft Implementation Board (SCIB).
Following the release of the ground rules, meetings were held with
the MSFCon-site Project Office representatives to review the responsi-
bilities of each, relative to the change processing system. The on-site
MSFCrepresentative had the primary responsibility for obtaining KSC
impact and coordination of a change. Expedited changeactivities were
supported by the CCBoperation at MSFC.
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To assure continuing managementvisibility of hardware changes in
process at KSC, weekly statistics on hardware changes and TCNsprocessed
at KSCwere maintained and provided to MSFCand the Contractor Change
Integration Grou_ (Refer to Figure II.B-3 for example.)
f. Crew Procedures ChangeRequest Activity. At the request
of JSC, an on-site MSFCCrewProcedures Resident Office was established
at JSCin October 1972. This office was responsible for coordinating
JSC/MSFCcrew interface activities, and providing formal MSFCrepresenta-
tion on the JSCCrew Procedures ChangeControl Board (CPCB). Contractor
ChangeIntegration personnel supported this activity at both Centers.
Actual flight crew procedures were released as 'Basic" issues.
These served as initial review copies to be changed and revised, as
required. The next issue in the evolution of crew procedures was
"Reference" copies, released approximately six monthsbefore the launch
of SL-I. This was the first issue to comeunder direct strict change
control. Based on approved changes to the reference issues, final crew
procedures were published. Final issues were also subject to strict
change control and, before final crew review and shipment to KSC, were
changed by printed revisions and/or replacement pages. After final
printing, crew commentsand other last minute changeswere incorporated
by "pen and ink" changeswritten into the checklists.
Real-time change requests were initiated during the mission and
were documentedon JSC form 482D. Real-time changes to the onboard
crew checklists occurred during the mannedmissions and were usually
necessitated by mission anomalies or opportunities to improve science
or systems performance. Because of their critical nature, real-time
crew procedures change requests were processed somewhat differently than
premission change requests. During the mission these changes were auto-
matically forwarded to the HOSC. Upon receipt of a change, the Change
Integration Engineer immediately coordinated it with each M_FC MSG and
submitted MSFC comments to JSC via the MSFC Resident Office. Every
effort was made to complete the review and coordination before the Flight
Director's approval for uplink to the crew. In many cases, the MSFC
review was conducted in two hours or less to support mission requirements.
Tracking and accounting at MSFC were accomplished using a modified
version of the SCIT system. With the use of this computerized system,
simultaneous coordination of many change requests and other documents
having unique review requirements and schedules was possible. The
modified SCIT provided timely listings of change requests received,
reports of delinquencies, open items reports, and other documents (such
as cross references), which made it possible to conduct and manage the
coordination process in a timely fashion and with minimum personnel.
Each document (normally a change request) placed in the formal
review cycle at MSFC was assigned a unique PCN. This number was
assigned to the document initially and to all related documentation
that followed. By use of the computer, this number along with unique
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codes used to identify specific crew procedures, review organizations,
document types, etc., permitted retrieval of cross reference listings
and various special reports that provided statistical information for
managementreporting.
Figure II.B-4 shows the total numberof change requests initially
projected and those that were actually handled at MSFC. This includes
requests distributed for information only, those requiring no MSFC
action, and those requiring formal review.
4. Change Activity Tracking and Accounting. Major elements of
the Change Integration and Configuration Control System used at MSFC
for the Skylab Program consisted of:
- Control of program requirements, such as plans, specifications,
ICDs, CEIs, and End Items;
- Identification of changes such as MSFC ECRs, JSC EDCRs, KSC
Change Requests, and Contractor's ECPs'
Centralized Program Control with the assignment of PCN numbers
and the scheduling of all actions required to disposition a
proposed change;
- Technical assessment to determine the need for the change, the
adequacy of proposed solutions and program impacts;
- Document decision and direct implementation of a change by
CCBD, Change Order, or Contract Modification;
- Contractor's response by ECP or Record ECP;
- Verification of Change incorporation by means of CDRs, PDTRs,
and Installation Notice Cards;
- Change Tracking and Configuration Accounting with the use of
the MSFC computerized SCIT and CMA systems.
Tracking and accounting for the above elements provided Skylab
Program Management with single change package control and total program
impact, as well as visibility of all change elements being processed
regardless of their complexity or the agencies involved. The system
afforded daily identification to cognizant personnel to those actions
needed and the person or group responsible for initiating positive
actions. It also provided statistical data for gaging the program and
design-to-cost status.
The Change Integration and Configuration Management Tracking and
Accounting System consisted of the following functions:
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The SCIT System provided current status as well as a "cradle-
to-grave" history of each change from its initial inception
through contractual direction given to implement the proposed
change.
The CMA System established the requirements baselines and
tracked authorized changes from the time of their formal
approval through incorporation.
The SCIT system tracked the MSFC change flow, interface changes
affecting other Centers, and the means of identifying hardware and
software configuration requirements by CMA Tracking. These systems
provided flexibility since most any combination of data fields could
be selected, sorted, and reported in any desired order. The special
usages developed for Skylab follow.
- Maintained current status and closeout action of all RIDs
identified during program reviews;
- Defined ATM in-house as-designed/as-built configuration;
- Open work system, tracked and reported all open/deferred
work to be passed on to KSC at turnover;
- Crew procedures, maintained accountability of MSFC technical
coordination on crew procedure changes;
- Stowage, maintained accountability of all SLCNs;
- ICD, tracked ICDs through preparation coordination baseline
and contractual acceptance.
a. Skylab ICD Matrix. The Skylab ICD matrix was a comput-
erized listing of all ICDs for which MSFC was either responsible or
had an interface with other NASA Centers. The matrix identified ICDs
by number and title, and provided schedule status information. The
matrix also identified the contractor responsible for generating the
ICD, the level of the ICD, and the NASA engineer who was cognizant of
the particular interface. All ICDs were identified and tracked until
the document was baselined by MSFC CCBD action.
The computer program provided reports identifying:
- Total list of MSFC ICDs;
- List of all ICDs generated by an individual contractor;
- List of all ICDs for which an individual NASA engineer had
responsibility;
Listing of all MSFC ICDs in chronological order by contractor
submittal date, by MSFC CCB submittal date, and by MSFC CCBD
date.
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This system was updated daily to reflect the latest action against
each ICD. On a monthly basis, the ICD Identification Matrix, IOM01840,
was published and distributed to all affected contractors, MSFCEngineer-
ing Laboratories and responsible NASAengineers.
b. OpenWorkAccountability. The open work accountability
system was a specialized application of the CMASystem that permitted
storage and retrieval of work items by:
- Module/Project Office;
- End Item/Serial Number;
- Source,
- Responsibility,
- Type,
- Location,
- Schedule.
A change was entered into the system at the point of Acceptance/
DD250and tracked through launch.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations. The overall Configuration
Management effort conducted on the Skylab Program enhanced the integrity
of all program elements.
By establishing a total Configuration Management System, with direct
responsibility for its functions assigned to a Change Integration Group,
the MSFC Engineering and Integration Branch afforded total program visi-
bility to all active participants.
With the establishment and implementation of the Configuration
Management System, resultant advantages were derived, such as (I) total
management visibility and statusing for change integration and configura-
tion accountability; (2) tracking of change actions between NASA Centers
and their contractors; (3) multimodule hardware configuration accounta-
bility for each flight; and (4) the statusing and accountability of all
hardware, software, and documentation change activity throughout the
fabrication, installation, and checkout phases.
In conclusion, it can be stated that in any multimodule effort
where complex interfaces are encountered, and a variety of sources are
used in supplying equipment, hardware, and documentation, an organized
configuration management system developed and implemented early will
enhance the integrity of the program.
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During the scope of the Skylab CMeffort, certain lessons were
learned based on problems and their ultimate resolutions. These are
briefly stated below and are offered in this report as recommendations
to be considered in any future endeavors.
a. Uniformity of CMRequirements. Imposing CMrequirements
on all contractors early in the program will help reduce duplication of
effort, unnecessary costs, and incompatibilities between contractors'
systems. ChangeIntegration and Configuration Control disciplines
should be established before the first major module PDR.
b. ChangeIntegration Group. Establish this group to engage
in change control before and during baselining of the hardware and
related documentation.
c. Program Control Numbering System. Manyadvantages
are derived from the single-change-package concept, especially in a
multimodule program.
d. ChangeIntegration Engineers. This cradle-to-grave
approach works to the advantage of a program in that one individual is
totally responsible for, and knowledgeable of, the total change package.
e. ChangeReview Board. It would be helpful to assign
signature authority to the CRBChairman for all documentation changes
to expedite same. This board should also be responsible for review of
change package closures to negate the need for package review and closure
at program's end. This will reduce manpowerneeds and related costs.
f. Configuration Control Boards. Establish requirements for
each Board, regardless of level, to convene on a weekly basis. Working
changes outside a board meeting cause delays in dispositioning and
issuing direction to contractors. It would be beneficial to issue uni-
form direction to suppliers, especially when interfaces are involved.
CCBDforms used by the various NASACenters are distinctively different;
a standard form would aid recipient contractors in complying with given
direction regardless of the NASAsource. The MSFCDirective form and
procedures for the completion is recommended.
g. Standard ChangeIntegration and Tracking System. Pro-
vides required visibility through reports and change listings making
it possible to conduct and managea complex coordination process in
a timely mannerwith minimumpersonnel.
h. Interface Control Documents. Preparation of an Inter-
face ManagementRequirements Documentand imposing it on all program
participants is a necessity.
i. Cluster Requirements Specification. Generate early in
program and impose as contractual direction on all major hardware con-
tractors for use as a guideline document in preparing Contract End Item
Specifications.
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j. Control of Documentation. Baselined program documents
early and place under Configuration Control authority thereby providing
a moreacceptable hardware control with visibility as to which docu-
ments require change because of a hardware change.
k. Open/Deferred Work. Establishing and imposing open/
deferred work requirements and an accountability system for this work
is a prerequisite to any multimodule program. Early establishment
precludes problems arising at the time of hardware turnover to the
government and provides the required program managementvisibility
subsequent to turnover.
I. Inter-Center Subagreements. Early development and use
of agreements between NASACenters is highly desirable and will prevent
misinterpretation of requirements and obligations.
m. ChangeTracking and Accounting. The SCIT System provided
visibility to Engineers, Contractors, Project Offices, and NASAManage-
ment with current listings of changes received, open item, and delinquency
reports. This made it possible to conduct and manage a complex coordina-
tion process in a timely fashion with minimum personnel.
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C. Mission Planning and Analysis
Special studies were conducted to determine the impact of require-
ments or changes on systems, experiments, and crew activity time lines.
To quote one example: The electrical power used was generated by solar
arrays that had to face the sun most of the time. In approximately
4000 revolutions around Earth, this sun-oriented attitude did not pro-
vide an attitude suitable for Earth viewing by built-in instruments.
Consequently, for Earth Resources Survey investigations, the vehicle's
attitude had to be changed to allow the sensors to point directly at
Earth and to maintain this Earth pointing attitude throughout the data
taking pass. To further complicate the problem, except during high
Beta Angle periods, Skylab passed from sunlight to darkness every revo-
lution around the Earth. This required that energy needs during each
dark period be provided by batteries that had to be charged during the
sunlight passes. Another consideration in planning Skylab operations
to support Earth Survey Experiments was the Attitude Control System
and its requirements and limitations.
Changesin vehicle attitudes were implemented in two ways: the
prime methodwas applying disturbing torques to combinations of three
massive gyroscopes (Control MomentGyros) so that reactive deflections
in the desired direction and magnitude could be achieved. The second-
ary system was propulsive in which gas was expelled from nozzles to
produce rotation in the required direction. Both systems had limita-
tions primarily in the rates of attitude change that could be achieved
economically; initiation of too great a rate would saturate the momen-
tum storage capabilities of the gyros requiring expenditure of thruster
gases for desaturation, and too frequent use of the thrusters would re-
suit in depletion of the stored gases.
Operational techniques were developed that would provide enough
earth survey pointing opportunities while conserving electrical power
and attitude control margins, and these techniques were modified dur-
ing the third mission when one of the control momentgyros failed.
i. Mission Definition
a. Orbit Definition. During the period of Skylab orbit
planning and definition, the basellned orbital parameters were going
through many alterations. There were many considerations in the choice
of final orbit definition. The Orbital Assembly (OA) altitude had to
be high enough to allow sufficient orbital lifetime to complete the
defined mission, and to minimize the effects of atmospheric shadowing
on solar observing experiments. It had to be low enough to meet the
payload capabilities of the SWS launch vehicle, allow reasonable pro-
pellant reserves and rendezvous durations for subsequent flights, and
minimize radiation exposure on the crew and equipment from the high
altitude radiation belts. The orbital inclination had to be sufficient
to accomplish the desired coverage of the earth's surface for the Earth
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Resources Experiments Package (EREP), and still remain within the pay-
load capability of the launch vehicle. The history of these OA orbi-
tal parameters is as follows:
APPROXIMATE DATE ALTITUDE INCLINATION
Apr 1968 230 n mi Circular 28.9 deg
May 1968 220 n mi Circular 28.9 deg
Oct 1968 185 x 210 n mi 35 deg
Dec 1968 185 x 193 n mi 35 deg
Jan 1969 185 n mi Circular 36 deg
Aug 1969 235 n mi Circular 35 deg
Jan 1970 235 n mi Circular 50 deg
Aug 1972 233.8 n mi Circular 50 deg
After the orbit definition stabilized in approximately January
of 1970, the only additional modification was made in August of 1972.
This modification lowered the orbit from 235 to 233.8 n mi so that
Skylab would traverse the same ground track every 71 revolutions. This
altitude was to be maintained throughout the mission by periodic CSM
Reaction Control System (RCS) burns or "trims". This facilitated EREP
planning, training, operations, and data return, and facilatated pre-
diction of trajectory related events.
b. Unmanned Activation Sequence. With the evolution of the
program, the requirements for the initial activation of the workshop
were definitized. The following is a summary of the unmanned activi-
tion sequence:
DATE ITEM
July 1969
February
1970
TB4 - Insertion
TB4+0.4 Sec - Separation from S-II stage
TB4+I5 Sec - Maneuver to retrograde local horizontal;
MDA pointed in direction opposite of
velocity vector X ° out of orbital plane.
TB4+I3 Min - Jettison payload shroud
TB4+I4 Min - Maneuver to solar inertial (XIOP)
TB4+24 Min - Deploy OWS array
TB4+46 Min - Deploy ATM
TB4+61Min - Deploy ATM array
TB4+85 Min - Energize ATM control system
TB4+85 Min - Begin CMG spinup
TB4+7.3 hrs - Transfer control to CMG
To - Liftoff
To+l hr - MI_/AM and OWS pressure check
To+4 1/2 hr - Vent MDA/AM to 1.3 psla N 2
Vent OWS LH 2 tank to 1.3 psla N 2
Vent OWS LOX tank to vacuum
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DATE ITEM
February
1970
To+ 5 hr - Pressurize MDA/AM with 02 to 5.0 psia 02/N 2
To+ 5 1/2 hr - M_DA/AM Pressure integrity check
To+ 5 1/2 hr - Pressurize OWS LH 2 tank with 02 to 5.0 psia
02/N2
To+ 7 1/2 hr - Safe IU oronite/water
To+ 7 3/4 hr - Transfer TACS control from IU to ATM PCS;
dump IU water
to+13 1/2 hr - OWS LH 2 tank pressure check
May 1970 TB4
TB4+2 Sec
TB4+4.5 Sec
TB4+4.8 Sec
TB4+6 Min
TB4+I2 Min
TB4+27 Min
TB4+31Min
- Insertion (To+9 Min)
- Issue S-II/S-IVB separation signal
- NPV (nonpropulsive vents);
Pitch to retrograde through GG
- Jettison payload shroud
- Deploy ATM; Deploy discone antennas
- Deploy ATM arrays
- Deploy OWS arrays
- Deploy meteoroid shield;
Acquire solar inertial attitude
TB4+52.5 Min - Initiate CI_ Spinup
June 1972
February
1973
TBI = SL-I - Liftoff
TB4 = S-II - OECO (TBI+578 Sec)
TB4+I0 Sec - Insertion
Pitch to solar inertial
TB4+20 Sec - Activate OWS refrigeration system
TB4+30 Sec - Initiate NPV (OWS habitation area
and waste tank)
TB4+5,5 Min - Jettison payload shroud
TB4+5,7 Min - Activate AM deploy buses
TB4+6.25 Min - Deploy discone antennas
TB4+6,5 Min - Deploy ATM
TB4+I5 Min - Deploy ATM solar arrays
TB4+27 Min - Activate ATM telemetry
TB4+32.4 Min - Deploy OWS solar arrays
TB4+43.7 Min - Activate ATM thermal control system
TB4+ TBD Initiate CMG spinup
TB4+86.2 Min - Deploy meteoroid shield
TB4+I,5 Min - Deactivate AM deploy buses
TB4+3 hr - Dump OWS pneumatics
TB4+4,5 hr - Transfer TACS control from IU to APCS at
about 25% CMG angular momentum
TBI = SL-I
TB4 = S-If
TB4+6 Sec
TB4+I0 Sec
- Liftoff
- OECO (TBI+588,696 Sec)
- Initiate NPV (OWS habitation and
waste tank)
- Orbital insertion; Pitch solar inertial
(Jettison payload shroud when SWS passes
through nadir)
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DATE ITEM
February
1973
TB4+20 Sec
TB4+5.7 Min
TB4+6.2 Min
TB4+6.5 Min
TB4+I5 Min
TB4+27 Min
- Activate OWS refrigeration system
- Activate AM deployment buses
- Deploy discone antennas
- Deploy ATM
- Deploy ATM solar arrays
- Activate ATM telemetry
TB4+31.2 Min - Deploy OWS solar arrays
TB4+86.2 Min - Deploy meteoroid shield
TB4+87.2 Min - Activate APCS
TB4+I.5 hr - Deactivate AM deploy buses
TB4+3 hr - Dump OWS pneumatics
TB4+3 hr 1.2 Min Activate ATM thermal control system
TB4+4 hr 40.2 Min Transfer TACS control from IU to
APCS at about 20% (1800 rpm) CMG
angular momentum
2. Orbital Traiectory Analysis
a. Launch Sequence. Before the decision to fly the dry work-
shop, the launch sequence was defined as follows: first the launch of
the SWS on a S-IB launch vehicle (AAP-2). Approximately one day later
the first manned CSM (AAP-I) would be launched on a S-IB vehicle for a
mission of up to 28 days. Subsequent to this first manned mission, a
second CSM would be launched, also using a S-IB booster, in conjunc-
tion with a separate S-IB launch of an unmanned spacecraft lunar
adapter, and a lunar module/apollo telescope mount spacecraft (AAP-3/4).
These would dock with the SWS and perform a mission of up to 56 days
duration.
After the decision to fly the dry workshop, a new launch sequence
was constructed that was similar to the previous one except for modi-
fications in named sequence and mission definition. The first launch
was that of the SWS on a S-V launch vehicle (SL-I). Approximately one
day later the first manned CSM launch (SL-2) would take place using a
S-IB vehicle. This mission was to have a duration of up to 28 days.
After the return of this crew, the next manned CSM would be launched
(SL-3), again on a S-IB vehicle, for a mission duration of up to 56
days. The final manned CSM (SL-4) would be launched, once again on a
S-IB, subsequent to the return of the SL-3 crew. This mission, as the
previous one, was to have a duration of up to 56 days. The desired
interval between launches of the manned CSMs was set at 90 _ 6 days.
The 84 day minimum wa_ the launch pad turnaround limit while the 96
day maximum was to constrain the total length of the mission requiring
the workshop.
b. SWS Attitudes. The primary mission SWS attitude, as well
as the attitude required for CSM docking, experienced considerable
modification. Attitude planning as of March 1968 indicated that the
SWS was to be maneuvered to a gravity gradient attitude during rendezvous
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and docking of the first mannedCSM. The primary attitude for the
remainder of that mission was to be solar inertial (SI) with the X-
axis of the SWSperpendicular to the orbit plane (X-POP). During the
storage period betweenmannedmissions, the SWSwas to be put into a
gravity gradient attitude. The second mannedmission was to use the
samedocking attitude and was to be performed with SWSprimary atti-
tude being SI with the X-axis in the orbit plane (X-lOP). Documenta-
tion dated October 1968 indicated that rendezvous and docking for all
mannedmissions would be carried out with Skylab in X-POPwith the MDA
pointing northward. The rendezvous and docking attitude was later re-
fined so that documentation dated May 1969 indicated an attitude of
X-POPwith the Z-axis along the local vertical (Z-LV). The remainder
of the mission was to maintain the X-SOPprimary attitude.
With the advent of the dry workshop concept, the primary mission
attitude was redefined as SI, X-lOP and this was to be the baseline
for all Skylab missions and storage periods. The intent at that time
was to maintain this attitude for rendezvous and docking. Documenta-
tion dated March 1971 indicated that a decision had been made to
change the SWS attitude for rendezvous and docking from the basic SI,
X-10P to the Z-LV attitude. In addition, the Z-LV attitude was indi-
cated for use during the EREP passes.
The attitudes actually used in the Skylab missions were those in-
dicated in documentation dated October 1971. The primary Skylab atti-
tude would be S1 with the X principal axis in the orbit plane, point-
ing along the velocity vector at orbita I noon, with the +Z axis point-
ing toward the sun. The attitude for rendezvous, Z-LV(R), was to be
Z local vertical with the X geometric axis in the orbit plane, and -X
axis in the direction of the velocity vector and the -Z axis pointing
toward the earth. If the beta angle was greater than 50 degrees,
then the SWS would be biased about the X-axis to a maximum of 23.5
degrees from the basic Z-LV(R) attitude. The attitude to be used dur-
ing the EREP passes, Z-LV(E), was similar to that used in the Z-LV(R)
except that the +X axis pointed in the direction of the velocity vec-
tor.
c. Drag Decay and Orbital Lifetime. The drag acting on an
orbiting spacecraft depends upon the altitude of that spacecraft and
the level of solar energy striking the atmosphere. Lower altitudes
cause the spacecraft to travel through more dense atmosphere thereby
increasing drag. Higher levels of solar energy cause an increase in
altitude of the atmosphere (expansion) and thereby has the same affect
as a lower orbit. The amount of drag and the mass of the spacecraft
directly determine the orbital lifetime. Increasing mass tends to
lengthen the lifetime while increasing drag tends to shorten it.
SL-I SWS insertion altitude of 235 n mi was finally chosen to
provide a rendezvous compatible orbit and to assure that the OA would
not decay below a minimum altitude of 210 n mi at the end of the eight-
month mission. This resulted in a predicted nominal orbital lifetime
of approximately 2050 days.
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With the advent of trim burns for the repeatability of ground
tracks, the altitude at the end of the eight-month mission was still
near the insertion altitude of 234 n mi. Including these trim burns
into the decay and lifetime analysis for the OAresulted in extending
the orbital lifetime by approximately 700 days and consequently modi-
fied the uncontrolled decay history to start at the end of the eight-
month mission. This resulted in a nominal predicted orbital lifetime
of 2730 days from the launch of the SWS.
d. Beta Angle Relationships. The orientation of the orbital
plane relative to the earth and sun had been used in the design of
the Skylab thermal control systems, solar power systems, attitude con-
trol systems and a planned mission profile. This orientation of the
orbital plane is given by the celestial angle beta, where beta is de-
fined as the angle between the sun and orbital plane in a plane per-
pendicular to the orbit plane that includes the earth-sun line. In
project documentation relative to mission requirements, trajectory
planning and flight planning, beta has been considered positive when
the sun is north of the orbit plane.
There were many systems and experiments on board Skylab that were
constrained by the beta angle or the length of the orbital daylight
and darkness, which is a function of the beta angle. Power availabil-
ity to the SWS was directly dependent upon the duration of sunlight
impinging on the solar arrays.
The scheduling of Z-LV(E) passes for EREP experiment performance
had to consider the effects of beta angle on the SWS systems. Target
lighting conditions, required for certain EREP experiments, were re-
lated to the beta angle. Several other experiments required a know-
ledge of the nighttime duration for optimum scheduling and operation.
The beta angle also had an influence on the procedure for the
attitude change when entering the rendezvous Z-LV(R) attitude. If
beta was greater than 50 degrees_ the SWS had to be biased about the
X axis so the CSM transponding antenna could view the OWS antenna.
A plot of the beta history is a sinusoidal curve whose amplitude
is bounded by a sinusoidal envelope that follows the seasonal motion
of the sun. The origin of the envelope depends on the date of launch
while the origin of the internal curve depends on the time of launch.
Consequently, the beta history for Skylab depended on the choice of
final launch date and time.
During the flight of Skylab, the beta angle history was such that
there were two periods during the manned portion of the mission during
which Skylab was in constant sunlight. These occurred during the first
and third manned missions.
3. Launch Vehicle Trajectory Analysis. Because the manned CSM
missions were to rendezvous and dock with the SWS, the SWS trajectory
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established the framework for the launch planning of subsequent mannedmis-
sions. The altitude and inclination of the SWShad to be such that the
CSMswere capable of rendezvous and docking. The time of launch of the SWS
had to be such that the launch windows for the subsequent CSMlaunches
occurred at times that satisfied the lighting and abort constraints.
To accomplish rendezvous, each CSMlaunch had to occur within specific
launch windows during which the orbiting SWSwas in the proper phase angle
relationship with the launch site. These windows consisted of an optimum
point at which time the launch and insertion would occur with minimumboos-
ter propellant use and a time margin during which launch could still take
place but with increasing use of propellant for yaw steering. The duration
of the launch window determine the maximumweight of booster propellant to
be allocated for yaw steering and dictated a specific loss in the amount of
payload that could be inserted in orbit.
Payload capability for a specific booster depends on the desired alti-
tude, inclination, launch azimuth, and first decending node. Increasing
the altitude requires a reduction in payload. Deviations from an optimum
inclination of 28.9 degrees (due east launch from CapeKennedy) require
reductions in payload. The selection of launch azimuth and decending node
affected the ultimate payload capability in that they defined the quantity
of propellant required for yaw steering.
As the orbit for Skylab varied in the planning stages, so did the pay-
load capability. During the wet the wet workshop period, the payload cap-
abilities of the S-IB launch vehicles were as follows:
APPROXIMATE DATE MISSION PAYLOAD CAPABILITY
July 1968 AAP-I 39,200 ib
AAP-2 (SWS) 31,i00 ib
AAP-3 39,800 ib
Based on a SWS altitude of 220 n mi inclination of 29 degrees
October 1968 AAP-I 38,017 ib
Based on a CSM altitude of 185 x 210 n mi inclination of 29
degrees
January 1969 AAP-I 38,780 ib
AAP-3A 39,350 Ib
Based on a CSM altitude of 81 x 120 n mi inclination of 35
degrees
During this period, it was planned to have a southerly launch azimuth
for the manned missions to minimize the land mass being overflown. These
azimuths were 112 degrees in October 1968 and ii0 degrees in January 1969.
The SWS was to be launched on a northerly azimuth of 65 degrees as indica-
ted in documentation dated January 1968. The decending node at this time
was indicated as 50 degrees and 134 degrees for the CSM and the SWS launch,
respectively.
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After the dry workshop concept was baselined and the planned in-
clination was changed to 50 degrees, the payload capability of the
boosters went through further modification. Documentation dated July
18, 1969 indicated that the payload capability of the Saturn V booster
was 198,000 Ib for an orbit of 260 n mi circular and 50 degrees inclin-
ation. For the same inclination and an altitude of 81 x 120 n mi, the
S-IB had a capability of 37,200 lb. With the advent of the 50 degree
inclination, it was decided that northerly launch azimuths should be
baselined for the CSM launches. Because of the increased inclination,
it became desirable to incorporate a variable azimuth capability in
the manned launch vehicles. Before this time a single launch azimuth
was set for the entire window duration. For a 50 degree inclination
this could have been costly unless the launch took place at the instant
for which the preset azimuth applied. A variable azimuth could be re-
set for the specific time of the launch and thereby would conserve
propellant and have additional payload capability or, optionally, in-
crease the size of the launch window. This option was available as the
launch window was defined during the time period as the time duration
during which less than 700 pounds of propellant would be used to
accomplish all necessary yaw steering.
The following is a history of the payload capability after the
decision to fly the dry workshop. All manned launch payload capabil-
ities are exclusive of 700 pounds of yaw steering-allocated propellant
and 2000 pounds of flight performance reserves propellant. The inser-
tion altitudes for the SWS and CSMs are 235 n mi and 81 x 120 n mi,
respectively. The inclination is 50 degrees.
PAYLOAD CAPABILITY
APPROXIMATE DATE MISSION (Pounds)
February 1970 SL-I (SWS) 184,325
SL-2 35,300
SL-3 35,800
SL-4 35,300
June 1971 SL-1 (SWS) 210,022
SL-2 35,300
SL-3 35,400
SL-4 35,300
February 1972 SL-I (SWS) 212,725
SL-2 36,768
SL-3 36,230
SL-4 37,450
The final launch parameters for the planned mission were as
follows:
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MISSION TARGETED AZIMUTH (de_) DESCENDING NODE (deg)
SL-I 40.88 153.25
SL-2 47.035 155.021
SL-3 46.190 154.828
SL-4 45.382 154.601
4. Conclusions and Recommendations. In reviewing the Skylab
mission design and the supporting studies and analyses performed, it
is concluded that the methods used were as logical and valid as the
state-of-the-art would allow. Each hardware development (component,
system, or launch vehicle) change that impacted the mission parameters
set off a new series of analyses and computer runs that resulted in
changes to orbit attitude, inclination, launch date, or other require-
ment. It is recommended that future programs be developed by the same
basic approach.
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D. Special Engineering Analysis
I. Contingency Analysis. In the period preceding the launch of
SL-I, a program was initiated to analyze the potential show stoppers
in the Skylab program, with particular attention devoted to the SL-I
sequence. Some events in the SL-I sequence were irreversible and, if
a problem occurred, probably little could be done to remedy the situ-
ation. An example of this type of failure would be an inability to
jettison the payload shroud. Most other events, however, were not
considered catastropic and an integrated effort was initiated by MSFC
to study the most significant items. The philosophy associated with
this effort was that, if a problem did not occur that was identical to
the problem analyzed, the effort was still useful because the involved
personnel "had been down the street before", i.e., they were familiar
with the system and how it operated. They were, therefore, more cap-
able of dealing with a problem occurring in real time.
a. Feasibility Study. Preliminary studies resulted in iden-
tification of the following events to be analyzed. Inability to:
- close MI)A vent
- jettison radiator shield
- deploy ATM
- deploy ATM solar arrays
- deploy OWS solar arrays
- vent OWS habitation area
- deploy discone antennas
- release lock on ATM canister
- deploy meteoroid shield
Loss of: ATM thermal control
- AM telemetry
one control moment gyro
b. Detailed Studies. For each contingency analyzed, a pre-
liminary study was conducted. Detailed areas needing further study
were supplied to each MSG. The MSGs, with appropriate contractor
support, conducted detailed analyses pertaining to their particular
discipline, i.e., electrical power (load models, thermal models,
mechanical feasibility, crew simulation).
The significant question was "would there be sufficient electri-
cal power and thermal control to conduct a mission, and if so, what
is the mission?" Results of the analysis indicated that not only was
there a feasible mission, but that it could be near-nominal as origin-
ally planned if:
- careful power management procedures were initiated, and
- the launch of the manned vehicles be scheduled to struc-
ture the high activity periods of the mission during per-
iods of high beta angle.
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The individual responses by the MSGs were then combined into an
integrated resolution of the contingency. The analyses were continued
in sufficient depth to determine adequate workarounds and to identify
any special provisions necessary to accomplish the workaround.
The following problems were addressed just two weeks before the
scheduled launch of SL-I. The problems were identified during a mis-
sion simulation conducted at JSC with support provided by MSFC and con-
tractor personnel:
- Inability to deploy the ATM solar arrays
- Inability to deploy the OWS solar arrays
- Inability to deploy the meteoroid shield and
the OWS solar arrays.
Coincidentally, the anomaly that occurred early during SL-I flight
paralleled the circumstances of this analysis in many ways and the
analysis results were applied directly in development of alternate mis-
sion plans.
c. Conclusions and Recommendations. The experiences encount-
ered in conducting the Skylab mission emphasizes the importance and the
usefulness of conducting studies of this type. Of particular signifi-
cance is the experience and the increased familiarity gained with the
various systems operational modes by the individuals performing the
analysis, and their ability to transfer that familiarity to the problem
at hand.
During the Skylab mission, real-time studies were continued in the
following areas because of the real-time problems:
- OWS solar array deployment
- Affect of loss of meteoroid shield on thermal balance
- Power system (battery) degradation
- AM coolant loop degradation
- Reserves study for the actual SL-I configuration, i.e.,
electrical power available, electrical loads, thermal,
and commodities reserves.
- Loss of cooling loop for ATM control panel and Earth
Resources experiments.
It is recommended that analysis programs be initiated early so re-
suits may influence design of the systems and perhaps avoid some of the
potential failure modes inherent in most systems. Also, the contingency
analyses should be closely correlated with Failure Mode Effects Analysis
and identification of "single failure points" and "critical items."
2. AUTOSCAN Performance Report. The Skylab program was designed
to extend the duration of manned space flight and carry out a broad
spectrum of experimental investigations, using pulse code modulation
(PCM) telemetry systems developed during the Gemini and Apollo programs
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to transmit approximately 1800 data measurements to the various ground
stations. It was estimated that four billion bits of data could be
transmitted during a 24 hour period. This is equivalent to approximately
one million pages of computer printout per day with 500 data values per
page.
The task of reviewing/analyzing this volume of data, required the
development of two data handling methods - Data Compression and AUTOSCAN.
Data compression removes all redundant data points in the fixed format
of the telemetry system and affixes an identifier and time to each of
the remaining data points. This was accomplished with a zero order pre-
dictor (ZOP) algorithm at the ground station that permitted transmis-
sions from the station only when a change in the value of the downlinked
measurement had occurred. AUTOSCAN is an acronym for a digital computer
program designed to search the data for points that exceed some prede-
termined limit. The information is for use in performing daily systems
analyses and to indicate areas that require further investigation.
a. AUTOSCAN Program. An AUTOSCAN Task Team was organized in
December 1970, to develop and implement the AUTOSCAN concepts. The Task
Team responsibilities are given in the '_UTOSCAN Implementation Plan,"
ED-2002-1392.
Reviews of various automated scanning programs were conducted,
searching for techniques that might be incorporated in the AUTOSCAN pro-
gram and problem areas to be avoided during development of the AUTOSCAN
program.
Numerous meetings were held with MSG personnel to familiarize them
with the AUTOSCAN concepts and to define the types of requirements
needed to assist in program definition. To facilitate this, all the on-
board measurements were grouped in system/subsystem categories. This
allowed concentration on a smaller volume of measurements at any one
time rather than treating the entire volume of measurements.
As each MSG Leader (MSGL) presented their respective scan require-
ments, they were reviewed and used to help define the basic program
concepts. In this initial phase, sufficient requirements were submit-
ted to establish the majority of measurement types that the program
must accommodate. Actual scan limits for nondiscrete measurements were
provided for only a minority of the measurements, but this was suffi-
cient to define program requirements for scanning. The program concepts
formulated were provided in prose and flow chart form to programmer/
analysts for the programming and coding required to implement these con-
cepts. The flow charts provided were detailed and complete, but were
used only as guides by the programmer analysts in developing the program.
The development and implementation of the AUTOSCAN program was an
iterative process through six versions, with each subsequent version
possessing some capability over the previous version. Separate programs
were developed for the AM and A_4 all Digital Data Tape (ADDT) to pro-
vide sufficient computer core storage for both AM and ATM telemetered
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measurements. The ATM scan program was developed and checked out first
and then the necessary additions, deletions, and modifications made to
provide an AM scan program.
The special modules resulted from the review of the data users re-
quirements, some of which could not be accomplished with the basic pro-
gram concepts (event, limit, and statistical scans). Special computer
subroutines (modules) were developed to handle the expanded require-
ments, which included cyclic, slope, and consumables data types. Exam-
ples of other types of special modules are:
- Limit scan activated by an analog measurement
- Limit scan activated by a discrete and analog measurement
- Limit scan activated by a discrete and two analogs
- Change of units of measurement in output
- Limit scan activated by two analogs
- Processing activated by limit violation of analogs plus
a delta stop time.
Specifications and detailed flow charts for the special modules were
submitted for programming as the special module requirements developed.
Each special module was submitted as it became available, with all
special module specifications and flow charts presented in the "AUTO-
SCAN Program Requirements," ED-2002-1400, Rev C document for formal
release. The document was released in various revisions five times
between November 1971 and June 1973 to incorporate new special modules
or modify existing ones as needed.
Measurement scan requirements received from the data users were
incorporated into the "AUTOSCAN Measurement Requirements," ED-2002-1387,
Rev F document which served as a data base for AUTOSCAN and contained
all the onboard measurements together with pertinent information to
identify all limit and discrete scan requirements for individual mea-
surements. This data base was used to prepare the preprocessor that
contained the input requirements used by the AUTOSCAN program. The
continuous influx of requirements was reflected by periodic releases of
the Measurement Requirements Document. The document, in various revi-
sions, was released seven times between November 1971 and February 1974.
The development of the AUTOSCAN Implementation Plan was initiated
in mid-1971. The document was not a comprehensive description of the
AUTOSCAN program but described the guidelines for implementing the AUTO-
SCAN system, and the program implementation activities, both before and
during the mission. This document was released three times between
December 1971 and September 1972.
Internally generated data were used to check out the earlier ver-
sions of the program. These prototype programs were useful in sizing
the input and output, computer storage, and the amount of computer time
required. These considerations lead to the elimination of most special
modules except on an individual basis.
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Checkout and improvement continued through 1972 using data
primarily from various Skylab module tests, including JSC, and KSC
testing. The outputs were reviewed and all problems identified to the
progran_ner/analysts. Some problems were experienced during these re-
views, e.g., anomalous appearing behavior for a measurement could not be
ascribed to a particular source (i.e., AUTOSCAN program or data). Oscil-
logram traces were used to verify behavior of some measurements. These
reviews indicated that the input data contained a significant amount of
noise. This lead to a recommendation by the AUTOSCAN Task Team that
some type of noise filter be incorporated in the program. This recom-
mendation was not implemented initially, but measurement activate/deac-
tivate flags were incorporated during the mission that would suppress
the measurements having an unusally high degree of activity. The AUTO-
SCAN program had the capabilities/constraints at the February 1973 time
frame as shown in Table II.D-I.
A series of Mission Simulations were initiated in Jaunary 1973,
which involved both MSFC and JSC. These simulations included transmis-
sion of simulated ADDT data from JSC to MSFC. Many problems were en-
countered with the transmission of these data, which was processed
through the AUTOSCAN program as it became available. The review of the
AUTOSCAN outputs from this simulation were hampered due to the lack of
a nominal data base for comparison and the problems associated with the
data transmission network. Problems uncovered and comments were again
transmitted to the programmer/analysts for refinement of the program.
Approximately 25 percent of the 46 Special Modules requested had
been programmed at SL-I launch but none had been checked out, with the
major effort expended on developing the baseline program. The computer
time allotted to the AUTOSCAN program had been expected to severely
limit the chances of running the Special Modules, and data users were
made aware early in the program that the Special Modules would be de-
leted if computer time became excessive.
Multiple limits were submitted by several mission support groups
for many of the analog measurements. The capability to handle multiple
limit scans for a measurement was beyond the ability of the baseline
analog scan program. An attempt was made to coordinate a consistent set
of limits between the various requestors with the majority of the con-
flicts resolved; however, because there were some conflicts that could
not be resolved, the decision was made to accept only the parameter
limits submitted by the MSGL for his system.
The problems with the data network continued through the launch
timeframe. At the time of SL-I launch, ADDT could be transmitted, but
not at the level anticipated or at a level necessary to satisfy the data
requirements. The data requirements were fulfilled by relying primarily
on real-time data and expanding the support provided by the Mission
Operations Planning System (MOPS) terminals. While ADDT could be trans-
mitted electronically at a reduced rate, it was primarily available only
on selected batches during the early days of the mission. To expidite
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Table II.D-I. Baseline Program Capabilities and Major Constraints
BASELINE PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
i. Read routine for ADDT
2. Reduce event data
a. Bilevels, single bit discretes
b. ATM Digital Computer (ATMDC) bit pattern
c. ATMI)C single bit
3. ATMDC and 8K backup processor
4. Switch selector processor
5. Input processor
6. Output processor
7. Limit sense, analog or ATMDC
8. Change limits by event detection
9. Deactivate measurements by event detection
i0. Activate measurements by event detection
ii. Key special processing by AUTOSCAN flags
MAJOR CONSTRAINTS
I. Accept ADDT
2. Progranlned for UNIVAC 1108 Exec VIII computer
3. Huntsville/Slidell computer compatibility
4. Maximum of 65K word core storage
5. Modular
6. No analysis/evaluation
7. High interest areas detected/flagged
8. Intended for Saturn Workshop telemetry data
9. Limits could be changed during mission (48 hour turnaround time)
i0. Execute as ADDT becomes available
II. No general purpose module for cyclic, slope of consumable data
types
12. Requested units of the scanning limits must be in agreement with
MSFC calibration data tape
13. Airlock and ATM telemetry data systems are run independently
14. Requested scanning limits should be in agreement with limits
requested by the system's responsible office
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the receipt of data, a scheme was employed whereby tapes were flown from
JSC to MSFC for processing. These and other data problems impacted use
of the AUTOSCAN program to a large degree. It was not until May 20, 1973
(six days after SL-I launch) that any AUTOSCAN output became available and
not until June 14, 1973 that it became available for most batches of data.
The decision to expand the support provided by the MOPS terminals to
help fulfill the data requirements included installing additional terminals
and manning these terminals around the clock. To help relieve the manpower
problem created by this expansion of effort, the AUTOSCAN Task Team supplied
four personnel to man the MOPS terminals. The evaluation of the AUTOSCAN
program performance continued with half the required manpower. In the early
AUTOSCAN outputs, erratic and erroneous behavior was noted on many measure-
ments. On May 21, 1973, one week after SL-I launch, an information sheet
indicating this behavior was made available to AUTOSCAN requesters and was
later supplemented by at least two more information sheet directly relating
to noise.
Correlating data were obtained and reviewed and it was established
that the AUTOSCAN program was accurately reflecting the input data. As a
result, the AUTOSCAN output was used as a tool to research the problems of
the input data, attempting to isolate the various data network problems,
and to serve as a basic measure of quality for the data. In late June 1973
investigations of the data problems were finally initiated by other groups
and on July 5 and 6, 1973 the first of several "data verification" tests
were conducted that involved the entire data system and included review of
data by JSC, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and MSFC.
The AUTOSCAN Task Team was requested to participate in these activi-
ties and represented the major part of the effort from MSFC. The review of
the data from the data verification tests was somewhat limited because only
data received and processed at MSFC were available. The review generally
consisted of using "octal" dumps of the data for certain selected measure-
ments and researching these data for items indicating anomalous or strange
responses. Items noted by the AUTOSCAN review were further researched by
using various special processing data to attempt to reach conclusions con-
cerning the cause of the anomalous behavior noted in the data. In some of
the early reviews, support of the MSGLs was enlisted to determine expected
behavior for measurements and to attempt to correlate data as seen on the
consoles with the ADDT data.
The initial test and subsequent review produced 36 problems or anoma-
lous behavior occurrences (26 ATM and I0 AM). In an intercenter meeting
at JSC in mid-July, seven of these items were presented and four discrep-
ancy investigations were initiated by JSC. Late in July, in another inter-
center meeting at JSC, an additional five items were presented. At this
last meeting a total of eight recommendations were made by MSFC and seven
of these were implemented.
The investigation made by JSC also uncovered many problems and caused
fourteen Discrepancy Reports (DRs) to be generated with actions being
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assigned to both JSCand GSFC. The classes of problems generally agreed
with those noted at MSFC. The DRswere concerned with such things as
improper handling of data by the Mission Data Retrieval System (MDRS),
operational procedure problems, Decommutator/Remote Site Command Com-
puter (DECOM/RSCC) software interface problems, Remote Site Data Pro-
cessor (RSDP) software interface problems, automotive interference at
Vanguard, etc. Changes were implemented to resolve these problems.
A decision was made at MSFC to delete the AUTOSCAN Analog and Event
Scans and replace them with an "Events Summary Program" in an effort to
process more data. The "Events Summary Program" was the AUTOSCAN pro-
gram with the analog scan capability removed.
During September 1973, an additional series of data verification
tests were performed. The interim work from the first verification
tests, plus the resulting work from these September tests, did produce
some improvement in the quality of the data. Unfortunately the effort
was primarily centered on the ATM and principally on ATM Auxiliary Stor-
age and Playback (ASAP). As a result, the quality of the ASAP data had
improved considerably while A_i real-time and AM data showed virtually
no improvement.
The review of the "Events Summary Program" output continued and
other data were reviewed for problems. Avoid Verbal Order (AVOs) forms
were submitted to obtain correlating data to research suspected problems
and attempt to isolate the causes.
In mid November 1973 activities were initiated to form a "Data
Quality" group that would review the incoming data using various inter-
mediate processing outputs and provide an overall monitoring and ad-
vice function for the data processing at MSFC. Four members of the
AUTOSCAN Task Team were assigned to staff this effort on November 16,
1973. Again, the primary emphasis was on the ATM ASAP data. The
effort produced some improvement in the data and spotlighted numerous
deficiencies in the data processing system at MSFC. The support of
this effort continued through February i0, 1974, two days after SL-4
splashdown.
b. Conclusions and Recommendations. The quality of the input
data for the AUTOSCAN program caused the program to produce erroneous
data, resulting in an output that was more voluminous than planned.
Additionally, the long lead time before the output became available
decreased the usefulness of the program output to the data users.
Normally a minimum of three days was required from the time data was
received at MSFC until the output was distributed. Minor refinements
were made to the AUTOSCAN program during the mission to improve either
computer time or to reduce volume of output.
While the AUTOSCAN program did not totally fulfill its intended
function due to problems beyond its control, data users classed it as a
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potentially valuable tool. In view of the increasing amount of data
from space vehicles as systems become more sophisticated, it is felt
that a program employing the AUTOSCAN concept would be highly desir-
able for use with future programs.
For future programs using computer review of down-linked teleme-
try data similar to the AUTOSCAN concept, the following recommenda-
tions should be given serious consideration:
(i) An AUTOSCAN type of program should be an integral
part of the data management system. All the data management functions
- AUTOSCAN, data acquisition, data processing, data distribution, etc.
- need to be integrated into a more unified organization, operating
under a single management area, and, if possible, under the leadership
of one principal group.
(2) Checkout and debugging of the overall data transmis-
sion system and software should be initiated early with a high degree
of involvement by all associated groups. The data system must be in
good operational readiness at the time of launch. It is not possible
to perform adequate debugging operations on the data system after mis-
sion initiation.
(3) A rigidly controlled data base should be built for
early checkout phases of the program (simulated input data tape). The
behavior of each measurement on this tape should be known immediately
(data values vs times, discrete occurrences vs times, bit patterns of
digital measurements vs times, etc.). This would allow faster review
of the outputs with problem isolation and debugging of the program be-
fore use with data of unknown quality.
3. Corona Analysis. During the period between 1961 and 1969,
several space vehicles that used high voltage for power generation and
electronic sensing devices experienced one or more anomalies resulting
from the effects of corona. These anomalies were primarily caused by
malfunction of sensitive circuits as evidenced by erroneous data, loss
of data, loading of high impedance power supplies, insulation deterior-
ation, production of noxious gases and odors, and/or eventual voltage
breakdown resulting in system loss.
Based upon these past experiences and the fact that Skylab was the
most sophisticated manned space vehicle to be flown, NASA/MSFC initia-
ted a corona investigation and assessment effort to determine the sus-
ceptibility of the flight designed hardware to the effects of corona.
In addition, the survey was to identify tests and analysis required to
verify the need for design modifications and operational constraints
procedures for the hardware.
a. Premission Analysis. Of the 437 module equipment and
experiment items scheduled for flight that were surveyed, 44 items were
determined to be corona-susceptible. Eighteen of these items were
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identified as requiring further tests and/or analysis. Three of the 18
items were modified during prototype development to reduce susceptibil-
ity. The other 26 items were determined to be flightworthy.
(i) Susceptible Equipment. All susceptible equipment was
analyzed and categorized as shown in the Table II.D-2 summary. Many
items were successfully used on Apollo in applications similar to those
intended for Skylab. Other items successfully passed qualification tests
to prove life capability. Only six items, shown in the "RESTRICTED"
column of Table II.D-2 required further effort. All items were either
cleared for unrestricted use or had operational constraints procedures
defined.
(2) Susceptible Experiments. All susceptible experiments
were analyzed and categorized as shown in Table II.D-3 summary. Only
two of the experiments shown were initially considered corona-free, but
all were eventually cleared for use with imposed operational restric-
tions.
(3) Investigation Results. The results of the detailed
analysis of susceptible equipment and experiments are shown in Tables
II.D-4 and II.D-5 respectively. The recommended general mission con-
straints procedures for all itmes that were corona susceptible at
launch are summarized in Table II.D-6.
b. Mission Performance. It was recommended in the Corona
Investigation Final Report Revision and Addendum A (5-2935-HSV-554,
dated February 7, 1973) that the AM 10-watt transmitter be energized
only after the AM Truss pressure was below 0.66 N/m 2 (5 x 10 -3 torr).
The premission ground test data indicated that it would require at
least 12 hours after SL-I liftoff for the pressure to be at 1.5 N/m 2
(i.I x 10 -2 torr). The actual pressures in the AM truss area for the
first three hours after launch were in excess of 0.66 N/m 2 (5 x 10 -3
torr) and exceeded i x 10-3 torr for the first 14 hours. Actual pres-
sure profile data indicated that localized pressure about the 10-watt
transmitter was in excess of that for the vehicle, due to packaging
which restricted a rapid depressurization as experienced by the ex-
plored vehicle surfaces.
Since the AM 10-watt transmitter was activated during this high
pressure period (as predicted), corona bursts resulted, as recognized
by losses in power and data. Rapid action by the ground personnel in
deactivating the 10-watt transmitter and activating the 2-watt trans-
mitter corrected the problem. The 2-watt transmitter was used until
power localized pressures were reached for 10-watt transmitter opera-
tion.
On days 5 and 7, the OWS was depressurized, resulting in exces-
sive gas being ejected about the AM/MDA/A_ external hardware. The
ejected gas was far enough from the Radio Frequency (RF) components
to be no hazard. As recommended, however, all future ejections were
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at a reduced rate, thus eliminating any possibility of high voltage
equipment corona related or induced problems.
Six days after SL-I launch, a meeting was held at MSFC to discuss
the corona susceptibility aspects of adding a solar shield to the OWS
for thermal control. Since the shield was to be a large metallic sheet,
it would eventually become charged by the space plasma. This charge
would be at a different potential than the OWS tank skin. This effect,
coupled with the solar wind effects, would cause the shield to move to-
ward the tank skin. At the critical pressure-spacing product, corona
bursts could have occurred. Construction of the shield had two corona
reducing features:
- A mylar insulating layer was placed between the metal-
lic portions of the shield and the OWS tank skin; and
- Nonconducting nylon ribbing was used.
In addition, only aluminum foil was used (i/4-mil mylar with very thin
aluminum (AI) coating) and the conductive thermal control paint (SI3G)
would face the sun. Aluminum rods, used to support the shield, would
collect the charge on the shield surface and dissipate it to an insig-
nificant level before reaching the tank skin.
c. Conclusions and Recommendations. Early development of
corona specifications defining pressure and voltage design and test
criteria, eliminates the need for much of the postdesign tests and
analyses expended for Skylab. However, analyses by high-voltage
experts armed Skylab managers with detailed facts regarding Skylab
equipment and experiment hardware, which resulted in a corona-free
mission.
Where equipment cannot be designed or protected against corona
occurrences, it is imperative that predefined operational constraints
procedures be strictly observed.
4. Other Special Engineering Analysis. Other special engineer-
ing analysis efforts were performed on Skylab. Several significant
studies were safety oriented and are summarized in Section V.C in
this report. Studies which were performed as part of a particular
system development are summarized in the respective system paragraph
in this report.
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E. Structural and Mechanical Systems
The initial AAP program considered such items as experiments on
space-erectable or expandable structures, deployable booms and mechan-
isms, data recovery vehicles from orbit, development of new docking
devices, spacecraft on tethers, and artificial gravity spin-up of the
entire Orbiting Assembly (OA). Structural dynamics analyses were made
on flexible, 200-ft booms with low frequencies; small deployable space-
craft tethered by long cables to the workshop; and also the dynamics of
large spinning assemblies with the CSM attached by cables or booms.
By December 1966 the concept of an MDA, which was considerably
larger than the AM, was accepted as baseline for all structural studies.
It should be noted that a shorter MDA or AM with a somewhat larger
diameter was proposed; however, the former concept was accepted.
Structural modules identified and accepted as baseline to the program
were:
LEM - Lunar Explorer Module to be used as unmanned carrier/
docking device for ATM.
ATM - Apollo Telescope Mount.
M/)A - Multiple Docking Adapter with one axial and four radial
docking ports (two radial ports were to be used for
emergency or convenience only).
AM - Airlock Module for transition from MDA to S-IVB through
the Spacecraft LEM Adapter (SLA).
SLA - Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter.
S-IVB - "Wet" Second Stage of S-lB.
BOOM - 100-ft boom (originally considered being deployed from
S-IVB before the MDA concept).
RM - Resupply Module
LM&SS RACK - Lunar Mapping and Scientific Survey rack.
SOLAR ARRAYS - Only for the ATM.
CABLES - For possible reeling-out of ATM from LEM or CSM from
S-IVB.
It should be noted that the requirement for an artificial gravity
of at least 1/6 was baseline at this time.
The principal activity was addressed to hard-tethered (boom) and
soft-tethered configurations, design of MDA, and mission requirements.
By July 1967 the following structural activity had been completed:
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STUDY CONCLUSION
Cable Dynamic Studies for Configurations of Soft-Tethered
ATM, CSM, and LEM
Discarded
S-IVB to be used as Wet Workshop at 260 Nautical Mile(n mi) Accepted
Orbit using Saturn I-B (S-IB)
Unmanned Docking of LEM/ATM to M_DA Accepted
Boom Configuration, Hard-Tether LEM/ATM Backup to
System
By May 1968, MDA longeron design was frozen and all work on the
Lunar Module (LM) and ATMwas stopped due to design changes. This was
primarily in the subsystem area but also due to structural load problems.
Other changes included the following:
- Redesign of SLA due to acoustics,
- ATM canister load-carrying (had been nonload-carrying) and
attachment of packages,
- Refinement of orbital/launch locks (had been primarily a
one-lock system),
- Structural beef-up of LEM at LEM/ATM interface,
- Problem identified for latch loads North American Rockwell
(NAR)/JSC stated possible 350-400K loads, but probably were
conservative,
OWS-Solar Array System (SAS) hinged to allow always face sun,
- Unmanned docking of LEM/ATM,
- Deletion of two radial ports: LEM/ATM port with crew instal-
led probe; and 90 degrees away, spare CSM port with drogue
but not electrical, due primarily to mission cutdown and
weight savings,
No testing requirement for RM.
Structural work proceeded from definition of load programs. For
dynamics, this included docking, latching, acoustical, and design loads
for experiment and commodity packages.
By April 1969 the OWS structural model was still undefined and
docking latch loading was appearing as a real problem. By May 1969,
influence coefficients for the axial port were completed with MDA beam
stiffness with radial port influence. A sophisticated docking program
was also deemed necessary.
In the summer of 1969 the dry workshop decision was made and the
LM eliminated from the program. The final configuration was firmed
by November 1969 using a folding truss to rotate the ATM rack 90
degrees after orbit injection.
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I. Design Requirements. After advent of the dry workshop, struc-
tural design philosophy reflected over-design of the structure to elim-
inate structural testing. The policy was then defined in the CRS that
new structure designed for the Skylab payload would be stress-analyzed
with a factor of safety of 2 on yield and 3 on ultimate and therefore
no static tests of the structure would be required. Also, because pre-
viously designed structure was to be used, it was stated that factors
of safety of I.I on yield and 1.4 on ultimate would be used in the
stress analysis on manned structures. These limits were confirmed by
static testing and factors of safety of i.I on yield and 1.25 on ulti-
mate on unmanned structures. All module contractors were requested to
use these guidelines in writing their CEI specifications.
These requirements were met in the design of the MDA and the PS.
The AM structure was an existing design negotiated early in the AAP
when a factor of safety of 1.36 on ultimate and no requirement for
yield were permitted. Contract waivers and deviations would be allowed,
recorded, and approved in Appendix K of the CRS. Also, verification of
strength was made by static tests of the AM/MDA on the original static
test articles. Waivers also granted on subsequent design modification
to this test structure, therefore, new overall static tests were not
run.
a. Design Criteria Documents
(i) Cluster Requirements Specification. A single docu-
ment that identified the design criteria for all contractors. This
document included the authority to grant deviations to contractors
with structures designed to different criteria. Thus, Appendix K to
the CRS became an official record of deviations.
(2) IN-ASTN-AD-70-2. Served as the preliminary loads
criteria reference. It was a first-cut analysis to provide data for
initial design of the low-frequency primary structure. It consisted
of the dynamic analysis of a mass-spring model and it served the pur-
pose of getting the program started by supplying design launch loads.
Later, in June 1972, an analysis was begun that included the entire
Skylab payload using refined models of each module. Good correlation
was obtained from this analysis. The document also provided uncoupled
and longitudinal loads.
(3) IN-ASTN-AD-70-1. The loads criteria document for
all internal and external components mounted on Sky lab structure. The
document provided the initial criteria for the design of packages and
other components. The analysis considered the weight of each component
and where and how it was mounted; i.e., the MDA was divided into eight
zones and loads were specified for longeron or frame-mounted packages.
It was found later that the loads specified in the document were
a good base for preliminary design. Some exceptions were uncovered as
a result of acoustical testing that showed the criteria used in some
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componentswere too low. A requalification test had to be applied in
these instances.
The shock criteria were questioned by JSCas too conservative;
testing at MSFCverified the criteria.
In somecases, deviations to the criteria were granted where de-
tail analysis of the zone would show conservatism in the loads.
(4) IN-ASTN-AD-71-10. Published later to cover orbital
loads as they apply to all structures on the cluster.
2. Functional Description. The following paragraphs describe
the history of each Skylab module during its development. Vibro-
acoustical tests were performed by JSC on three Skylab assemblies.
The first assembly tested was the OWS Dynamic Test Article. The Pay-
load Assembly (PA) was tested in two configurations; launch and orbi-
tal. The launch configuration consisted of the Fixed Airlock Shroud
(FAS), PS, AM, MI)A, Deployment Assembly (DA), and ATM. The orbital
configuration was comprised of the FAS, AM, MDA, DA, a docked CSM, and
a deployed ATM with no solar arrays. The results of these tests are
discussed in the following paragraphs. In addition, static testing
was performed on some of the individual modules and subassemblies.
Descriptions and results of these tests are also given in the indivi-
dual module discussion.
a. Payload Shroud. The PS provided: an aerodynamic fairing;
a structural support for the ATM during launch; an environmental shield
with purge capability to maintain positive internal pressure for pro-
tection of enclosed modules, and a noncontaminating separation and
jettison system. From a variety of proposed PS configuration concepts,
the two configurations selected for detail evaluation were:
(I) Over-the Nose, and
(2) Segmented Separation.
The Over-the-Nose shroud was to be jettisoned axially, with or
without rails, using thrusters. The basic configuration for the con-
cept was applicable only to the WWS. The Segmented Separation concept
contained four 90-degree segments to be pyrotechnically severed and
jettisoned laterally on orbit (see Figure II.E-I). Both configurations
were technically feasible and the primary reason for selecting the seg-
mented configuration was programmatic, based on cost and schedule.
The split shell had a potential advantage that deserves mentioning
for possible future application. If needed, its design would be trans-
latable to separation of the PS during ascent and from the standpoint
of performance, recontact on orbit would not be a problem. An impor-
tant feature of the segmented concept used in the Flight Article was
the pyrotechnic system used to separate the shroud. Reliability
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was proved to be superior for all the fragments induced by its operation
were contained and disposed of, thus preventing contamination of the
payload.
The design criteria called for high factors of safety of 2.0 and
3.0 with no test; therefore a conservative, simplified analysis was
performed on the structure. Testing was limited to ATM support areas,
jettison-separation concepts, and the vibro-acoustical test on the PA
(refer to paragraph II.E.2.j for further discussion). The tests demon-
strated completely satisfactory performance. The analysis verified the
integrity of the structure for the design flight loads.
b. Deployment Assembly. The DA rotated the ATM 90-degrees
and supported it in the orbital configuration (see Figure II.E-2). The
assembly did not have a static test and a factor of safety of 3 was
used in the analysis. Of particular importance was the functional test
to demonstrate the deployment of the 25,000-pound ATM. An air-bearing
system was designed to simulate the zero-g environment. A low energy
spring/cable package deployed the ATM. A unique spring-loaded latch
mechanism locked the ATM in the deployed position (see Figure II.E-3).
Camming action retracted the latch as the ATM/DA approached the deployed
position. Just before the ATM/DA reached the deployed position, cam-
ming action and spring force preloaded the latch which eliminated latch
movement due to loads generated by the Thruster Attitude Control System
(TACS) firing. A ratchet locked the cam, latching the ATM/DA in the
deployed position. During launch, the ATM was attached to the DA
through four support points with the rigidizing mechanisms in the
floating position. Following PS separation, the springs of the rigid-
izing mechanism retracted and rigidized the ATM to the DA interface
(See Figures II.E-4 and II.E-5).
A stress analysis on primary structure was performed and is docu-
mented in the Strength Summary Report, IOM33111. The adequacy of the
structure to carry design loads was demonstrated by this analysis. The
DA was also included as part of the JSC Vibro-acoustical Analysis.
(Refer to paragraph II.E.2.j for further discussion).
c. Multiple Docking Adapter. The MDA evolved from the
original 1966 version of 65 inches in diameter by 38 inches in length
to the final module of 120 inches in diameter by 163 inches in length
(See Figure II.E-6). Some of the structural features required in trans-
forming the MDA from the WWS configuration to Dry Workshop (DWS) will be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
The longerons were designed to accommodate equipment that was to
be transferred to the OWS. The equipment had to fit through the AM/OWS
hatch and was relatively light. When the change to the DWS occurred and
the EREP experiments were added, permanent equipment such as film
vaults, experiment packages, and the ATM Control and Display (C&D) Con-
sole were installed in the MDA. The heavier weights of the equipment,
as well as higher CSM docking loads, prompted major redesigns in the
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structure. The longerons had to be reinforced with longitudinal splices;
the docking port frames were strengthened; and an intermediate frame was
added between the ports and the Structural Transition Section (STS)
interface frames. A support truss for the S194 L-Band antenna for EREP
was added in 1971 in the outside shell.
The MDA was subjected to both static and dynamic tests. The dyn-
amic test consisted of the static test article with no internal pres-
sure. It was subjected to three phases of test, i.e., acoustical, low
frequency vehicle dynamics, and modal surveys. The objectives of the
dynamic test were to verify the structural assembly and its design
criteria; to obtain modal response and impedance data, and to qualify
the hardware for flight. The test was conducted at JSC as part of the
PA. As a result of this test, weight classifications in two environ-
mental subzones were changed, nine new environmental subzones were
added, and no component requalification was required.
The static test consisted of subjecting the MDA shell to nine
loading conditions. The MI)A was tested to proof and leak pressure, to
pressure and docking and latching loads, and to local loading condi-
tions. The objective of these tests was to verify the structural inte-
grity, to determine deflections and stresses, and to verify analytical
methods. No structural failures occurred during the dynamic and static
tests and the structural integrity of the MDA was demonstrated. Exten-
sive analysis was performed to substantiate the design of the MDA.
d. Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM). This module was designed
to accommodate solar astronomy experiments, provide the SWS or OA with
attitude control and partial electrical power. It consisted of a rack,
an experiment canister, four solar arrays, a C&D console housed in the
MDA, and supporting subsystems (See Figure II.E-7).
Originally, the ATM Rack had the only SAS. It had an Orbital Lock
System that was retractable. The launch configuration was inverted from
the Skylab mode, with the solar end facing aft to the S-IB launch
vehicle. The CSM was to dock to the LM/ATM, pull it out, and then in-
sert it in orbit and let it dock to the WWS MI)A. After the decision
to change to DWS, some design changes came about because of inverting
the launch mode and the higher environments from S-V vehicle.
The ATM was subjected to vibro-acoustical testing at JSC. As a
result of this test the test criteria were increased in two environ-
mental subzones. Requalification test was recommended for the Control
Moment Gyros (CMGs). Other components were not requalified. Also,
launch engine shutdown sequence was changed from 4-0 to 2-2. Static
testing was performed on single structure and is described next.
e. Rack. This structure was originally conceived as s uni-
versal payload support system. There were three or four payloads under
consideration. The first payload was Project Thermo that, coupled with
the requirement to support the LEMAscent Stage, was responsible for
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dictating the Rack's octagonal shape. Other payloads included the
LM&SS or Department of Defense (DOD) classified payload. Each differ-
ent requirement imposed on the single structure dictated the design of
separate portions of the rack, resulting in an over-designed assembly
for the Skylab mission. At first, the rack had a truss configuration
made from vertical beams, upper and lower rings, and diagonal members.
Later, shear webs were added to the panels behind the outriggers to
support the CMGs. As black boxes were added to the other panels, shear
webs were also installed there. Another late addition was the Solar
Array Support Ring for support of the solar arrays and to provide hard
points for ground handling. Original design included an Extra Vehicu-
lar Activity (EVA) strut as one of the diagonals. This strut was re-
quired for launch loads and was designed to move out of the way with the
aid of a pyrotechnic device when in orbit. Because of being a single-
point failure item it was removed and the structure was proved adequate
with minor changes. The structural integrity of this assembly was ver-
ified by test and analysis. The rack was subjected to transportation
and flight loads with successful results.
f. Spar/Canister. This center package supporting the ATM ex-
periments consisted of a cruciform spar evolved by the cylindrical can-
ister. The spar was made from one-inch-thick aluminum plate to satisfy
the requirements of the ATM experiments Principal Investigators (Pls)
for an optical bench. When the weight was found to be excessive, about
40 percent of the material was removed with 2-inch diameter lightening
holes. Originally, the center package was attached rigidly to the rack;
the pointing requirement within the package came later. The structural
integrity of this assembly was successfully verified by test and analy-
sis. The spar/canister was tested to flight and transportation loads.
g. Cable Tray. The structural integrity of this assembly
was verified by test and analysis. During the static test a failure
was experienced on one of the fittings. Redesign and retest demonstra-
ted the integrity of the structure. This was the only failure experi-
enced by any ATM component.
h. Gimbal Ring Assembly (GRA). The requirement was to have
a rigid support during launch and a flexible, frictionless system on
orbit. The concept of gimbal rings with flexible actuators for pivots
fulfilled this requirement. The structural integrity of this assembly
was demonstrated by test and analysis.
i. Solar Arrays. The Solar Array structure was subjected to
static testing by applying limit design loads for the launch and orbi-
tal configurations. For the orbital configuration, the test had to be
stopped shortly before it was planned for the in-plane loading condi-
tion due to excessive deformation. Because of the conservative load
the structure was not redesigned. The structural integrity of the
assembly was also demonstrated by extensive analysis.
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j. Airlock Module (AM). The AMwas required to provide:
(i) A habitable, interconnecting pressure vessel between
the MDAand the OWS,
(2) The atmospheric nitrogen supply,
(3) Intervehicular activities (IVAs) support,
(4) An airlock to support EVAs, and
(5) Structural mechanical equipment to support the vari-
ous functional systems (See Figure II.E-8).
The as-flown AMwas a carry-over from the WWSconfiguration to Skylab.
At the time of change-over, one of the four AM trusses had a removable
link; two others were changed to this configuration to allow mounting
of six nitrogen bottles on the three removable link trusses. The MDA
interface ring was strengthened and gussets were added to the STS
stringers. Other modifications such as penetrations, welds, and re-
vised rivet patterns were also accomplished.
The requirements for this structure grew through the evolution
period resulting in three elements, i.e., the STS, the tunnel, and the
trusses. Of outstanding design value were the film transfer booms.
These tubular elements stored in the FASextended 25 feet allowing the
transfer of film cassettes from the EVAhatch to the ATMEVAstation
and back. The flexible tunnel connecting the AM with the OWS was de-
signed to provide the continuity of the pressurized passageway between
the two modules without transferring any loads. Four double-pane win-
dows were installed in the STS with each pane capable of containing
the differential pressure of the cabin.
Structural integrity of the airlock tunnel and STS was demonstra-
ted with Static Test Article No. I vehicle mated to the Static Test
MDA. The structure was subjected to 12.4 psid and to ultimate load
simulating WWS launch and ascent loads. The launch and ascent loads
for the DWS configuration were later verified by analysis as reported
in "Verification of J-i Launch and Ascent Structural Capabilities
Based on Evaluation of STA-I Static Test Results", McDonnell Douglas
Astronautics Company-Eastern Division (MDAC-ED) report E-0517. Struc-
tural capability for subsequent weight increases was verified by analy-
sis and reported in "Effect of AM/MDA Properties Change on AM Structural
Capabilities", MDAC-ED report E-0654. The AM was also subjected to
vibro-acoustical testing. The following were recommended for the AM,
PS, DA, and FAS: an increase in the test criteria in eleven environ-
mental subzones (three new ones were added); special environmental cri-
teria were established for seven components, and four components were
recommended for requalification tests.
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A stress analysis was performed on major structure using finite
element computer techniques. The results showed the AM structure
adequate in all areas except for a local section of the trusses. Sub-
sequent component testing verified that the structure would not fail
under the design loads.
The AM/STS was verified by proof and leak pressure testing of the
mated sections to 8.7 psig. Later, when the AM was mated to the MDA,
two leak tests were performed.
k. Fixed Airlock Shroud (FAS). This structure provided sup-
port and transferred load to the Instrumentation Unit (IU) for the PS,
DA, AM, Oxygen (02) Bottles, four antennae, and EVA support equipment.
The criteria were no test and factors of safety of 2.0 and 3.0 on ul-
timate. Analytical verification on primary structure resulted in over-
all positive margins of safety except for the outside supports of the
02 bottles. Re-analysis showed the supports good for a smaller load
factor than original design criteria, but still acceptable for flight
(See paragraph II.E.2.j for vibro-acoustical testing).
The filament-wound 02 bottles may be singled out for their size
on a manned spacecraft. These six pressure vessels, approximately
four feet in diameter by s_x Zeet in height, underwent extensive de-
velopment and qualification testing programs. The two discone antennae
extending 40 feet when deployed presented interesting features for zero-
g simulation during testing.
i. Instrument Unit (IU). The functions of the IU were to
provide mounting surfaces for electronic components, and transfer the
load between the FAS and the OWS. The Skylab IU was identical to the
Saturn except for relocation of some of the internal equipment. The
Saturn testing was accepted as verification of the structural capabil-
ity of the unit. Extensive analysis verified the local effects of
equipment mounting and somewhat different environments. The vibro-
acoustical test of the PA caused 23 components to be retested. Two
additional small-scale static tests were performed to add confidence
in the design.
Some of the major structural changes that the unit went through
from its Saturn configuration were:
(I) The insulation was changed to baked cork; and
(2) Bonded doublers were added to the OWS interface.
The lower factor of safety plus ATM contamination requirements forced
the insulation redesign and a foil cover was added to the insulation.
The higher Skylab tension loads introduced the bonded doublers and
testing was required to verify the integrity of the bond. Other major
studies for this unit because of the long duration of the mission and
the change in environments, included a micrometeoroid assessment,
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thermal analysis of the effects of temperature on material degradation,
and sealing of coolants for the thermo conditioning panels. None of
the above had any major repercussions on the design.
m. Orbital Workshop(OWS). This modulewas a S-IVB stage con-
verted into the primary living quarters for the crew (See Figure II.E-9).
The OWScontained all the food, water, sleeping, eating, hygienic facil-
ities, biomedical experiments, trash airlock, etc. Because the OWSwas
a modified S-IVB stage, manyof the componentswere not requalified.
All subassemblies were extensively re-analyzed with particular emphasis
in the areas of new and modified structure.
Because of the manymodifications, a complete vibro-acoustical test
was performed on the entire assembly including the After Interstage. The
objectives of this test were to verify acoustically-induced vibration
design and test criteria, to demonstrate structural integrity of brack-
etry and secondary structure, and to verify the analytical models used
for dynamic load analyses. Acoustical and low frequency sinusoidal
vibration tests were performed on the DynamicTest Article (DTA). The
DTAwas a full scale, high-fidelity flight article simulation. The
results of the test were the verification of the dynamic test criteria
for OWScomponentsfor most cases, and revised criteria evolved for
others. A summaryof the work performed in each subassembly is given
in the following paragraphs.
(i) Forward Skirt. Major additions to the forward skirt
included the supports for the solar arrays and a thermal shield. Test-
ing of the S-IVB/V forward skirt was accepted as qualifying for the OWS
configuration. Extensive analysis was used to verify the integrity of
the structure. The thermal shield was analyzed and a representative
portion subjected to acoustical testing.
(2) Habitation Tank. Manyalterations had to be imple-
mented to covert the S-IVB propellant tank to the crew habitation and
experiment station. The most significant alterations were the penetra-
tions on the cyclinder tank wall for the two Scientific Airlocks (SALs),
the wardroomwindow, the access panel, the mounting of equipment through
two floors, and the support structure for the water containers. Other
packageswere mounteddirectly to the tank. All these modifications to
the original structure prompted dynamic and static load testing of a
production type test article. The structure was also verified by ex-
tensive analysis.
The Static Test Article (STA) was subject to seven cases of com-
bined loading including ground winds with the access panel removedand
critical launch conditions. The purpose of these tests was to verify
the structural integrity of the cylindrical portion and to determine
the effects of rigging the meteoroid shield. As a result of the test
it was determined that no general instability or local buckling occurred
and no damageor permanentdeformation was observed.
11-71
Radiator
Common bulkhead
LOX tankf
SAS
Forward skirt
Aft ski rt
SAS TACS
LH2 tank
Forward
dome
Figure II.E-9 Orbital Workshop Major Structures Breakdown
II-72
After the tests, the STA was subjected to an internal pressure of
32 psig. The objective was to demonstrate the structural integrity of
the habitation area tank cylinder penetrations and the common bulkhead
trash airlock penetration, and to demonstrate that there was no detri-
mental yielding or other damage. The test demonstrated all the objec-
tives except for the failure of a butterfly hinge in the meteoroid
shield. A redesign of the hinge was completed after the test.
Some of the interesting design innovations on the habitation tank
are described here:
The entry hatch and its pressure equalization system presented a
requirement of designing a handle that could not open before the pres-
sure was equalized on both sides of the hatch. It also had to open
rapidly once equalization was achieved, and be under control to pre-
vent damage to the dome in the open position.
Of particular interest was the distribution of equipment in the
crew quarters. Many studies were performed on how to arrange the masses
without exceeding the capability of individual tank wall fasteners and
how to obtain a uniform weight distribution in the periphery of the two
floors. The floor grid configuration was adaptible to different equip-
ment restraints and at the same time provided an astronaut foot restraint
pattern. The design was accomplished with minimum weight expenditure,
in spite of no test design criteria being available. The conical sup-
port structure used for both floors and water containers had to be de-
signed to take fore-aft loads while allowing the cylinder tank wall to
expand due to pressure. The joint with the tank wall was made flexible
to bend as a hinge while the cone wall had to carry compression loads
without buckling.
Another major design feature was the reinforcement of the tank
wall at the penetrations of the windows and access door. This was
accomplished with a minimum loss of tank buckling load-carrying capabil-
ity.
Finally, the trash airlock presented an interesting linkage sys-
tem allowing the ejection of disposables without impairing the seal.
(3) Aft Skirt. The aft skirt was qualified during the
Saturn program. Major changes were the tie-down supports for the solar
arrays and supports for the TACS structure. These modifications did
not degrade the structural capability of the aft skirt and therefore
retesting was not deemed necessary. Extensive analysis verified the
integrity of the structure.
(4) Aft Structure. This was the S-IVB thrust structure
which was modified to accommodate the TACS nitrogen gas storage spheres
and the refrigeration system radiator. The aft and intermediate frames
were both changed to provide the capability of carrying the new loads.
Only vibration testing was performed on the new structure. Factors of
2.0 and 3.0 were used for static load in the analysis of the structure.
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(5) Aft Interstage. The OWSAft Interstage was almost
identical to the S-IVB with only minor modifications. Therefore, the
structural integrity was established primarily by comparing the load-
ing environment of the OWSto that of the S-IVB, and to the structural
capability determined from the S-IVB/V qualification and development
tests.
(6) Solar Arrays. Extensive testing and analysis was
used to verify the design compliance of the structure. Static test
was performed on the beamfairing, the beamfairing hinge, and the wing
stabilizer beam-to-beamfairing hinge assembly. Both launch and orbi-
tal loads were applied to the test articles. Vibro-acoustical testing
was applied using 70-I criteria (paragraph ll.E.l.a.(3)). This criteria
was too low in someareas and retest was required. As results of the
tests, someparts failed, which required a redesign. Retest and a new
math model were required before the unit was qualified for flight. The
design of this unit is high lighted by the compactness of the solar
arrays in the stowed configuration and the efficient functioning of
the controlled rate of deployment.
3. Design Verification. Dynamics and stress analyses were per-
formed in the following areas: Vibration Analyses, Loads Analyses,
Acoustical Analyses, Dynamic Test Instrumentation/Plans, Mission Sup-
port-Contingency, Stress Analysis, and Studies.
Principally, the dynamics effort consisted of generating math
models and subsequent updates of these analytical models due to design
changes, structural module redefinition, impact of test data, and
sophistication of models. The following paragraphs describe the effort
on the DWS program.
a. Vibration Analyses. Vibration analyses were performed on
numerous Skylab configurations, both baseline and contingency. Prin-
cipal Sky lab configurations analyzed were:
(i)
(2)
(3)
Baseline - Primary Effort
Launch configurations
- Deployed orbital configurations
- CSM docked to orbital configurations
Baseline - Secondary Effort
Orbital configuration with arrays stowed
Orbital configuration with ATM arrays deployed
Orbital configuration, ATM not deployed
Baseline Contingency
- CSM docked to axial and radial MLDA ports
CSM docked only to radial MDA port
(4) Analyses Updates. Analyses updates were completed
and modal property data generated in support of loads and control
11-74
studies. As analyses were generated during design and test phases,
numerousanalyses updates were accomplished. The principal updates
were associated with:
- DWSChangefrom WWS
- Sophistication of ATMDAand primary
support structure
- Sophistication of structural model
includes backup structure
- MDAport revisions incorporate influ-
ence coefficient test and updated
models of arrays and FAS
- Incorporate math model changes due to
Modal Survey Test results, ATMGRA
sophistication, and revisions to OWS
array due to DynamicTest results
- Final model that increased sophistica-
tion in GRAarea, MDAport, DAand OWS
arrays. Necessary due to control and
load concerns.
Aug. 1969
Mar. 1970
Aug. 1970
July 1971
Aug. 1972
Mar. 1973
Of principal note was the development of large degree-of-freedom
math models to accommodatesophistication and modal fidelity required
in both load and control studies. A modal selection technique was
developed to retain important structural modal properties with models
of a size that could be handled.
b. Loads Analyses. Dynamic loads were derived on the modal
property configurations, primarily for:
- Launch and boost conditions associated with payload
responses and loads,
- Docking and latching loads for orbital mating with
the Skylab WS,
- Deployment loads associated with appendages of the
Skylab WS.
Principal load cycles or analysis updates were completed when
revised modal data were available. Of principal note was the develop-
ment and derivation of a docking and latching analytical program that
represented a state-of-the-art advancement and a sophisticated boost
phase loads program using a base motion approach.
The principal milestones associated with the loads analyses were:
- Latching load impact to bIDA ports,
- Latching and boost phase load impact to the ATM
canister,
- MDA port redesign to accommodate higher bending
moment,
- Engine firing sequence change from 4-0 to 2-2 to
alleviate ATM canister response.
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c. Acoustical Analyses. Studies were completed to assess
the transmissibility of noise through the structure; to refine design
acoustical, shock, and vibration levels, and to update the design cri-
teria where necessary. This included the correlation, evaluation, and
subsequent criteria level updates due to analysis and dynamic tests.
d. Dynamic Test Instrumentation/Plans. The vibro-acoustical
tests (both acoustical and modal survey) represented a "first" for
overall size, structural complexity, and dynamic property refinement.
The principal activities of the associated studies were the predictions
of pretest analytical results for both launch and orbital configura-
tions of the Sky lab payload; the definition of instrumentation require-
ments which included the data retrieval-requirements, and the genera-
tion of an overall dynamics test plan.
e. Mission Support-Contingency. The dynamics activity asso-
ciated with mission support involved four primary activities as follows:
- Analysis of the anomaly Sky lab configuration to provide
modal property data for, (I) Skylab control sensitivity
studies, (2) Load impact studies, and (3) Redesign re-
quirements.
- Analysis of on-going events, as docking/latching capa-
bility, parasol design, and MDA Six-Pack Rate Gyro de-
sign.
- Calculation of de-orbit loads and participation of SL-I
anomaly evaluation.
- Mission evaluation.
f. Stress Analyses and Studies. Stress analyses and studies
were performed as described in the following paragraphs:
(1) Skylab A Strength Summary.
- Summarized structural integrity of major subassem-
blies using contractor stress reports where possi-
ble and doing additional analyses as required (in-
cluding FAS, ATM, DA, and AM),
- Calculated and summarized loads at critical inter-
faces on cluster,
- Developed capabilities of all critical components
and interfaces for updated load impact and mission
evaluation, and
- Reviewed critical areas to ascertain flight readi-
ness of each module.
(a) MDA Docking Port Influence Coefficients. De-
veloped detailed computer models of MDA and monitored influence coef-
ficient tests of MDA. Analytical finite element models were developed
for the axial and radial docking ports. Static tests were performed
to verify the models.
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(b) ATMAlignment Modeling. Determined effects of
spar alignment at one-g and use in zero-g environment and effects of
temperature differentials on alignment.
(c) Stress Analysis Static Test Monitoring and Eval-
uation of AM/MDA. Predicted static test results and monitored static
tests of AM/MI)A. The AM/MDA was subjected to pressure and flight load
tests with analytical models to verify and predict test results.
(d) Stress Analysis Static Test Monitoring and Eval-
uation of ATM. Predicted static test results and monitored static tests
of ATM subassemblies.
(e) General Instability Analysis. Performed a gen-
eral instability analysis on outside shell payload cluster. The objec-
tive of this task was to determine the loads at which general instabil-
ity occurs during three phases of the launch environment, i.e., lift-
off, maximum airload, and booster burn-out. An analysis of nonlinear
collapse behavior in a critical region, and the determination of the
actual factor of safety for PS and FAS (designed to higher factors of
safety than the rest of the structure) were included.
The modeling of the Skylab structure was made in significant de-
tail, which included discrete rings and stringers and other geometric
and loading discontinuities. To limit the size of the problem, only a
180-degree segment of the structure was used. Even so, the analysis
involved the solution of Eigenvalue problems with some 20,000 degrees
of freedom that, perhaps, is the largest bifurcation buckling problem
ever solved.
Results of this analysis showed that buckling occurred first at
the OWS, which is the aft most section of the structure. The upper
parts appeared to be well designed from the point of view of diffus-
ing point loads into the lower parts of the structure. In general,
the analysis proved that the structure had adequate factors of safety
for all modules.
f. ATM CMG Study and Test Program. Analyzed, monitored, and
interpreted the CMG test program. Two tests were performed, i.e., a
CMG Rack Static Test and a Bench Test. A finite element computer model
provided seventeen deflection cases for the Bench Test. The Rack Static
Test was intended to detect structural deformations that would cause
bindings in the CMG's operation. The results of both tests showed that
the CMG operation would not be impaired by the load conditions imposed.
g. Finite Element Models. All models used in the dynamic
tasks described in sections ll.E.3.a through ll.E.3.e herein, were con-
structed by stress. The final assembly represented the largest number
of degrees-of-freedom used to that date.
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4. Conclusions and Recommendations. In general, as it was evi-
denced by the successful completion of the four Skylab missions, all
the structural and mechanical systems functioned properly and fulfilled
their intended goals.
An exception was the OWS meteoroid shield that failed during SL-I
lift-off. Some other failures of minor consequences were encountered
during the length of the mission. Nevertheless, the primary objectives
of Skylab were adequately met and in many cases surpassed by the alert-
ness of the crew members with the able support of the ground personnel.
Some pertinent recommendations for future programs are:
a. Design criteria documents binding all subcontractors should
be initiated at the start of the program;
b. Timely coordination for interchange of data (particularly
computer outputs such as stiffness models) is essential to avoid mis-
runs and save time;
c. SOCAR reviews were successful tools for reviewing designs,
and should be encouraged for future programs;
d. More capability for inflight maintenance and repair should
be provided in manned space vehicles. Particularly, automatic devices
should be provided for backup manual operation in case of malfunctions;
e. Assign a responsible project engineer for each major sub-
structure. The duties of this project engineer should be the coordin-
ation of all aspects of analyses, design, fabrication, test, and assem-
bly. This engineer should be free of administrative and managerial
duties so he may devote most of his time to the technical aspects of
the problem.
f. Place strain gages and accelerometers on critical struc-
tural items so data would be available for diagnosis of any malfunc-
tions.
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F. Electrical Power Systems
The Skylab Electrical Power System (EPS) configuration consisted
of two independent and complementary power generating, storaging, con-
trolling, distributing, and monitoring systems. The Skylab Cluster
used the available power to operate, control, and monitor the life-
support, housekeeping, experiment, instrumentation and communication,
and attitude control systems. All electrical power for Skylab was
generated directly from the sun by photovoltaic solar arrays. Ni-Cd
batteries stored the energy to allow continuous powering of loads
during each orbital night. Power distribution and control was by
means of a two-wire electrical network, which used a single point
grounding system for the entire Cluster. The two independent power
systems were designed to be operated normally in a parallel mode,
thus permitting power sharing in either direction.
The complexity of the EPS imposed the development and use of
analytical tools that could rapidly reflect the system configuration
as it changed and yield accurate performance predictions. These tools
included Load Assumptions and Power Allocation Documents and Computer
Programs for System Analyses. Contingency analyses performed before
launch included the possible failure of OWS Solar Array Wings deploy-
ment and thus proved invaluable for quick response to the real-time
occurrence.
Premission predictions for EPS performance required up-dating
due to the reduction in AM EPS capability caused by the loss of one
OWS Solar Array wing at launch and accelerated ATM EPS battery degra-
dation. Several off-normal vehicle attitude maneuvers, which were im-
posed for vehicle thermal control until a sun-shield could be manually
deployed, severely stressed the ATM EPS hardware. Restricted by debris
from the meteoroid shield, OWS Wing i deployment was not possible, thus
power scheduled for loads and for AM battery charging was not avail-
able. This condition presented an abnormal storage mode for the AM
EPS until the crew of SL-2 cleared the restricting debris and deployed
the solar array wing. The paralleling of the two power systems pro-
vided the necessary EPS flexibility, under a variety of nonscheduled
and anomalous operating conditions, and with systems having differing
degradation rates, to satisfy all imposed electrical loads and for
supporting all maneuvers and operating conditions.
Premission design verification was conducted at the component,
black box, subsystem, system, and flight vehicle levels. Results from
this program required some design modifications, performance require-
ments and prediction up-dating, and insight into hardware/system anom-
alies to be expected inflight as well as the knowledge of how to over-
come, workaround, or repair those conditions. During the mission,
unexpected anomalies imposed additional ground testing, using backup
hardware and/or the Skylab Cluster Power Simulator (SCPS), to verify
procedures before implementation by the flight crew.
Analyses of the data retrieved resulted in gaining significant
and valuable EPS engineering knowledge, which was usable for establishing
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effective design concepts and requirements for future spacecraft.
Although the report is presented in discipline language and is pri-
marily intended for discipline use, the information contained may be
useful to designers to whominter-system effects are important.
i. Design Requirements. The design requirements for the Skylab
EPS evolved as the Cluster configuration changed from the original
program design to the final hardware configuration. Cluster config-
uration development is discussed in detail in paragraph II.C.I. The
original configuration involved two completely independent power sys-
tems; an AM/OWS Power System consisting only of primary batteries,
and an ATM EPS consisting of a solar array, batteries, and power con-
ditioning equipment. However, an even prior configuration was visual-
ized as a parasitic type to receive its power from the CSM fuel cells.
a. ATM System. The ATM EPS did not change significantly from
the original system (i.e., the solar array/battery type). The design
evolution involved the number of Charger/Battery/Regulator Modules
(CBRM), the solar array configuration, battery design, and mission dur-
ation and type. The mission concept began with the ATM as a free flying
vehicle docking with the Skylab during the final manned mission. This
involved the use of the LEM as a part of the ATM to provide electrical
power before solar array deployment and propulsion before docking with
the Skylab. At this time, it was planned to fly the Cluster in a Gravity
Gradient (GG) attitude with the vehicle X-axis along the local vertical
until docking with the ATM. After the ATM docked, the attitude was to
be solar inertial. Z-LV attitudes were originally contemplated.
After the decision to change from a wet to dry workshop concept,
the ATM became hard-mounted to the Skylab Cluster with preinstalled
cabling rather than tethered umbilical cabling. The solar arrays
were modified slightly in that the turnaround buses were bonded to
the substrate for increased reliability. The LEM was deleted from
the vehicle and the C&D Console was moved in the MDA.
During thermal vacuum testing, a problem was found in the ATM
battery cell shorting to the battery case. The problem was resolved
by the addition of fuses in the battery negative leads to prevent
the possibility of a single short affecting the remainder of the
CBRMs, and the redesign of the third electrode to provide uniform
pressure over the entire cell area. A fourth electrode was added to
improve the response of the third electrode signal, and also to
assure the rapid and complete recombination of oxygen and hydrogen,
which is normally produced. The other design change was the 20 per-
cent increase of precharged cadmium plate surface area in each cell.
The purpose of precharge was to maintain the useful battery capacity
for longer periods of cyclical operation.
During post-manufacturing checkout, another problem occurred with
the CBRM plus or minus 15 Vdc internal power supply transistors. The
problem was resolved with the replacement of suspected components with
transistors and diodes of higher rating.
11-80
Several failures were encountered with shorting of the wet slug
tantalum capacitors in the input filters. The wet slug capacitors
were replaced with tantalum foil capacitors. Following this modifi-
cation of the input filter, a thermal vacuumand randomvibration
acceptance test was successfully conducted on the 18 flight CBRMs.
b. AM/OWS ystem. The Airlock EPSdesign evolved from a
simple primary battery system to a complex solar array/secondary
battery system. The evolution was prompted by changes in mission
objectives and design requirements.
Until 1967, all system power after docking was to be derived from
the CSMEPS. The AMEPSwas required to provide only a minimal amount
of power during the initial (predocking) mission phase, a period of
only 11.5 hours. The AMEPSconsisted of silver-zinc primary batter-
ies and a power distribution system.
The mission duration was extended and the sophistication of the
OWSincreased to accommodatethe growing experiment program. The AM
EPSdesign concept was then changed to a solar array/secondary bat-
tery system with silver-zinc primary batteries to be used for pre-
activation power only. The first of manyconcepts had solar arrays
mounted on the AM. Through the evolutionary design phase, as the
power requirements increased, the solar arrays were relocated on the
OWSto accommodatethe increasing array size. Also, in these early
design stages, batteries and power conditioning equipment concepts
evolved through a series of trade-off studies. One such study com-
pared both silver-cadmium and nickel-cadmium batteries. The selec-
tion of nickel-cadmium was based on the availability of more ground
test data and flight history implying less development risk. Several
solar array/secondary battery system designs were evaluated, with the
primary goal of increasing the overall efficiency and reliability of
the system. Buck regulation was selected to maximize efficiency, for
both the battery charger and voltage regulator. In addition, a peak
power tracker was incorporated in the charger to extract maximumarray
powerwhen demandedby the system. Whenthe results of this design
approach were established, the AMEPSconsisted of four power condi-
tioning groups (PCGs). Each group included a battery charger, a
voltage regulator, and a thirty cell, 33-ampere hour, nickel-cadmium
battery. Input power for the PCGswas derived from solar arrays
mounted on the OWS.
Power requirements continued to increase thus requiring both a
larger solar array and the expansion of the numberof AMPCGsfrom
six to eight. Reduction of preactivation load requirements, coupled
with the increased available nickel-cadmium battery energy from the
additional two units, led to the elimination of AMprimary silver-
zinc batteries.
At this time, the use of ATMsolar modules, for both the ATMand
OWSsolar arrays, was considered important to achieve design standard-
ization. Shortly after this, the "dry launch" concept was adopted,
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which made the ATM an integral part of the cluster and made the OWS
S-IVB a true space laboratory rather than a propulsive stage. Because
the ATM attitude system was capable of holding the cluster in the solar
inertial attitude at all times, there was no longer any need for a sep-
arate OWS solar array orientation system and the array articulation re-
quirement was deleted.
A solar array was later conceived for the OWS that was to be used
specifically with the AM PCGs as an integrated power system. Maximum
and minimum voltage and power requirements were deliberately specified
to be 1.5 times the ATM module design to minimize the impact on PCG
redesign.
In the process of design evolution, a second ampere-hour (A-h)
meter was added to the battery charger to improve reliability. Also
a discharge limit feature was added to provide a signal to the voltage
regulator when the A-h meter computed battery state-of-charge (SOC)
equaled 30 percent; the voltage regulator then reduced its output
and effectively removed the associated battery from the bus. This
feature was added to prevent inadvertent overloading of any one bat-
tery, although intentional deep discharges were still possible by the
use of override logic circuitry. Both onboard display and ground TM
of the A-h meter status were available. Manual override of the i00
percent SOC signal from the A-h meter was added to permit continued
battery charging in the voltage limit mode.
Battery cell failures during cyclical ground testing prompted a
redesign of the battery case to aluminum for improved heat transfer
to the coldplate. Internal cell changes were incorporated to reduce
the probability of cell internal shorts. To further reduce battery
operating temperature and therefore improve cyclical life, the cool-
ant loop temperatures were lowered and both the A-h meter return fac-
tor and battery trickle charge rate were reduced. The latter neces-
sitated battery charger design changes.
The conversion from a wet to dry workshop resulted in a complete
redesign of the wet Power Distribution and Control Console. All the
subsystem components could now be hard-mounted in the OWS before
launch.
A console was developed within which the system electronic mod-
ules, circuit breaker panels, and control and display panels would be
installed; however, the wet to dry conversion resulted in more systems
and more sophistication. The circuit breakers, switches, and display
arrangement was finalized in mid-1971.
In addition to the console-mounted panels, four "remote" C&D
panels were baselined. The remote panels provided for crew control
locally of functions that would be cycled many times during the mis-
sion. By providing the controls in the area of use, traffic to and
from the power distribution and control console was considerably re-
duced.
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c. Cluster EPS. Before the dry workshop concept, the ATM
and AM/OWS EPSs were baselined as completely independent systems, each
supplying its own loads. However, due to the Cluster load distribu-
tion, the available power margin on the ATM EPS was found to be con-
siderably larger than that of the AM EPS. To provide a more flexible
Cluster power system, and to provide better interface voltage regula-
tion at the CSM interface, the normal operating procedures were revised
to operate the AM and the ATM power systems in parallel. The power
sharing was determined by the AM Regulated Bus Open Circuit Voltage
(OCV) setting and the Cluster load distribution. The Cluster single-
point-ground (SPG) concept was adopted. The ground point was in the
AM when the CSM to MDA power transfer connectors were not connected,
and in the CSM at all other times.
d. Final Design Requirements. The Cluster design require-
ments are completely described in the CRS. The major requirements
from the CRS are included below.
(i) General Cluster Requirements. The SWS Electrical
system as shown in Figure II.F-I was comprised of two solar array/
battery dc power systems; one located on the ATM and the other on the
AM/OWS. The ATM and AM/OWS distribution systems were operated in
parallel electrically. The SWS Electrical System was to have the cap-
ability of supplying 7530 watts of power to the Cluster loads while in
the Solar Inertial mode. The system was to have the capability of sup-
plying 6000 watts during the Z-LV Earth Resources Pointing Mode and
2600 watts during the Z-LV Rendezvous mode.
(2) AM/OWS System. The solar cell array mounted on the
OWS and rechargeable batteries and associated power conditioning equip-
ment located on the AM were to be capable of supplying 3814 watts of
power to the cluster loads during the SI mode of operation, 3000 watts
during the Z-LV-E mode of operation, and 1300 watts during the Z-LV-R
mode of operation.
(3) ATM System. The solar cell array mounted on the ATM,
and rechargeable batteries and associated power conditioning equipment
located on the ATM were to be capable of supplying 3716 watts of power
to the cluster loads during the solar inertial mode of operation, 3000
watts during the Z-LV-E mode of operation, and 1300 watts during the
Z-LV-R mode of operation.
(4) Cluster Loads. Total Cluster loads were not te ex-
ceed 9000 watts steady state for limited time duration, and were not
to exceed 7530 watts average per orbit with average day loads equal
to average night loads.
- Of the 9000 watts, the load on the AM EPS at any
time was not to exceed 5800 watts; 2900 watts per
Regulator Bus.
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- Of the 9000 watts, the load on the ATM EPS at
any time was not to exceed 4800 watts; 2400
watts per bus.
- The minimum load on the AM EPS at any time was
not to be less than 1920 watts; 960 watts per
Regulator Bus.
- Energy balance condition was not be be exceeded
by each of the 26 power subsystems during the SI
mode. A minimum reserve capacity of 30 percent
of rated capacity shall be maintained in each
battery.
(5) Rechargeable Batteries. The allowable discharge
levels of both ATM and AM Ni-Cd batteries was not to exceed the values
specified under the following conditions:
CLUSTER ORIENTATION
SI
Z -LV
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DISCHARGE
30 percent Depth-of-Discharge (DOD) per
Battery per Orbit
50 percent DOD per Battery during Z-LV
pass, provided 30 percent of the
Rated Capacity remained in the Battery
2. Functional Description
a. Major Elements. The Skylab EPS consisted of the follow-
ing ATM and AM/OWS EPSs. The power systems are described both in the
launch configuration and the configuration at launch of SL-4.
b. ATM Electrical Power System
(i) Launch Configuration Systems and Major Components.
The major systems of the ATM EPS and their major components were as
follows:
- Power Generation System (18 solar panels)
- Power Conditioning and Energy Storage System
(18 CBRMs).
- Power Distribution System (12 distributors
with redundant buses).
- Power Control System (switches, relays, logic
circuits).
- Monitoring System (meters, indicator lights).
- Circuit Protection System (circuit breakers
and fuses).
(a) Power Generation System. The 18 ATM solar
panels converted sunlight into electrical power, which was processed
by the Power Conditioning and Energy Storage System (the 18 CBRMs)
and continuous power was provided to power subsystem loads through the
Distribution System.
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The ATM solar panels had a predicted combined power capability
over the sunlit duration of about 10,480 watts at 55 degrees centi-
grade at the beginning of mission at zero beta angle. The 18 solar
panels (one for each of the 18 CBRMs) were mounted on four wings.
The wings were oriented 45 degrees to the longitudinal axis (X-axis)
of the SWS. Figure II.F-2 shows the fully deployed array and depicts
the numbering system adopted.
(b) Power Conditioning and Energy Storage System.
Power conditioning and energy storage in the ATM EPS was accomplished
by the 18 CBRMs and two load-sharing units (Primary and Secondary).
Each of the 18 CBRMs consisted of a charger, a battery, a regulator
and an Auxiliary Power Supply.
Charger. The function of the charger was to
charge its associated battery using power
generated by its solar panel. The charger
was of the nonisolated, step-down switching
regulator type.
- Battery. Each CBRM contained an Ni-Cd bat-
tery rated at 20 ampere-hours. The battery
contained 24 cells that were series connec-
ted, hermetically sealed, four-electrode
type.
- Regulator. The function of the ATM buck-
boost regulator was to regulate the voltage
level of the power delivered by the CBRM to
buses 7DI0 and 7D20 and then to the ATM main
buses 7DII and 7D21 respectively.
The input power to the regulator was provided from the solar panel
or from the battery or both. When the solar panel voltage was less
than the battery voltage, all the input power was provided by the bat-
tery. The input voltage level could vary between 25.5 and 80 Vdc.
(2) Configuration at Launch of SL-4. The configuration
of the ATM EPS at the time of launch of SL-4 was not radically dif-
ferent from that at launch of SL-I. The ATM solar arrays suffered
from an average degradation of seven percent. Two CBRMs were inoper-
ative due to solar array input contactor problems on CBRM 5 and a
regulator failure on CBRM 3.
The results of the component degradation and failures resulted
in a predicted SL-4 bus power capability for the ATM EPS of 3700
watts, beta angle = 0 °, SI.
The CBRM batteries showed more degradation that was to be ex-
pected based on DOD and temperature effects. The average battery
capacity available at the end of the SL-4 mission was 10.2 A-h with
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a standard deviation of 1.3 A-h. The cause of the increased degra-
dation is thought to be long term trickle charging before launch.
c. AM/OWSElectrical Power System
(i) Launch Configuration Systems and Major Components.
The systems of the AM/OWSEPSand their major componentswere as
follows :
- PowerGeneration System, 8 Solar Array Groups(SAGs)
- Power Conditioning and Energy Storage (8 PCGs)
- PowerDistribution System (redundant buses)
- Power Control System (switches, relays, logic
circuits)
- Monitoring System (meters, indicator lights)
- Circuit Protection System (circuit breakers
and fuses).
(a) PowerGeneration System. The generation of
electrical power in the AM/OWSEPSwas accomplished with the eight
OWSSAGs. The SAGsconverted sunlight into electrical power that
was conditioned by the PowerConditioning System (PCS) and distribu-
ted to the subsystem loads and to the batteries for recharging. Each
of the eight SAGsconstituted an independent power source, one for each
PCG. The SAGswere mountedon two wings as shownin Figure II.F-3.
(b) Power Conditioning and Energy Storage System-
General. Power conditioning and energy storage in the AM/OWSwas
accomplished by eight PCGsand two Shunt Regulators. Each of the
eight PCGsconsisted of a battery, a charger, and a regulator. In
addition, the PCGscontained sensing devices, controls, and inter-
connecting circuitry and were actively cooled.
Each PCGwas designed to be capable of operating under the var-
ious levels of power provided by the SAG, to condition this power,
recharge the battery, and distribute the power to the Skylab subsys-
tems.
(c) Battery Charger. The battery charger consis-
ted of a charger regulator, a peak power tracker, and an A-h integra-
tor. The charger regulator contained a buck-type voltage regulator
to provide a regulated and variable dc voltage to the battery and/or
the bus voltage regulator.
- Battery. Each of the eight PCGs contained
a 33 A-h Ni-Cd battery to store the solar
array power and supply it to the bus voltage
regulator when power available from the SAG
was not sufficient to meet cluster load re-
quirements.
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- Bus Voltage Regulator. Each of the eight
PCGs contained a buck-type remote sensing
regulator to provide regulated dc power to
the AM Regulator buses and EPS control buses.
- Power Distribution System. Power distribu-
tion in the AM/OWS EPS was accomplished by a
redundant system of main power buses and sub-
buses distributing the power provided by the
two independent groups of four PCGs each.
d. Configuration at Launch of SL-4. The major difference
between the AM/OWS EPS at this time compared to that at SL-I launch
was the loss of OWS solar array wing 2. This resulted in a reduction
in power capability of the AM/OWS EPS of approximately 40 percent.
The system power capability at this time was 2900 watts, beta angle =
0 °, SI. Time dependent degradation of the remaining solar array was
not detectable. Battery capacity degradation was minimal, the average
capacity being 33.6 A-h with a standard deviation of three A-h.
3. Interface Requirements. The EPS interface requirements are
described in detail in the CRS. The most important requirement being
the power transfer across interface. Power feeders having a maximum
resistance of 15 milliohms per bus, were to be provided between the
ATM interface and AM/OWS power distribution system and capable of
carrying 2500 watts in either direction. Power feeders were to be pro-
vided between the SWS and CSM capable of carrying 2400 watts Interface
voltages shall comply with Table II.F-I.
4. Design Verification
a. Analysis. Design verification analyses involved five
categories: system or subsystem capability, power sharing, transient
analysis, interface design limit verification, and load analysis. The
analyses used both manual and computer tools. The following is a brief
description of the major analyses performed.
(i) SWS EPS/CSM EPS Operation. The SWS EPS was re-
quired to provide power for the CSM quiescent mode and periodic sys-
tems checks after the CSM docked and was electrically mated. It was
planned that the CSM fuel cells would continue to operate and provide
all required CSM power until the cryogenics were depleted, approximately
12 days after docking. During this period the SWS EPS and the CSM EPS
operated as completely independent power systems. During the initial
umbilical mating verification, activation, and deactivation of power
transfer and various CSM EPS verification periods, the SWS EPS oper-
ated briefly in parallel with either the fuel cells or CSM batteries.
Numerous studies were performed to analyze the SWS EPS capability to
supply the required CSM load and to analyze the SWS EPS/CSM EPS
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INTERFACE
FROM TO
Table II.F-I.
FUNCTION
Interface Voltage Requirements
MAX LOAD POWER STEADY STATE INTER-
(WATTS) FACE VOLTAGE(VOLTS)
See Note 6 MIN MAX
AM
AM
AM
AM
MDA
OWS
ATM
ATM
ATM
AM
ATM
MDA
AM
OWS
MDA MDA Loads
MDA Power from SWS to CSM
(Via MDA)
OWS OWS Buses
OWS OWS Loads
CSM Power from SWS to CSM
(Via MDA)
AM Power from S/A Group to
AM Power Cond.
EXP Power Supplied from SWS
to ATM Experiment(diode
inside experiment)
EXP Power Supplied from SWS
to ATM Experiment(diode
outside experiment)
AM !ATM C&D Power
MDA ATM C&D Power
AM Power Transfer Between
ATM and AM
Power Supplied from SWS
EXP
SWS to Experiment
See Note 3 25.0 30.0
2472 27.6 30.0
3000 25.5 30.0
See Note 3 25.5 30.0
2400 26.8 30.0
See Note 4 51.0 125.0
See Note 3 26.0 30.5
See Note 3 25.0 30.5
382 27.8 30.5
382 27.3 30.5
2500 28.3 30.5
See Note 3 24.0 30.0
NOTE i.
2.
3.
1
D
6.
Maximum load power listed corresponds with minimum interface
voltage.
Minimum load power is zero and corresponds with maximum inter-
face voltage.
Each individual load must meet the minimum steady state inter-
face voltage level at its individual steady state maximum load.
See Module Power Allocation Documents for individual load re-
quirement.
The minimum average power over the sunlight portion of the orbit
supplied by the Solar Array Group at 51 volt operating point at
the interface during the Solar Inertial Mode is 1312 watts.
The interface voltage requirements do not include signal and
control power.
The maximum load given is shared equally between the two pos-
itive buses in the two bus system where applicable.
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operating compatibility. The analyses showedthat the SWS/CSMpower
system were compatible under the above conditions.
(2) Cluster Load Versus Capability Analysis. The SWS
EPSpower capability was affected by two major mission variables, Sky-
lab orientation modeand time (beta-angle variation and degradation of
both solar array and battery).
The major time dependent degradation factors were the battery
capacity decay and the reduction in the available solar array power.
The capacity decay rate was affected by the battery DODper-orbit
and temperature while a major portion of the solar array power degra-
dation was attributed to the thermal cycling effects.
Conclusions that were drawn are:
- Solar inertial capability satisfied the load require-
ment in all mission phases.
- In certain Z-LV-E passes, the capability did not meet
the worst-case load requirement. In these cases, load
managementwas required to perform the Z-LV-E opera-
tion.
(3) Load Analysis. Detailed load analyses perdictions
were performed for the three missions for both the SI and Z-LV modes.
It was shownthat the predicted loads could vary widely within a given
orbit.
The load analyses performed indicated that with proper power
managementthe EPShad sufficient capability to supply the load re-
quired to meet planned program activities as scheduled in the premis-
sion flight plan.
(4) Grounding. Several studies were conducted to assess
the Skylab grounding system for both the orbiting cluster and the ground
checkout configurations. The most significant of these studies were:
- A study on EREPgrounding in March 1971 resulted in a
design change to the grounding configuration of the
EREPsystem.
- An information report that summarizedthe grounding
criteria on primary and secondary power systems used
on Skylab was prepared in April 1971.
- In August 1971 an analysis was conducted on the AMsuit
compressor power inverter SPGfault current to determine
the impact of this fault current on cluster system oper-
ation. The results were presented at the 16th Electrical
Panel Meeting in October 1971. Analysis results indi-
cated no significant system degradation would result.
11-92
- In October 1971 results of a review of the ground
checkout configurations at KSCwere presented at the
16th Electrical Panel Meeting. Conclusions were that
the mating of the ESEumbilical connectors to the
cluster and launch vehicle established numerousstruc-
tural return paths which were in parallel with the re-
turn wiring for circuits using structural ground. The
magnitude of the ground return currents was not detri-
mental to the operation and performance of Skylab.
- A detailed review, concluded in March 1972, of the as-
built production drawings of Skylab hardware was con-
ducted to identify grounding violations. All such
violations were waivered.
(5) Circuit Protection Versus Wire Compatibility. Dur-
ing SOCAReach modulecontractor reviewed the power distribution net-
work to assure that each circuit protective device adequately protected
the power distribution wiring.
It was concluded that with the hardware changes occurring during
the SOCARand with the completion of the activity requested to review
internal wiring of experiment equipment, the circuit protection was
compatible with the wiring and no further action was required.
(6) Corona. Each item (experiment/equipment) assigned
to Skylab was analyzed for Corona susceptibility according to peak-
applied operating voltages and operating products, residual and con-
taminating atmospheres both in and near the item being investigated.
Those items having field stresses greater than 50 volts/mil were
recommendedfor either qualification or special testing to evaluate
the corona susceptibility.
(7) Contingency Analyses. Several detailed analyses
were performed to evaluate possible contingency modesof operation.
These contingency modesincluded: failure to deploy OWSand/or ATM
solar arrays, failure to deploy meteoroid shield, and failure to
deploy the ATM. These analyses resulted in remedial and alternate
sequences to be adopted in the event of various subsystem or compon-
ent failures.
b. Testing. Testing of the Skylab EPSwas conducted at
the component, black-box, subsystem, system, and flight vehicle
levels. The objective of all test programs was to assure that the
flight vehicle would meet all Skylab requirements with a high level
of confidence. The overall testing can be divided into three cate-
gories: Development or Engineering Model Testing, Qualification and
Acceptance Testing.
Essentially all major EPS components were subjected to develop-
mental testing. These components include both AM and A_ batteries,
chargers and voltage regulators. Qualification and acceptance testing
was required on all individual components and functional units that
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were to comprise the Skylab EPS. In addition, all systems were sub-
jected to integrated testing at KSC.
The results of the component and subsystem testing are shown in
Tables II.F-2 through II.F-5 below.
Table II.F-2. ATM Solar Array Performance*
PARA_LETER
Module Speci-
fication
Requirement
Power Output
SPECIFIED OR
PREDICTED VALUE
700 Milliamps at
49 Volts
Test Panel I
681.3 Watts
Maximum
Test Panel II
752.7 Watts
Maximum
*All values at 30°C
ACTUAL VALUE
Test Panel I Avg
Value for 20 Mod
730.6 Milliamps
at 49 Volts
726.3 Milliamps
at 49 Volts
Test Panel II Avg
Value for 20 Mod
797.2 Milliamps
at 49 Volts
783.2 Milliamps
at 49 Volts
715.5 Watts
Maximum
785.3 Watts
SOURCE OF DATA
1
X-75 Simulator
Test
Denver Sun-
light Test
X-75 Simulator
Test
Denver Sun-
light Test
**Predicted value using X-75 simulator output of individual
modules; actual value based on sunlight test.
Table II.F-3.
PARAMETER
Battery Cycle Life
Charger Efficiency
Regulator
Efficiency
CBRM Performance
S PECIFIED
VALUE
4000 Cycles
Operation
> 92%
> 89% from
iO0 to 200W
> 85% @ 400W
ACTUAL VALUE
Curve based on
test data
92.9 to 94.3
90.5 to 94.1
84.0 to 86.8
SOURCE OF DATA
Battery cycle
test
CBRM Electri-
cal ATP
CBRM Electri-
cal ATP
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Table II.F-3. continued)
PARAMETER
Charger Control of
Battery V versus T
Characteristics
Maximum SA Current
(Charger On)
EMI Requirements
Life
PARAMETER
Continuous Bus Poweri
capability of 1 CBRM
/SA Subsystem
(Worst Case SA)
Temperature Range of
batteries under hot
& cold predicted
enivornments
Power mismatch be-
tween CBRMs-Control-
led by power share
circuits
S PEC IF IED
VALUE
Specified
curves
+ 150 mV
13.5 + 0.5A
Meet
50M02408D
4000 Cycles
PREDICTED
VALUE
218 Watts @
the bus
-10°C to
+30°C
5% for IOOW
to 300W per
CBRM
ACTUAL VALUE
Specified curves
+ i00 mV
13.5 + 0.1A
Out of Specifica-
tion on conducted
& Radiated inter-
ference
Verified
ACTUAL VALUE
227 Watts
-IO°C to +30°C
3.5%
SOURCE OF DATA
CBRM Electri-
ca i ATP
CBRM/Solar PNL
sunlight test
CBRM Qual test
Life test
SOURCE
CBRM Life test-
ing with simu-
lated solar
array
ATM Prototype
TV testing
ATM Prototype
TV testing
Table II.F-4. OWS Solar Array Performance
PAR_TER SPECIFIED ACTUAL VALUE SOURCE OF DATA
VALUE
Module Specifica-
tion Requirement
944 Milli-
amps @ 71.7
Volts @ 28oc
970 Milliamps @
71.7 Volts @
28°C
Flashlamp test
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PARAMETER
Battery Charger
Life Test
Battery Cycle
Life
Voltage Regula-
tor Life Test
SAG/PCG
Compatibility
PCG
Capability of
4 PCGs
Peak Power
Tracking Accur.
Regulator Droop
Characteristics
Table II.F-5.
SPECIFIEDVALUE
ORTESTPURPOSE
i000 hour test
4000 Cycles
i000 hour test
Determine opera-
ting characteris
tics & compati-
bility
Predicted MaxSI
Mode:
0o _ 530 W
58.5° _ 850 W
73.5° _ 1500W
Predicted MaxZ-
LV Mode:
0° _ 300 W
73.5° @ 40 W
Predicted Max SI
Mode:
0° _ 2120 W
Predicted MaxZ-
LV Mode:
0° _ 1200W
Predicted
95-100 %
0.04 + .002
volts/amp
PCGPerformance
ACTUALVALUEOF
TESTRESULTS
Within specified
values
Verified
Within specified
values
System compati-
-i bility was veri-
fied & operating
characteristics
were determined
540-563 W
890-930 W
1354-1453W
300-375 W
80-90 W
2150 W
1300 W
95.4 to 99.48%
Verified
SOURCEOFDATA
Life test
Life Test
Life Test
Denver Sunlight
test
Battery Module
tests
Battery Module
tests
Battery Module
tests
Battery Module
tests
c. Skylab Cluster Power Simulator Testing (EPSBreadboard).
The purpose of the EPSBreadboard was to provide a meansto demonstrate
the operation of the A_"_EPSin parallel with the AMEPS, and to insure
stable operation of the two power systems under various load conditions
before mating of the actual flight systems. Other areas of investiga-
tion were proper load sharing between the two systems and an analysis
of the single point ground system. Secondary objectives were to provide
a means to demonstrate and analyze power system failure and contingency
modes of flight operation as well as to provide an alternate means of
simulating orbital performance (day-night cycle, Z-LV-E mode). The
Breadboard was also intended to be used during the mission to analyze
performance and to verify solutions to problems occurring during flight.
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(i) SystemDescription. The EPSBreadboard hardware
consisted of both flight systems hardware and ESEhardware. The flight
(or flight equivalent) hardware included 8 PCGs,18 CBRMs,and ATM Power
Transfer Distributor, AM power distribution system, and three AM con-
trol, display, and circuit breaker panels. The ESE equipment included:
ATM solar array simulators, OWS solar array simulators, cluster load
banks, a CSM source and load simulator, network control and switching
equipment, a digital data acquisition system, a low temperature test
unit, an air conditioning system, and various ESE C&D panels. All
power distribution interconnecting cabling was made equivalent to flight
wiring.
(2) Testing. Testing on the breadboard began in February
1972. Testing was performed in compliance with the "Skylab Cluster
Power Systems Breadboard Test Requirements" document, 40M35693. The
breadboard was also used as a training aid during classes on the
Cluster EPS for flight control and astronaut personnel. The major tests
performed are shown in Table II.F-6.
5. Sneak Circuit Analysis. The goal of the sneak circuit
analysis was to uncover any condition that, due to a sneak electrical
path (an undiscovered, unwanted electrical path), could cause unfore-
seen problems in the EPS. The Sneak Circuit Analysis performed on
Skylab was effective for reasons other than equipment and personnel
safety and mission success such as:
- Establishment and maintenance of a complete set of
documentation.
- Verification of interfaces within and between modules.
- Development of simplified schematics used to conduct an
evaluation of the activation circuitry, system sequence
checks, and crew procedures.
The use of the computer as a tool in circuit analysis on pro-
grams as large as Skylab was unique; however, the technique proved it-
self to be both economical and essential in assuring that all electri-
cal paths were identified. The performance of this type of task by
manual methods would have been extremely difficult and inefficient con-
sidering the complexity of the Skylab EPS.
a. Analysis Description. The sneak circuit analysis per-
formed included the following modules of Skylab: ATM, MDA, AM, and
OWS. The ESE and the Skylab interfaces with the IU and CSM were in-
cluded in the analysis. Those IU functions that controlled Skylab
systems were analyzed. Experiments associated with the Skylab were
also a part of the analysis. The CSM was analyzed separately by the
Boeing Company (TBC), Sneak Circuit Analysis Group in Houston, Texas.
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Table II.F-6.
REF PARA
Tests Performed on Skylab EPS Breadboard
(Reference 40M35693)
TEST PERFORMED
6.7
7.3.1
7.4.3
7.3.3
7.3.4
7.3.7.5
7.4.1
7.3.7.1
7.3.7.2
7.1.14
7.3.7.3
7.4.2
7.3.2
7.3.6
7.3.8
CSM Power System Verification
Initial Paralleling Verification
Battery DOD Prediction Verification
SWS EPS/CSM Fuel Cell Parallel Operation
SWS EPS/CSM Descent Battery Parallel Operation
Bus Interface Voltage Limit Test
Switching Test
CSM Feeder Transient Test
CSM Feeder Noise Test
CSM/XFER Bus Noise Test
Power Sharing Test
Contingency Mode Testing
Z-LV-R Simulation
Solar Inertial Operation
Z-LV-E Operation
SPECIAL TESTS OR APPLICATIONS
AM Battery Testing (premission)
Flight Crew Training
Flight Controller Training
SL-I/2 Battery Storage Test
SL-3 AM EPS Shutdown Procedures Test
SL-3 SAS 4 Current Anomaly Test
AM Battery Recharge Procedure Test
Coolant Loop/PCG Deactivation/Activation Procedure
Voltage Regulator Thermal Checkout
CSM Power Transfer Circuit Check
ATM Battery Capacity Test
CBRM 17 Low Output Analysis
CBRM 3, 5 Interconnection Test
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The analysis was limited to the time period from prelaunch to
mission termination. The ESEumbilical power and control circuits were
analyzed for the time period from just before initiating the automatic
sequence until after umbilical separation. Circuitry of the airborne
modules and interfaces defined previously were analyzed for the opera-
tional modesof each mission phase, including prelaunch, launch, orbit
insertion, orbital operations associated with docking and undocking of
CSMs,and OAoperations through mission terminations.
The analysis included the primary power and control circuits,
switched secondary power and control circuits, switched signal cir-
cuits, commandcircuits, and computer interface circuits. Certain non-
switched signal circuits, the grounding trees and most of the digital
logic circuitry were excluded. Electrical functional changes reflect-
ing CCBaction were included. Minor electrical changes madewithout
CCBapproval were also included in the analysis.
Analysts were initially trained in the techniques of data encod-
ing and analysis. The analysts applied the topological diagrams and
sneak clue techniques to each of the network trees to identify poten-
tial sneak circuit conditions.
b. ProgramConcept. The SneakCircuit Analysis effort was
worked on a team concept consisting of NASA,MMC,TBC, MDAC-EDand
McDonnell Douglas-Western Division (MDAC-WD).The reason for the team
concept was to expedite the overall analysis effort and to implement
timely corrective action.
The NASA(MSFC)supported all phases of the analysis. The MMC
prime function was to managethe team, obtain the data for the analy-
sis, evaluate potential sneaks, and ensure implementation of correc-
tive action. The TBCprime function was to analyze the Skylab circuitry
and identify any potential problems. The MDAC-EDand MDAC-WDprime
function was to assist MMCin the data area and support TBCin coord-
ination with the design engineers for potential sneak circuits analy-
sis or identification.
A review board, consisting of a memberfrom each organization,
was established to dispose of all reports.
c. Data Operation. The data collecting and filing activi-
ties, which were performed to support the Skylab Sneak Circuit Analy-
sis, had as their prime objective the provision of accurate, complete,
and current information for the analysis. Over 6,000 items of data
were received. Of this total 4,000 were schematics or wire lists. The
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balance consisted of integrated schematics, specifications, system
handbooks, operating procedures, malfunction procedures, and other
reference documents.
d. Data Acquisition. Data in both microfilm and hard copy
forms were identified and received, which provided a description of
the electrical circuitry and its operation. However, after microfilm
was used for several months it was determined that it was not program
effective to continue its use in all cases. Only those drawings that
were used for analysis only, such as specification control drawings,
vendor specifications, and procurement drawings continued to be used
in the microfilm form. Timely receipt of this information was required
for all of the circuitry within the scope of the analysis. These data
included any type of information that accurately specified circuit
continuities or aided in the understanding of the operation of the sys-
tems having electrical circuitry to be analyzed. Accuracy of the in-
formation obtained was assured to the extent possible by selecting
wiring and schematic information from which the cables and equipment
were to be manufactured. The data were checked wherever possible to
assure that the true electrical configuration of Skylab was being used
in the analysis activities. The data received for exclusive use in the
sneak circuit analysis were retained in files.
Electrical schematics were the most important data received and
used. Schematics at the integrated system level and the detailed
"black box" level, which included "proprietary" information, were
received and used.
e. Results. The task involved the acquisition, correlation,
and encoding of over 4,000 detailed schematics and wiring lists for the
various modules. These data represented the 2,800 black boxes (refer-
ence designators) in Skylab. The data input to the computer programs is
shownin Table II.F-7.
M_DULE
ATM
MDA
AM
OWS
Table II.F-7. SneakCircuit Computer Input qu_m_ary
BOX INTERNAL
DATA _BID)
92K
22K
46K
57K
BOX EXTERNAL
DATA _BED_
22K
6K
12K
14K
54KTOTALS 217K
TOTAL WIRE SEG-
MENTS _RECORDS)
II4K
28K
58K
71K
27 IK *
*In addition, approximately 25,000 records in the ESE,
portable equipment, experiments, and instrumentation
areas were analyzed using manual analysis techniques.
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As a point of reference the Skylab CSMconsisted of 22,000 BID
records and 13,000 BEDrecords for a total of 35,000 records. Thus
Skylab was approximately 7.8 to 8.5 times as complex as the Skylab CSM.
Eight new computer programs were developed and 17 programs were
modified to provide assistance in performing and managing the analysis.
The purpose of these programs varied from tracking of input documents
and output reports to automatically drawing network trees from informa-
tion in the data base. These programs significantly reduced the effort
and cost of performing the analysis, provided a high degree of visibil-
ity of analysis and changes, and insured that every possible electrical
path in the subsystems covered was considered. A total of 400 computer
hours (IBM 260/65 and 370/155) was used in the analysis effort.
The computer runs resulted in the output of the following data for
analysis:
MODULES NETWORK TREES PATHS
ATM/MDA 3,474 21,354
AM/OWS 5,418 26,230
TOTALS 9,892 47,584
A total of 1,530 change packages were received and analyzed. Of
these 312 were electrical functional changes.
The analysis resulted in the preparation of 259 Sneak Circuit
Reports. Many reports described more than one sneak circuit condition.
A significant by-product of the analysis was the identification of
drawing errors. Over 300 Drawing Error Reports were released.
The Sneak Circuit Reports were reviewed and disposed of. The dis-
position was as follows: 44 Sneak Circuit Bulletins; 40 Problem Re-
ports; 91 Design Concern Reports, and 17 Drawing Error Reports. Correc-
tive actions resulting from review of these reports included 20 hardware
changes, 37 procedural changes, 4 documentation changes, and 5 test con-
straints. In addition over 45 hardware changes resulted from the Draw-
ing Error Reports. All Sneak Circuit Reports were disposed of and
closed out. Several Drawing Error Reports remained open because the
original drawings were no longer maintained. However, notification of
the errors was made to all concerned organizations involved in the test,
mission control, and mission support areas.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations. Except for the loss of OWS
Solar Array Wing 2 at the beginning of the SL-I mission, the Skylab EPS
performed as expected with minimal operational anomalies. The two
power systems (A_I_ and AM/OWS) operated compatibly in parallel provid-
ing sufficient power capability for both SI and Z-LV operating modes.
None of the anomalies or system degradations were of sufficient magni-
tude to cause the immediate loss of sufficient power to cancel critical
activities or to cause the loss of any prime mission objective.
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Specific recommendations for future missions include the use of
solar cell interconnector materials that more closely match the solar
cell material and where possible elimination of the solder interface.
This will be necessary for missions imposing large quantities of temp-
erature cycles. For optimum power transfer between the solar array and
the power conditioning equipment include peak power tracking in future
power control and conditioning designs. In addition future design
should include sufficient instrumentation to permit effective engine-
ering analyses of performance and anomalies.
Paralleling of the two power systems proved to be a good means of
providing excellent EPS flexibility under various operating conditions
and differing system degradation rates. The design feature was at
least partly responsible for the long duration of the Skylab mission.
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G. Communicationsand Instrumentation System
The SWSInstrumentation and Communications (I&C) Systemwas the
electronic equipment used to provide information and control between
the Skylab orbiting vehicle and the ground, and between the crewmenin
Skylab. The I&C System specifically provided audio and visual commun-
ications, subsystemand experiment status information, biomedical mon-
itoring, commandsignals, and rendezvous ranging signals. The system
was divided into seven major portions, as follows:
- OAAudio
- OATelevision (TV)
- ATMData
- AMData
- ATMCommand
- AMCommand
- SWS/CSMRanging
Each portion of the system had interfaces with other systems,
namely, the CSM,the IU, Skylab Experiments, Launch Complex39, and the
SpaceTracking and Data Network (STDN).
i. Design Requirements. The SWS Communications System design was
established to meet the requirements of the following documents:
- Cluster Requirements Specification, RS003M00003
- Skylab Frequency Plan Instrumentation and Communications
Interface, ICD 50M13120
- Skylab to MSFN Instrumentation and Communications Inter-
face, ICD 50M13126
- Skylab Orbital Assembly Audio System Requirements, ICD
50M13136
- Skylab Orbital Assembly Television System Requirements,
ICD 50M16132
- Module, Subsystem, and Intermodule Interface Control Documents
a. Intercenter Panel. Definition and resolution of all I&C
interface problems were delegated to the I&C panel in March 1967 by the
director of the Saturn AAP. The charter meeting of the panel was held
in April 1967, and over the course of the total AAP and Skylab programs,
16 meetings were held. The task of the panel was significantly reduced
in September 1968 when the LM and the AM were assigned to MSFC for pro-
gram implementation. At this point a number of interfaces were either
eliminated or reduced to level B (intracenter-intercontractor). During
the program, subpanels and ad hoc working groups were formed with the
panels sponsorship to work in specialized areas. Examples of these groups
are the RF System Subpanel, the Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Sub-
panel, the Data System Subpanel, the Audio Working Group, and Transducer
Working Group.
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b. Data Systems. Early configurations established a data
system in support of the ATM and a second in the AM. These systems
were baselined using existing equipment designs. The designs represen-
ted equipment from the Saturn program in the case of the ATM and the
Gemini program in the case of the AM. As the program evolved system
configuration changes occurred. Generally, the changes were directed
to expanding capacity and insuring the achievement of the required
operating life.
In the case of the ATM the addition of Remote Analog Submultiplex-
ers (RASMs) provided additional measurement capacity and the develop-
ment of the ASAP equipment provided for storage and recovery of selected
data during the periods when RF contact was not available.
The Gemini system configuration was revised by the addition of the
PCM interface box. The capability obtained by addition of this box in-
cluded additional channels by dividing down some high sampling rate
channels included in the original PCM format. This made available
added portions (subframes) of the format for recording more than the
single subframe that was recorded in Gemini, and provided a means of
selecting between redundant programmers to insure system operating
life. As part of the data system, multiple recorders were installed
to insure reliability and record increased amounts of data when no
ground station contact was available. Recorder modifications were made
to permit recording of digital experiment data not identical to the
Gemini format and to record voice on a second track.
c. Command Systems (Including RF Systems). The Command Sys-
tems, as did the data systems, used equipment developed for earlier
programs, specifically Saturn-IU equipment on the ATM and Gemini on
the AM. The systems incorporated redundancy as was normal for command
systems.
The AM command system had a teleprinter added as an output. The
unit operated from a standard format command signal having a separate
system address. The equipment was unique to Skylab and was used daily
to provide updated flight plans, menu changes, revised operating pro-
cedures, repair instructions, and a variety of other communications.
During development, a challenging item was the selection of a writing
medium that was the proper tradeoff between flammability and clarity
of reproduction.
The baseline systems incorporated redundant transmitters on both
the ATM and AM to assure availability during the life of the program.
The ATM was baselined with i0 watt transmitters while the AM used the
2 watt Gemini transmitters. Analyses were conducted on the transmit-
ter links and the marginal nature of the AM 2 watt units resulted in
direction to switch to I0 watt transmitters. Another revision in the
program resulted in a single 2 watt transmitter being incorporated in
the communications system (redundant in frequency to one of the ten
watt units) for use during boost and the early flight period. The
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change was incorporated as a result of analyses that showedthe partial
pressure from outgassing and evaporative cooling systems in the IU, had
for several hours after launch, the potential of causing arcing at the
power and potential levels used in the I0 watt units.
Each antenna system for the ATMand AMinvolved ground selection
for the best coverage for any ground station contact. Revisions were
madein the switching matrix on both modules during program reviews to
insure that a failure in switching systems would not prevent transmis-
sion from another antenna.
d. Ranging System. The ranging system was incorporated as an
aid to the ascending CSMto conduct an efficient rendezvous with the
orbiting SWS. The equipment on the SWSwas identical to that carried
on the LM ascent stage in the Apollo program. A high gain directional
antenna was designed and installed on the SWSto maximize the distance
at which ranging data would be available. The antenna was designed to
produce a pattern fitted to the nominal approach path.
e. Audio System. The baseline audio system was a wire exten-
sion of the CSMaudio panels to permit headsets to be plugged in through-
out the modules of the SWS. Requirements reviews and systems analyses
resulted in the establishment of stations where Speaker Intercom Assem-
blies (SIAs) were installed throughout the cluster. These SIAs were
equipped with speakers and a push-to-talk microphone to permit commun-
ication between Skylab crewmenor between crewmenand the ground.
Special EVAand IVA stations allowed suited crewmento tie into the
system. The SIAs also provided for control of an audio recorder, the
pickup point for operational biomedical information, distribution of
C&Walarm tones, and plug-in capability for communications via headsets.
f. TV System. Various proposals on the incorporation of a TV
system in Skylab were presented starting late in 1967. No program di-
rection was given to incorporate the system until October 1968. The
initial system installed was based on real-time transmission only.
Television images to be transmitted included general working scenes
throughout the SWSusing the Apollo color camera and pictures from the
ATMscientific cameras.
System evaluation of possible use of TV brought about the design
and development of a remote control lens to be used in conjunction with
the SALand boomsystem developed for Experiment T027. This combina-
tion of equipment would permit the extension of a camera outside the
SWSfor exterior views. The system was never used because one airlock
was used for the umbrella shade and the boommechanismhad to be ejec-
ted from the other airlock due to a failure. Continued analysis of
possible TV scenes and available ground contact time led, in 1971, to
incorporation of a video recorder. Use of this recorder freed the
crewmansuse of TV in sending plctorial data from the times and periods
of ground station contacts.
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The final addition to the capability of the TV system was the
addition of an adapter to permit the TV camera to pick up the image
from the Viewfinder Tracking System (VTS) optics of the EREPequipment.
2. Functional Description. The total I&C system was used by the
SWS when docked to a CSM on orbit as shown by Figure II.G-I. It should
be noted that in its baseline configuration both the audio and TV parts
of the system are dependent on the CSM for operation. Further descrip-
tions will be provided on each of the seven basic portions of the sys-
tem with a special description on audio contact to the ground in case
of a failed CSM. System descriptions are to a large extent presented
as single figures consisting of a block diagram and associated black
box descriptions. Special features are pointed out in the body of the
text.
a. Data Systems. The ATM and AM PCM data systems both made
use of equipment developed for and flown on earlier programs. Both
systems were used to process, record, and transmit housekeeping and
scientific data. The systems shown in Figures II.G-2 and II.G-3 both
had fixed formats for both real-time transmission and delayed broad-
cast from recordings. The AM system provided more recorded data flex-
ibility than the ATM by having various portions of its complete output
selectable for recording.
The ATM reliability goals were accomplished by incorporating in-
stalled redundant equipment for all functions considered critical or
high risk. Selection between the redundant elements could be made by
ground command or crewman selection from the ATM G&D console.
The AM used essentially the same approach with the in flight main-
tenance capability being provided for the tape recorders. These were
installed in operating positions and any data required could be re-
corded on any one although during certain experiment operating modes
all three were required simultaneously. For in flight maintenance
procedures spares were carried in the SWS and installed during flight.
Additional AM recorders were brought up to the SWS on manned flight
SL-3. An AM tape recorder repair kit was brought up on manned flight
SL-4.
The RF portion of the ATM telemetry subsystem was used to tele-
meter real-or delayed-time PCM data from the ATM systems and experiments
to the STDN. Input switching enabled either transmitter to transmit
either the PCM real-time format or the PCM delayed-time (recorded) for-
mat. Both transmitters could transmit the same data (i.e., real-time
format or delayed-time format) simultaneously.
Appropriate modulation and antenna selection was accomplished by
either ground command or astronaut control. The antennas were switch-
able so whichever element exhibited the higher gain at a given space-
craft look angle to the ground, that element could be selected for
telemetry transmission.
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The need for one or more omnidirectional radiating elements for
downlink data was realized early in the ATMprogram. Preliminary
consideration was given to mounting these antennas at the end of booms
extending out from the ATMrack structure. However, the concept of
using the solar panels as extended antenna mounts soon evolved, and was
accepted. The telemetry antenna design first given serious considera-
tion was the use of a notch cut into the edge of a dummysolar panel,
or a slot cut out of the dummysolar panel mountedon the end of the
solar panel wings. The design was_ mechanically, compatible with the
solar panels but eventually had to be replaced because of unsymmetri-
cal antenna patterns including sharp nulls.
The notch concept was finally discarded in favor of simple dipoles.
The flown configuration had two dipoles mounted in planes that were
mutally perpendicular, thus avoiding overlap of pattern nulls. They
displayed better overall patterns and were still relatively simple
mechanical devices, with sufficient mounting flexibility to favorably
orient the antenna pattern.
The AM RF system included two types of antenna, namely stub
antennas and discone antennas. Because the discone antennas were fold-
ed inside the shroud, the stub antenna mounted on a fixed portion of
the shroud was designed to be used during launch in conjunction with
the 2 watt transmitter. Use of the 2 watt transmitter during the launch
phase avoided the possible loss of data due to corona in the lO-watt
transmitter.
In the transition from the WWS to the DWS concept of Sky lab, con-
sideration was given to using all 2 watt transmitters. Subsequent
analysis determined the 2-watt transmitter to be inadequate for contin-
uous orbital operations, because these low-level transmitters resulted
in marginal signal levels at maximum slant range for both the 220 and
260 n mi trajectory altitudes, being considered at that time. The VHF
coverage of a 260 n mi, 50 degree inclination mission was reduced from
28.1 percent of flight time to 21.2 percent, or nearly a 25 percent
decrease. The analysis compared the 2 watt transmitter to a i0 watt
transmitter. It became apparent that an increase in the power output
of the transmitters was necessary to increase coverage and permit sig-
nal acquisition at maximum slant range. Use of a i0 watt transmitter
represented a seven dB increase in signal margin. This power level
yielded positive signal margins for less than nominal link conditions.
The I0 watt transmitter was subsequently defined for the AM telemetry
system and became the orbit configuration. As mentioned earlier, a
2 watt transmitter was retained and used during the launch phase.
b. Command Systems. The ATM command system hardware was a
carryover from the Saturn program. The command receiver operated at
450 M}Iz and after demodulating the RF signal, provided a dual phase-
shift keyed (PSK) audio output to the decoder or a 72 Kilo Bits per sec-
cond (Kbps) wave train to the digital computer memory load unit. The
latter signal allowed the ground to reload the A_ digital computer
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memoryif required. The output of the decoder was either digital inputs
to the ATMdigital computer or digital commandsprocessed by the switch
selectors. As noted in Figure II.G-4, the switch selectors and the digi-
tal computer could also be accessed by an onboard keyboard mounted on
the ATMC&Dconsole. The keyboard was capable of implementing the same
commandsthat were available to the ground. The commandsystem was re-
dundant and could be operated in parallel or individually.
The original design of the ATMcommandsystem consisted of one-
half the redundancy shownin Figure II.G-4. To meet the program reli-
ability requirements the system componentswere configured to provide
two independent parallel systems connected in active redundancy al-
though only one operational system was'required for processing the com-
manddata transmitted by the STDN. Systemdesign allowed the STDNto
address either or both independent systems. The ATMcommandsystem was
activated via an AMcommandsystem function.
From the early design stages of the ATM, when the ATMwas to be a
free-flying module to be docked to the WWScluster, the need for one
or more antennas was required on the ATMfor commandreception. It
was desirable that these devices be omnidirectional because they were
to be effective with the cluster in a variety of attitudes. Preliminary
consideration was given to mounting these antennas at the end of booms
extending from the ATMrack structure. However, the concept of using
the ATMsolar panels as extended antenna mounts soon evolved and was
accepted.
Three antenna configurations were considered: a scimitar element,
a fixed (bent) dipole element, and a deployable dipole element. The
bent dipole antenna (also referred to as a quadrant antenna), whencom-
pared to a scimitar element, showeda more uniform antenna pattern with
only minor nulls in the pattern, whereas the scimitar showedsharp peaks
and deep nulls in its pattern. The dipole element thus was a more de-
sirable antenna, being more omnidirectional. The dipole element also
proved to have a better gain distribution (i.e., percentage of spheri-
cal coverage versus antenna gain) than did the scimitar antenna.
Considering the above and the fact that the bent dipole was much
smaller and lighter than the scimitar element, which required a heavy
ground plane, the bent dipole antenna was selected to be mounted on an
antenna panel at the end of ATMsolar panel 710.
The second element of the redundant antenna system was to be a
deployable dipole element located on the end of ATMsolar panel 712.
This element was given initial rejection on the basis that the added
element was not really necessary for adequate coverage and also that
it would require deployment that would be less reliable. However, the
second element when added in quadrature to the first element (on panel
710) and being in a plane perpendicular to the first element provided
an exceptional complementfor commandcoverage.
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The AM command system also operated at 450 MHz but accepted only
those commands with the proper vehicle address code. As noted in Figure
II.G-5, redundant receivers and decoders were provided with the capabil-
ity of switching from one system to the other automatically or by ground
command. In addition to providing 544 discrete commands, and update the
timing system, the command system also processed uplinked messages to
the AM teleprinter providing the crew with a hard copy of data transmit-
ted from the STDN.
During the launch and initial unmanned activation period of Skylab,
command reception was accomplished using the command and launch stub
antennas located on the AM FAS. Following deployment of the discone
antennas, command reception was switched from the stub to the discone
antennas.
The stub antennas were modified Gemini elements designed for com-
mand reception in the 440 to 460 MHz frequency range (450 MHz nominal.
The electrical characteristics of the stub elements were basically un-
changed except the stubs which were _/4 wavelength long before the DWS
ended up as a %/2 stub element in its final configuration.
The discone antennas, designed for command reception at 450 MHz
nominally, remained unchanged in electrical characteristics since their
inception during the early program period. Each discone element was
located on the ends of booms that were deployed subsequent to Skylab
orbital insertion and PS jettison. To establish the best possible con-
figuration for optimum coverage, the location and length of the booms
were varied during the program.
c. Ranging Subsystem. During the CSM rendezvous and docking
phase, the AM ranging system was used in conjunction with the CSM Apollo
ranging system to compute and display the range between the CSM and the
SWS. The AM ranging system consisted of a helix element ranging antenna,
a Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver, and a range tone transfer assembly
(RTTA). A block diagram of the AM ranging system is shown in Figure II.G-6.
During the period of WWS to DWS transition, an AM ranging system
was introduced to work in conjunction with an established CSM Apollo
three-tone ranging system. System design was based on the technical
restraints of the Apollo system and the Skylab mission requirements. As
the mission requirements (e.g., tracking range, SWS attitude during ren-
dezvous, CSM to SWS orientation during rendezvous) changed, so did the
conceptual design of the AM ranging system.
Several options were considered in establishing the ranging antenna
element(s) type and locations. Based on an early mission sequence re-
quirement that the SWS would be in the Z-LV attitude for one-orbit from
noon-to-noon and in the SI attitude for the remainder of the rendezvous,
it was concluded that it would be impossible to generate the required
antenna coverage from the AM without the addition of boom supported
antennas.
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Several antenna configurations were considered. Adequate antenna
coverage could be provided for a SI rendezvous (i.e., no Z-LV) with
two low gain helices each mounted on six-foot deployable booms extend-
ing from the AM STS and one high gain helix deployed on a shorter boom
from the STS below the longitudinal (X-axis) axis of the SWS. Boom
mounted antennas on the AM STS would also provide adequate coverage
with a sequence requirement for SWS Z-LV attitude for two orbits (max-
imum) with the OWS leading. This was the final attitude requirement
established for rendezvous.
The deployed boom concept for the ranging antennas was rejected
for the fixed mounted antenna concept, so no movable or deployable
appendages would be necessary to activate the antenna system.
Continued analysis and finalization of mission sequence require-
ments for rendezvous, led to the definition of a single helix 5-turn
element antenna. Its location was to be fixed mounted on the ATM
DA, such that after the DA was deployed, positioning the ATM above
the MDA in its sun-oriented on-orbit position, the ranging antenna
would be located approximately over and on the +Y side of the MDA
axial docking port.and below the main body of the ATM. The antenna
was oriented such as to provide coverage in the X-Z panel and in
the +X, +Z quadrant of the plane of rendezvous and docking. The
range was 300 n mi with the SWS in the Z-LV attitude. The antenna
element was predominantly circularly polarized and was used for both
receiving and transmitting. The 3 dB beamwidth was 50 degrees with
peak gain of 9 dB.
d. Audio System. The audio subsystem was designed to provide
intercom capability for the crew within the OA and/or while engaged in
EVA and to provide two-way communication between the STDN ground sta-
tions and the crewmen in real time. Delayed time downlink voice was
also provided. In addition, the subsystem supports the gathering of
biomedical data and operation of the C&W subsystem. See Figure II.G-7
for a functional block diagram and a listing of major components.
For normal communication, the operation of the system required the
presence of the CSM because the system was dependent on the CSM audio
amplifiers and transmitter/receivers for on-orbit intercom and real-time
communication with the ground. Because RF communication with the ground
was limited on average to approximately 30 percent of the time, the
capability to record voice was provided in the AM. A tape recorder
amplifier was provided in the Audio Load Compensator (ALC) taping the
voice signal from the earphone lines. The voice was recorded on the
second track of the AM data recorder and played back at high speed when
over a ground station.
Two independent channels, A and B, provided redundant voice com-
munication capability throughout the OA. One channel was configured
to provide intercom and real-time transmission with the ground and the
second channel was allocated for the recording of voice. Voice inputs
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into an SIA or EVA/IVA panel via headsets were routed to the CSM via
the microphone amplifiers of the ALC. In the CSM the signal was amp-
lified and returned to the SWS ALC via the headset line amplifier. The
signal was then distributed to any active SIA or headset connected to
this channel. For real-time communication with the ground, the CSM S-
band transmitter/receiver was switched to the proper channel via the
CSM audio panels providing duplex voice communication with a crewman
from any audio station on the SWS.
In the course of the Skylab program the audio system underwent
significant changes as the program requirements were revised from the
WWS to DWS by LM deletion and finally an attached A_. Although the
interface with the CSM voice communication system did not change the
system originally included a secondary voice mode that used airlock
audio equipment and transceivers to provide intercom and a simplex
link between the airlock and the STDN.
In the final configuration, the airlock RF voice communication
subsystem was deleted which included the _ transceiver, VHF duplex
receiver and peripheral audio equipment. The revised system took ad-
vantage of existing communication hardware required by the CSM when fly-
ing to and from the SWS. The revised system, as flown, included use of
the CSM S-band system for duplex communication, backed up by the CSM
VHF communication equipment. Redundant, ALCs were provided in the SWS
providing separate buffer amplifiers for the microphone and earphone
lines in addition to providing voice record capabili::y as previously de-
scribed. As new experiment and operational requirements were developed,
the quantity and locations of the SIAs continued to be changed. During
this period a study was made on the design requirements for the SIA and
whether it should be a two-box unit or a one-box unit for providing
channel switching, headset connection, microphones, speakers and asso-
ciated amplifiers, tape recorder controls, biomedical monitoring chan-
nels and interface with the C&W system. Incorporation of all of these
functions in one box resulted from studies conducted by NASA, module
contractors and crew preference.
e. Television System. The Skylab TV system consisted of a TV
bus routed through the MDA, AM, and OWS for record/transmission of scenes
from a portable field sequential color camera and a tie-in with the five
ATM experiment cameras for the retrieval of scientific data, (see Figure
II.G-8). The video output from any one of these cameras was selectable
for downlink transmission to earth via the CSM S-band transmitter. Be-
cause continuous contact with ground stations was impossible due to the
low nonsynchronous orbit of Skylab, a video tape recorder was provided
capable of recording 30 minutes of video data and playback at the same
record speed via the same S-band transmitter.
In the SWS, five camera plug-points (TV input stations) were pro-
vided for use by the color camera so that almost all manned areas in-
ternal to the SWS could be observed. One of these stations was located
so that the astronaut's EVA could be observed. In addition, a special
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adapter was provided for the camera to be mounted on the Experiment
T027 boom (remotely controlled by the crewmen inside) to make observa-
tions outside the spacecraft. A video switch located in the MDA provi-
ded the capability to switch from the TV bus to the ATM cameras for
recording or transmission to ground. The ATM TV video was the same
scenes as monitored by the crew on the ATM C&D console. A unique fea-
ture of the video tape recorder was its capability to interweave the
crews voice signal into the video signal format, eliminating the neces-
sity for a separate RF downlink for audio. Audio inputs to the tape
recorder was accomplished by interconnecting a cable from the SIA con-
nector normally used for headset operation to the Video Tape Recorder
(VTR) audio input connector.
The evolution of the TV system was one whereby new requirements
were identified over the course of the program. As the SWS configura-
tion changed from the WWS to the DWS, trade-offs were initiated between
using preinstalled cables or drag-in cables.
The system trade-offs resulted in a configuration using a single
preinstalled coaxial cable bus through the SWS with amplifier stations
for connecting the TV camera. The amplifiers were found necessary due
to losses in the cable length required to cover the entire SWS. The
Skylab program made use of the best cable available for interior use on
a manned vehicle, RG-210, and developed the necessary isolated (float-
ing shield) coaxial connectors.
A later requirement for transmitting ATM signals was met by the
installation of a switch in the MDA to select between signals origin-
ating in the MDA and either of two A_ signals. The switch included
amplifiers to achieve a proper interface level for the transmission of
the ATM signals. The ATM was modified from its baseline closed circuit
TV system design by the addition of equipment to add a synchronization
signal to the TV signal and ground isolation to eliminate a ground loop
to ATM structure.
System evaluation led to a new program requirement that allowed
the camera to be mounted outside of the SALs in the OWS on the Experi-
ment T027 universal extension mechanism. This provided coverage of
scheduled EVAs to the AT_I and also a means of surveying the exterior
of a majority of the OA via a remote control panel.
During 1971 reviews were made of the feasibility of incorporating
a VTR in Skylab. Late in the year, the decision was made to incorpor-
ate a recorder from the Earth Resources Technology Satellite Program
modified for incorporation in a manned space vehicle with provisions
for some manual control.
A final system change initiated early in 1972 was to transmit by
television the scenes of the VTS of the EREP.
II-125
3. Interface. The control of interfaces was an important techni-
cal aspect in the formation of the Skylab I&C system. At the time of
liftoff 53 ICDs were used to control the wide variety of interfaces that
were peculiar to the I&C system.
The method generally followed in the preparation of ICDs and Inter-
face Revision Notices (IRNs) was to have the custodial agency prepare a
technical draft, distribute copies for review, consolidate comments re-
ceived orally or in writing and based on the complexity of the change,
conduct a final review with affected parties before submittal for pro-
gram baseline.
The ICDs reflected a variety of program controls. The types are
illustrated by the extensive Level A Audio and Television System Re-
quirements documents encompassing system configuration, system perform-
ance, crew interfaces, previous equipment to be used, and operating
techniques. The intermodule types represented by the CSM to MDA, and
ATM to AM, level A and B respectively, which covered the I&C functions
required between modules and the parametric standards of such functions,
common SWS hardware to various modules, such as the SIA to the MDA and
OWS required a level B document that covered functional requirements and
electrical interconnections. A group of tabular documents showing mea-
surements, commands and RF frequencies were generated as level A for the
control between centers and are illustrated by the MI)A measurement and
ATM DCS RF command lists; the I&C checkout interfaces between vehicles
and KSC as illustrated by the AM/MDA ESE to Quick Look Data System(QLDS)
located in the Operations and Checkout (0&C) building, document; the
command and measurement support required by experiments such as M509
Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment to OWS; and the vehicle in flight to
ground in the Skylab to STDN document.
Each of the ICDs involved a variety of technical skills, the nego-
tiation of responsibilities on a program effective basis and finally the
assurance of testing for compliance. Many of the experiment interface
documents for Skylab involved an educational process for organizations
outside the program that were unfamiliar with the need and purpose of
ICDs.
4. Design Verification. Extensive analyses and tests were conduc-
ted on each of the Communication and Data Systems to verify its opera-
tional integrity. Analyses were conducted on new hardware design and in
hardware applications that were unique to Skylab, i.e., RF communication
to ground compatibility. A thorough test program was conducted where
feasible, from the black box level to the total system. The magnitude
of the Skylab vehicle precluded ground testing of the complete system
on the TV and audio system, the on-orbit operation of the docked CSM to
the SWS being the first time these systems were activated as an integra-
ted unit. The following paragraphs summarize the more pertinent design
verification for each system.
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a. Analyses. Because the majority of the Skylab Data and
Communicationsystems were application of design and hardware developed
on previous programs, the only formal systems performance analyses were
conducted on the antenna coverage and RF circuit margins, the analysis
on the Skylab TV Systemand a RF beat frequency analysis. As with all
the other systems comprising the Skylab Vehicle, Failure Modesand Ef-
fects Analysis (FMEA), Single Failure Point (SFP), and contingency analy-
ses were conducted on the Data and Communicationsystems but are not de-
tailed in this report.
(i) SystemsAnalysis
(a) RF Link Analysis. Up and DownRF link analyses
were conducted on the commandand telemetry systems for both the AM and
ATM. The analyses evaluated the communication links using the expected
Skylab trajectory and the STDNground station operating parameters.
Analyses of these links were performed using the ComputerOriented Com-
munications Operational Analysis (COCOA)programs tabulated output car-
rier margins (Cm). These data then, provided the nucleus for determin-
ing the RF link capability associated with communications bar charts, the
data-dump/command-gaps,the impact of rendezvous and earth pointing atti-
tude on the telemetry links, and generating the CommandModule (CAM)ana-
log plots.
A summaryof the ATMand AMtelemetry and commandRF link calcula-
tions is shownin Tables II.G-I through II.G-6. A plus six dB Cmat max-
imumslant range was required for satisfactory performance criteria (ICD
specification). Both AMdiscones and the ATMAft dipole exceeded the +6
dB Cmat maximumslant range, using antenna gains achievable over 75 per-
cent of the telemetry antenna patterns. The commandlinks, with the ex-
ception of the commandstub antenna in conjunction with the Model 27
backup commandreceiver, exceeded the +6 dB Cmat maximumslant range,
using antenna gains achievable over 95 percent of the commandantenna
patterns.
The trajectory-related RFdata generated for the ATMand AM telem-
etry links by COCOAprograms, which used measuredand calculated param-
eters in time increments of 0.2 of a minute, indicated that 95 percent
or better of the link computations provided a positive Cm; 84 percent
or better provided a +6 dB. The ATMand AM commandlinks indicated 99.9
percent or better provided a positive Cm; 99.8 percent or better pro-
vided a +6 dB Cm.
In analyzing the generated link data, it was determined that the
telemetry Cmswere basically the samewhen the SWSwas in either the Z-LV
attitude or in the SI attitude. Also, the principal limiting tactor in
completing the VHFand Ultra High Frequency (UHF) links, based on a pos-
itive Cm,was the maksing data and the two-degree elevation angle con-
straint, with respect to the ground stations.
(b) Antenna Pattern Analysis. The radiation pattern
over the surface of a sphere in a e, _ coordinate system was analyzed
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Table II,G-I.
PARAMETER
ATM Telemetry RF Link Calculations
S/C XMTR POWER (i0 WATTS)
S/C ANTENNA GAIN - FWD & AFT
ANTENNA DIPOLES(75% COVERAGE
FOR COMPOSITE RHCP & LHCP
S/C LOSSES, CALCULATED
SPACE LOSSES (FREQUENCY =
235.0 MHz, RANGE = 1,300 n mi
RECEIVE CIRCUIT LOSSES
(RF & POINTING ERROR)
GROUND STATION ANTENNA GAIN
(18-ELEMENT TELTRACE SYSTEM)
RECEIVED POWER LEVEL
RECEIVER SYSTEM SENSITIVITY
T e = 365°K/B = 300 kHz
CARRIERMARGIN
FWD
ANTENNA LINK
Pt = 40.0 dBm
G t = - 9.0 dB
Lx = 4.5 dB
L s = 147.4 dB
AFT
ANTENNA LINK
Pt = 40.0 dBm
G t = - 5.3 dB
L x = 4.5 dB
L s = 147.4 dB
Lr = 2.0 dB L r = 2.0 dB
Gr = 19.0 dB Gr = 19.0 dB
Pr = -103.9 dBm Pr = -100.2 dBm
RN = -108.0 dBm RN = -108.0 aBm
Cm = 4.1 dB Cm = 7.8 dB
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Table II. G-2.
PARAMETER
S/C XMTRPOWER
( i0 WATTS)
S/C ANTENNA
GAIN- DISCONES
ANDSTUBANTENNA
( 75%COVERAGE)
FORCOMPOSITE
RHCPANDLHCP
S/C LOSSES
SPACELOSSES
(FREQUENCY=
235.0 MHz, RANGE
= 1,300 n mi)
RECEIVECIRCUIT
LOSSES(RF AND
POINTINGERROR)
GROUNDSTATION
ANTENNAGAIN(18-
ELEMENTELTRAC
SYSTEM)
RECEIVEDPOWER
LEVEL
RECEIVERSYSTEM
SENSITIVITY
Te = 365°K/
B = 300 kHz
CARRIER MARGIN
AM Telemetry RF Link Calculations
DISCONE LINK i DISCONE LINK 2 LAUNCH STUB
Pt = 40.0 dBm Pt = 40.0 dBm Pt = 40.0 dBm
G t = - 5.2 dB G t = - 6.1 dB G t = - 9.2 dB
Lx = 4.0 dB Lx = 3.4 dB Lx = 3.2 dB
L s = 147.4 dB L s = 147.4 dB L s = 147.4 dB
L r = 2.0 dB L r = 2.0 dB L r = 2.0 dB
Gr = 19.0 dB Gr = 19.0 dB G r = 19.0 dB
Pr = - 99.6 dBm Pr = - 99.9 dBm Pr = -102.8 dBm
RN = -108.0 dBm RN = -108.0 dBm RN = -i08.0 dBm
Cm = 8.4 dB Cm = 8.1 dB Cm = 5.2 dB
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Table II.G-3.
PERCENT
SPHERICAL
COVERAGE
75%
80%
85%
9O%
95%
Telemetry RF Link Carrier Margins I versus Antenna
Spherical Coverage
ATM LINKS
FWD DIPOLE AFT DIPOLE
+7.8 dB
+6.3 dB
+4.3 dB
+2.1 dB
-i.0 dB
DIS CONE i
+8.4 dB
+7.2 dB
+5.4 dB
+2.9 dB
-0. I dB
AM LINKS
iDISCONE 2
+8.1 dB
+6.6 dB
+5.4 dB
+3.1 dB
+0.i dB
+4.1 dB
+2.1 dB
-0.2 dB
-2.6 dB
-5.5 dB
I - CARRIER MARGIN CALCULATED AT HORIZON (1,300 n mi)
Table II.G-4. ATM Command RF Link Calculations
LAUNCH STUB
+5.2 dB
+3.9 dB
+2.6 dB
+I.i dB
-i.0 dB
FWD AFT
PARAMETERS ANTENNA LINK ANTENNA LINK
Pt = 70.0 dBm Pt = 70.0 dBm
G t = 18.0 dB G t _ 18.0 dBm
Lx = 1.0 dB Lx = 1.0 dB
Ls = 153.0 dB L s -- 153.0 dB
Gr = - 18.0 dB Gr = - 16.8 dB
Lr = 4.1 dB Lr _ 5.1 dB
Pr = - 88.1 dBm Pr -- " 87.9 dBm
RN = -104.0 dBm RN = -104.0 dBm
Cm = 15.9 dB Cm _ 16.1 dB
STDN XMTR POWER (i0 KW)
STDN ANTENNA GAIN (LHCP)
STDN LOSSES (XMTR CIRCUIT +
ANTENNA POINTING LOSS)
SPACE LOSSES (FREQUENCY =
450 MHz, RANGE = 1,300 n mi)
S/C ANTENNA GAIN (DIPOLES)
FOR 95% COVERAGE (LHCP COVERAGE)
RECEIVE CIRCUIT LOSSES
RECEIVED POWER LEVEL
RECEIVER SENSITIVITY
CARRIER MARGIN
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for each of the ATM and AM antennas. The analysis results were pre-
sented in the form of antenna directivity contour plots and cumulative
gain plots for each antenna element, and diversity patterns and cumu-
lative gain plots for combined antenna coverage.
The antenna directivity plots presented the relative field strength
(i.e., relative to maximum and isotropic) in a specified polarization at
any point on an imaginary sphere enclosing the SWS antenna element. The
relative field strength (or power level) was identified by an amplitude
in decibels at every angle of @ and _. The data for the directivity
plots were taken every two degrees in _ and two degrees in _ in one
decibel increments. Directivity plots were presented for right-hand-
circular-polarization (RHCP), left-hand-circular-polarization (LHCP),
and both orthogonal linear polarizations for each ATM command and
telemetry antenna and for the AM ranging helix antenna; and RHCP and
LHCP for the AM command and telemetry antennas.
The COCOA computer program was used to compute the spherical area
and associated percentage of the total area for each decibel level on
the directivity patterns. Power at each decibel level was then compu-
ted and summed to obtain the total power, from which the isotropic level
(with respect to the maximum level) was obtained. Specific directivi-
ties at any spherical coordinate @ and _ would then be referred to this
isotropic level.
Based on the above directivity data, graphical analysis was per-
formed to obtain the cumulative percent spherical coverage for all the
SWS antenna system patterns (command and telemetry).
Special contour plots were prepared for all the ATM and AM telem-
etry antennas to reflect the polarization diversity capability of the
STDN for telemetry reception. Composite data tapes for the directivity
patterns were generated using original RHCP and LHCP data. Complemen-
tary data (RHCP and LHCP) for each element, SWS configuration, and
telemetry frequency were then compared, data point for data point, at
each 8, _ look angle recorded on each pattern. The highest absolute
directivity level, at each point was recorded on the composite data
tape, which was used to generate the combined circular polarization
diversity patterns for each of the telemetry antenna combinations. A
number of these combinations were analyzed to generate the combined
coverage data and the associated cumulative gain curves.
The measured antenna data, described previously, was compared with
the specification antenna coverage levels contained in the Skylab to
STDN ICD. The comparison was made using the appropriate cumulative
gain curves, also mentioned previously. A summary of this information
is contained in Tables II.G-7 and II.G-8. For the telemetry antenna,
the RHCP and combined RHCP and LHCP data shown for these are com-
patible with the STDN receiving system. For the command antennas the
LHCP data is shown because this is the polarization of the STDN command
transmissions.
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Table II.G-7. Skylab Telemetry System to STDN Coverage
Requirements
TELEMETRY ANTENNA COVERAGE SUMMARY
ANTENNAS
ATM DIPOLE (AFT), WING 713
ATM DIPOLE (FWD), WING 710
AM LAUNCH STUD, -Y+7°(I._UNCH)
AM LAUNCH STUB, -Y+7 ° (ORBIT)
AM DISCONE i
AM DISCONE 2
COMPOSITE: ATMDIPOLES
COMPOSITE: AM DISCONES
COMPOSITE: AM DISCONES +
LAUNCH STUB
COMPOSITE: AM DISCONE i
+LAUNCH STUB
COMPOSITE: AM DISCONE 2
+LAUNCH STUB
N/S = Not specified.
N/A = Not available.
dBi _ decibel isotropic
SPECIFIED
COVERAGEI% )
N/S
N/S
0 dBi over 15
-5 dBi over 35
-5 dBi over 50
-5 dBi over 50
-6 dBi over 97
-5 dBi over 85
N/S
NIS
N/S
MEASURED COVERAGE
73 (-6 dBi)
60.5(-6 dBi)
28
49
70
64
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
RHCP+LCHP_ %I
77 (-6 dBi)
65 (-6 dBi)
33
54
74
70
97
94.5
99 .i
(-5 dBi)
87.5
(-5 dBi)
87.5
(-5 dBi)
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Table II.G-8. Skylab CommandSystem to STDNCoverage Requirements
COMMANDANTENNACOVERAGESUMMARY
ANTENNAS
ATMDIPOLE(AFT), WING712
ATMDIPOLE(FWD),WING710
AMCOMMANDSTUB,-Z-7°(LAUNCH)
AMLAUNCHSTUB, -Y+7°(LAUNCH)
AMCOMMANDSTUB,-Z-7° (ORBIT)
AMLAUNCHSTUB,
AM DISCONE I
AM DISCONE 2
COMPOSITE:
COMPO SITE:
COMPOSITE:
COMPO SITE:
COMPOSITE:
SPECIFIED COVERAGE
-6 dBi over 82%
-6 dBi over 82%
-14dBi over 75%
N/S
-14dBi over 80%
COMPOSITE
-Y+7 ° (ORBIT) N/S
-14dBi over 90%
-14dBi over 90%
ATMDIPOLES
AM DISCONES
AM DISCONES +
COMMAND STUB
AM COMMAND +
LAUNCH STUBS
AM DISCONE 1 +
COMMAND +LAUNCH
STUBS
AM DISCONE 2 +
COMMAND +LAUNCH
STUBS
-6 dBi over 95%
-14dBi over 97
-14dBi over 98
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S = Not specified.
dBi = decibel Isotroplc
SPECIFIED COVERAGE
(LHCP %)
68
63
78
74.5 (-14 dBi)
83
80 (-14 dBi)
93
92
98
99.8
99.9
99.9 (-14 dB£)
99.9 (-14 dBi)
99.9 (-14 dBi)
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(c) RF Beat Frequency Analysis. The problem of
interaction of RF signals generated on board Skylab was evaluated under a
computerized beat frequency analysis implemented early in the program.
The primary responsibility for this task was given to the EMCSubpanel.
Through this medium, a beat frequency analysis plan was generated and
data coordination between the two centers was maintained. The analysis
evaluated the interaction of all RF frequencies (including experiments)
that could cause problems onboard Skylab. The effects of intermodula-
tion products, harmonics, and image frequencies were identified and
their impact on system operations evaluated. Those frequencies that
were identified as potential problems were resolved by vendor qualifica-
tion tests or module/intermodule tests.
(2) Data SystemsAnalysis. Because the ATMand AMdata
systems were designed on previous programs, the analysis for design
verification were confined primarily to the compatibility of the data
system as it interfaced with the RF transmitters and antenna.
In particular, the evolution and changes to the AM transmitters
were based on the need for adequate RF signal margin, data modulation
bandwidth requirements and corona. The use of two 2 watt transmitters
in the AM (selected in part to prevent corona and no cooling during
launch and storage) gave way to the selection of one 2-watt transmitter
and three i0 watt transmitters (similar to the ATMtransmitters) based
on analyses of insufficient circuit margin, redundancy, and possible
degradation in equipment performance as the mission duration was in-
creased. Analysis had indicated that the transmitter used during launch
could operate without any coolant and be corona free if the power output
was maintained at less than 2 watts. In the final configuration, a 2
watt transmitter was installed for launch purposes (and as a back-up
during flight) while three I0 watt transmitters were provided for on-
orbit operations to support real-time PCM, delay-time PCM, and delay-
time voice transmission simultaneously.
(3) Command System. Because the ATM and AM command sys-
tems were developed on previous programs, the primary analyses were
conducted in the area of reliabiiity and ground-to-air link analyses.
Compared to Skylab both the ATM and AM command receiver/decoders
were qualified for short duration missions. As the mission duration
became longer (greater than 56 days) the requirements for redundancy in
the ATM command system was addressed. When the Skylab program changed
in concept from the WWS to the DWS in July 1969 and the subsequent
decision for the ATM attitude control system to be responsible for the
total cluster control, the ATM command system was reviewed in light of
its interface with the ATM digital computer. The result was to provide
a parallel redundant system, (command antenna, receiver, and decoder)
capable of operating in active redundancy or each parallel half opera-
ting by itself.
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(4) Ranging SystemAnalysis. Design analyses for the VHF
ranging system were primarily in the type of antenna required on the SWS
and its location. Influencing parameters included the SWSorientation
during rendezvous. The original antenna evaluated was a Gemini type stub
antenna mounted on an AM truss; however, as the SWSorientation for ren-
dezvous becamefirm, the need for a helical antenna with various beam
widths was analyzed. In addition, circuit margin analyses were conduc-
ted with the antenna located on an AMboom, the MDA,and on the ATM
truss. These analyses led to a 5-turn helix with a 3 dB beamwidth of
50 degrees and a 9 dB gain mounted on the ATMtruss and pointed along
with the X axis of the SWS,capable of operating at a maximumrange of
300 n mi. Another analysis included the tracking capabilities for ren-
dezvous function for terminal phase initiations (TPI) maneuvers for
ranges less than 30 n mi. The loss of tracking data for certain approach
angles were identified.
(5) Audio SystemAnalysis. Design analyses of the audio
system was divided in two areas; system analysis and hardware analysis.
Systems analysis consisted of identifying the support functions
required of the audio system and the types of controls, displays, and
facilities required by the crew. These analyses and requirements were
maintained and updated via the Audio SystemsRequirements document,
which was continually revised by meeting with crew systems organizations
and technical organizations from MSFC,JSC, and their contractors. An
audio working group was formed to evaluate crew requirements, experiment
requirements, and the overall mission requirements. The outputs were
defined in terms of what type functions, displays, and controls would
be required of the hardware. Hardware analyses included:
- Modifications to the lightweight headset to in-
crease microphone signal output and reduce loading
on the microphone bus whenmultiple headsets were
on one channel.
- Channel-to-channel crosstalk analysis due to the
earphone line of both channels connected to a com-
monC&Wsystem.
- Systems gain analysis for the normal and rescue
configuration based on variation in the crewmans
voice and off-nominal head-to-microphone position.
(6) Television SystemAnalysis. A detail analysis was
conducted on the Skylab TV system to evaluate the quality of TV
pictures as monitored on the ground. Analyses were conducted on the
airborne system to assure that the quality of the signal being sent from
the Skylab was sufficient to yield a good picture. Such parameters as
frequency response_ coaxial cable attenuation, linearity, video bus
levels, and the RF link were considered. Also considered, was the effect
of the SWS/CSMaccumulated tolerances on the video signal level.
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The results of this analysis led to the conclusion that the signal-
to-noise of the video signal would be at least 30 dB, based on the
carrier-to-noise ratio as predicted by the RF link analysis. It was de-
termined that the linearity of the system was satisfactory and the band-
width of the downlink signal would be limited by the CSM transmitter.
Other analyses included:
- System grounding to eliminate a shock hazard in the
portable TV camera.
- Coaxial cable shield grounding through the MDA
video switch.
b. Tests. Testing of the data systems included obtaining
data on antenna patterns, compatibility tests with STDN ground stations,
corona tests, and transmitter operation without cooling. The need for
major test programs and plans were evaluated and directed by means of
the I&C panel meetings. Where applicable these requirements were assigned
to subpanels or ad hoc working groups. In particular, scale model antenna
testing, EMC tests, GSFC tests, Skylab Test Unit (STU)-STDN tests, MDA/AM
attitude tests, and KSC test plans were thoroughly evaluated by the I&C
panel. The panel also evaluated the need for simulators at MSFC, JSC, GSFC,
or at the module contractors to provide proper equipment and interface com-
patibility. The panel thus provided complete visibility on what was being
tested so duplicate tests would not be performed. The panel also was a
center for dissemination of test data.
The need for the panel to develop overall test philosophies was to
a large degree based on to what extent and where the Skylab modules could
be mechanically interconnected as a cluster to substantiate the I&C sys-
tems, especially in the areas of ground loops, EMC, RF beat frequencies,
and acoustics. When considering the overall cost of some of these plans,
it became apparent that a total interconnected Skylab could not be tested
as a unit and intermodule testing would have to suffice.
Because portions of the Data and Communication system were located
in every module of the SWS, considerable intermodule tests were required
to verify system integrity. For example, separate interface tests were
conducted between the MDA/AM and the CSM and the MDA/AM and the OWS for
the audio and TV system due to facility limitations. For the same rea-
son, the ATM television subsystem was never ground tested with the CSM
RF subsystem. To compensate for the lack of a total end-to-end tests,
special test equipment and simulators were required to facilitate inter-
module tests. In addition to module/intermodule tests compatibility
tests were required at the various NASA centers and contractor sites to
evaluate hardware interfaces in a timely manner. These included antenna
pattern tests, audio, TV, and air-ground communication interfaces.
(i) Antenna Tests, The need for antenna tests was recog-
nized early in the Skylab program. Tests, using scale model antennas,
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were identified for the CSM,ATM, and AM to verify antenna location,
radiation patterns, spacecraft shadoweffects and define regions of
acceptable spacecraft look angle.
Scale model of the CSM,AM, OWS,and ATMwere provided so measure-
ments could be madein the launch and orbital configuration. Polar
plots were obtained at various locations to determine a satisfactory
location for the stub antennas.
As the cluster configuration becamemodified by the addition of
the OWSsolar panels, two U}{Fdiscone antennas were designed and loca-
ted 90 degrees apart on extendable booms.
Antenna measurementswere performed and principal plane radiation
pattern polar plots obtained to allow selection of a satisfactory loca-
tion within the constraints of the cluster geometry.
(2) STDNCompatibility Tests. The STDN/SWScompatibility
tests were conducted at GSFC,JSC, and MDAC-E. A typical STDNground
station was located at each site. Testing at GSFCaddressed nominal
compatibility of the AMand ATMData Systemsand the AM and ATMcommand
systems with STDN. The GSFCtests are itemized in Table II.G-9. These
tests consisted of sending AM/A_4PCMdata tapes to GSFCfor playback
through their ground station. Conversely, GSFC-generatedcommandtapes
were verified with the ATMand AMcommandsystems.
The one significant problem during the GSFCtests was the loss of
synchronization by the ground station during playback of AMsubframes
3 and 4 and M509PCMdata. The problem was resolved by all STDNsites
dedicated to Skylab to have a Model 317AMonitor Bit Synchronizer in-
stalled and operating before the launch of SL-I/2.
Other STDNinterface tests were conducted at JSC to determine the
compatibility of the TV and Audio System that used the CSMS-Band sys-
tem for communication with the ground. No problems were encountered
with audio downlink or uplink. Significant results of TV tests
included:
- Verification of signal level at the MDA/CSMinter-
face for optimummodulation index of the CSM
transmitter.
- Because the ATMcamera pictures an aspect ratio of
i:i JSCwas prepared to provide an optical conver-
ter for conversion to a commercial aspect ratio of
4:3 when the ATMpicture was provided for network
distribution.
- In the course of these tests, it was found that the
color camera video-to-sync signal ratio was 100:28
as compared to the standard commercial ratio of
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100:40. This required modification to the VTR and
TV GSE as used for KSC checkout.
- Playback of the interleaved audio and video from the
audio splitter disclosed a 60 Hz hum on the voice sig-
nal. This was found to be due to the VTR sync tip damp-
ing circuit that was damping at a different level when
the Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) voice signal was
interleaved with the video. The VTRs were returned to
Radio Corporation of America (RCA) from KSC for a circuit
modification to correct this problem.
(3) STU-STDN Facility. Approximately one year before launch
of SL-I, work began at MDAC-E to establish a single test facility where the
major elements of the Skylab Data and Communication hardware and STDN
ground equipment would be simulated. The purpose of the facility was to
(a) perform compatibility testing of the Skylab
Audio, TV, Command and Telemetry Systems, and
(b) provide mission support.
Simulation of the Sky_b system also included the CSM audio and RF sys-
tems and the ATM telemetry system.
The system was used to support the audio and TV system tests dur-
ing the AM/MDA 5 psia altitude chamber tests; assist in resolving the
ground synchronization problem associated with the AM data playback,
and conducted limited AM PCM waveform testing. Off-nominal TV testing
was also conducted to provide background data in anticipation of possi-
ble mission problems.
(4) Data System Tests. The primary test verification on
the AM and ATM data systems was in the area of corona and tape recorder
life tests.
(a) Corona Test. The pressure profile that the AM
RF equipment would be required to operated during launch was found to
be affected by the OWS IU venting of water vapor. Corona versus alti-
tude pressure tests were conducted to determine the probability of
corona occurrence and possible equipment damage. Comparison of the
equipment test data and the expected pressure profile indicated ade-
quate safety margin and/or no equipment damage should corona occur for
the I0 watt transmitter, coaxial switch and the quadriplexer. However
a constraint was established in that the transmitter power must be
removed before the cycling of the coaxial switch from the launch of
SL-I plus 24 hours.
Power-altltude tests on the quadriplexer showed corona could occur
at 2.5 watts and at pressures greater than 1.56 x 10 -2 mm (Hg). This
resulted in a recommendation that the power from the 2 watt transmitter
be limited to 2 watts or less.
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However, this design limitation was modified when corona was
experienced during the altitude chambertest simulating the operation
of the 2 watt transmitter during the boost phase of the SL-I. It was
subsequently determined that corona was affected by the Voltage Standing
WaveRatio (VSWR)and phase angle. Rather than modify the quadriplexer,
additional attenuation was inserted, limiting the quadriplexer input power
to 1.8 watts. During the course of these tests, it was also determined
that commandscould be sent through the quadriplexer even if corona should
occur at another port.
(b) TapeRecorder Life Test
1 AMRecorder Extended Life Test. An extended
life test program was implemented and successfully completed on 3 AM
tape recorders in March 1973. Test parameters included, bit error tests,
end-of-tape, start of tape cycling for 3 temperature environments (plus
4.5 degree centigrade, ambient, and plus 49 degree centigrade) and re-
cord/playback cycling tests ranging from 240 to 860 hours at ambient
temperature. Although a failure did occur during these tests, the cause
was found to be a motor bearing that was not lubricated during manufac-
ture. A traceability check was madeand three tape recorders had bear-
ings replaced.
2 ATMTape Recorder Test. On December28, 1972
a life test failure occurred on the ATMtape recorder. The recorder
had completed 120 days of the 266-day life test. Failure was due to
the recorder throwing tape loops, which caused the motor to stall. Tape
loops occur particularly when the tape reel must decelerate at the end-
of-tape, stop and then reverse directions. Becausea short strip of
tape at each end has the oxide material removed, this allows a light
(which is directed at the tape) to shine through this "window" and ac-
tivate a detector circuit that causes the machine to stop and reverse
its direction. The throwing of tape loops was found to be associated
with the difference in friction between the tape that has oxide mater-
ial removedand the rest of the tape together with temperature and
humidity. The higher the temperature, the greater the tendency to
throw tape loops; therefore, the upper limit of the tape recorder temp-
erature was reduced from +40°C to +30°C and it was decided that the
failure on December28, 1973 on the nonflight life test unit did not
warrant the need for any flight unit modification. The recorder sub-
sequently completed its life test with no additional failures.
(5) CommandSystem Test. Verification tests on the com-
mandsystem were incorporated as a part of the STDNcompatibility tests,
antenna pattern tests, and corona tests. In addition, tests were con-
ducted for interference to commandreceptions of Digital CommandSystem
(DCS) receiver/decoders due to possible mixing of the three AMtransmit-
ter frequencies within the quadriplexer. Test results verified proper
reception of commandsthrough the quadriplexer while the three transmit-
ters were operating, with and without modulation.
11-142
(6) Ranging SystemTest. To validate the SWSantenna/
transponder design the ranging system was tested for the following param-
eters:
- Receiver Sensitivity
- System Delay
- Jitter
- Sync-Slip Test
- Acquisition Capability
- Automatic Gain Control (AGC)Voltage Calibration
In addition, radiation distribution plots on the 1/20 scale model of
the SWSwere madeto evaluate the antenna coverage.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
a. Conclusions. The I&C system performed as expected for the
entire mission. All equipment failures were protected by system redun-
dancy design, onboard spares for replacement, or alternative operating
techniques. Some data channels were lost or degraded during the mission,
but in all cases the user had sufficient other data to monitor and analyze
the systems operation. The Skylab program proved that both repair and
replacement activities can be conducted on electronic equipment.
Designing I&C equipment and installations for inflight maintenance
should be a prime consideration for all future manned space flight pro-
grams.
b. Recommendations. These recommendations are directed toward
the system implementation of the various portions of the I&C system on
future missions. In the establishment of future systems, all require-
ments and ICDs should be completely aired, reviewed, and concurred in
by all interested parties early in the program to minimize configuration
changes. Systems and equipment requiring frequent personal use should
undergo a thorough dry run so all desired operating conditions are ex-
plored and any constraints engineered out of the systems.
(I) Data Systems. On future missions comparable in time
and experiment complement to Skylab, data systems should be more flex-
ible in format and incorporate capabilities such as data compression,
priority program selection, and system redundancy for every measurement.
Premission marriage testing of the flight and operational ground
data systems should be conducted in all possible modes.
(2) Command System-Timing System. A method should be
incorporated to update any timing signals generated by vehicle systems.
Use of the timing update to maintain a common time between the flight
vehicle and the ground should minimize the problem of correlation be-
tween ground and airborne data of related observations and events.
When multiple vehicles are joined, a single time reference system should
be used.
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(3) Audio System. Future manned programs with large
operational volumes and/or separate compartments should consider the
use of portable low-sensitivity wireless microphones. These would per-
mit a crewman to talk into an intercommunication system from anywhere.
The crewman could receive calls and responses from speakers located
throughout the vehicle.
Hearing aids should be considered for crewmens use during habita-
tion of low-pressure environments. These devices will compensate for
the drop in acoustical efficiency of the atmospheric medium and in ef-
fect will allow loud speaker volumes to be reduced to a lower level
and enable some voice conversations to take place without the aid of
intercom systems.
(4) Television. Minor additions to components to pro-
vide easier use by the crew are the recommendations for the TV
system.
When more than one camera is included in a mission, an identifica-
tion code should be included in the vertical interval test signals.
The addition of a lens with a wider angle of view than that available
on Skylab appears useful for confined interior scenes.
Effective use of the tape recorder would be heightened by the
addition of a digital "tape remaining" indication on the recorder, an
"end-of-tape" signal that could be presented visually and audibly
throughout the vehicle, and the remote control of tape moving and tape
stop from positions throughout the vehicle where the camera is operated.
(5) RF System. Externally-mounted RF equipment with volt-
age levels that could experience corona should be located so it will not
be exposed to any venting from the vehicle. Venting during the Sky lab
EVAs is strongly suspected of causing local partial pressures in the area
of vented RF equipment sufficient to cause equipment malfunction of fail-
ure.
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H. ATM Control and Display Subsystem
The ATM C&D subsystem provided the first attempt to integrate
the command and control functions of a group of related scientific
instruments. Six primary solar experiments, their supplemental
pointing aids and experiment support subsystems were controlled and
monitored by on-orbit astronauts through the use of the C&D subsystem.
The subsystem consisted of four major assemblies: the C&D console,
the inverter lighting control assembly (I-LCA), the rotation control
panel (RCP), and the digital address system (DAS) backup panel. To-
gether, these assemblies provided the man-machine interface that
allowed the astronauts to conduct the solar experiments, make manual
adjustments to the Skylab attitude, control experiment pointing, in-
stall and retrieve film canisters, regulate power, perform housekeep-
ing functions, control lighting, and monitor both consumables and
potential trouble spots.
i. Functional Description. The ATM C&D Subsystem is shown in
Figure II.H-I. Conditioned power for the console was provided by the
I-LCA. Backup source for this power was provided by the Backup In-
verter Lighting Control Assembly (BI-LCA). The crew interface was
provided primarily by the ATM C&D Console which provided the controls
and displays required to operate the ATM experiments and subsystems.
Commands were provided to the ATM by toggle and rotary switches, the
Manual Pointing Controller (MPC) and the DAS. Monitoring was accom-
plished by the use of status lights and flags, alert lights, dual-
scale vertical meters, pulse counters, digital displays, activity
history plotter, and TV displays. Additionally, the C&D Console
interfaced with the MDA Radio Noise Burst Monitor (RNBM), provided
data recording and monitoring capabilities and, with the OWS TACS,
provided status monitoring and thruster inhibit command capabilities.
All critical command and display functions were implemented through
redundant wiring and switching contacts and alternate displays, or
were available through the DAS. The I-LCA, BI-LCA, the DAS backup
device, and the RCP were powered through the console power distribu-
tion networks. Power was provided from redundant ATM +28 Vdc buses
to the console and was routed via circuit breakers or switch contacts
to the subsystem components. The I-LCA was energized from redundant
console buses, derived directly from ATM buses, and overload protected
by a pair of console main circuit breakers. The I-LCA or the BI-LCA
were controlled from the console and generated the 400 Hz power and
the 5 Vdc power required by the console displays. Circuit breakers
at the console, provided overload protection to the fixed 400 Hz
buses and to the fixed, unregulated +5 Vdc buses. Current limited
outputs were incorporated in the design of the variable and fixed,
regulated +5 Vdc supplies. The unregulated +5 Vdc output lines were
fused in the I-LCA. The DAS backup device was normally off-line,
allowing commands to be entered to the ATM switch selectors and ATMDC
from the console DAS. Although it was never required during the mission,
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the device was designed so the console DAS outputs would be open
circuited and ATM commands manually entered via the backup device.
The RCP was enabled from the console during ATM EVA activities by a
switch closure. When enabled, ATM canister rotation and S082 A&B
experiment doors commands were provided by the RCP under control of
the EVA crewman.
2. Control and Display Console. The console panel layout is
shown in Figure II.H-2. The general arrangement provided for experi-
ment controls to be centrally located with associated subsystem con-
trois placed around its periphery. The upper console contained the
main experiment controls in a matrix arrangement. Controls for
experiments that were activated in a general time sequence ran from
left to right in two main groups with common control functions
aligned in columns. This allowed quick activation of experiment
power, opening of doors, selection of camera modes, etc. All TV
controls were located immediately below the experiment matrix and
above the TV monitors. The lower console contained other experi-
ment-related functions such as the TV monitors, X-ray scope, X-ray
activity plotter, and manual pointing control stick. The control
stick was positioned for right-hand operation for all the ATM astro-
nauts were right-handed.
The remainder of the console was taken up with associated sub-
system controls. The TM and pointing control system (PCS) controls
were located at the upper right; the CMGs control and monitor equip-
ment along the right side; power systems controls at the lower right,
and the digital keyboard and panel circuit breakers were located in
the lower left. Along the left-hand side of the console were the
panel lighting controls, an event timer for use with experiments,
thermal controls for the telescope canister, and a film reset knob.
Explosive devices controls were located in the upper left-hand corner.
The upper left contained switches to enable or inhibit ground control,
and the upper center was used for alert readouts.
a. Design Requirements. The philosophy incorporated in
the ATM C&D Console design is summarized as follows:
- LM concept was used where practical.
Maximum use of LM and CM flight-qualified hardware was
used.
Operation by either one or two crewmembers in a shirtsleeve
environment was provided.
The console was capable to operate continuously while the
cabin was pressurized.
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Design, location, and use of all controls and displays were
in accordance with standard humanengineering practices,
where practical.
Redundantcircuitry and circuit protection were incorporated
to eliminate the possibility of loss of parts of more than
one experiment, or loss of an entire experiment or subsystem
due to a single point failure.
No scheduled maintenance was planned during flight.
The basic structural envelope of the ATMC&DConsole was a carry-
over configuration from the WWSphase of the Skylab program. As
originally conceived the ATMC&DConsole would be installed and oper-
ated in the LM. Due to the severe space limitation in the LM, a some-
what unorthodox console configuration evolved. Console cutouts and
dimension limitations (particularly in depth) were designed to satisfy
the LM requirements.
The DWSconcept eliminated using the LMand the ATMbecause part
of the DWScluster. The ATMC&DConsole, as a result, was relocated
in the MDA. Although the MDAlocation provided a more spacious loca-
tion, design considerations at this point in the program required
that the C&DConsole remain basically as conceived for the LM. Reloca-
tion of the console into the MDA,however, necessitated a new struc-
tural interface definition. The dynamic environment in the MDAwas
more severe than in the LM, thus creating increased concern in the
ability of the C&Dcomponentsto survive the vibration. To counteract
this, a four point, vibrstion-isolation mounting schemefor the entire
console was devised that placed the console center-of-gravity in the
plane of four symmetrically located isolators.
b. ATMC&DConsole Functional Description. The ATMC&D
Console contained all componentsrequired for commandingand monitor-
ing the following ATMexperiments and subsystems:
- Experiments
Hydrogen-Alpha (H-_0 1 and 2 telescopes
X-Ray Telescope (S056)
Extreme Ultra Violet (XUV) Spectroheliograph (S082A)
and Spectrograph (S082B)
White Light Coronagraph (WLC) (S052)
Ultra Violet (UV) Scanning Polychromator
Spectroheliometer (S055A)
X-Ray Spectrographic Telescope (S054)
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- Subsystems
Attitude Control System (ACS)
Telemetry
Power System
TVSystem
Canister Thermal
Ground/DAS
Alert
The ATMC&Dcomponentswere arranged on nine panel assemblies,
with the experiment controls and displays centrally located in a
row-column matrix configuration where rows across contained experi-
ment controls and displays and columns downcontained controls and
displays having a commonfunction. Subsystemcontrols and displays
were functionally grouped around the periphery areas.
A History Event Recorder, located in the lower left-hand corner
of the console, was designed to provide an onboard record of solar
activity. The device allowed simultaneous recording of two channels
of analog data. Onechannel recorded the X-Ray Telescope (S056)
X-Ray Event Analyzer (X-REA) outputs. The other channel recorded
RFactivity as provided by the Solar RNBM. These data were recorded
on five cycle logarithmic paper at a selected paper rate of either
I0 inches per hour or 30 inches per hour. The paper could also be
run in a review modeat 1,800 inches per hour in the forward or re-
verse directions. Time reference was recorded, via a third channel,
in Greenwich MeanTime provided by the ATMDCin hours, minutes, and
seconds. Due to a preflight test mishap and an onorbit procedure
error, the plotter becamejammedand inoperative during SL-2.
The ACScontrols and displays provided: activation and mode
selection of the Experiment Pointing Control Subsystem (EPCS), Star
Tracker, and MomentumDump;override controls for the CMGsubsystem
and the ATMDC;TACSinhibit commandsand thruster status, and Fine
Sun Sensor (FSS) experiment bias enter controls. The Monitor area
of the C&Dpanel provided for the display of ACSparameters (and
selected experiment data) on two dual scale vertical meters and
three numeric displays. Critical ACSparameters were redundantly
wired and displayed. The MPCprovided up/down, right/left manual
control of the Experiment Pointing System (EPS) and Star Tracker
inter/outer gimbal positioning. The MPCcould be replaced in orbit
with a spare provided in onboard storage. The replacement was not
required.
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The TMSystem controls and displays provided for activation of
the system and modecontrol. Modecontrols allowed the activation
of the ATMtape recorders in the record or playback mode, the selec-
tion of tape recorder or real-time inputs to the ATMtransmitters,
and the selection of forward or aft antennas for each transmitter.
The Power SystemDisplays provided status monitors for the
individual ATMCBRMs,status flags that cued the operator to off-
nominal conditions, and dual scale vertical meters used to monitor
parameters of the ATMmain buses and individual CBRMs. Controls
were provided to activate all CBRMsimulatneously or to turn ON/
OFFindividual chargers and regulators. An ATMPower Off switch,
bordered in red, was provided to permit rapid deactivation of the
ATM.
The TV controls provided for the activation of the ATMTV system
and for the operation of the individual experiment TV cameras. Two
TVmonitors were provided, each of which could display any of five TV
signals from ATMexperiments H<-I, H<-2, XUVMonitor (MON), WLC,and
XUVslit. The monitors allowed the operator to point the instruments
at a particular area of interest and to determine the FSSbiases
required to compensatefor FSSmisalignment with instruments having
fine pointing requirements.
The TV monitors received noncomposite video signals. External
horizontal and vertical drive signals were supplied from the ATM
synch generator. Capability was provided to display and control
electronic cross-hairs. The monitors had five independent controls
for brightness, intensity, and cross hair position left/right and up/
down. Oneof the TVmonitors failed at the conclusion of SL-3 (all
experiment functions completed) and was successfully replaced at the
beginning of SL-4.
The Canister Thermal controls allowed selection of primary/off/
secondary pumpsand controllers and heater power auto/off. A dual
scale vertical meter was provided for display of system parameters.
The BASkeyboard provided the commandand data entry capability
for functions that had not been allocated a dedicated control and
provided the backup commandcapability for control of critical sub-
system functions. Commandswere entered in the ATMDCand via switch
selectors to the TM, Power, Canister Thermal, Attitude Control, and
Experiment/TV AIM systems. The DASkeyboard consisted of eight push-
buttons numbered0 through 7, and an Enter and a Clear pushbutton.
Whena five digit octal commandwas typed into the keyboard, the
binary equivalent was sent out and accepted by one of the five units
associated with the I_S, four switch selectors, and the ATMDC.
The Alert advisory indicators warned the astronaut of a low
level malfunction of an ATMexperiment or subsystem. The system was
independent of the Cluster Caution and Warning (C&W)System and the
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functions monitored did not require immediate crew attention. The
Alert indicators were energized by ground return with all logic and
switching provided by the ATM.
A distributor assembly, which was located at the bottom of the
console, accommodatedinterpanel and subassemblywiring. All panel
connections were routed directly to the distributor or interface
connectors by meansof an interconnecting harness, which eliminated
interpanel connector interfaces. Powerdistribution signal condition-
ing, and relay switching that was required by the panels was provided
by the distributor.
The use of the power distribution switches or circuit breakers
provided a flexible power distribution scheme. Console single point
failures were capable of being isolated to insure against the loss
of an entire experiment or subsystem. Electroluminescent Lighting
(EL) was used for panel nomenclature, for integrally illuminated
displays, and for numeric readouts. The integral lighting system
included panel lamps and the following displays: Vertical Meters,
Flags, Cross Pointer, and History Plotter. The integral lighting was
considered good by Skylab operating crews. During the SL-4 mission a
short developed resulting in the loss of illumination to the displays
and nomenclature.
The console design incorporated manycomponentsthat had flown
in space programs before Skylab and were qualified for use in the
console as off-the-shelf design items. The majority of these com-
ponents were qualified for the LM. Relocation of the console in the
MBAnecessitated new interface definition. The dynamic environment in
the MDAwas more severe than in the LM, thus creating increased con-
cern in the ability of the C&Dcomponentsto survive the vibration.
The three basic vibration isolation methods considered were: (i) indi-
vidual isolation of sensitive components, (2) individual isolation of
the nine C&Dpanel assemblies, and (3) vibration isolation of the
entire console. The latter method was selected because of severe
behind-the-panel space constraints associated with the other two
options. A four-point, vibration-isolation mounting schemewas adopt-
ed with the console CGin the plane of the isolators and equidistant
to the isolators in that plane. The vibration isolators were sized
and found to be compatible with existing MI)Aspace limitations. The
vibration isolation subsystem, which had a natural frequency of 8 to
12 Hz, provided a compatible environment for the hardware that was
previously qualified to LM levels and, thus, requalification at the
component level was not required. All componentsperformed satis-
factorily without degradation, following exposure to environments
during the console qualification test program.
Thermal control was provided by a liquid coolant loop that was
designed to meet the following requirements:
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- Local panel temperatures not to exceed 105°F.
- Maximumpressure drop of 3.0 psi at 220 Ibm/hr.
The coolant loop was an open-cycle, cold-rail system, fluid being
supplied externally by the AMcoolant system. Cold rails were
structurally integrated, using dip brazing techniques for improved
thermal conduction to the console structure. The console structure
(frame) served as an intermediate heat sink, transferring component
heat loads to the coolant loop for removal from the console.
3. Inverter-Lighting Control Assembly Functional Description.
The I-LCA provided regulated and unregulated electrical power, both
ac and dc, to the ATM C&D Console. These various types of power were
required for the operation of the console display components and the
EL of the console nomenclature and display components.
The I-LCA was located externally on the forward conical section
of the MDA on the L-Band antenna truss. Operational power was provided
to the unit by ATM power buses with input and output circuit breakers
located on the ATM C&D console.
The design approach selected to satisfy the significant require-
ments of a remotely variable output and high efficiency for the ac
outputs was the Pulse Width Modulator (PWM) technique. One fixed out-
put and two variable output inverters were operated from 28V bus No. I,
and one fixed inverter capable of supplying the total load was operated
from 28V bus No. 2. This approach provided redundancy to protect
against single failures. These inverters would automatically shut-
down in the case of a short on the output. Circuit protection was
provided to prevent over-voltage outputs.
The regulated dc outputs were generated from a ripple preregulator
that provided the power to three separate regulator circuits. Two of
these were remotely variable from the ATM C&D console. All three were
switched to an unregulated backup generated from the fixed PWM inverters.
The I-LCA thermal control was accomplished by a combination of
active heaters, selected case finish, and thermal isolators.
A failure occurred on SL-3 resulting in loss of the variable in-
verter outputs. The remainder of the mission was completed operating
the EL from the bus No. 2 fixed inverter. The source of the failure
was not isolated and could have been internal to the I-LCA, the C&D
console, or the interconnecting wiring.
A BI-LCA system was also provided. The "black box" components
of this system consisted of two inverters, two converters, internal
and numeric lighting brightness control panels, a connector panel,
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and a patch plug stowage panel. These componentswere located inter-
nally in the MDA. Useof the BI-LCA could be acquired by patch plugs.
The patch plugs would remove power from the primary I-LCA and com-
pletely isolate its circuits. The BI-LCA was not used during the
mission.
4. EVA Rotation Control Panel. The EVA RCP (Figure II.H-3),
located at the ATM Center Workstation, was used to rotate or roll the
ATM experiment canister to any desired position within a range of
+120 degrees from a mechanical zero roll reference position. During
_VA it served as a control panel to position the ATM experiment can-
ister so each of the four film retrieval/replacement doors (S052,
S054, S056 and H-alpha) of the ATM could be aligned with the Center
Workstation and ATM experiment film camera assemblies replaced. The
EVA RCP contained controls to open the S082A and S082B thermal shield
doors at the Sunend Workstation to enable replacement of the S082A
and S082B film camera assemblies.
Full rotation control capability existed at the ATM controls
and displays console and provided an additional backup to the RCP.
Thus, should the RCP control handle become completely disabled ATM
film retrieval could be accomplished by controlling canister rota-
tion from the console under the direction of the EVA astronaut.
5. Backup DAS Device Functional Description. The addition of
functions addressable only by the DAS required a redundant command
capability. The DAS backup device (Figure II.H-4) was added to the
C&D subsystem and installed in the MDA adjacent to the right of the
console to provide command redundancy. In normal operations the unit
was electrically disconnected from the system allowing the console
DAS to provide commands.
The DAS backup device was a manual switching unit that used
rotary switches to format each command. Digit i provides the enable
command to the selected ATM switch selector or digital computer,
and digits 2 through 5 provide the digitally encoded 12 address
data bits. The unit was not needed during the mission.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations. Generally, the ATM C&D
subsystem operated well during the Skylab mission. All ATM mission
objectives were met and the controls and displays contributed to
smooth astronaut performance.
The major crew comments directed at C&D Console design concerned
the high density of switches and a preference of rotary switches over
the three-position toggle switches. Recommendations from the flight
crews were to remove selected switches that were seldom or never used
from the panel and group them on a separate panel or incorporate them
in DAS. The rotary switches were preferred for ease of verifying
switch position during panel scan. The toggle switch positions were
not easily identifiable due to the short throw mechanism.
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I. Caution and Warning System
The Saturn WorkshopCaution and Warning (C&W)System provided the
crew with visual displays and audible tones when specified cluster param-
eters reached out-of-tolerance conditions.
The original C&WSystem design concept consisted of a Call and Warn-
ing Unit and an alarm tone generator that was part of the Gemini Voice
Control Center. Initially, only 12 parameters were to be monitored.
System sensors and associated electronics were nonredundant. Later, the
system was modified to expand the Emergencyand Warning Unit capability
to monitor 35 parameters, which included fire and rapid loss of vehicle
pressure. Redundant sensors and electronics were added together with
two klaxons for providing emergencytones. Finally, the C&WSystemwas
expandedto contain redundant subsystemswithin a caution and warning
unit. Seventy-six selected parameters were monitored and four separate
audio tones, along with visual indicators, were provided.
The contractor effort regarding the system included the following:
The design and development of the C&WSystem.
- Performance of the integration effort required for defining
and evaluating the AM, ATM,MDAand OWSC&WSystem for com-
pliance with cluster requirements.
Qualification of system componentsand verification of sys-
tem performance.
Performance of C&WSystem support activities for all Skylab
missions.
i. Design Requirements. The finalized requirements for the C&W
System are defined in the Cluster Requirement Specification, RS003M00003,
Appendix H. A summary of these requirements is presented below.
a. C&W System Purpose. The C&W System for the cluster (CSM
docked to SWS) was required to monitor the performance of itself (volt-
age only) and other selected systems parameters, and alert the crew to
imminent hazards or out-of-limit conditions that would jeopardize the
crew and compromise primary mission objectives, or, if not responded to
in time, could result in loss of a system. Parameters monitored by the
C&W System were to be categorized as either EMERGENCY, WARNING, or
CAUTION. When any of the parameters reached the predetermined out-of-
tolerance level appropriate visual and acoustical signals were to be
activated. See Table II.I-i.
b. C&W Subsystems. Each vehicle (SWS or CSM) C&W System was
to consist of the following:
(i) Emergency Subsystem. The emergency subsystem was to
alert the crew to defined emergency conditions that could result in crew
injury or threat to life and required immediate corrective action, includ-
ing predetermined crew response. The subsystem was to alert the crew by
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triggering an acoustical alarm system in the vehicle atmosphere and by
providing typical warning category outputs. The emergencysubsystemwas
to be dc-isolated from the caution and warning subsystem.
(2) Caution and Warning Subsystem. The caution and warning
subsystemwas to alert the crew to defined caution or warning out-of-
tolerance conditions. All outputs of the caution and warning subsystem
were to be displayed on the caution and warning system panel(s) and were
to generate the appropriate caution or warning tone for routing to the
crewmanearphones and speaker intercom assemblies (SIAs). The caution
or warning conditions were defined as follows:
(a) Caution. Any out-of-limit condition or malfunction
of a cluster system that could result in not meeting primary mission ob-
jectives or could result in loss of a cluster system if not responded to
in time. Crew action was required although not immediately.
(b) Warning. Any existing or impending condition or mal-
function of a cluster system that would adversely affect crew safety or
compromiseprimary mission objectives. Immediate action by the crew was
required.
2. Functional Description. The design features and major compon-
ents of the C&W System are described in the following paragraphs; de-
tailed description of this system is contained in the Skylab Caution and
Warning Technical Manual, MSFC 40M35701.
a. Skylab C&W System. The Skylab C&W System consisted of G&W
Systems installed in both the SWS and the CSM. Each system provided the
crew with visual displays and audio tones when selected parameters
reached out-of-tolerance conditions. In the docked configuration, the
two C&W Systems interfaced by means of discrete contact closures to pro-
vide for cluster wide monitoring of selected parameters. The C&W System
equipment used to monitor these parameters is shown in Figure II.I-i.
The SWS C&W System control and display panels are shown in Figure 11.1-2.
(i) SWS C&W System. The system monitored the performance
of specified vehicle systems and alerted the crew to hazards or out-of-
limit conditions. The SWS C&W System used two independent subsystems; a
caution and warning subsystem for monitoring various system parameters,
and an emergency subsystem for detecting fire or rapid loss of pressure.
(2) CSM C&W System. The CSM contained a separate C&W Sys-
tem for monitoring thirty-six critical system parameters in the CSM. An
out-of-tolerance condition in the CSM resulted in the generation of audio
tones and the illumination of visual displays in the CM. In addition,
the CSM C&W System provided redundant contact closures to the SWS C&W
System. Upon receiving the CSM inputs, the SWS C&W System activated the
corresponding SWS warning audio tone and illuminated the visual displays
to alert the crew so that corrective action could be taken. The audio
tones continued until the SWS C&W System was reset; however, the CSM
closure remained until reset from within the CM. The CSM C&W equipment
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and operation is discussed in detail in the Skylab Operations Handbook,
Volume I, SM2A-03-SKYLAB-(1).
b. Major SWS C&W Components. The SWS C&W System was made up of
the following major components:
(i) Circuit Breaker Panel 202. Circuit Breaker Panel 202
housed the SWS C&W System related circuit breakers. This panel was loca-
ted in the STS. Fourteen circuit breakers were used for controlling power
to various components of the C&W System. These circuit breakers provided
power to the redundant components in the system from two independent ener-
gized buses.
(2) Control and Display Panels. A total of fifteen separ-
ate control and display (C&D) panels were provided in the SWS for control,
display, operation, and testing of the caution and warning and emergency
subsystems. Three of these panels were used for control and display of
both subsystems, whereas, the remaining twelve were used for control and
display of the fire detection portion of the emergency subsystem.
(a) Control and Display Panel 206. The major power and
control switches for the SWS C&W System were located on Panel 206 in the
STS. The master alarm red telelight switch was illuminated when either
a caution, warning, or emergency parameter was activated. When depressed,
the master alarm telelight switch provided a reset signal to the C&W unit
electronics to terminate the audio tones, extinguish all master alarm
telelight switches and master alarm status lights, and remove the telem-
etry closures. In the emergency subsystems, this reset signal also extin-
guished the parameter identification lights when the parameters had returned
within limits. The memory recall amber telelight switch was used to indi-
cate that caution and/or warning parameter(s) that activated the C&W sub-
system had been stored in memory. Depressing the memory recall telelight
switch caused the identification light(s) to be illuminated for the param-
eters(s) that were stored in memory. This provided for the identity of
short term C&W subsystem activations after the fact. The clear switch
erased the memory circuitry in the C&W unit and extinguished the recall
telelight switch. Three power switches were provided for powering the SWS
C&W System. One switch was used to control power to the C&W subsystem and
the other two switches were used for the emergency subsystem. Four test
switches were provided for testing the C&W subsystem electronics, audio
tone, and visual displays. Three volume controls were also provided for
controlling the intensity of the emergency, warning, and caution tones.
(b) Display and Inhibit Switch Panel 207. The parameter
identification lights and inhibit switches were located on Panel 207, also
in the STS.
There were forty parameter identification lights used to aid the crew
in identifying which parameter or system had gone out-of-tolerance. Emer-
gency and warning parameter lights were colored aviation red while caution
parameter lights were colored aviation yellow. Each display had two bulbs
for redundancy, with each bulb being driven by separate power sources.
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Each parameter monitored by the C&W System had a corresponding
inhibit switch(s) on Panel 207. The inhibit switches were used to
disable a malfunctioning circuit or input signal without disabling other
active parameter inputs. They could also be used to determine the nature
of the malfunction in those cases where more than one parameter shared a
common identification light. There were 76 double-pole single-throw in-
hibit switches used on this panel.
(c) OWS Repeater Panel 616. This panel was located in
the Experiment Compartment of the OWS. The panel contains one master
alarm reset telelight switch (aviation red) that performed the same func-
tion as the master alarm telelight switch on AM Panel 206.
Ten parameter identification lights were used to aid the crew in
identifying various parameters of systems that had gone out-of-tolerance.
Each display contained two bulbs that were powered from separate power
sources. The lights were color-coded the same as those appearing on the
AM Panel 207.
(d) Fire Detection Control Panels. The fire sensor con-
trol panels (Panels 120, 236, 237, 238, 392, 529, 530, 618, 619, 633, 638,
and 639) provided the controls for operation and test of the fire sensor
assemblies. A typical panel is shown in Figure 11.1-2.
Each panel had the capability of controlling two sensors. Two power
switches were provided, one for each sensor, which allowed manual selec-
tion of one of two normally energized buses capable of supplying power to
the respective sensor. A master alarm reset/test switch was provided for
testing the sensor(s) and resetting the SWS C&W System. A red display
lamp was provided for each of the two sensors that illuminated upon acti-
vation of the sensor and remained illuminated until power was momentarily
removed from the sensor. The bulbs and lenses on the panels and the panels
themselves could be replaced in flight. Two spare panels (complete with
lenses and bulbs) and eight lenses and bulb assemblies, were stowed in the
OWS for inflight replacement. In cases where one panel controlled only one
sensor, a clip was provided for covering the unused control and display.
When both sensors were energized, the panel dissipated 5.5 watts of power.
(3) Caution and Warning Unit. The C&W unit contained redun-
dant C&W subunits and redundant emergency subunits. Each subunit was
powered from a normally energized bus and was protected by an independent
circuit breaker. Each C&W Subunit used 36 caution and 26 warning parameter
inputs and provided 22 caution and 17 warning outputs for parameter iden-
tification lights. Each emergency subunit had 12 parameter inputs and pro-
vided 12 outputs for parameter identification lights. The capacity of the
C&W unit, including growth capability, is shown in Table 11.1-2.
Each subunit provided a current limited control voltage that was dc-
isolated from the input bus. The control voltages from the two C&W sub-
units were added together by diodes to provide one combined control volt-
age, but the emergency subunits control voltages remained isolated. These
voltages were routed to their respective C&W System parameter closures and
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Table 11.1-2. Caution and Warning System Parameter Inputs
INPUT CAPACITY**
INPUT TYPE CHAN-
NELS SINGLE
AM Caution 16 8***
eOWS Caution 4 4****
AM Warning ii 4
eOWS Warning i 0
Optional-AM Caution or Warning 7 2
*Optional-OWS Caution or Warning i 0
,Emergency-Fire 5 0
*Emergency-Pressure i 0
GATES
"2 OR" "3 OR"
5 2
0 0
2 4
I 0
5*** 0
I 0
5 0
i 0
"8 OR"
1
0
i***
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
I
32
4
28
2
12
2
i0
2
NOTES: *These input types cause identification light outputs for the OWS in
addition to those on the AM caution and warning system panel.
**The quantities given are for one half on the caution and warning
system; the system electronics (excluding sensors) are completely
redundant.
***One Spare Channel
****Two Spare Channels.
control switches for operating the C&W System. The control voltage returns
for all subunits were isolated from each other and all other vehicle re-
turns.
The C&W unit was coldplate mounted on AM Electronics Module 5. In the
standby mode, the unit consumed a maximum of i00 watts of power.
(4) High Level Audio Amplifier. A high level audio amplifier
(HLAA) was added to the SWS C&W System to provide caution and warning tones
in the event of a failure to the buses powering the speaker intercom assem-
blies. The HLAA amplified the caution or warning tone from the C&W sub-
units and applied the tone directly to the speakers in the speaker intercom
assemblies. The HLAA contained two amplifiers for redundancy; each ampli-
fier was powered from a normally energized bus and was protected by an in-
dependent circuit breaker. The HLAA consumed ten watts of power when in
the standby mode and a maximum of i00 watts when amplifying the caution
and warning audio signals. The HLAA was coldplate mounted on AM Electron-
ics Module 5.
(5) Signal Conditioning Packages. Two signal conditioning
packages (C&W instrumentation packages) were provided for redundancy. The
signal conditioning packages conditioned preselected signals from the C&W
System sensors and voltage levels from monitored buses. A total of 19
caution and 17 warning parameters were routed to the signal conditioning
packages. These signals were routed into level detectors that were preset
to trigger when a designated signal level was exceeded. The level detector
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turned on a relay driver that provided a relay closure to the C&Wsystem.
All level detectors in the signal conditioning packagesexcept the PCO2
low detectors received their basic power from the C&Wsignal conditioner
converters which supplied _24 Vdc regulated voltages to the detectors.
Power for the relays and the PP02low detectors were powered directly by
the EPScontrol buses. The signal conditioning packageswere coldplate
mountedon AMElectronics Module 5. The total level detector power con-
sumption was 3.7 watts per package. In addition, each energized relay
required approximately one watt of power.
(6) Signal Conditioner Converters. The dc-dc converters
converted the EPSbus voltage into _ 24 Vdc and +5 Vdc regulated voltages.
The _24 voltages were used to power the level detectors in the signal con-
ditioning packages and the differential amplifiers in the PPC02sensors.
The +5 volts were used to power the EVAsuit inlet water temperature sen-
sors and the AMcoolant loop temperature sensors. Twosignal conditioner
converters were used for redundancy and were mounted on AMElectronics
Module 5. Each converter consumedii.5 watts of power.
(7) ATMDigital Computer/WorkshopComputer Interface Unit
(ATMProvided). The ATMdigital computer provided the primary computa-
tional capability for the A_I_pointing control system and the cluster
attitude control system. There were redundant ATMdigital computers
that interfaced with the workshop computer interface unit (WCIU)in the
ATM. The WCIUprovided the input/output buffering and automatic switch-
over capability for the two digital computers. Each computer contained
subroutines for determining out-of-tolerance conditions and for setting
the discrete output registers in the WCIU. The discrete output registers
determined the status of the relays that provided the discrete C&Wclosures.
EachATMdigital computer weighed i00 pounds and dissipated 165 watts. The
WCIUdissipated 105 watts.
(8) Control and Display Logic Distributor (ATMProvided).
The control and display logic distributor housed the relays which were used
to provide the C&Wclosures in the ATM. The combined C&Wcontrol voltage,
routed via redundant paths from the ATM/AMinterface to the C&Dlogic dis-
tributor, was applied to two control buses within the distributor. These
control buses provided the C&Wcontrol voltage for the various C&Wclosures.
The unit accepted discrete inputs for energizing the various relays and
provided redundant outputs that were routed across the ATM/AMinterface
through separate connectors. The control and display logic distributor
dissipated 40 watts of power.
(9) Speaker Intercom Assemblies. Thirteen speaker intercom
assemblies (SIAs) were located through the SWSfor intercommunications be-
tween the crew and communications with the ground. These assemblies con-
tained a red master alarm status light on each unit and were also used for
reproducing the caution and warning tones. The caution tone was a contin-
uous i kHz frequency while the warning tone was i kHz frequency, modulated
at a 1.4 Hz rate. The C&Wtones were routed to both the $1A speaker and
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the crewmancommunication umbilical connectors. In the active modeeach
SIA consumed4.0 watts of power. Two flight spares were stored in the
OWSfor inflight replacement.
(i0) Klaxon Assemblies. The klaxon assemblies contained
redundant speakers, which converted the emergencysignals into audio tones.
The emergencyaudio tones were coded to permit the crew to readily identify
the nature of the emergencysituation. The fire tone was a siren while the
rapid delta P tone was a buzzer. For isolation purposes, one speaker in
each klaxon assembly was driven by Emergency Subunit i; whereas, the second
speaker was driven hy Subunit 2. One klaxon assembly was located in the
forward tunnel of the AM and the other in the forward compartment of the
OWS.
(ll) Sensors. Two sensors, i.e., fire and rapid delta P,
were unique to the SWS C&W System. A description of these sensors follows.
The remaining sensors used by the C&W System were previously developed and
are described under the Instrumentation System, paragraph II.G.
(a) Fire Sensor Assembly. Detection of fire conditions
aboard the SWS was accomplished by 22 fire sensor assemblies (FSAs) located
throughout the pressurized compartments. The fire sensor assembly consisted
of an ultraviolet (UV) fire sensor and a quick release adapter plate which
allowed easy installation and replacement. There were two FSAs located in
the MDA, eight FSAs located in the STS, and twelve FSAs located in the OWS.
The FSAs located in the MDA and OWS were used to provide general area cov-
erage, whereas, those in the STS were used for viewing particular modules.
Each fire sensor assembly was a self-contained unit whose operation was
controlled by a fire sensor control panel (FSCP). The FSAs were designed
with an optical field-of-view of 120 degrees included cone angle. The
sensors, though not totally redundant, were mounted in such a manner as to
provide as much coverage overlap as possible. A fire detected by any of
the FSAs would result in a generation of an emergency alarm by the C&W
System. Six FSAs were stored in the OWS for flight replacement.
Fire Sensor Description. The sensors detected
the UV emission from flames and provided for initiation of an emergency
alarm when the UV intensity exceeded the detector threshold leve_. Flames
emit large amounts of photons in the 1800 to 2800 _ wavelength band, which
is =he region of sensitivity for a UV fire sensor.
The sensor consisted of two UV radiation sensing tubes and the asso-
ciated electronics for conditioning the signals. A twin-tube approach
was used to preclude false fire alarms with passage of the Skylab through
the earth's radiation belts. One sensing tube monitored background parti-
culates incident upon the system while a second tube monitored both the
background particulates and ultraviolet radiation. The pulse rate out of
each tube was conditioned by the electronics and filtered to obtain adc
voltage proportional to the pulse rate. The difference between the dc
voltage representing the UV detector tube and the background tube was a
measure of the UV flux emitted from a fire source. An emergency alarm
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was initiated when the difference in tube outputs exceeded a preselected
value. A statistical analysis of the design, based on estimates of radi-
ation levels expected to be encountered in the Skylab orbit, indicated
that a threshold of 35 counts/sec and a time constant of one second would
preclude more than one false alarm for each 56 day mission. To compensate
for the unexpected, however, the FSAswere designed with a gain adjust
having the capability to select a sensitivity setting from 25 to 75 counts/
sec, in i0 count increments. Typical FSAresponse time to UV input equi-
valent to a 50 microampere standard flame at distance of ten feet was one
second.
The emergencyalarm activated by the FSAhad two forms. Onewas
switch closure to the fire sensor control panel (FSCP), which in turn ini-
tiated a relay closure for the C&Wcontrol voltage that activated the C&W
unit. The other emergencysignal generated by the sensor provided an elec-
trical ground for a display light located on the FSCP. Extinguishment of
the fire resulted in the relay opening. The electrical ground output for
the display light remained latched on after a fire was sensed and could
only be reset by temporarily removing power from the sensor.
Preflight system verification tests of the fire sensor operation were
accomplished during ground tests via a UV light source and the panel mounted
test switches. In flight, partial circuitry tests were performed using the
FSCPtest switch or the C&Wsystem test fire switch on AMPanel 206.
Sensor Selection. Although an abundanceand vari-
ety of commercial fire sensors existed, it was found that little had been
accomplished in developing space qualified devices. Devices subject to an
intensive study included a correlation spectrometer (gaseous products),
ultraviolet and/or infrared sensors (flame), and temperature sensors (heat).
The ultraviolet radiation detector was selected.
The results of the study indicated that detection of ultraviolet rad-
iation emitted during the ignition stage of a fire provided better overall
sensitivity, response time and coverage than other type flame detectors.
In addition, UVwas considered the better parameter for detecting flames,
primarily from background considerations, i.e., the UV radiation from the
sun was determined to be less likely to trigger false alarms than the
infrared radiation given off by any hot body on board the vehicle.
(b) Rapid Delta P Sensor. Detection of rapid decompres-
sion of Skylab pressure was performed by redundant rapid pressure loss
sensors. Should the cluster pressure decrease at a rate of 0.i psi/minute
or greater, an emergencyalarm was generated. This particular pressure
decay rate was selected to permit time for emergencyaction. Typically, a
meteorite puncture of the vehicle or a large rupture of the vehicle would
be the cause of a rapid leak rate. The detectors were located behind the
teleprinter paper storage container in the STS.
1 Sensor Description. The rapid pressure loss
w
sensors consisted of a variable reluctance absolute pressure transducer and
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associated electronics. The electronics buffered the absolute pressure
transducer signal to the AM telemetry system, differentiated the pressure
signal to obtain a rate of pressure change for the telemetry system, and
energized a relay to provide contact closures to the emergencycontrol
voltages when the pressure decay rate exceeded0.i0 psi/minute. The trip
point could be adjusted before installation via a potentiometer located on
the side of the sensor. Application of 28 Vdc via the delta P test switch
on AMPanel 206 activated a self-test modein the detector, which simulated
electrically an excessive pressure loss and allowed verification of all
electronics downstreamof the pressure transducer. The sensor consumed
5.6 watts of power.
Sensor Selection. The rapid pressure loss sensor
design used was selected following an intensive investigation of available
sensors. Due to rigid schedule requirements, sensing devices that required
limited development effort and methods with similar application were sought.
The devices and methods reviewed included:
Detection of high leak rates which exceeded the makeupcapability of
the cabin pressure regulators using pressure switches.
Detection of pressure changes across a capillary restriction using
a low range differential pressure transducer.
Analysis of the sound spectrum associated with escaping gas as a func-
tion of orifice size, direction, pressure differential, etc.
Differentiation of the output of an absolute pressure transducer re-
ferenced to cabin pressure.
The absolute pressure transducer/differentiator sensing schemewas selec-
ted primarily because of its excellent response time and its ability to
directly convert rate information from cabin pressure measurements.
c. Telemetry. Individual discrete parameters were provided from
each subunit to enable ground control to distinguish when a caution, warn-
ing, fire or rapid delta P alarm had been generated. Analog data associa-
ted with each CWUconverter voltage output was also provided. These param-
eters, in conjunction with _he selected vehicle systems telemetry parameters
identified in the Instrumentation System, paragraph II.G, were used to
determine system status and to resolve system anomalies.
3. Design Verification. Verification of the Caution and Warning
System design requirements was successfully completed during the course of
the testing program. The testing phase on the flight hardware employed a
comprehensive program of tests. These tests began at the component level,
both in-house and at vendor facilities, and continued through module inter-
face, systems, systems interface, and systems integration testing. Comple-
tion of the testing program was accomplished at the launch site.
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a. Contractor Tests. A large part of the system consisted of
various types of sensors supplied by outside vendors who were required
to verify conformance to the contractor componentSpecification Control
Drawings (SCD). All sensors were required to pass contractor Preinstalla-
tion Acceptance (PIA) Tests for the Instrumentation System.
Manufactured equipment was also tested and included the C&Winstru-
mentation packages and the dc-dc converters. The individual printed cir-
cuit card assemblies were tested before installation in the instrumenta-
tion packages. Other subassemblies such as the parameter display panel,
switch and circuit breaker panels, and associated wire bundles were sub-
jected to manufacturing mechanical and electrical checks and inspections
before integrated system level testing.
Contractor PIA tests on the C&Wunit and high level audio amplifier
were waived; however, contractor personnel at the vendor facility monitored
unit testing. The contractor system level test flow utilized to verify the
performance of the C&WSystem is shownin Figure 11.1-3.
During systems evaluation testing, C&WSystem input/output signal
handling, sensor trip point levels, and compatibility with other systems
(i.e., audio, TM, ECS, EPS,DCS, and coolant) were verified. The C&W
interface parameters were checked during the systems assurance test. The
test also verified AM/MDAC&Wfunctions end-to-end and supported all AM/
MDAsystems in an EMCcheck. AM/MDAC&Winterfaces were rechecked after
installation of MI)Aequipment that arrived late. Simulated flight test
permitted activation, monitoring, and power downof the C&WSystem in the
manner planned for the mission. Further EMCchecks were supported by the
C&WSystem as a part of this test. During the altitude chambertest, the
C&WSystemwas checked for proper responses to simulator inputs during an
unmannedrun, and functionally checked for visual and audio indications at
simulated altitude by the flight crew. Before shipment, the EREPwas re-
installed, and mannedorbital modeand EMCtests were repeated as a part
of an abbreviated simulated flight.
b. Problems and Solutions. Testing of the C&WSystem exposed a
nominal numberof problems. The following discusses these by subsystem.
(I) Alarm Tone Variations in Frequency and Quality. The
C&Walarm tone quality varied, becameless clear, and changed in frequency
during system validation. Troubleshooting indicated an intermittent condi-
tion having the effect of a short on the C&WSystemHigh Level Audio Ampli-
fier No. 2 output. The circuit was monitored during subsequent testing.
During simulated flight the tone degradation recurred. The C&WSystem High
Level Audio Amplifier, Serial Number(S/N) i00, was removed from the vehicle.
A functional test was then performed that verified that the system No. 2
output was defective. Unit S/N i01 was subjected to the samefunctional
bench test, met all requirements and was installed on the vehicle. S/N i00
was found to contain resistors that have incorrect values installed in the
No. 2 subsection of the amplifier. All additional units were verified to
have the correct parts installed. The discrepant parts in S/N i00 were
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S_/stems Validation
Nov 26, 1971 to Jan 7, 1972
Systems Tests, AM Vertical
• Equipment with AM Wiring
• AM Vehicle Interfaces with
ATM, MDA, OWS & CSM Simulators
C&W System Emphasis:
• Input/Output Signal Handling
• Sensor Trip Point Levels
• Compatibility with Other
Systems (Audio, TM, ECS,
Electrical, DCS and Coolant)
S_stems Assurance
Mar 28, i972 to Apr 16, 1972
Systems Tests, AM/MDA Mated
• AM/MDA Interface Circuits
• AM/MDA Equipment End to End
• Simultaneous All Systems
Operational Compatibility
• Revalidation of Disconnections
C&W System Emphasis:
• AM/MDA Functional End-to-End
• All Systems EMC Support
• Parameters Crossing Interfaces
_7
AM/MDA Interface
May 8, 1972 to June 3, 1972
Retest of AM/MDA Interfaces
and Equipment After Arrival
of Late MDA Equipment
#
Altitude Chamber
Jul 11, 1972 to Jul 14, 1972
Crew and Equipment Operation with
AM/MDA at Altitude
C&W System Emphasis:
• Functinal Check by Flight Crew
• Verified Proper Operation of
Monitored Systems at Altitude
Proper Responses to Simulator
Inputs during Unmanned Run
Correct Visual and Audio Indi-
cations during Manned Runs
---C>
Simulated Flight
Jun 6, 1972 to Jun 20, 1972
Systems Operation to Simulate
Inflight Modes and Sequences
EMC Tests:
• Critical Circuit Margins
• Radiated Susceptibility
• Noise in Receiver Passbands
• Bus Transients and Noise
C&W System Emphasis:
• Functional Compatibility
and EMC Test Support
• Orbital Activation, Monitor-
ing of Systems, and Power
Down
Figure 11.1-3 Caution and Warning System Test Flow
Simulated Flight
Sept 4, 1972 to Sept 13, 1972
Repeat of Manned Orbital
Mode and EMC Tests after
Return of EREP
Ship
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causing intermittent operation of the short circuit protection circuitry,
which resulted in the changes in tone amplitude and frequency.
(2) Erratic Gas Flowmeter T/M Parameter. During system
validation, gas flow sensor parameters F205, F209, F210, and F211 had erra-
tic outputs and indicated below normal flow rates. Investigation of this
condition indicated that the flowmeters had improper shielding. In addi-
tion, the OWS gas interchange sensor (Parameter F205) was improperly loca-
ted in the duct. The RF type shielding was changed to audio shielding on
all four gas flow sensors and the OWS gas interchange sensor was relocated.
The C&W gas flow trip points were also lowered to further reduce the pro-
bability of false alarms.
(3) Unexpected Caution and Warning Power Light. The param-
eter identification light illuminated when the Panel 207 signal conditioner
inhibit switch was placed to the enable position during system validation.
Laboratory tests found that a short had developed between a component and
ground on a printed circuit card assembly. A new circuit card assembly
was installed and the system retested.
(4) Primary Coolant Low Temperature Below Specification.
During system assurance, C&W System temperature parameter trip points were
below specifications on the primary coolant low parameter and on the EVA i
and EVA 2 inlet temperature low parameters. The C&W instrumentation pack-
age trip points were found to be lowered by the presence of 2 to 4 MHz
noise observed between vehicle structure and the dc returns from the dc-dc
converters to the instrumentation packages. The problem was successfully
resolved by the addition of jumper plugs to both C&W signal conditioner
(instrumentation) packages. The jumper plugs contained capacitors instal-
led between the pins connected to structure and the dc power returns.
These capacitors shorted the conducted noise.
(5) Noise Perturbations on MDA Temperature Parameters. Var-
ious MDA temperature parameters experienced up to 15 counts of noise at
random intervals on the T/M outputs during altitude chamber tests. Testing
revealed the C&W unit internal dc-dc converters were generating the noise
due to their electronic switching action. The noise was coupled into the
MDA temperature parameter T/M lines in the vehicle wire bundles. Capaci-
tors installed between the C&W telemetry output signal return lines and
chassis ground and between the C&W telemetry output signal return lines
and chassis ground and between the C&W subunits signal ground and chassis
significantly reduced the noise coupled into the MDA temperature parameters.
Modifications were performed on all C&W units to incorporate the internal
capacitors.
(6) No Secondary Coolant Flow Alarm. A C&W System alarm did
not occur when the secondary coolant pump A switch was placed to on during
altitude chamber tests. The problem was isolated to a reed switch failure.
The pump containing the defective reed switch was removed and replaced.
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(7) TwoC&WSystem Alarms not Recallable from Memory.
During descent from altitude, two separate C&WSystem alarms occurred that
could not be recalled from memoryto be identified. Retest and trouble-
shooting at ambient altitude after the run could not repeat the condition.
Memoryrecall circuitry functioned correctly in all cases. During crew
debriefing, it was stated that following the first alarm the memoryclear
switch had been inadvertently actuated before attempting memoryrecall.
The crew believed the memoryrecall sequencewas performed correctly after
the second alarm; however, the parameter identification light did not illu-
minate. Becausethe problem could not be repeated, it was categorized as
an unknowncondition. The problem never recurred during subsequent testing.
(8) Rapid Delta Pressure Alarms from RFI. The rapid delta
P C&Walarm triggered at various times during simulated flight _IC tests.
It was found that the rapid delta P sensors were susceptible to low fre-
quence variations in RF field strength of VILFtransmitters. False alarms
occurred as a result of the sensor detecting the RF variations induced on
the sensor leads. Problem resolution was accomplished by installing new
wire bundles, which incorporated RF filtering and shielding, between the
sensors and vehicle pressure bulkhead.
(9) Secondary Coolant Temperature Low Alarm. A secondary
coolant temperature low alarm occurred during simulated flight. The sen-
sor was found to have a low resistance short to structure. The defective
sensor was removedand replaced.
(i0) Lack of EVANo. 2 PumpDelta P Alarm. The EVANo. 2
pumpdelta P C&Walarm did not occur with zero pressure on SUSloop No. 2.
The problem was determined to be a defective sensor that was remaining
open. The sensor was removedand replaced.
c. Launch Site Testing. Launch site test requirements for the
C&WSystem are defined in Report MDCE0122, Test and Checkout Requirements
Specifications and Criteria for use at KSC, and by the Skylab Integrated
SystemTest Checkout Requirements and Specifications, DocumentNo. TM
012-003-2H. Tests per these requirements were successfully accomplished
during the system level and integrated testing performed at KSC.
One significant C&WSystem problem occurred during KSCtesting. Dur-
ing the AM/M_DA/CSMinterface test, an inadvertent rapid delta P alarm could
not be correlated with vehicle activity. The new wire bundles, mentioned
in the preceding paragraph had been installed. Duplication of the problem
was attempted at the contractor facility. Test results confirmed that the
alarm occurred due to fluctuations that existed in the rate output section
of the delta P sensor. The erroneous rate output was found to be a func-
tion of internal interference in the sensor resulting from the effect of
two harmonics heterodyning. The transducer oscillator and the dc-dc con-
verter oscillator, both internal to the sensor, were generating the har-
monics. The sensors were modified to synchronize the dc-dc converter
oscillators. In addition, filter capacitors were added between the +28 Vdc
return and signal return to chassis, and a zener diode was installed
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between the +28 Vdc input lines to prevent transients on the sensor volt-
age regulator inputs.
4. Mission Results. The C&W System operated nominally throughout
the Skylab mission and performed all required mission functions. The sys-
tem successfully monitored all 76 parameters and satisfactorily detected
out-of-tolerance conditions. The system was operational for a total of
4011 hours. During this time, the system activated approximately 220 times.
a. Out of the 76 parameters monitored, the only false alarms that
activated the C&W System were associated with the fire sensor assemblies.
These false fire alarms were attributed to the following factors:
(i) High Temperature. Three false alarms occurred on day
146 shortly after C&W System activation. The source of the alarm was FSA
639-1, which was located in the OWS center sleep compartment. These alarms
were attributed to the excessively high ambient temperatures (approximately
145°F) in this area. The FSA was qualified to an operating temperature of
100°F. No additional alarms occurred after the SWS returned to normal
operating temperatures following the deployment of the thermal parasol.
(2) High Radiation Levels. Four false alarms occurred dur-
ing passes through the South Atlantic Anomaly. Dosimeter and proton spec-
trometer data indicated that at the time the alarms occurred peak radiation
levels were encountered. On DOY 147 and 152, two alarms were activated by
the No. i Cooling Module Fire Sensor (392-1). No additional alarms occurred
following reduction in the sensor sensitivity setting from 35 counts/sec
to 45 counts/sec. On DOY 365 and 016, two Experiment Compartment Fire Sen-
sors (619-1 and 618-1) activated, respectively. The sensitivity of these
sensors was not changed and the alarms did not recur.
(3) Sunlight. The following false alarms were caused by
Solar UV radiation entering the vehicle as direct sunlight or as reflected
light, i.e., the Earth's albedo.
(a) During the first EVA on DOY 158, OWS cooling module
FSA 392-2 activated with entry of sunlight through the opened EVA hatch.
Because both OWS cooling module fire sensors are located in the compartment
evacuated during EVA, the associated EVA procedures were revised to inhibit
both OWS cooling module fire sensors.
(b) Two erroneous fire alarms occurred on DOY 216 and were
generated by the ward room FSA 633-2. At the time of the alarm, the Sky-
lab was passing through the South Atlantic Anomaly in a near ZLV attitude
with the ward room window sunshade removed. In this configuration, the
unprotected window was exposed to earth-reflected UV radiation. Although
the SAA radiation level also encountered at the time of the alarms was less
than that observed at the time of the SL-2 alarms, i.e., approximately 0.I
vs 0.19 rad/hr, the combination of both conditions was considered sufficient
to have caused the alarm. No additional alarms occurred and no corrective
action was considered necessary.
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(c) Twoadditional fire alarms occurred on DOY247.
The alarms were caused by ultraviolet radiation coming through the unfil-
tered OWSSALwindow during the UV photography experiment S073/T025.
b. During the Skylab mission, two C&WSystem related component
failures occurred. They were as follows:
(i) FSCP. During the SL-2 mission, one component failure
was identified. Side 2 of Fire Sensor Control Panel 392, S/N i0, failed
to respond to self-test and was successfully replaced with an inflight
spare. The removedFSCPwas retained onboard as an inflight spare for
reinstallation in panel locations 530 or 619 in the OWSwhich used only
side i.
(2) PumpDelta P. During SUSLoop No. i activation on DOY
218, no C&Walarm was generated from the pumpdelta P sensing circuitry.
This condition confirmed the loss of the EVALCG-I pumpdelta P sensing
circuitry suspected to have failed during the SL-2 mission.
c. During the Skylab missions, the C&WSystem in the AM/MDAU-2
vehicle and the C&Wsimulation in the Skylab Test Unit (STU) were main-
tained in a mission support modeat the contractor facility. The Airlock
U-2 C&WSystemconfiguration was identical to Airlock U-I. Special tests
and operational modeswere performed as required to support the resolu-
tion of problems or suspected problems on the SWSinflight. Data was
plotted on all C&WSystemrelated parameters to monitor system performance
and to observe parameter trends for out-of-tolerance or any erratic oper-
ation. These data primarily camefrom the STU/STDNfacility at the con-
tractor. The AM/MDAU-2 and STUwere used to support significant mission
problems occurring during the SL-2 mission in regard to fire sensor false
alarms and OWSBus i and 2 low alarm.
(i) Three false alarms occurred on DOY146 shortly after
activation of the C&WSystem. Fire sensor assembly 639-1 located in the
OWScenter sleep compartmentwas the source of the alarms. Testing was
performed at the contractor STUfacility on an FSAwhich failed at a
temperature above the qualification temperature of 311°K (100°F).
(2) An OWSBus i and Bus 2 low alarm occurred when the asso-
ciated CBsopened. The U-2 vehicle was used to perform a test to verify
that both Bus i and Bus 2 low sense circuits functioned properly. The test
was to determine the possibility of a short circuit existing between the
circuits due to a wiring incompatibility. Test performance proved the C&W
sense circuits performed properly and were not tied together.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations. The following conclusions and
recommendations are the results of a review of the C&W System design, the
adequacy of the test program associated with this system, and the perform-
ance of the C&W System during the Skylab mission.
a. Conclusions. The design and verification of the Skylab C&W
System were proved to be effectual in that all required mission functions
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were performed satisfactorily. The system was operational during all
mannedphases of the mission and successfully monitored all 76 preselected
parameters, which relieved the crew to perform other assigned activities.
The crew reported that the C&Wsystem performed in an outstanding manner
and that they were well pleased with all C&WSystem/crew interfaces; i.e.,
system control/inhibit switches, audio alarms, indicator lights, parameter
categories, memoryrecall, and system reset capabilities. Of the 76 param-
eters monitored, only the gas flow, PPC02,and CMGSat parameters activa-
ted the C&WSystem an excessive numberof times. The ATMCMGSat parameter
activated frequently during periods of high crew activity and/or ATMrate
gyro failures while the PPC02and gas flow alarms resulted from marginal
sensing techniques used. Refinement in techniques to accurately measure
PPC02and gas flow are required to make these parameters more meaningful.
The numberof false alarms generated by the system were minimal and
readily explainable. With the exception of the fire alarm activated by
the South Atlantic Anomaly that required the reduction in the sensitiv-
ity of one FSA(392-2), all other false alarms were due to improper
managementof the vehicle systems.
b. Recommendations. The following items were identified during
system testing and/or mission support activities and are recommendedto
further improve the capabilities of the C&WSystem:
(i) Provide the capability to monitor the inhibit switch
positions associated with the various C&Wparameters via a TMdata word.
Continual questioning of the crew was required to determine status of
the inhibit switches.
(2) Add TMparameter, with ground test capability, to
alert ground support personnel that a C&Walarm occurred and was reset
while the vehicle was out of contact.
(3) Improve techniques for monitoring PPC02and gas flow
to permit meaningful surveillance of these parameters.
(4) Use high level (0-5 Vdc) input signals in lieu of low
level (0-20 mv) signals for better noise rejection characteristics.
(5) Stabilize the C&Wvoltage parameters by balancing the
TMoutput circuitry.
(6) Impose stricter EMI requirements on componentdesign to
avoid late design changes as was experienced with the rapid delta P sensor.
(7) Simplify wiring by incorporating circuitry presently
contained in the High Level Audio Amplifier into the G&Wunit package.
(8) Provide ground test capability for verifying sensors
that are unavailable to monitor such as the MOLsieve temperature sensors.
(9) On future applications, add filter networks internal to
the rapid delta P sensor and C&Wsignal conditioner packages.
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J. Attitude and Pointing Control System
The prime objective of the ATMPointing and Control System (PCS)
was to accurately point an experiment package towards the sun to obtain
scientific phenomenadata. The PCSwas developed to meet the ATMscien-
tific objectives which required high pointing accuracy and stability
under both internal and external disturbance torques. These scientific
objectives minimized the use of mass expulsion from the vehicle to re-
duce the possibility of contamination of the scientific instruments.
The basic PCS(later called the Attitude and Pointing Control Sys-
tem) that was developed provided attitude and pointing control for the
clustered vehicle and pointing and control for the gimbaled solar ex-
periment package. For the former system, a momentumexchange system
consisting of three noncontaminating CMGsprovided vehicle control.
The three-CMGcluster and its ancillary equipment were designated
the "CM_Control Subsystem". The control system developed for the spar-
mounted solar experiments included a gimbal arrangement for control in
two axes and an open loop roll control via a ring gear for the third
axis. The CMGControl Subsystemprovided the dynamic roll control for
the latter axis. The spar control system was designated the Experiment
Pointing and Control (EPC) Subsystem.
Design implementation of both the CMGControl Subsystemand the
EPCSubsystemwere subjected to major revisions as mission objectives
were altered from their initial conception. It is the objective of the
following discussion to trace the PCShistory.
i. Workshop Attitude Control System. Prior to the advent of the
DWS, the Workshop Attitude Control System (WACS) was to provide control
of the cluster immediately after orbital insertion for acquisition of
rendezvous and docking attitudes, and for attitude control during un-
manned storage periods.
The WACS was to be activated following S-IVB stage passivation,
and was to be commanded to assume control of the SWS. Astronaut com-
mands or ground commands would select the WACS control modes, and the
necessary control phases.
The WACS would have the capability of sequencing control functions
to maneuver the OA for attitude acquisition and to maintain the attitude
within specified limits. When commanded, the WACS could inhibit thrus-
ter firings while monitoring attitude and rates. Attitude and rate
maneuvers could also be commanded by the astronauts.
Following each manned mission, the WACS would be commanded to
assume control of the SWS during the storage period. Prior to each
manned mission, the WACS would be commanded to orient the SWS for
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rendezvous and docking with the CSM. For example, after the AAP-3 CSM
had docked, the WACSwould be ground-commandedto return the OA to an
X-axis perpendicular-to-the-orbit plane (X-POP) attitude and hold until
the workshop was reactivated (about 5 days). The WACSwould then maneu-
ver the OA to an X-POPZ-LV (Z-axis Local Vertical) attitude in prepara-
tion for rendezvous and docking of the AAP-4 LM/ATM. During docking,
the CSM Reaction Control System (RCS) would aid the WACS by providing
additional rate damping. After docking of the LM/ATM, and deployment
of the ATM solar wings, the ATM PCS was to be activated.
After PCS activation, the WACS would be placed in a minimum power
consumption condition which would enable the WACS to be reenergized as
required. The CSM RCS would be turned on to maneuver the OA to the ATM
acquisition attitude. Control of the OA would then be assumed by the
PCS.
a. WACS Performance and Design Requirements. Table ll.J-i
lists the system performance requirements, with respect to the refer-
ence coordinate frame, for each WACS operational mode. It also lists
the WACS design requirements, astronaut command authority, and ground
command authority.
b. WACS Operation. The WACS, as shown in Figure ll.J-l, con-
sisted of the following basic hardware:
- Rate Gyros
- Discrete Horizon Sensors, Conical Horizon
Sensors and processing electronics
- Sun Sensors
- Control Computer
- Control Switching Assemblies
- Thrusters
- Control and Display (C&D) Panel
Redundant components and circuitry were provided to meet crew safety
and mission success criteria. Table ll.J-2 lists the pertinent char-
acteristics and type of redundancy associated with each component.
c. Operational Modes. With the aforementioned equipment, the
WACS provided the following operational modes:
- Gravity Gradient
- Storage
- X-POP/Z-LV
- X-POP
- Inertial Hold and Maneuver
The WACS used these modes to maintain the defined reference atti-
tudes in addition to maneuvering through the transitional phases. Addi-
tional system functions included the MDA north or south condition of
the X-POP and X-POP/Z-LV mode, the inhibiting of thrusters, and biasing
during any mode. An astronaut or ground command was required to switch
the WACS from one operational mode to another.
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2. PCS Engineerin_ Background. The ATM mission, which was to be
an extended orbital mission, required that the ATM vehicle roll axis (Z-
axis) be collinear with the solar vector. The requirement for extremely
precise attitude control during long duration missions eliminated consi-
deration of conventional reaction jet control systems for attitude con-
trol. (Practical limitations on minimum impulse vehicle rates obtain-
able with reaction jet control systems are inconsistent with precision
control in the arc-second range. Also, fuel consumption with associa _
ted weight penalty precludes the reaction jet control system for long
term missions). The CMG, which is a momentum exchange device, was
therefore chosen as the controlling device for the ATM vehicle since it
offered the advantage of precision attitude control and momentum ex-
change properties.
The design and development of the PCS was based on evolving ground
rules and directives dating from June 1966. Prior to that time propo-
sals were studied (primarily the Ball Brothers Apollo Telescope Optical
Mount proposal) in some detail by a small number of MSFC personnel.
Visits to Langley Research Center and a study of various CMG systems
were conducted during the summer of 1966. A set of ground rules for
the project was drawn up in response to directives from the OMSF and
included in a PDR in July 1966. This set of ground rules provided for
a design using the Langley CMG LM/Rack freefly mode, maximum astronaut
usage, maximum Saturn Apollo hardware, a 28-day maximum life, no redun-
dancy, and a 1968 launch. Based on these ground rules, design of a PCS
was begun and procurement action for long lead time components initia-
ted. The PCS design (1966) consisted of fine and coarse sun sensors,
single analog control computer with switching and logic, three CMGs,
CMG electronics and inverters, three rate gyros, hand controller, and
analog displays. This system depended on a RCS manual dumping of the
CMG bias momentum, visual pointing of the experiments, and voice record-
ing of pointing position. All telemetry was conditioned external to
the PCS. Ground commands were decoded in the control computer.
The first major impact occurred when the primary ATM vehicle was
clustered. This required increasing CMG momentum, addition to the sys-
tem of orbital plane reference, and frequent momentum dumping. About
the same time, experiment demands and crew motion combined to require
a decoupled experiment package mounting with separate controls. It was
realized that man-motion disturbances would tax the capability of the
CMG subsystem to maintain the experiments' pointing stability require-
ments. Extensive simulation studies of crew motion disturbance effects
were performed. In addition, a roll positioning capability for the ex-
periment package was added. These impacts, along with increased readout
needs, added to the analog control computer (a star tracker reference
was also added) complexity until a separate electronics box, the Inform-
ation Correlator Assembly (ICA), was proposed. Study of the ICA design
revealed that the minimum complexity was close to that of a small digi-
tal computer. After extensive investigation of available computers,
procurement approval for a new computer was requested.
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Reliability considerations for the long mission times caused a new
look to be taken at redundancy. All mission-critical single-point fail-
ures were maderedundant by switchover capability, and duplex components
were added. For example, system redundancy was provided to the point
that any component failure that could cause the mission to be aborted,
was provided with a backup unit, or an alternate subsystem configuration
could be selected by the astronaut to allow PCSoperation without perform-
ance degradation; e.g., two CMGs,in lieu of three, could control the
ATMvehicle. Somebackup units operated in parallel with the primary
units, while others were not activated unless the primary units(s) failed.
Selection of the backup was controlled by the astronaut actuating appro-
priate switches on the C&DPanel.
Other increases in complexity were required as results of simulation
analysis indicated new problem areas. The resultant PCSwas entirely
different in capability, ease of operation, reliability, and complexity;
however, the samebasic accuracy and performance were maintained or im-
proved.
3. Description of Initial PCS. The initial design of the PCS, was
developed to meet the high accuracy pointing and stability requirements
established by the desired experiment requirements. These latter require-
ments were to be maintained by the PCS under the influence of external
and internal disturbance torques such as gravity gradient, aerodynamic
drag, and vent disturbance and crew motion, respectively.
The primary ATM vehicle configuration consisted of an CSM, SWS, AM,
MDA, and an LM/ATM joined together in a "cluster" configuration. An
alternate, or backup configuration consisted of the CSM and LM/ATM docked
together. Alternate vehicle configurations under investigation included
a free-flying LM/ATM and a tethered configuration. For the latter con-
cept, the LM/ATM was connected to the S-IVB/MDA/CSM combination with
either a rigid or a soft tether. The S-IVB/MDA/CSM was passively stabil-
ized, primarily using the gravity gradient field, and the LM/ATM was
actively controlled to point toward the sun using the CMG control system.
The free-flying LM/ATM and the tethered design study configurations were
eventually discarded. For the cluster or backup vehicle configuration
the PCS provided three-axis attitude stabilization and maneuvering cap-
ability of the ATM vehicle in either configuration and provided the cap-
ability of pointing the experiment package at desired locations on the
surface of the solar disk, or its outer perimeter, for the purposes of
solar experimentation. The subsystem was to be activated in orbit after
the vehicles comprising the ATM vehicle configuration were assembled and
docked. It assumed control after the CSM had oriented the vehicle with
the Z-axis aligned to within 9 degrees of the center of the sun with
the X-axis approximately in the orbit plane. The PCS maintained vehicle
control for the duration of the solar experimentation period and for the
subsequent storage period.
The ATM PCS consisted of the CMG control system, the EPS, and the
Roll Positioning Mechanism. The PCS design that evolved was influenced
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by many factors, the prime requirement of being able to meet the high
accuracy pointing specifications for the various vehicle configurations
and the concommitant internal and external disturbance torques. The
significant external disturbance torques are those due to gravity gra-
dient and aerodynamic drag, of which the former disturbance was more
pronounced (an order of magnitude); the internal disturbance torques
were those created by crew motion. Because of the earth orbital en-
vironmental influences, the cluster attitude had to be held to a fixed
position relative to the orbital plane. To significantly reduce the
gravity gradient bias torques, the vehicles principal axis of minimum
moment-of-inertia had to be constrained to lie close to the orbital
plane while the ATMexperiment package pointed towards the sun. Since
this constrained the vehicle attitude about the line of sight to the
sun (Z-axis), the roll repositioning requirement was obtained by an RPM
that could be driven _95 degrees relative to the ATMrack and then locked
to any position within said range. To meet the pitch and yaw pointing
requirements, a two-axis gimbaled EPSwith a maximumrange of _ 3 de-
grees was required. The EPSprovided primarily experiment package iso-
lation from the relatively large vehicle perturbations from nominal
crew motion disturbances.
The CMGcontrol system provided ATMvehicle maneuvering capability(manual or automatic) and attitude stabilization about three axes. This
system was chosen primarily because of performance benefits with respect
to both dynamic response and compensation of cyclic disturbance torques
caused by gravity gradient and aerodynamic effects. Most passive con-
trol schemeswould not have the required accuracy and could not develop
sufficient torque to meet the dynamic performance requirements. During
experimentation periods, use of CMGsprevents optics contamination that
would result from a reaction control thruster exhaust.
a. PCS Design Requirements (1966). For the PCS design require-
ments, roll was defined as the angular rotation about the line of sight
from the experiment package to the center of the sun, and pitch and yaw
were the small angular deviations of the experiment package with respect
to this line of sight. The design requirements were as follows:
(i) Command pointing requirements:
- Roll command position (_r): _i0 arc min.
- Pitch and yaw con_nand position (_p,y): _2.5 arc sec
(2) Control system pointing and stability requirements
about the commanded reference point:
- Pitch and yaw attitude: _2.5 arc sec for 15 min of
operation.
- Pitch and yaw rate (maximum jitter rate: _i arc sec/s
- Roll excursion: _ 7.5 arc min for 15 min of operation
- Roll rate (maximum jitter rate): _i arc min/s
- Maximum acquisition time: i0 min
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- Offset pointing:
Pitch and yaw repositioning capability from any
point to any other point within a _20 arc min
square nominally centered on the solar disk.
Roll repositioning capability of +90 degrees from
the North Ecliptic Pole solar reference position.
Time not to exceed one minute, including settling
time at the new attitude, for an offset maneuver
in either pitch and yaw or roll.
- Time resolution: manual trim to within +2 arc sec.
Whereapplicable, these values were considered to
lie within the i_ probability boundsand were to be
achieved in the presence of nominal expected astro-
naut motion during intervals of experiment data
gathering only.
b. Initial PCSOperation. The PCSmadeuse of various sensor
and sensor output processing in determining the vehicle attitude errors.
These sensors and their locations are noted in Table ll.J-3. The inter-
face of these sensors (and output processing) with the remainder of the
PCSis shownin Figure ll.J-2. This figure also depicts the operational
modesof the control system as described below.
Table ll.J-3. Original PCSSensor Complement
SENSOR LOCATION OUTPUT
Acquisition Sun Rack
Sensor
Cluster pitch and yaw atti-
tude.
Fine Sun Sensor Experiment
package
Experiment package pitch and
attitude with respect to solar
disc.
Canopus Tracker Rack Cluster roll attitude with re-
spect to the suns line of sight.
Integrators on Out-
put of Rate Gyros
Rack Cluster pitch and yaw atti-
tude.
Rate Gyro Rack Cluster roll rate.
Rate Gyros (2) Experiment
package
Experiment package pitch and
yaw rates when EPS is active.
Cluster pitch and yaw rates
when EPS is caged.
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Figure ll.J-2 ATM Control System Mode Definition Block Diagram
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Two gyros are located on the experiment package to detect pitch and
yaw rates. An additional rate gyro is located on the rack to detect
roll rate. During the daylight portion of the orbit, cluster pitch and
yaw attitude angles (vehicle X and Y axes, respectively) are sensed by
an Acquisition Sun Sensor (Acq. SS). During the night portion, these
angles are obtained by integrating (in the ATMcontrol computer) body-
fixed rate gyro output signals which first undergo a coordinate trans-
formation. By differentiating the Acq. SS outputs during the day and
utilizing the body-fixed rate gyros at night, pitch and yaw rate damp-
ing for the CMG control system was obtained. Roll attitude angle (Z-
axis rotation) for the cluster was generated by integrating the rack-
mounted roll rate gyro.
The EPS consisted of a pitch/yaw "flex-pivot" gimbal controlled by
two redundant torque motors per axis. Error signals derived from the
FSS and the experiment pitch and yaw rate gyros drove the actuators.
The Roll Positioning Mechanism (RPM) provided roll attitude positioning
of the experiment package through a roll offset drive motor attached to
the supporting ring of the experiment package. The astronaut could ro-
tate the experiment package through +95 degrees. The roll freedom was
required to align optical slits of certain experiments with the suns
limb while maintaining the desired orientation of the principal axis of
minimum inertia with respect to the orbital plane.
Figure ll.J-2 also shows the rack-mounted Canopus star tracker
which was used to meet the _i0 arc min accuracy requirement of the ex-
periment package roll reference computation with respect to Ecliptic
North. In addition, the tracker compensated for long term roll refer-
ence gyro drift and could provide the attitude reference for calculating
the required roll command to keep the clusters principal axis of minimum
inertia close to the orbital plane. The tracker was mechanically gim-
baled in two axes through _20 degrees (inner pivot) and +80 degrees
(outer pivot). Since Canopus is off the Ecliptic South Pole by 14.5
degrees, an inner gimbal freedom of +_.20degrees was selected to permit
Canopus acquisition and lock at any time during the year when the line
of sight was not occulted by the earth. The outer gimbal freedom of
_80 degrees was dictated by the constraint of maintaining the vehicles
principal axis of minimum inertia approximately in the orbital plane,
by the orbital plane parameters, by the celestial geometry, and by
cluster orbital assembly alignment tolerances. The tracker had _I/2
degrees field-of-view in the acquisition mode and could either acquire
the star automatically or be driven in a manual search mode by the
astronaut. Once star acquisition had occurred, the field-of-view was
reduced to +i0 arc minutes.
m
The ATM Control Computer (ATMCC) was a multipurpose analog assem-
bly. It was an integral part of the CMG, EPS, and RPM systems. The
general functions of the ATMCC were to accept and process error signals
from the rack and experiment package-mounted sensors to provide rate
plus displacement command signals to the PCS actuators (CMGs and EPS/
RPM torquers), and provide configuration switching for various PCS
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operational modes. The componentalso contained the bending modefil-
ters, conditioning electronics for the manual pointing controls and
telemetry processing of the required ATMCCparameters, and the necessary
electronics for implementing the CMGH-vector control law, the CMGsteer-
ing law, and caging the CMGs.
c. PCSOperational Modes. Table ll.J-4 indicates where the
CMGand EPScontrol systems obtained their attitude and rate information
during the various operational modes. Control modesfor PCSoperation
are briefly described as follows:
(I) Experiment Pointing. This modewas to be used during
periods of data gathering. The CMGcontrol system would maintain the
cluster attitude with the vehicle Z-axis pointed toward the sun. The
EPSwould be controlled by the FSSerror signals. The pitch and yaw
optical wedges inside the FSScould be rate commandedvia the astronaut
control stick for offset pointing of the EPS. In this modethe roll
channel of the control stick normally commandedthe RPM. The astronaut
could override this condition so that the roll channel of commandstick
commandedthe roll axis of the CMGcontrol system. This was desirable
in the event a roll attitude of the experiment packagewas required be-
yond the _+95degree RPMoffset range. The astronaut could then maneuver
the vehicle slightly to obtain the desired attitude.
(2) Monitor and Acquisition. It was anticipated that
periods would exist during daylight operation for which solar experi-
mentation would not be required. The system was then placed in this
mode. Both the EPSand RPMwere caged, and the CMGcontrol system would
maintain the vehicle in inertial hold. This modecould exist during day
and night portions of the orbit.
(3) Inertial Hold and Maneuver. In this mode, the astro-
naut had the capability of maneuvering the entire vehicle, using the
CMGs(the EPSand RPMwere caged). The CMGcontrol system maintained
an inertial hold unless the astronaut commandedan attitude maneuver.
For a given attitude command,the CMGcontrol system would maintain
that attitude.
(4) MomentumDumpMode. The EPSand RPMwere also caged
in this mode. The CMGcontrol system operation was identical to that
of the Monitor and Acquisition night mode. Although three-axis atti-
tude error signals were available from the integrators, they were not
sent to the CMGs. This caused any attitude perturbations existing after
a momentumdesaturation period to be removedwhen the CMGloop was again
closed.
d. Initial PCSDesign Changes. The next step in the evolving
PCSdesign was to add additional gyros to the ATMrack. The PCSimple-
mentation was as shownin Figure ll.J-3. The implementation was such
that vehicle rate information would no longer be derived, whenrequired,
by differentiating the Acq. SS outputs in the ATMCC. The additional
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Table ll.J-4
MODES
Experiment
,Pointing
'Mode I
Monitor DaY2
and
Acquisition
Mode
Inertial Hold
and
Maneuver
Mode
Preliminary ATM Mode Definition
VERNIER SYSTEM
Pitch and Yaw Roll
Attitude Attitude
Fine sun sensors Roil positioning
on experiment mechanism set
package, error by control stick
signal from op- unless override
tical wedges set switch is on; the
by control stick roll positioning
mechanism is
locked
EPS gimbals
caged at zero;
wedges zeroed
Locked at last
position
EPSgimbals Locked atlast
caged at zero; position
wedges zeroed
EPSgimbals
caged at zero:
wedges zeroed
Momentum IEPSgimbals
Dump caged at zero;
Mode 4 wedges zeroed
Locked atlast
position
Locked atlast
posttion
FINE SYSTEM*
Pitch and Yaw I Pitch and Yaw
Rate I Attitude
Rate gyros
Rate Kyros active
resolved to rack
coordinates
Rate gyros active
resolved to rack
coordinates
Rate gTros active
resolved to rack
coordinates
Rate gyros active,
resolved to rack
oordinates
1
*Roll rate is obtained from the rate _'ro.
I Automatico!ly switch to mght monitor and acquisition mode at'clock
Automatically switch to night sitle hold at clock time.
3Automatically switch to day at clock time.
*Attitude error siffnats to CMG control system open.
Acquisition sun
sensor
Acquisition sun
sensorResolved inte-
grated experi-
ment package
rate gyros
Resolved inte-
ffrated ex'per i-
ment package
rate gyros
ionly or rate
gyros and
control stick
Resolved inte-
grated experi-
ment package
rate g3Tos
Roll "] Pitch and Yaw
Attitude ] Rate
Integn-atc rate iLead network on
gyro unless output of acquisi-
override is on, tion sun sensor
then integrate
control stick
and rate gyro.
r
Integrate rate Resolved experi-_
gyro ment package
rate gyros.
=,
Integrate rate IResolved ex_eri-
_D'ro ment package
rate gyros
Integrate rate Resolved experi-
_'ro only or bnent package
rate g-yro and rate gyros
control stick
Integrate rate
gyro
Resolved experi-
ment package
rate gyros
time.
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components also obviated the need for the coordinate transformation re-
solver located on the spar Z-axis. Sensor implementation was such that
each primary unit also had a backup. Averaging the aensors outputs for
the respective channels did not occur until later. PCS operational mode
requirements did not change, nor did their names. The EPS flex pivots
were redesigned to allow !2 degrees of rotation about the EPC X and Y
axes. Rotation about the Z-axis (RPM) was extended from _95 degrees to
+95 degrees, -120 degrees by moving the roll ring gear stop. A further
design change moved the stops to the final flight configuration of _120
degrees of rotation.
e. Preliminary PCS Performance Requirements.
performance requirements were not completely defined.
tabulated below were preliminary and subject to change.
Initially,
The requirements
(i) Control Moment Gyro Control Subsystem
- Z-axis
Pointing: _i0 arc-min.
Stability: _7.5 arc-min for 15 minutes.
Jitter: +3 arc-min/second.
Maximum Commanded Vehicle Rate
Cluster Configuration: +0.03 deg/sec
CSM/LM/ATM Configuration: _+0.3 deg/sec
Position input commands through the DAS in
increments of 1 degree up to _15 degrees.
- X and Y axes
Pointing: !4 arc-min.
Stability: _6 arc-min for 15 minutes.
Maximum Commanded Vehicle Rate
Cluster Configuration: _+0.03 deg/sec
CSM/LM/ATM Configuration: _+0.3 deg/sec
Position input commands through the DAS in
increments of i degree up to _15 degrees.
(2) Experiment Pointing and Control Subsystem
- Experiment Pointing System (EPS)
Gimbal range: _2 degrees.
Accuracy: Less than _2.5 arc,sec.
Jitter rate: +i arc-sec/second.
Maximum experiment rate: 135.3 arc-sec/second.
Rate loop gain: 90 sec "I
Attitude (Sun Sensor) loop gain: 5.75 to 11.5 sec "2
Bandwidth: Not less than 4 Hz
Offset Pointing Capability: _20 arc-min/axis.
(3) Roll Positioning Mechanism
- Gimbal range: +95 degrees, -120 degrees.
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- Rate loop gain: 270 sec
- Caging loop gain: 0.50 sec"I
- Rate commandcapabilities: _7 deg/sec
+0.7 deg/sec
___3.5deg/sec
_0.35 deg/sec
f. PCSAdditions Prior to DWS. The requirements for a small
general purpose digital computer were being formulated. It was required
to perform the following functions for the CMGControl Subsystem, total
momentumcalculations, CMGmomentummanagment,roll reference computa-
tions, telemetry processing, discrete commandsignal processing, and
system timing. Associated with the Digital Computerwas an Input/Output
Assembly (IOA) which functioned as an interface between the computer
and the remainder of the PCS. By that time the EPSand the RPMwere
descriptively combinedand called the EPCS. The CMGControl Subsystem
and EPCS,combined, were called the PCS. The Acq. SSwas still used
during orbit daytime only. It provided vehicle attitude and rate (de-
rived in the ATMCC)information for the X and Y control axes. At orbit
nighttime, the EPCSrate gyros were used to provide this information(attitude information was derived in the ATMCC). Switching from Acq.
SS to EPCrate gyro(s) reference and vice versa was performed automat-
ically at orbit sunset and sunrise by the Digital Computer. A sun pre-
sence signal from the Acq. SSwas used by the Digital Computer in de-
termining orbit sunset and sunrise. The Z-axis rate gyro was used on
a continuous basis to provide vehicle rate and attitude (derived) in-
formation for the Z control axis. The star tracker was to track Conopus
or Achernar for determining the vehicle Z-axis reference. The ATM Con-
trol Computer conditioned the sensor(s) signals to provide rate plus
displacement command signals to the CMGs. The astronaut had the cap-
ability of manually controlling the CMG Control Subsystem by means of
an address/command keyboard (attitude commands) or a hand controller
(rate commands) located on the PCS C&D panel.
There were two backup means for removing CMG accumulated momentum.
The primary means was for the astronaut located in the LM to manually
input gravity gradient maneuver commands to the CMG Control Subsystem
via the address (command keyboard). The alternate backup approach was
to use a RCS, located on the CSM or the SWS, for removing the bias
momentum. This was to be accomplished via voice link instructions from
the LM astronaut to the astronaut controlling the RCS. Based on the
instructions, the astronaut would use the RCS attitude control thrusters
to introduce desaturation impulses about all three vehicle axes.
The EPS used the FSS to sense the ATM spar attitude errors and the
rate gyros for sensing rates. These sensors were hardmounted to the
spar which was, and is, the structure which supported the ATM solar
experiment package. The ATMCC conditioned the sensors signals to pro-
vide rate plus displacement command signals to the flex pivots actua-
tors. Each sensor in the FSS could be effectively biased by the astro-
naut to offset point the experiment package. The RPM was driven open
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loop by the astronaut using rate switches on the C&Dpanel to control
the spar Z-axis. The astronaut repositioned the Z-axis in accordance
with experiment demandrequirements.
The nameand a brief description of each of the control modesfor
PCSoperation were redefined as follows:
(i) Standby Mode. Used during activation and deactiva-
tion of the PCS. It placed the Control Computer (CC) into a null state
of operation. It was also entered automatically in the event of a sys-
tem temporary power failure.
(2) Monitor and Acquisition Mode. During orbital day-
time, this modewas to be used for maintaining the ATMvehicle minimum
momentof inertia axis (X-axis) in the orbital plane and maintain the
Z-axis parallel to the sunline. At orbit nighttime, it was to be used
to perform gravity gradient momentumdumpmaneuvers.
(3) Experiment Pointing Mode. This modewas to be used
only during solar experimentation (daylight hours). The CMGControl
Subsystemstabilized the ATMvehicle with the Rack coarse pointed at
the sun, and the EPCSmaintained control of the experiment package.
(4) Inertial Hold and ManeuverMode. In this mode, the
ATMvehicle could be maneuveredto any inertial-oriented attitude and
held. The CMGControl Subsystemwas to be used to orient the vehicle.
The EPCSwas deactivated, with the experiment package caged and locked.
(5) RCSMomentumDumpMode. This modewas to be used
when gravity gradient maneuvers, manually or automatically, could not
be performed to dumpCMGbias momentum. ARCS, manually controlled,
was to be used to dumpthe momentum.
4. Wet to Drx Workshop Transition Period. During this period,
the PCS was first renamed the ACS, but later called the APCS. Essen-
tially five major areas of the total control system design were impacted
in going from the WWS to the DWS configuration, namely:
- Elimination of the LM
- WACS to TACS
- Addition of Z-axis pointing local vertical requirement
- Nested system concept
- Digital control law computations replaced the analog ones
The new mission requirements for the DWS eliminated the LM. The
contaminating hot gas WACS Propulsion System (WPS) and the WACS were
replaced by the cold gas TACS. The WPS used nitrogen tetroxide as the
oxidizer and monomethylhydrazine (MMH) as the fuel, pressurized by
nitrogen; the TACS used gaseous nitrogen as the propellant in a blow-
down system. The TACS was to provide an earth pointing capability with
the Z-axis pointing local vertical and the X-principal axis in the
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orbital plane. This attitude was required during pointing of earth
resources experiments and during rendezvous and docking of the CSM.
The CMG Control System functions were to maintain SI attitude control
of the vehicle, maintain dynamic roll control of the experiment spar,
provide limited vehicle maneuver capability (e.g., gravity gradient
desaturation maneuvers); and provide possible aid in Z-LV maneuvers
and hold. The EPC System had to provide the capability to offset point
the experiment spar _24 arc minutes and provide experiment roll capabil-
ity of _120 degrees relative to the vehicle Y-axis for experiment slit
orientation. The CMG and EPC control systems performance requirements,
basically, had not changed.
The nested control system configuration consisted of the TACS and
the CMG Control Subsystem, and utilized the latter system for control
whenever possible. The TACS fired whenever CMG momentum buildup reached
90 percent of its capacity or whenever the TACS rate and attitude dead-
bands were exceeded. CMG control law solution was to be performed in a
digital fashion as opposed to an analog solution in the obsolete ATM
Control Computer.
5. APCS Configuration
a. Design Requirements. The final pointing and stability
requirements for the CMG and EPC control systems are described below.
The two basic changes in the design requirements were in the pointing
uncertainty and stability of the X and Y vehicle axes, and in a jitter
requirement for the EPCS. The preliminary requirements for said axes
included a pointing uncertainty of _+4 arc minutes versus the present
_6 arc minutes, and a stability of _6 arc minutes as opposed to the
present _9 arc minutes, each for a 15 minute period. The initial jit-
ter rate for the vehicle control axes was ill-defined causing undue
requirements on the control system. Subsequently, this requirement was
postponed until a more feasible definition of the jitter rate could be
established, as described below.
The TACS was designed to control the attitude of the vehicle dur-
ing certain events. It was also designed to augment the CMG Control
Subsystem when required. A more detailed description of the design
requirements for the three systems comprising the APCS may be found in
ED-2002-984 Volume III Rev G, APCS Functional Requirements.
(i) CMG Subsystem SI Pointing Requirements
- Z-axis
Pointing Uncertainty: _i0 arc-min.
Stability: _7.5 arc-min for 15 minutes.
- X and Y axes
Pointing Uncertainty: _6 arc-min.
Stability: _9 arc-min for 15 minutes.
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- Momentum Requirements: Under normal operation, the
three CMGs shall be capable of storing 6,900 foot-
pound-seconds of angular momentum before becoming
saturated.
(2) EPCS SI Pointing Requirements
- X and Y axes
Pointing Uncertainty: Less than +2.5 arc-sec.
Stability: _2.5 arc-sec for 15 minutes.
Gimbal Range: _2 degrees.
Experiment Package Rate
Maximum: Greater than 80 arc-sec/second.
Minimum: Less than 2 arc-sec/second.
Rate Loop Gain: 14.6 sec-i
Attitude (FSS) Loop Gain: 141.7 sec -2
Offset Pointing Requirement: +24 arc-min/axis
from the center of the solar disk.
- Z-axis (Roll Positioning Mechanism
Pointing Uncertainty: _i0 arc-min.
Stability: Under control of CMGS/TACS.
Gimbal Range: _120 degrees.
Rate Loop Gain: 36.7 sec-i
Rate Command Requirements: _7 deg/sec
_0.7 deg/sec
+._3.5 deg/sec
+0.35 deg/sec
- Jitter: The EPCS was to be designed so that the
jitter at the FSS mounting interface would not ex-
ceed E1 sec of arc (2 sigma) per any i sec of time
about the cluster X or Y axis, nor would it exceed
_+3 min of arc (2 sigma) per any i sec of time about
the cluster Z-axis. Jitter is defined as the spar
movement at the FSS mounting interface over a period
of any i sec of time: i.e., the equivalent angular
displacements of the mounting interface occuring
within i sec of time.
b. APCS Functional Description. The SWS APCS comprises three
control subsystems:
- CMG Control Subsystem
- EPC Subsystem
- TACS
Attitude control was accomplished primarily by a combination of
the CMG Control Subsystem and the TACS in a so-called "nested" config-
uration. This nested concept used the CMG Control Subsystem for vehicle
control whenever possible. The TACS actuated whenever CMG momentum
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buildup approached its capacity (90 to 95 percent of capacity) or when-
ever the TACS rate and attitude deadbands were exceeded. Early in 1972,
the nomenclature "nested" was dropped, but the concept of the TACS aug-
menting the CMG Control Subsystem was retained through flight. The CMG
Control Subsystem, in general, maintained vehicle control while the EPC
Subsystem was used during solar experimentation periods. A functional
block diagram of the APCS is shown in Figure ll.J-4. Two major hardware
changes were implemented since the original APCS design of 1969-1970;
angular momentum per CMG was increased from 2,000 ft-lb-sec to 2,300
ft-lb-sec in mid-1970 by an additional oscillator in the CMG Inverter
Assembly (CMGIA) and in mid-1972 a Memory Loading Unit (MLU) was added.
The I_LU interfaced with both ATM_DCs and was capable of reloading the
entire flight program, loading an 8K memory after failure of a memory
module, and providing flexibility for real time program change. There
were only minor changes to the design and implementation of the re-
maining hardware.
The six mutually exclusive control modes which are addressable by
the C&D Console switches for APCS operation were not changed since the
early concepts of the DWS. The name and a brief description of each
follow:
- Standby Mode. Used when vehicle control was not required
of the APCS, e.g., during CSM control of the SWS. While in
this mode the CMG gimbal rates and the TACS firing commands
were not activated.
- SI Mode. During orbit daytime, this mode was used for main-
taining the vehicles minimum moment of inertia axis (X-
principal axis) near the orbital plane and the Z-axis par-
allel to the sunline. At orbit nighttime, it was used to
perform gravity gradient momentum dump maneuvers for desat-
urating the CMGs.
- Experiment Pointing Mode. This mode was identical to the
day portion of the SI mode excepa that the EPC system could
be activated each orbital sunrise and deactivated each orbi-
tal sunset.
- CMG/TACS Attitude Hold Mode. In this mode, the vehicle
could be maneuvered to any inertial-oriented attitude and
held. The CMG/TACS control subsystems were used to control
the vehicle. The EPC subsystem was deactivated, with the
experiment package caged and locked.
- TACS Attitude Hold Mode. This mode was used to maneuver the
vehicle to any inertial-oriented attitude and held using the
TACS only.
- Z-LV Mode. This mode was entered during the rendezvous phase
of the mission or when earth pointing for experimentation
11-198
L)
I
I
I I
m
I'---
u
o d
,-1
z
0
0 •
z)-,
Ou_
)
I
°Io
_0
m
o
o
,.-4
o
&J
o
=
m
>,
u_
o
=
o
=
o
=
m
m
<
-,T
I
_J
II-199
periods is required. Normal vehicle control was
under CMG/TACSconfiguration.
(i) CMGControl Subsystem. A block diagram of the subsys-
tem is shownin Figure ll.J-5. During orbit nighttime, attitude informa-
tion was always derived from a strapdown computation in the ATMDigital
Computerand rack-mounted rate gyros provide rate information. The Acq.
SS was used during orbit daytime only. In the time period (late 1969
to early 1970), this sensor provided vehicle attitude information for
the X and Y control axes. Subsequently, this sensor updated the strap-
downcomputation for said axes so that the flight configuration always
had vehicle attitude information derived from the above mentioned strap-
downcomputation. The ATMDCprocessed the sensor(s) signals with a CMG
control law to generate CMGgimbal rate commands. The astronaut had the
capability to manually control the CMGControl Subsystemby meansof the
DASon the ATMC&DConsole.
Three double gimballed CMGsorthogonally hardmounted to the A_I_
Rack, were the subsystem actuators. They provided the torques required
for vehicle control. Momentummanagementcomputations were performed by
the Digital Computer. Unloading the bias momentumstored in the CMGs
was accomplished by gravity gradient maneuvers, performed automatically
during orbit nighttime. The computer monitored the momentumstored by
the CMGsabout each vehicle axis. After orbit sunset the computer sent
rate commandsto the CMGswhich provided the control torques for achiev-
ing the commandedmaneuvers. Several such maneuverswere commandedur-
ing the occultation period.
(2) TACS. Figure ll.J-6 is a simplified functional block
diagram of the TACS. If TACSand CMGcontrol were enabled, TACSwas
used for CMGcontrol monitoring or when the vehicle/CMG system became
saturated. The vehicle was controlled by TACSonly if selected, or if
the CMGsystem was incapable of adequately controlling the vehicle.
TACSwas used to control the attitude of the vehicle during the
following events:
- Separation of the S-If stage from the SWS
- Maneuver to gravity gradient for PS jettison
- PS jettison
- ATMdeployment
- Maneuver to and hold SI attitude prior to CMGspinup
- ATMand OWSsolar array deployment
- CMGspinup
The TACSaugmentedthe CMGControl Subsystemas previously de-
scribed during:
- Docking and undocking of the CSM(s)
- Reacquisition of and holding the SI attitude
- SWS/CMGmomentumdesaturation
- Z-LV mode
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The TACS utilized six cold gas GN 2 thrusters located on the aft
skirt of the OWS, as shown in Figure ll.J-7. Table ll.J-5 lists the
torques that these thrusters provided.
Table ll.J-5. Vehicle Axes Torques
THRUSTER X-AXlS TORQUE Y-AXIS TORQUE Z-AXIS TORQUE
1 - Negative
2 Negative - Negative
3 Positive - Positive
4 - Positive
5 Positive - Negative
6 Negative - Positive
Each thruster force varied from approximately i00 pounds (force)
at the beginning of the mission and diminished to approximately i0
pounds (force) at the end of the mission. To compensate for this, the
Minimum Impulse Bit (MIB) firing time (40 to 400 milliseconds) was
changed via astronaut/ground conlnand.
The TACS firing logic, based on a control law, was designed to
null out the attitude error and rate error simultaneously. Figure
ll.J-8 is an uncoupled phase plane representation of the TACS switching
lines.
From its inception, basic hardware design of the TACS was changed
very little. However, numerous software changes occurred in the TACS
control law constraints, i.e., attitude gains (a0i), rate gains (ali),
rate ledge limits, etc., in order to utilize the TACS in the most effi-
cient manner as an integral part of the APCS.
(3) EPC Subsystem. The experiment package and EPC sensors
were mounted to a three-degree-of-freedom spar as shown in Figure ll.J-9,
that is contained in the ATM Rack. The flex pivots allowed approximately
_2 degrees of rotation about the XEp C and YEPC axes. Rotation about the
ZEp C axis over a range of _120 degrees was obtained. Solar North Pole
was the experiment zero reference position for roll.
The EPC Subsystem was used to maintain attitude control of the spar,
and thereby, the experiment package. The package was provided with an
independent control system to essentially isolate it from perturbations
due to large disturbance torques on the vehicle, e.g., torques created
by crew motion. A simplified block diagram of the subsystem is shown
in Figure ll.J-10.
The EPC provided automatic control of the experiment package XEp C
and YEPC axes. Manual positioning of the two axes was also provided
for the purpose of offset pointing the experiment package. The FSS was
used for sensing spar attitude errors with rate gyros sensing rates.
The Experiment Pointing Electronics Assembly (EPEA) conditioned the
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sensors signals to provide rate plus displacement command signals to
the flex pivots actuators (DC torque motors).
The experiment package could be offset pointed in the XEp C and YEPC
axes over a range of _24 arc-minutes, with the center of the solar disk
being the zero position. The solar disk measured approximately 32 arc-
minutes from limb to limb. Offset pointing was accomplished by posi-
tioning an optical wedge located in each channel of the FSS. The wedge
was mounted in the path of the sunlight passing through the FSS optics,
and could be rotated to refract the sunlight a fixed angle in a con-
trolled direction. The wedges were positioned by a drive mechanism
controlled by the astronaut via the Manual Pointing Controller. A wedge
offset produced a FSS output error voltage that causes the spar to rotate
about the appropriate axis (XEPC or YEPC ) and point the FSS, and thereby
the experiment package, in a direction that would drive the FSS output
voltage to null. Stability was then automatically maintained by the
EPC Subsystem. The solar experiments were aligned to the FSS. The
position of each FSS wedge was displayed on the ATM C&D Console, and
corresponded to the experiment package offset position from the center
of the sun in the XEp C or YEPC axis.
The RPM was used to rotate the spar about the ZEp C axis over a
range of _120 degrees. The mechanism was commanded by the astronaut
via rate switches of the Manual Pointing Control Panel located on the
C&D Console. Spar roll rates of _7, _3.5, _+0.7, and _+0.35 degrees per
second could be commanded. Once the spar was positioned, the RPM would
hold the location until a repositioning command was received. The
astronaut repositioned the spar in accordance with experiment demand
requirements. The astronaut could also utilize the ATM EVA Rotation
Control Panel (during extravehicular activity) to command rates of
_7/3.5 or +0.7/0.35 degrees per second to reposition the spar. The
rates were dependent on the setting of the Manual Pointing Roll Gain
switch on the ATM C&D Console. The spar roll position was displayed
on the Console.
c. CMG Control Law Development. The three double-gimbal
CMGs imparted a reaction moment to the vehicle as a function of their
actual relative gimbal rates. The six CMG relative gimbal rates had to
be commanded from information derived from body-mounted attitude and
rate sensors. Since these sensors were aligned to the vehicle geometric
axes, they provided information relative to these axes only. This three
dimensional information had to be routed or "steered" to provide six
commanded CMG gimbal rates which would produce a reaction moment to
optimally cancel any disturbance moment. The law that goverened this
generation of a six dimensional vector based upon three axes informa-
tion was called the steering law.
The first control law under investigation was deficient in that
for some regions of CMG gimbal angles, the primary axes moments were
reduced but the cross-coupling moments were increased significantly.
One of these regions was when all inner gimbals were zero and all outer
gimbals were minus 45 degrees.
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The Cross-Product Steering Law was offered by MSFC as an alterna-
tive to the Langley Control Law. To nullify a disturbance torque, the
H-vector of each CMG was made to move into the direction of the disturb-
ance torque. While both of these laws basically were designed to do
this, the Cross-Product Law included the sine functions of the inner
gimbal angles to reduce the cross-coupling effects. If used directly
to control the CMG cluster, the steering law would fall short of the
control goal, an invariant forward gain with a minimization of cross-
coupling torques.
The "H-vector control law" which was developed was a closed loop
controller. This law, when used with the Cross-Product Steering Law,
provided an almost optimal CMG cluster control law. The ideal control
law implied that the torque obtained from the CMG cluster must be iden-
tical with the commanded torque to the CMG cluster. The H-vector Con-
trol Law scales an _ vector to be a commanded torque. The _ vector was
based on vehicle body sensor information and thus indicated the direc-
tion of the disturbance moment. The commanded torque vector was then
electronically integrated and compared to the angular momentum of the
CMG cluster. The error momentum vector was then nulled by driving the
six CMG gimbal angles with the aid of the steering law.
Using the H-vector control law and its associated Cross-Product
Steering Law, the CMG gimbal angles required to produce a given total
momentum vector were not uniquely defined. A highly undesirable momen-
tum distribution could develop where two of the three individual angular
momentum vectors were parallel and the third was antiparallel. For this
antiparallel orientation, the CMG cluster exhibited zero gain along the
axis of colinearity. Thus, even though the CMGs were not saturated they
would not be able to compensate for a disturbance along that axis.
Studies were then started on the development of an "Isogonal Distribu-
tion and Rotation Law."
H. Kennel (MSFC) had shown (January 1968) that for any given total
angular momentum vector, it was desirable to place the three individual
spin vectors into an orientation in which each contributed an equal com-
ponent along the total vector. This constraint resulted in equal angles
between the actual vectors and the total, i.e., an isogonal distribution.
The H-vector control law utilized only three of the available six degrees
of freedom; the isogonal distribution used two of the remaining three
degree of freedom. Rotation of the individual angular momentum vectors
about the total angular momentum used the remaining degree of freedom.
This Rotation Law minimized impact of the CMGs inner gimbal stops. The
Isogonal Distribution and Rotation Law not only eliminated any anti-
parallel condition, but also extended the bandwidth of the direct gain
and reduced the cross-coupling torque.
Further development by M SFC (H. Kennel) of the CMG Control Law was
obtained in July 1970. The control law was divided into three portions:
the steering law (no cross-coupling), the distribution law, and the ro-
tation law. The steering law generated gimbal rate commands such that
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the torques resulting on the vehicle were identical to the desired
torques in direction and magnitude. This assumedthat the actual gim-
bal rates were identical to the commandedgimbal rates. Only when the
gimbal rate capability was exceededwould the magnitude of the resulting
torque be less, but the direction would remain that of the command. The
distribution law tended to spread the CMGangular momentumvectors away
from each other, and the rotation law minimized gimbal stop impact.
(i) Steering Law. The steering law was noncross-coupling
in the sense that the actual torque on the vehicle was equal to the com-
manded torque (normalized) under the condition that the commanded and
actual gimbal rates were equal. This law used vector pairing exclusively:
CMGs No. i and No. 2 formed pair A, CMGs No. 2 and No. 3 formed pair B,
and CMGs No. 3 and No. i formed pair C. Each CMG was therefore parti-
cipating in two pairs, and the resulting angular velocity commands were
added later. Since pairing was used, the individual sums and the cross
products had to be generated, along with their magnitudes (or their
squares) used for normalization. An extremely small positive quantity
was added to the magnitudes to avoid a division by zero. Each vector
pair could generate a control torque, and the demand on each pair was
scaled according to the individual ability while keeping the total to
unity. Each vector pair assumed its share of the command by dividing
it into a component along with another perpendicular to their sum. The
first was handled by a scissoring action of the two CMG vectors with
respect to each other and the second by a rotation of the pair as a
unit. The appropriate angular velocity commands could then be generated.
The steering law assumed that all CMG momentum magnitudes were equal to
the nominal. It is noted that the angular velocity commands of the
steering law are not, in general, perpendicular to the CMGs, and do not
depend on the CMG mounting configuration. However, the mounting config-
uration determined the transformation of the CMG angular velocity com-
mands into gimbal rate commands.
(2) Distribution Law. Most of the CMG momentum change
was along the orbit normal, disregarding maneuvers. The distribution
law attempted to make the components of the CMG vectors along the orbit
normal equal to each other. This resulted in spreading the vectors far
apart, reducing the angular velocity required of the vectors to meet the
required momentum change. The angular velocity commands were later gen-
erated in conjunction with the ones from the rotation law. The distri-
bution was made by rotations about vector pair sums which did not affect
the total momentum, i.e., no torques resulted on the vehicle. For two
CMG operation there was no distribution possible, and the distribution
gain was set to zero.
(3) Rotation Law. The rotation law utilized only rota-
tions about vector sums, and the total angular momentum was not distur-
bed. The angular velocities for the rotations were generated such that
the largest gimbal angles were reduced, thus minimizing gimbal stop
impact.
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By early 1971, the CMGControl Law was divided into two parts: the
steering law and the rotation law. The distribution law above was com-
bined into the steering law. This control law was the flight configur-
ation.
d. MomentumManagement. Since CMGsaturation was caused by
noncyclic disturbance torques, predominantly gravity gradient and aero-
dynamic drag, a way had to be devised to eliminate or at least minimize
these torques with the least expenditure of fuel. With the given vehi-
cle configuration and mission requirements of pointing the vehicle Z-
axis at the radiometric center of the sun every daylight period, it was
only possible to minimize, not eliminate, these noncyclic torques. The
problem was approached in two ways.
- Minimize the noncyclic disturbance torques by finding
an optimal vehicle orientation but maintaining the vehi-
cle Z-axis pointed towards the center of the solar disk.
Investigations resulted in the orbital plane update and
pseudominimumprincipal axis of inertia schemes. The
latter technique sampled vehicle momentumat specified
times during the daylight orbital period and compared it
with the previous days samples. The comparedsamples in-
dicated whether the bias momentumcomponentsabout the
vehicle axes were increasing or decreasing. This inform-
ation was then translated into appropriate angle position
commandsabout the vehicle Z-axis to ensure a minimumbias
momentumaccumulation.
- The saturation effects of the remaining noncyclic disturb-
ance torques were nullified by periodically producing con-
trolled bias torques which would tend to desaturate the
CMGcluster momentumbuildup.
For the latter approach, early studies (1968-1969) analyzed the bahavior
of gravity gradient desaturation techniques for the LM/ATM/CSMbackup
vehicle configuration using complex vehicle maneuvers.
The basic momentummanagementstrategy that evolved consisted of
maneuvering the vehicle during the dark portion of the orbit in order
to develop gravity gradient torques which reversed the rate of change
of angular momentum,thus causing desaturation. The vehicle maneuvers
that yielded such a momentumbehavior were based upon analytical expres-
sions of the gravity gradient torques acting on the vehicle in an arbi-
trary orientation. The gravity gradient torques were primarily functions
of the vehicle momentsof inertia, orbital position, and orientation of
the mass distribution with respect to the gravity potential.
For the SI orientation the maximummomentumbuildup occurred on
the vehicle Xv axis since the torque about this axis never changed sign
over an orbit. On the other hand, the integral value of the Yv or Zv
axis torque was zero since both were perfectly cyclic with no bias. The
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Xv axis bias torque was primarily a function of the angle between the
orbital plane and the solar oriented vector. A large angular maneuver
about this axis could reverse the bias torque and effect momentumde-
saturation. Residual momentumresulting from aerodynamic torques and
the lack of perfect desaturation due to finite vehicle maneuvertimes
was regulated by commandingsmall rotations about the other orthogonal
vehicle axes. An added advantage of such a simple schemewas that it
was not necessary to explicitly monitor the vehicle orientation. That
is, additional sensors and peripheral computation were not necessary
to demaneuverin order to be solar oriented at the sunrise terminator.
This approach to the problem resulted in the study of a large class
of control laws employing sample data schemes. The basic control laws
were first implemented and subsequent modifications were the result of
the addition of aerodynamic torques. The effectiveness of each tech-
nique was determined simply by the ability to constrain the accumulated
momentumto someaverage value. In the case of the most general desat-
uration technique, momentumbuildup was controlled using as little as
39 percent of the orbital plane for desaturation maneuversfor an orbi-
tal to ecliptic plane inclination of 45 degrees.
The addition of aerodynamic torques from a preliminary aerodynamic
model yielded an environment in which momentum control was more diffi-
cult. This required the design of more efficient control laws of the
same general type. Control was achieved in all cases for an orbital
desaturation of 50 percent. The subsequent addition of more realistic
aerodynamic characteristics rendered most of the control methods inef-
fective. Only the most general form of the given class of laws yielded
partial but unsatisfactory control in the combined gravity and aerodyn-
amic environment. Thus, the revision of the aerodynamic portion of the
model necessitated the development of an entirely new control policy.
This control policy consisted of performing large angular maneuvers
about two vehicle axes and subsequent small angle maneuvers about three
vehicle axes in such a manner as to track the gravity vector on the dark
side of the orbit. This method approached optimality in terms of gravity
gradient desaturation, i.e., momentum buildup was controlled using as
little as 25 percent of the orbital plane for desaturation maneuvers
for a worst case orbital-to-ecliptic-plane inclination of 45 degrees.
In the simulation studies, a great deal of information was obtained
concerning the type of control policy required as well as information on
vehicle behavior. This was important for future studies which included
the implementation of new control methods, variation of orbital param-
eters, changes in the required desaturation percentage, and inclusion of
other external torque disturbances.
From the above studies, and additional analyses, the feasibility of
using the gradient of the gravity field to desaturate the CMG subsystem
by means of small-angle vehicle maneuvers was established. Three succes-
sive maneuvers, under ATMDC control, were performed during the night por-
tion of the orbit for CMG desaturation.
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6. Design Verification
a. Analysis
(i) General Description. Extensive analysis were performed
to verify compliance of APCS performance with requirements and goals. The
performance analysis covered three principle topics:
- Activation
- Normal Operation
- Contingencies
Of these, most work was performed on analysis of normal operations which
was further categorized as:
- Rendezvous and docking
- Maneuvering
- Experiment operation
- Navigation, timing, and attitude control
For each of the general topics analyzed, i.e, activation, normal opera-
tion, contingencies, the analysis addressed the following specific topics:
- Disturbances
- Transition events
- Sensor characteristics
- Computer software
- Actuator characteristics
- Vehicle properties
(2) Activation Analysis and Documentation. Analysis was
performed and documented verifying capability of APCS performance for
each of the following activation events:
- Deployment sequence
- Control following orbit insertion
- Payload shroud jettison
- Maneuver to SI
Transfer control of IU to ATM
- Propellant usage under IU control
- Control with partially spunup CMG
(3) Normal Operation Analysis Documentation. Analysis
was performed and documented to demonstrate and verify APCS capability
for meeting performance requirements. These analyses addressed the
following subjects:
(a) Rendezvous and docking. Response during axial
docking, TACS control for undocked configuration; control via CSM for
the docked configuration.
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(b) Maneuvers. Pointing and maneuvering capabilities
analysis, maneuvering from rendezvous Z-LV attitude to SI, TACSimpulse
requirements for Z-LV maneuvers, TACSimpulse requirements for Z-LV with
desaturation maneuvers inhibited.
(c) Experiment Operation. Analysis was performed to
determine capability of the APCSfor meeting pointing and stability re-
quirements of ATMexperiments, EREPexperiments, and various experiments
concerned with stellar and solar pointing which are mounted in the OWS
scientific airlock. In particular, these analyses addressed the follow-
ing:
- Total error sources of EREPpointing.
- Total error budgets for CMG/EPCpointing.
- Stability and response of EPCsystem.
- Stellar pointing; errors due to strapdown
calculations and maneuveraccuracy.
- CMGouter loop control compensation.
- CMGhardware effects.
- CMG/TACSimpulse budgets.
- CMG/TACSflexible body interaction.
- EPC/CMG-vehiclecoupling.
- EPCcontrol-experiment dynamics interaction.
- EPCcontrol-compensation and stability design.
(d) Navigation and Timing. Various analyses and sim-
ulation studies were performed and documentedto verify maintenance of
the vehicle attitude reference frame. These documentsdealt specifically
with:
- Strapdown attitude reference frequency and time
response.
- Navigation and timing computation scheme.
- Navigation algorithm.
- Star tracker control.
- External disturbance torques reset logic.
(4) Results. The results of all analysis led to manyAPCS
design and operational conceptual and implementation changes as the pro-
gram progressed from initiation through SL-4. In sun_nary,every aspect
of the APCSoperation was thoroughly analyzed to achieve design verifi-
cation prior to operation. More detailed accounts and description of
analyses performed can be obtained from the APCSSummaryDocument;
50M78002,January 31, 1973.
b. Tests. Flight hardware testing of the ATMmodule during
Post-Manufacturing Checkout, Thermal Vacuum,KSC, etc., is beyond the
scope of this section, but is covered in ED-2002-1416"Skylab System
Verification Analysis and Pointing Control System." Hardware simula-
tion and software verification defined herein is restricted to those
activities utilizing the A_I_DCflight program in closed-loop operation
with dynamic models and/or flight type hardware.
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Three independent simulators were used in performing hardware sim-
ulation and software verification. The System 360 Model 75, located at
IBM - Huntsville is an all digital software simulator which modeled both
the vehicle and the ATMDC. The System 360 Model 44, located at IBM -
Huntsville, incorporated a flight type ATMDCwith software models of the
WorkshopComputer Interface Unit (WCIU) and the vehicle. The Hardware
Simulation Laboratory (HSL), located at MSFC,was an all hardware simu-
lation with the exception of software equations for vehicle body dynamics
and software simulation of the OWSTACS. The HSLhad the capability of
substituting software models for all sensors and actuators with the ex-
ception of the ATMDC. The functions performed by the simulators were
software verification, system integration and dynamic responses. These
functions were investigated for the activation, normal, and contingency
operational modes.
The two periods under test during activation were ATMdeployment
and CMGs/TACSactivation.
For normal APCSoperation the following areas were investigated
and verified:
(i) Rendezvousand Docking
- Z-LV(R) ManeuverGeneration
(2) Maneuvers
- ManeuverGeneration
- MomentumDesaturation Maneuvers
- Attitude Hold Maneuvers
- Z-LV(E) Maneuvers
(3) Experiment Operation
- EPCSInterfaces
- Roll Reference Validation
- SI Offset Pointing
- EPCSResponses
(4) Navigation, Timing, and Attitude Control
- Navigation and Timing
- Attitude Reference Generation
- Sensor Data Processing
- CMG Control
- TACS Control
Various off-nominal, unusual, and emergency situations were inves-
tigated to evaluate their effects and included:
- Redundancy Management - CMG
- Redundancy Management - Rate Gyro
- Redundancy Management - Acq. SS
- ATMDC Self-Test and Switchover
- 8K Program
- Random Reacquisition
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7. Conclusions and Recommendations. As has been shown, the design,
fabrication and assembly, along with the concommitant analysis, simula-
tions, test and checkout of the APCS has encompassed a time span of seven
years, i.e., from approximately June 1966 to the launch of Skylab 1 on
14 May 1973. During this period, an exhaustive effort was made not only
to ensure the adequacy of the basic control system for the early mission
objectives, but to comply with new system requirements as a result of
evolving mission objectives.
The design of the original PCS rendered it quite flexible to imple-
mentation of new design changes. Primary vehicle control with the use
of CMGs, and fine pointing and stabilization of the solar experiments
via the EPCS did not change from the original design concepts. The
transition from WWS to DWS included computation of the CMG control laws
and momentum management in a digital fashion as opposed to analog tech-
niques in the former configuration. The extended mission duration caused
a concerted look towards increasing reliability with the addition of back-
up hardware and insuring the probability of mission success. Even the
addition of the Z-axis pointing local vertical requirement did not im-
pose any severe restrictions on the APCS to perform this operation.
Mechanization of the hardware and implementation of the required soft-
ware proved readily attainable by early judicious planning of a flex-
ible control system design.
A great deal of time and effort was expended in deriving and inte-
grating a fairly complex complex control system to obtain pointing
accuracies in the few arc-second range. Because of its inherent de-
sign flexibility, only minimal modifications to the APCS backup hard-
ware would be required to render it a viable and low cost payload can-
didate for future manned space missions.
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K. Contamination
Since contamination does not fall into a specific category as a
spacecraft system, such as electrical power systems or thermal control
and environmental control systems, an explicit systems definition of
contamination cannot be discretely established. The systems definition
for Skylab is a description of spacecraft contamination, definition of
the sources and their characteristics, and the measures and controls
that were established so that contamination would not compromise the
Skylab mission objectives.
As a result of manned spacecraft's outgassing from exposed non-
metallic surfaces, leakage characteristics, controlled engine firings,
venting waste materials, and other necessary vents, an induced atmos-
phere around the spacecraft existed and was dependent upon the ambient
orbital conditions and the nature of the contaminant. This induced
atmosphere was capable of generating an optical interference background
through particulate scattering, broadband and selective band absorption,
and radiating in the infrared. The induced atmosphere also provided a
source of contaminants that were deposited upon critical experimental
or operational surfaces in the form of thin films or particulate mat-
ter. The specific form of contamination and its subsequent nature of
degradation was a complex function and was dependent upon the spectral
characteristics of specific instruments, instrument design, and opera-
tional usage.
i. Design Requirements. The contamination control for Skylab
came as a result of basic Skylab documentation such as the Cluster Re-
quirements Specification, RS003M00003, which gave the technical require-
ments. A special chartered group at the Marshall Space Flight Center,
the Contamination Control Working Group (CCWG), was assigned to iden-
tify sources and sensitive elements, eliminate sources through hardware
modifications, approve actions and resolve problems that arose regard-
ing design, testing, etc.
The CRS established the prelaunch cleanliness requirements for
manufacturing transportation and stowage, and contamination control
plans for ground handling and cleanliness at KSC. The launch and/or
orbit control requirements set forth the allowable degradations due to
contamination on thermal control surfaces, cluster windows, optical ex-
periments and instruments and solar cell panels, cluster design for con-
tamination control such as assembly, geometry, or line-of-sight consi-
derations; locations of sensitive elements protective shields and covers;
material selection; and material outgassing control. In addition, the
CRS established design for contamination tolerances, orbital venting
and dumping, leakage, operational controls, and timelining of orbital
operations.
However, the requirements imposed by the CRS became effective
after assembly of the cluster, and continued through the launch and
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orbit phases. Contamination control of modules and experiments during
design, manufacturing, test, and delivery phases was governed by the
contamination control plan in the respective specifications that were
written with the cognizance of CRS requirements.
The CCWG was formed in December 1970 to formulate and coordinate
the technical efforts of MSFC for implementation of CRS requirements
stated above. In particular, this group was responsible for the fol-
lowing tasks:
a. Assuring identification, coordination and implementation
of optical contamination orbital control requirements and constraints;
b. Assuring necessary overall coordinations to properly de-
velop requirements for (accomplishment of) orbital optical environ-
ment through the definition and resolution of problems associated with;
- Selection of materials of construction,
- Orbital vent locations,
- Scheduling of certain mission events such as docking
activities and venting,
- Attitude control thruster selection, location, and
firing,
- Ordnance and pyrotechnic devices,
- EVA activities,
- Ground assembly, test, and handling,
- Manufacturing operations.
c. Resolving problems and initiating actions regarding de-
sign, analysis, study, test and operations by employing the line or-
ganizations of MSFC or of various contractors.
The CCWG accordingly supported development of analytical models
and a series of extensive ground test programs to verify the models
and to prove the efficacy of many control measures implemented with
respect to flight hardware. As a result of these activities, analyti-
cal capability existed so that direct mission support of Skylab could
be performed by predicting and verifying through flight data Skylab
environments, establishing constraints or controls, assessing anomalies,
and preparing a section of the Mission Evaluation Report of Skylab with
respect to contamination. In addition, the CCWG was effective in elim-
inating vents, rerouting vents for minimum impact, establishing filters,
and recommending many changes to minimize effects of contamination on
Skylab. Many materials were subjected to tighter controls by virtue
of the CCWG actions.
2. Functional Description
a. Contamination Sources. The various contamination produc-
ing sources of the Skylab Cluster were assessed and the nature and
characteristics of these sources were established. The primary sources
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of concern were those effective during the boost and orbital phases
of the mission. The major sources are:
- Outgassing of vacuumexposed materials;
- Venting of liquids and gases;
- Cabin atmosphere leakage;
- Motor exhaust contaminants;
- Extra vehicular activity;
- Sloughing of particles from external surfaces.
Of these, the primary sources of contamination are outgassing,
venting of liquids and gases, leakage, motor exhaust products, and par-
ticle sloughing. Quantitative evaluation of particle sloughing was
not madebefore the mission because of their unpredictibility.
(i) Outgassing of VacuumExposedMaterials. The total
cluster nonmetallic area exposed to vacuumwas approximately 250,000
ft 2. The average cluster steady-state outgassing rate was 20 grams/
day assuming an average rate of i0 "I0 grams/cm2-sec (based upon mater-
ial outgassing requirements as set forth in 50M02442). There were
approximately 195 different nonmetallic vacuum-exposedmaterials with
surface areas larger than i square foot on the Skylab cluster.
The outgassing rate for a given material is a function of pre-
treatment, thickness, temperature, and age. Since the outgassing rate
is primarily a function of temperature and age, and since the tempera-
ture is a function of orbital positions, the actual outgassing rate of
a particular surface is a continuously varying function of time.
(2) Venting of Liquids and Gases. The venting of liquids
and gases was also a major source of contamination during Skylab orbi-
tal operations. Since venting activities were basically controlled or
preplanned activities, these sources and their impact could be control-
led to a degree by establishing mission rules and constraints to mini-
mize their impact. The locations, directions, massflow rates, mass
distributions, operational frequency and duration, and constituents
were established for each of the vents on the CSM,MDA,IU, AM, and
OWS. The vent locations are shown in Figures II.K-I and II.K-2 and
Table II.K-I. The vent characteristics are shownin Table II.K-2.
(3) Cabin AtmosphereLeakage. The maximumspecified
cluster leakage was 14.7 Ib/day, however, the average leakage observed
was approximately 3.75 ib/day. The leakage products were mostly light
gases, 02, N2, C02, H20, and were not expected to condense on critical
surfaces.
(4) Motor Exhaust Contaminants. Three engine subsystems
were operated in the vicinity of the Skylab Cluster. They were the
Service Module Reaction Control System, Thruster Attitude Control Sys-
tem, and the Stage II Retrorockets.
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The Service Module had four clusters of four 100-pound thrust
attitude engines each.
These engines were used for orientation before navigation measure-
ments; before Service Propulsion System (SPS) burn for ullage setting;
for attitude control during SPS burn; for SM and CM separation; for
orbit circularization and matching, and for translation and attitude
control during rendezvous and docking.
The Thruster Attitude Control System was a cold nitrogen gas blow-
down system with 1372 Ib of N2 available for the Skylab mission. The
thrusters were capable of producing a visible plume of condensed and
frozen nitrogen particles, but the clearing times of the plumes were
quite small. The visible plumes were calculated to dissipate in less
then one minute after thruster shutdown, and could momentarily inter-
fere with experiment operation by causing transistory data interference.
The four Stage II retrorocket engines were located on the forward
end of the second stage of the Saturn V vehicle.
Each engine provided 35,000 ib of thrust. It was estimated that
each engine will expel 188 ib of exhaust material during the 1.5-sec
firing time. This produced an average mass flow rate of 125 ib/sec.
Photographs taken during flyaround showed silver-grey deposition
on the OWS Solar Array beam fairing, aft skirt, and TACS propellant
bottle meteoroid shield. By analyzing the geometry of the observed
shadowing, it was determined that the probable cause of the deposi-
tion was the S-II retrorockets. However, critical surfaces were
shielded and no significant performance degradation was observed.
(5) Extra Vehicular Activity. EVA pressure suit venti-
lation exhaust particles were a local source of external spacecraft
contamination. Most experiment susceptible surfaces were either pro-
tected or too remote to be affected. However, three experiments were
performed during EVA. Extraneous particles were observed in one ex-
periment's data, but the actual source of the particles is unknown.
b. Experiment/Systems Susceptibility. All Skylab experi-
ments and systems were analyzed to determine their susceptibility to
contamination. Critical items were identified from preliminary analy-
ses and in-depth susceptibility analyses were performed on these items.
(I) Experiments Susceptibility. The most significant
effects of contamination, either internal to or external to the space-
craft, is the possible degradation of optical experiment results. In
addition, contamination could also degrade the data from particle col-
lection experiments and contribute to the degraded performance of sys-
tems that are affected by external induced pressures.
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The deposition of outgassed species and overboard ventings on
optical surfaces is a recognized hazard that can be partially control-
led through proper selection and treatment of the materials that are
used in spacecraft construction and control of liquid and solid waste
disposal. Unfortunately, few measurementshave been made of the opti-
cal effects of the condensables in the ultraviolet and x-ray regions
where available evidence indicates that the effects will be the most
severe. Detailed investigations that relate the structure of the con-
taminant layer to the deterioration of the optical performance of the
element are limited.
Contaminant deposits on optical experiment surfaces lead to signal
attenuation by meansof absorption and/or scattering. Noise can be in-
troduced into optical experiment data by fluorescence, scattering, or
wave front distortions. In the case of collection experiments, deposi-
tion of contaminants will complicate analysis of the collection surfaces.
An induced atmosphere or cloud of molecules and particles about the
spacecraft can also attenuate signal and contribute noise by essentially
the sameprocesses. Additionally, the induced atmosphere may raise
pressures in high voltage electrical components leading to power losses
or corona.
The Corollary, Earth Resources Experiments Package and Apollo
Telescope Mount experiments identified as being appreciably susceptible
to contamination follow.
- Corollary
S019 UV Stellar Astronomy
S183 UV Panorama
S020 X-Ray Solar Astronomy
S063 UV Airglow'Horizon Photography
S073 Gegenschein/Zodiacal Light
S149 Particle Collection
S150 Galactic X-Ray Mapping
D024 Thermal Control Coatings
M415 Thermal Control Coatings
T025 Coronagraph Contamination Measurements
T027 Contamination Measurements
T002 Manual Navigation Sightings
- EREP
SI90A Multispectral Photographic Cameras
sIg0B Earth Terrain Camera
S191 Infrared Spectrometer
S192 Multispectral Scanner
S193 Microwave Radiometer Scatterometer/Altimeter
S194 L-Band Radiometer
- ATM
S052 White Light Coronograph
S054 X-Ray Spectrographic Telescope
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S055 XUVScanning Polychromator Spectroheliometer
S056 X-Kay Telescope
S082AXUVCoronal Spectroheliograph
S082BUV Spectrograph
Experiment susceptibility analyses were performed for each experi-
ment. These analyses included detailed hardware analyses, experiment
operational analyses, contamination susceptibility analyses, and recom-
mendations for minimizing the contamination impact. Allowable experi-
ment performance degradation limits were obtained from experiment Prin-
cipal Investigators and Experiment Managers. These limits were trans-
lated into allowable depositions thicknesses scattering levels, and
mass column densities for comparison with contamination predictions.
(2) Systems Susceptibility. The major systems identified
as being significantly susceptible to contamination were:
- Thermal Control Surfaces - ATM-STS,OWS,M_DAand
AI_I surfaces;
- Solar Array Systems -ATM-SAS, OWS-SAS;
- Windows- OWSWardroomWindow, STSViewing Ports,
MDAWindow, Scientific Airlock Window, CSMWindows;
- Attitude Pointing and Control System - Startracker.
The effect of contamination on these systems was widely varied,
but in all cases was expected to be slightly detrimental. Contaminant
deposits on thermal control surfaces can result in a change in absorp-
tivity-emmisivity characteristics and cause an undesirable shift in
operating temperatures. Contaminant deposits on solar array system
surfaces could result in increased radiant energy absorption by the
cover slides and panel back surfaces both of which will reduce elec-
trical output. Deposits on windows could reduce transmissivity and in-
crease light scatter resulting in decreased viewing characteristics.
Attitude pointing and control system optics could develop imbalances
or equipment decreased sensitivity as a result of contaminant deposits.
Pollution of the space surrounding the orbiting assembly could result
in increased radiation scatter plus spectral absorption; thereby de-
gradation of optical experiment results, especially those concerned
with weak radiation sources in the daytime sky.
A methodology was developed for determining the degradation of
operational characteristics due to contamination for each of the sys-
tems listed. Available test data was used to establish the relative
magnitudes of the degradation. This data was later used during predic-
tion, and mission support and evaluation phases.
c. Skylab Contamination Improvement. Based on studies and
tests conducted during Skylab contamination control/assessment acti-
vities, hardware, and operational changeswere implemented to reduce
the impact of contamination on susceptible systems. The specific areas
affected follow:
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(i) Materials. A significant numberof material changes
were madebecause of incompatibility between susceptible optical sur-
faces and material outgassing characteristics.
(2) Vents. Vents were relocated to take advantage of
preferred venting directors. Examples include the Mole Sieve and En-
vironmental Control System Condensate Vent. Shielding was installed
on some vents including the M512, M479, and PCU to protect sensitive
instruments. The primary condensate vent and M092 vent were relocated
into the OWS Waste Tank filter system to reduce external particle den-
sities. The contingency condensate vent nozzle was redesigned to re-
duce the plume dimensions and particle sizes.
(3) Filters. Based on a ground test program, 2.0-micron
filters were installed in the OWS Waste Tank to minimize particle
fluxes being emitted by the waste tank vents. The filters on the M479,
M092, and Habitation Area Vents were modified to reduce particle emis-
sion.
(4) Covers. A cover was installed on the OWS aft radia-
tor system to protect it from the S-II retrorocket firing.
(5) Pyrotechnics. All pyrotechnics were of a self-
contained design so that combustion products would not contribute to
the contamination environment.
3. Interface Requirements. The interface requirements between
the contamination "system" and Skylab were established in the form of
operational controls and constraints. The controls and constraints
were design so that contamination would not compromise the Skylab mis-
sion objectives.
The controls and constraints effective between the experiment and
vehicle systems were delineated in the Mission Requirements Document.
For SI-I/2, they are shown in Table II.K-3. Detailed experiment/vent
operational constraints are shown in Table II.K-4.
During the Skylab mission, mission support activities identified
certain desired modifications to the controls and constraints developed
for SL-I/2 as a result of operational changes and assessment of the con-
tamination environment. Changes to the General Contamination Mission
Rules (Table II.K-3) are listed below.
a. Mission Rule 12-5: Delete EREP from contamination alert.
Rationale - Cloud brightness levels of 10-14 B/B0, as measured by the
T027/S073 Photometer, is well below the EREP sensitivity level.
b. Mission Rule 12-10: This Mission Rule is waived for S054.
Rationale - The S054 door was pinned open on SL-2.
c. Mission Rule 12-14: Delete $054 from the Operational Vent/
Experiment constraint table. Rationale - The S054 door was pinned open
on SL-2.
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RULE NO.
12 -2
12-3
12 -4
12 -5
12 -6
12-7
12 -8
12 -9
12-i0
Table II.K-3. General Contamination Management Rules
MISSION RIFLE
Deleted
CSM RCS firings will be minimized during dock/undock oper-
tions.
Where possible, experiments will be scheduled so that ex-
periment contamination limits will not be exceeded.
If any of the following contamination levels are experi-
enced, a (ATM, EREP, Corollary) contamination alert will
be issued by the indicated position:
POSITION SOURCE INDICATED LEVEL TYPE ALERT
Corollary ATM QCM 0.02 x 10-6gms/cm2/hr ATM
Corollary EREP QCM 0.5 x 10-6gms/cm2/hr EREP/Corollary
ATM S052 i x i0 -I0 B/B0 ATM/CorolIary/EREP
Corollary T027/S073 1 x 10 -14 B/B0 ATM/CorolIary/EREP
Definition:
Contamination Alert: A situation where the contamination
environment may be sufficiently high to consider changes
in the nominal flight plan. An alert will be followed by
a conference set up by Corollary which includes the con-
tamination team members, and representatives from the po-
tentially affected discipline.
Vents will be planned so that there is minimum impact to
experiment operation.
Normally during orbit shaping maneuvers, only the CSM +X
thrusters will be used.
CSM urine and waste water must not be dumped within i000
ft of the SWS.
Deleted
Aperture doors and experiment optics covers (including
their windows) must be closed except during the data taking
periods of the following experiments:
COROLLARY EREP ATM
S019 SI90A S052
S020 SI90B S055A
T027/S073 S191
S063 S192 S082A
S183 STS Windows S082B
11-228
12-ii
12-12
12-13
12-14
Table II.K-3 (continued)
COROLLARY EREP ATM
T002 H-Alpha I
H-Alpha 2
Star Tracker
S054
The contingency trash disposal plan will be used in the
event of trash airlock malfunction and will be scheduled
to have minimum effect in experiment operations.
Liquid dumps will be inhibited when Waste Tank pressures
> 0.08 psia as indicated by the waste processor outlet
pressure or the Waste Tank low pressures.
Waste Tank pressures above the triple point of water
result in existence of free water in the Waste Tank.
Simultaneous liquid dumps into the Waste Tank from more
than one source (dump nozzles) normally will not be per-
formed to ensure Waste Tank pressures < 0.08 psia. It
may be necessary to inhibit atmosphere dumps into the
Waste Tank during liquid dumps from another source..
Trash airlock operation is permissible during liquid
dumps into the Waste Tank.
Operational vent/experiment constraints matrix
(see Table II.K-4).
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The final version of the Operational Vent/Experiment Constraints
table is shownin Table II.K-5.
4. Design Verification
a. Contamination Models. As a result of Skylab premission
contamination assessment and control activities, three computer pro-
grams were developed to provide contamination models for Skylab.
These models were developed primarily for premission contamination
evaluation and controls, daily mission support, and postmission eval-
uation. These programs represented a present state-of-the-art under-
standing of the phenomena of contamination encompassing the physics of
the contamination aspect as related to Skylab, summary of all available
related ground testing (including specific performance data concerning
Skylab vent hardware simulated in large scale ground test programs),
and various relationships between contamination and effects on the
contaminant sensitive instruments. The three programs used were the
Cloud Math Model (CLOUD), Deposition Math Model (ODRAP), and the OWS
Waste Tank Model. These models have the following capabilities:
(i) Cloud Math Model: Three dimensional simulation of
Skylab geometry;
- Vent characteristics (particle sizes, velocities,
plume extent, etc.) and critical experiment lines-
of-sight are contained in the model. (Particle
sizes, velocities, plume extent, were derived from
ground test programs and were adjusted as flight
data became available;
- Treats particulate trajectories from various vents;
- Considers residual earth's atmosphere influence
(drag) on the particles and the velocity vector of
Skylab with respect to the trajectory of particles;
- Considers the effect of sublimation on particles
that result from liquid vents;
- Established either the electromagnetic scattering,
absorption, or emittance properties of the parti-
cles as a function of time.
(2) Deposition Math Model. Three dimensional simulation
of Skylab geometry;
- Considers mass source rate as a function of time
and temperature for all major outgassing materials
and vents;
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- Considers fraction of this mass capable of im-
pinging on any surface, i.e., considers config-
uration factors and plume mass distribution;
- Considers temperature of the source of contamina-
tion and surfaces impinged upon;
- Considers the fraction of mass capable of conden-
sing on a surface as a function of temperature,
i.e., sticking coefficients, and influence of
angular considerations to the sticking coeffi-
cients;
Considers resublimation (desorption rate) of the
deposited material as a function of temperature;
- Establishes local "pressure" regimes for evalua-
tion of corona susceptible experiments;
- Established degradation in functional properties
of specific surfaces as a result of contaminant
thickness.
(3) OWS Waste Tank Math Model. Treats quasi-steady state
and transient conditions in Waste Tank as a function of vented liquid
materials;
- Establishes sublimation rates of liquid materials
dumped into the Waste Tank;
- Establishes mass accumulation as a function of
time;
- Establishes tank internal pressure as a function
of time;
- Establishes gaseous flow rates/mass flow rates
through the Waste Tank nonpropulsive vents.
b. Ground Test Programs. Numerous vacuum chamber tests were
conducted at various NASA and contractor locations to evaluate specific
Skylab waste disposal and venting systems and their influence on Sky-
lab contamination. In many instances, the test results have provided
basic data either for an analytical model or qualification of a system
with respect to contamination. This section describes the results of
three major test programs which provided model data.
(I) Skylab Contamination Ground Test Program (SCGTP).
The SCGTP was designed and implemented to accomplish the following
objectives:
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- Provide quantitative data about the particle size
distribution, charge distribution, mass flow char-
acteristics, surface contamination effects, and
plume effects during a condensate, molecular sieve,
and fecal processor discharge;
- Determine the Orbital WorkshopWaste Tank pressure
profile, ice accumulation, and constituent behavior
during a biocide/urine flush, condensate discharge,
soapy water, and urine bag rupture.
Determine characteristics of the discharge efflu-
ent at the two nonpropulsive vents.
All of the above objectives were successfully accomplished. The
information obtained was used as basic input data for the contamina-
tion models previously described.
(2) Lewis Research Center CSMRCSEngine Plume Defini-
tion and Effects. The objectives of this test, using a simulated CSM
R4Dthruster, were to determine:
- Mass flux distribution as a function of angle
throughout the engine plume (including backflow);
- Sticking coefficient and subsequent desorption
characteristics of the engine plume material;
- Degradation of thermal control coating and solar
cell characteristics as a function of engine plume
deposition for simulated Skylab conditions of
vacuumenvironment and Solar UV exposure. The ob-
jectives were successfully accomplished and the
information obtained was input to the Deposition
Math Model.
(3) Ice Particle Sublimation Tests - Dudley Observatory.
The objective of this test was to determine the sublimation rates of
ice particles subjected to a simulated space environment in order to
determine ice particle life times. The objective was successfully
accomplished and the data was input to the Cloud Math Model.
(4) Urine Autopressurization Test. The objective of
this test was to determine the pressure buildup of urine being stored
for a period equivalent to the Skylab mission (9 months) in sealed
metal containers. Burst of the urine bags in the Skylab waste tank may
have provided a source of contamination from the waste tank vents. The
test provided quantitative data under long-term storage that the pres-
sure buildup would not exceed the design limits of the bags.
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c. Premission Contamination Predictions. The major con-
siderations in the development of Sky lab contamination predictions
were mission timeline, source definition, anticipated contamination
environment, and variations of source and model parameters. The im _
pingement/deposition of cluster outgassed materials on selected experi-
ments, windows, thermal control surfaces, electrical power system sur-
faces, and specific contamination monitors was calculated using the
Deposition Math Model. Relative susceptibilities of critical surfaces
to deposition were determined as a function of cluster position and
mission time period. A parametric variation was performed to illustrate
how perturbations to major model parameters would affect the predicted
contamination levels.
The induced atmosphere mass column densities, light scattering
properties, and absorption properties were calculated for outgassing,
mole sieve and waste tank venting, and operation of contingency vents
using the Cloud and Deposition Math Models. The Waste Tank model pro-
vided Waste Tank Vent source characteristics. The predictions were
made for sensitive experiment lines-of-sight. The impact of the En-
vironmental Control System Contingency Condensate Vent on the ATM and
EREP lines-of-sight was specifically analyzed since the SCGTP results
showed it to be a severe source of contamination.
The susceptibilities of experiments, Skylab windows, thermal con-
trol surfaces, and electrical power systems were assessed in terms of
model predictions of contaminant levels. The degradation of various
experiments/systems was assessed against experiment principal investi-
gator/systems evaluator established contamination sensitivity levels.
In addition, predictions were established for those specific con-
tamination detection instruments that were to be used to provide near
real-time mission support assessment of contamination and provide val-
idation data for the math models. In light of the predictions, the
existing constraints were reviewed for applicability.
The conclusions reached from the results of the prediction analy-
ses was that no experiment/system performance degradation due to con-
tamination was expected if the contamination mission constraints were
followed. However, contingency venting of liquids directly overboard
would result in high background scattering that would impact experiment
performance. Specifically the condensate vent would potentially affect
any or all experiment lines-of-sight depending on the cluster orbital
position during the venting period.
d. Mission Support/Evaluation. Skylab mission support and
evaluation was performed by the Contamination Mission Support Group
(CMSG). The CMSG performed premission, mission, and postmission ac-
tivities. General premission activities included training and simu-
lation, technical discipline team coordination, computer model develop-
ment, contamination prediction formulation, Data Request Form (DRF)
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and Detailed Test Objective (DTO) survey, and launch operations support.
Mission support and mission evaluation plans were prepared to define ex-
plicity, the methodology for performance of these activities.
During the mission, the near real-time and periodic real-time data
were analyzed to determine trends and establish contamination source
information. This trend and source data were used to assess design per-
formance and constraint effectiveness, to update mission predictions,
and to resolve anomalies. In addition, the CMSG monitored crew activi-
ties and maintained contamination DTO completion status for use in mis-
sion planning.
Mission evaluation was the longer term analysis activity, which
included assessment of all relative data generated during the mission
operation activity period, and also treated postmission splashdown
data. This analysis activity evaluated the overall contamination trends,
determined the degree of DT0 completion, identified anomalies, formula-
ted operational constraint recommendations where required, and provided
next mission prognosis.
Specific contamination mission objectives were defined and are
categorized into four assessment classifications.
(I) Design Performance Assessment. Design performance
assessment was accomplished through evaluation of six areas of inter-
est:
- windows,
- corollary experiments,
- ATM experiments,
- thermal control surfaces,
- solar array,
- star tracker.
Through evaluation of performance levels or condition of these areas
during the mission or postmission, the effectiveness of sources control
and effects of residual sources was determined. The operation times of
controllable vents, window covers, and experiments were used to corre-
late source emissions versus degradation effects.
(2) Constraint Effectiveness Assessment. The CMSG iden-
tified and established operational constraints for operation of cer-
tain experiments as system elements during or subsequent to potentially
degrading controllable vents. Generally, these constraints were devel-
oped to minimize exposure of sensitive elements to the sources through
application of estimated source cleaning times. During the mission,
it was necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of these constraints,
identify constraint violations, and determine impact, and recommend
operational changes if conditions were worse than originally predicted,
(3) Prediction Assessment. Data from Skylab were analy-
zed to determine source impact on sensitive experiment and system
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surfaces. These impacts were compared to initial (prelaunch) predic-
tions and models were adjusted to account for any discrepancies. The
refined models were then used to predict conditions for subsequent mis-
sions, and refine, eliminate, or develop operational constraints as nec-
essary.
Based on computer math modeling of the contaminant environment
around Skylab, contamination prediction summary reports were generated
on a daily basis during SL-I/2 and weekly for the remainder of the mis-
sion. The reports contained contamination deposition predictions for
critical operational surfaces and experiments along with the induced
environment predictions of mass column densities and radiant scattering.
Table II.K-6 is the final prediction summary for the Sky lab Mission.
These summaries were used by JSC for mission planning and assessment.
(4) DTO Assessment. The CMSG identified DTO functional
objectives (F0s) that were implemented to obtain data to support contam-
ination assessment and evaluation. In general, the data developed from
the F0s involved the use of crew time in visual observations and photo-
graphic sequences. Because of the manual nature of the data acquisition,
the CMSG monitored the on-going manned activities versus planned activi-
ities, and kept a running assessment of completion for each F0. Off-
normal conditions and/or missed events resulted in recommendations for
downstream events or alternate operations. The F0s performed during
the Skylab mission and their objectives were as follows:
- Obtain data on the contamination effects of certain
OA vent plumes and how these vent plumes and asso-
ciated contamination change with the durations of
the mission.
F0-1)
FO-2)
Observe, photograph and comment on the characteris-
tics of certain OWS vent plumes early in the mission.
Observe and comment on certain OWS vent plumes dur-
ing mid-mission.
FO-3) Observe, photograph, and comment on the character-
istics of certain OWS vent plumes late in the mis-
sion.
FO-4) Observe, photograph, and comment on the character-
istics of certain OA vent plumes as they occur dur-
ing the mission.
- Obtain data concerning the contamination on certain
OA windows and how this contamination changes with
the duration of the mission.
F0-5) Observe, photograph, and comment on the character-
istics of window contaminants early in the mission.
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EXPERIMENTS
Cloud (B/B_)
Column Density
Deposition (_)
COROLLARY:
CLOUD (B/B)
SI90A
SI90B
S191
S192
S193
S194
S063
S019
S183
S073
$201
T025/S073
S063K
S019K
S183K
S201K
S020K
$233
T025K
COROLLARY:
DE PO SITION
S190A
SI90B
S191
S192
S193
S194
S063AMS SL-3
S063AMS SL-4
S063 ASAL
S063 (STS)
S063 (WRW)
S019 SL-3
S019 SL-4
S183 SL-3
$183 SL-4
S073
$201
T025/S073
Table II.K-6. Contamination Prediction Summary
EXPERIMENT SENSITIVITY O! PREDICTIONS @
Not Available
Not Available
Not Available
3.7 x i0 -9
3.7 x 10 -9
4.0 x I0-9
4.4 x 10 -9
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
3.3 x i0 -I0
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
1.0 x 10 -13
Not Applicable
1.0 x 10 -13
3.3 x i0 -I0
Not Available
Not Available
Not Applicable
i. 2 x i0-8
Not Available
1.0 x I0-9 ®
R %O _g Icm2
7.6 x 10 -15 (157)
1.4 x i0-14 (157) @
0.o (o39)
5.03 x 10 "17 (364)
1.6 x 10 -16 (364)
5.03 x 10 "17 (364)
5.03 x 10 -17 (364)
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
2.7 x 10 "16 (031)
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
1.0 x 10 -16 (216) Q
5O 0.5 0.5
5O 0.5 O.5
300 3.0 3.0
560 5.0 5.6
2.5xi06 0.5 2.5xi04
2000 20 20
240 50 2.4
240 50 2.4
960 50 9.6
960 50 9.6
960 50 9.6
Ii i0 0.ii
ii i0 0.ii
18 i0 0.18
18 i0 0.18
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
2.7 x 10 -16 (033)
5.9 x i0 -16 (355)
4.6 x 10 -15 (348)
7.2 x 10 -15 (340)
7.5 x 10 -15 (341)
7.0 x 10 -15 (339)
4.6 x 10 -15 (363)
7.5 x 10 -15 (341)
4.6 x 10 -15 (363)
% _ _glcm 2
0 0 0 (032)
OQ 0 0 (032)
0 0 0 (032)
0 0 0 (032)
231.6 <I.0 2.316 (032)
0 0 0 (032)
2.6 1.0 0.026 (233)
1.5 i<l.0 0.015 (029)
0 0 0 (023)
94 5.8 0.94 (031)
175 i0.5 1.75 (031)
2.6 2.7 0.026 (233)
1.6 1.6 0.016 (025)
1.5 1.0 0.026 (233)
1.6 cl.O 0.016 (029)
0 N/A 0 (216)
1.6 N/A 0.016 (033)
0 N/A 0 (O23)
N/A: Not Applicable
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Table II.K-6. (continued)
EXPERIMENTS
I
COROLLARY :
DEPOSITION
EXPERIMENT SENSITITIVY
% 8 _g/cm 2
T025/S073
w/AMS
S063K
SO 19K
S183K
S201K (EVA)
S201K (AMS)
S020K (EVA)
$233 (CSM)
$233 (STS)
TO25K
R
@
N/A N/A N/A
200 50 2.4
ii i0 0.ii
18 i0 0.18
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
200 i .0 2.0
Not Available
Not Available
N/A N/A N/A
SYSTEMS
SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM' ACCUMULATIVE POWER LOSS
(%)
OWS SOLAR ARRAY GROUP (1-4)
OWS SOLAR ARRAY GROUP (5-8)
ATM SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM
THERMAL CONTROL SURFACE ACCUMULATIVE Z_°<
ALL SURFACES :
-CONTAMINATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS
ACCUMUlaTIVE (g/cm 2)
EREP X QCM (CSM FACING)
EREP -X QCM (OWS FACING)
EREP -Z QCM (ANTI-SOLAR)-2
ATM QCM (DAILY RATE)-2
T027 X QCM
T027 Z QCM
WINDOWS - ACCUMULATIVE TRANSMISSION LOSS
STS: DEPOSITION (g/cm 2)
TRANSMISSION LOSS (%) @ 6000_
@ 3ooo_
WARDROOM: DEPOSITION (g/cm2)
TRANSMISSION LOSS (%) @ 6000_
@ 3oooR
DEPOSITION (g/cm 2)
BRIGHTNESS LOSS (%) Q
CSM:
PREDICTIONS
% 8 _g/cm 2
1.6 N/A 0.016 (030)
1.5 cl.O 0.015 (029)
1.5 1.4 0.015 (030)
1.0 <l.0 0.010 (011)
4.0 N/A 0.040 (363)
1.6 N/A 0.016 (032)
4.0 0 0.040 (363)
5850 i0 58.5 (345)
94.7 <i.0 0.947 (032)
5.i N/A 0.051 (363)
PREDICTIONS DOY 039
3.43 %
2.92 %
0.00 %
+0. 190%
52.08 x 10 -6
60.77 x 10 -6
0.0 Q
0.0
N/A
N/A
9.549 x 10 -7
0.095 %
3.15 %
1.78 x i0-6
0.155 %
1.38 x 10 -4
2.31 x i0 -4
1.5o x LQ'4
21
31.5
23
SEE NOTES ON FOLLOWING PAGE
5.8 %
SL-2:
SL -3 :
SL-4:
SL-2:
SL-3 :
SL -4:
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NOTES:
i.
1
o
o
.
6.
.
.
9.
i0.
Table II.K-6 (continued)
Sensitivities are based upon the most susceptible wavelength
of a particular experiment.
Predicted deposition levels are based upon accumulative dep-
osition over operational time frames of systems or experi-
ments. B/B o predictions presented are for the highest levels
witnessed during the Skylab mission. Day-of-Year (DOY) that
these levels were reached are indicated in parenthesis beside
each prediction.
Column density predictions are based on total molecular
column density in g/cm 2.
Sensitivity based on tolerable percent degradation quoted
from experiment P.I. and ensuring calculation of tolerable
B/B o and deposition levels.
Sensitivity quoted directly from experiment P.I.
Sensitivity calculated from known experiment characteristics
and objectives.
Preliminary flight data indicates B/B o readings in the 10 -14
range.
Signal loss percent.
Flight data from the -Z facing Quartz Crystal Microbalance-
Contamination Sensor (QCMs) indicates a deposition rate of
approximately 12_/day. The only source appears to be local-
ized outgassing from the X facing QCM connectors, which are
in the field-of-view of the -Z QCMs. This is believed to be
a localized condition and not representative of Skylab out-
gassing, although the effect of ambient reflection has not
been totally assessed at this time. Therefore, math modeling
continues to use zero deposition on the -Z QCMs and the -Z
facing EREP experiments including S191, which had its outer
door left open for 40 days during SL-3.
CSM window brightness loss is the visible transmission loss
based on the spectral response of the human eye.
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F0-6) Observe, and comment on the characteristics of win-
dow contaminants during mid-mission.
F0-7) Observe, photograph and comment on the characteris-
tics of window contaminants late in the mission.
F0-8) Observe and comment on the characteristics of win-
dow contaminants during normal viewing times.
- Obtain data concerning contaminants on experiment
optical surfaces as the experiments are used during
the mission.
F0-9) Observe and comment on the characteristics of the
contaminants on experiment optical surfaces as the
experiments are used during the mission.
- Obtain data concerning OWS vent plumes and contam-
inants deposited on certain OA external surfaces as
viewed during EVA.
F0-10) Observe and comment on OWS vent plumes and contam-
inants on external surfaces during EVA.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations. At the conclusion of the
Skylab mission, the mission evaluation indicated that the methodology
and modeling techniques developed were valid, and that the contamina-
tion control measures instigated during the design, development, and
operational phases of this program were adequate to reduce the exter-
nal contamination environment, in many instances, to below the thres-
hold sensitivity levels for experiments and affected subsystems.
The following specific conclusions were reached as a result of
Skylab contamination control/assessment activities.
a. Contamination Control Working Group. A CCWG is a vehicle
for integrating contamination design requirements, determining systems
interactions and contamination effects on all systems as well as man-
aging technical contamination studies. Future programs should consider
contamination control as part of system integration efforts.
Under the guidance of the CCWG extensive testing of Skylab systems
including the Waste Management System was performed topredict contam-
ination levels. Design changes and operational procedure changes were
recommended by the CCWG to limit contamination. Rigorous analyses were
performed in conjunction with testing to model performance of the con-
tamination producing systems and to predict contamination levels.
Flight experience confirms that this multidiscipline approach is suc-
cessful and required for complex space vehicles.
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b. Surface deposition contamination and induced cloud bright-
ness levels can be predicted within _ 30 percent. Total contamination
of the vehicle can be predicted fairly accurately if periodic updates
of mission critical parameters and as-flown conditions are made.
Adequate premission predictions of surface deposition and induced
cloud brightness around the Skylab vehicle were made. In order to keep
the model results up-to-date, periodic revisions of the contamination
parameters were required and found desirable as the actual mission
deviated from nominal. The contamination model was updated because
mission changes, anomalies, and contingencies had a major impact on the
contaminant environment.
The line-of-sight model for surface deposition contamination was
shownto predict contamination levels within i0 to 20 percent. Model-
ing of the induced cloud brightness around the Skylab was found to be
dependent on parameters identified during the Skylab Contamination
Ground Test Programand were mission dependent.
c. The use of instrumentation to measure contamination depo-
sition and cloud brightness are invaluable in assessing and predicting
experiment degradation, contamination levels on critical surfaces and
as reference points for updating contamination prediction models. Mass
deposition monitors, low pressure sensors, residual gas analyzers and
cloud brightness monitors are recommendedfor these purposes.
Quartz Crystal Microbalances were successfully used on the exter-
ior of the Skylab vehicle to monitor massdeposition rates at specific
vehicle locations and cloud brightness monitors were used to detect the
brightness of the induced atmosphere around the vehicle. The accuracy
of the prediction model was improved by using these measurementsas
specific reference points.
d. Testing and flight observations have shown that discharg-
ing waste water into a waste tank that is exposed to vacuum, is success-
ful in allowing only vapor to escape, thus protecting against particle
production from major waste liquid sources. The modeof waste liquid
ejection is recommendedfor long term missions on those requiring elim-
ination of large quantities of waste liquid where storage is not feasi-
ble.
The waste tank concept of eliminating liquid waste has been in-
strumental in reducing the brightness of the induced atmosphere around
Skylab. The system has been operating within the guidelines established
for normal operation during ground testing.
The following recommendationsapply to future mannedspace program
contamination control/assessment activities.
a. Contamination control considerations should be integrated
into the initial spacecraft design concepts and should be a prime fac-
tor in mission design and planning.
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As a result of the Skylab program, it is evident that contamina-
tion control should be integrated into the design criteria on a level
comparable to thermal and power systems and should be considered from
the initial stage, through mission support. It is recommended for future
missions that a contamination control system integrate the degradation
effects resulting from interactions that occur between all contributory
systems.
Systems affected by contamination on Skylab were thermal, power,
attitude pointing control, environmental control, crew safety, and all
experiments or critical and operational surfaces such as windows and
antennas. Proper timelining of experiments and scheduled venting ac-
tivity can reduce the levels or the potential of contamination.
b. A uniform materials testing criteria should be established
to determine those parameters required for accurate modeling and assess-
ment.
Success of contamination modeling and subsequent counter-measures
is dependent upon extensive materials testing for source rates over the
range of temperatures, times of exposure and ambient environment inter-
actions anticipated. Resultant deposition capability must be determined
for major sources as a function of temperature variations of source and
sink, and the contaminant effects on signal attenuation.
Source rates for major outgassing sources on Skylab were inferred
from preliminary in-flight measurements and were nearly a constant rate
for a given temperature profile after months of exposure.
c. To reduce the contamination of overboard venting of liquids
and gases, adequate testing, design and analysis is required.
The Skylab Contamination Ground Test Program demonstrated the need
for testing of vent systems to determine parameters required, and eval-
uate vent nozzle designs. Overboard vents did not deposit on Skylab
exterior surfaces because of the relatively warm temperatures. Experi-
ence has indicated that particle size distribution, direction, and vel-
ocity can be created by proper nozzle design and flow rates for a given
liquid that can take advantage of sublimation characteristics and am-
bient atmosphere drag effect to minimize contamination levels. Given
these parameters, modeling can determine proper timelines and vent se-
quences. Alternative methods to venting overboard for sources unaccept-
able in a vent mode should be established.
d. Proper timelines for experiment exposure or operation in
relation to engine firings, outgassing levels, and overboard venting
are necessary to ensure low contamination levels.
The two types of contamination will be surface deposition or a total
mass column density along a particular line-of-sight. For different al-
titudes, the clearing time of particles and molecular interactions with
the ambient atmosphere should be considered.
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By modeling vents and engine firings, the periods where an experi-
ment or critical surface should be protected can be determined. This
approach for Skylab has been successful. Particles have been observed
by experiments when the predicted clearing time of particles were not
adhered to.
e. Future spacecraft with cryogenic surfaces will be highly
susceptible to all vents and leaks, even from non line-of-sight impinge-
ment, resulting from ambient atmosphere interactions and sublimation
processes.
Of all the sources of contamination on a manned vehicle, outgas-
sing and engine firings are a major problem because of the continuous,
long lasting nature of outgassing, and the necessity of engine firings
for rendezvous, docking, and attitude control. Other major venting can
be adequately designed, controlled, or timelined to minimize cloud bright-
ness or deposition potential.
Observations of mass deposition rates on mass detectors on the ex-
terior of the Sky lab vehicle indicated that outgassing sources and engine
firings were the major contributors to deposition. Other vented or leaked
material did not deposit at the temperatures of the Skylab exterior.
f. The contamination control of all experiment and vehicle com-
ponents should have a uniform set of specifications that encompasses the
susceptibility of the most critical surfaces. Documentation and moni-
toring by a single organization should exist from production to launch so
that a central record is maintained for the entire vehicle. Because of
greater experiment sensitivities on future missions and multiple inter-
faces anticipated, a higher degree of ground control is considered
necessary.
In general, it can be stated that prelaunch cleanliness was
well controlled and, aside from minor problems, no adverse effects can
be attributed to prelaunch contamination.
g. The capability to clean accessible optics or the development
of techniques to clean remote optics is highly desirable. New techniques
for contaminant detection and cleaning exist and should be thoroughly in-
vestigated for future application. These include Auger spectroscopy,
binary scattering, metastable beams, ion sputtering and activated plasmas.
Vacuum or GN 2 stowage for sensitive optics should be used.
Onboard Skylab optical cleaning kits for accessible optics consisted
of a mild detergent solution, distilled water, lint-free cotton, brush,
lens tissues, and convoluted bellows, and have been successful in remov-
ing contamination from certain Skylab surfaces. However, these techniques
will not remove many contaminants such as deposited outgassants from ex-
ternal sources. Stowage techniques appear to have been satisfactory.
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L. Crew Systems
i. Design Requirements. The Skylab DWS concept was firmly estab-
lished in the summer of 1969. Concurrent with the decision was the ini-
tiation of a concerted effort to firmly define the man/machine interfaces.
Specific Crew Systems documentation existing at the time that was manda-
tory for the total cluster included:
- MSFC RS003M00003
"Cluster Requirements Specification" dated August 1969
(specifically appendix G, titled "Crew Systems Design
Integration Requirements)."
- MSFC 10M32447A
"Human Engineering Design Requirements for AAP Experiments"
dated February 1969.
- MSFC 10M32158A
"Man/System Design Requirements for Orbital Workshop, Multi-
ple Docking Adapter, Airlock Module, and Apollo Telescope
Mount" dated March 1969.
Each of the documents was a working document and was subject to
revision during the design and build phase of the Skylab program.
In addition to the preceding listed documents, there were two human
engineering criteria documents. The documents were:
- MSFC-STD-267A
"Human Engineering Design Criteria" dated September 1966.
- MIL-STD-1472 (DOD)
"Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems,
Equipment, and Facilities" dated February 1968.
The remaining documented crew systems design requirements were the
individual module Contract End Item Specification. These documents con-
tained a functional and performance description of each identified item
to be delivered.
In addition to the contractural documentation, specific requirements
evolved and were recognized as a result of active participation by flight
crewmembers in reviewing and monitoring the design progress. Frequent
formal crew reviews were held at NASA Centers and contractors facilities
and included at least one prime crewmember. The accumulative inputs
from the crew increased the "workability" of the Sky lab, saved time in
task performance and, most importantly, gave the astronauts the interior
arrangement and man/machine interfaces they desired.
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2. Functional Description. When the decision was made to launch
the DWS, the pantry concept of the MDA changed to hardmounting most of
the previously stowed experiments. This allowed both ATM and EREP to
be launched in place with the control panels in the MDA. Situated aft
of the MDA, the AM/STS was originally designed to provide EVA capabil-
ity. The STS module provided the cluster with its two gas control sys-
tems, power distribution system and controls, and the data and commun-
ications systems. When the ATM C&D panel was added to the MDA, the STS
crew station had to accommodate crew functions, for A_I_ and STS.
At the onset, activities associated with the OWS consisted of little
more than demonstrating that a spent propulsive stage could be rendered
safe enough for crew entry. The number of separate compartments was held
to a minimum --- a large forward compartment, an aft experiment area
(primarily devoted to biomedical experimentation) a combined waste man-
agement and hygiene compartment, a food management compartment, and
sleep compartments. The open grid, which was widely used in the OWS for
floors, ceilings, and partitions, served two important functions; it
allowed free flow of ventilation air, and it provided crew mobility and
stability aids.
The DWS concept permitted more ambitious mission planning and im-
proved habitability i.e., an active food freezer/chiller system was
added to improve the quality of food. Additionally, because the OWS
would never be exposed to liquid hydrogen, it was possible to add an
observation window, relocate the scientific airlocks from the STS to
OWS forward area and place an airlock across the LOX/LH2 common bulkhead
to create a trash bin in the otherwise unused oxidizer tank. All the
items previously to be launched stowed in the MDA for later deployment
in the OWS were launched in place, which greatly reduced activation time.
During the early evolution of the OWS, designers consciously attempted
to retain a visual gravity vector, that is, one surface was designated the
floor and all nomenclature and operations were planned around this refer-
ence surface. Although it was recognized that up and down designators are
arbitrary in a weightless environment, it was felt that unless there was
strong reason to deviate from the chosen convention, it should be ob-
served. As design evolved, certain deviations were made in the OA. In
the OWS, sleep restraints were suspended between the floor and ceiling,
and use of the waste management compartment demanded that the crewmen
sit on the wall. Moreover, in other parts of the vehicle design consi-
derations appeared to legislate against maintaining consistent layout
conventions. In the MDA, operation of the ATM C&D and Experiment M512
required a crew position approximately 90 degrees to the vehicle center
line, and monitoring of the nearby STS and EREP controls and displays
required that crewmen orient themselves parallel with the vehicle axis.
The following paragraphs of this Section discuss the various means
of design verification, simulation, and test programs of the crew systems
aspects of Skylab. Mission results and evaluation of Skylab Crew Systems
performance are covered in MSFC TMX-64825, MSFC Skylab Crew Systems Mis-
sion Evaluation Report, July 1974.
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3. Design Verification. Analysis and verification of Skylab Crew
Systems Design was accomplished through a series of task analyses, pro-
cedural walkthroughs, and informal and formal incremental design reviews.
The task analyses, conducted by the individual module contractors, eval-
uated the operational aspects of each module crew station or crew func-
tion and served to establish basic hardware requirements. During this
phase of analysis the design was in its early preliminary stages with no
mockup hardware available for crewmen to evaluate.
The second phase of analysis and verification was to evaluate the
man/machine interface using contractor task analyses in conjunction with
early mockups. The mockup studies were used to evaluate the functional
aspects of each hardware item as it developed into a firm design. Both
task analyses and mockup reviews were used extensively in verifying the
conceptual and preliminary design phases of hardware development. The
verification was accomplished through informal and formal incremental
design reviews.
Incremental design reviews that involved MSFC, contractors, and
flight crews were held from the preliminary phases of the design through
flight hardware development. The earliest reviews were informal and at
a system or subsystem level. Actual crew system design evaluation and
verification at the module level occurred as PDRs when an entire module
evolved from conceptual to preliminary hardware design stage. As new
systems were developed, incremental informal reviews were held. The
incremental reviews continued through the entire Skylab hardware design
up to final hardware acceptance at KSC before launch.
Following the PDRs were the formal Crew Station Reviews (CSRs) and
CDRs. The CSRs constituted the final flight crew approval of preliminary
designs before CDRs. Subsequent to the CDRs, additions or changes to the
hardware design were evaluated through informal incremental reviews and
required CCB approval before implementation.
The Crew Compartment Stowage Reviews (CCSRs) were the final verifi-
cation before flight hardware integrated testing. Flight Crew Equipment
(FCE) including all stowage items, was fit checked to its corresponding
interface location. These FCE to interface locations included all stow-
age containers/locations and use locations.
The following paragraphs will discuss the analyses and reviews for
all Skylab modules and systems.
a. Task Analyses. The task analyses contained descriptions of
on-orbit crew tasks involving Skylab hardware. Task descriptions included
background information, task time, number of crewmen required, procedural
description, location of task, interior ambient conditions during task,
estimated energy required to perform each task element, hardware used to
accomplish task, documents used in the analyses and significant remarks
concerning the task. The task analysis format was developed by MSFC to
describe crew tasks at the most basic level from which more specific
descriptions could be generated. A separate analysis was presented for
each crew function. The analyses were an ongoing effort throughout the
development phase of Skylab hardware.
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The task analyses were used initially as a basis for Skylab hardware
design, i.e., to define functional requ_ements to initiate design solu-
tions and subsequently to resolve discrepancies between the hardware and
its use by the crew. Still later in the program they were used as inputs
to mission timeiines, maintenance, contingency procedures, and finally as
inputs for training and flight procedures.
b. Preliminary Design Reviews. As design advanced from concep-
tual to preliminary hardware designs, incremental and total systems/module
design reviews were conducted. At these reviews each hardware contractor
presented preliminary designs, supporting documentary analyses, studies,
etc., to the MSFC,JSC, and Headquarters review teams. The teams usually
consisted of three o_ four MSFCrepresentatives and one flight crew rep-
resentative to review an experiment or subsystemwith a single contrac-
tor engineer. These informal incremental reviews were conducted on all
Skylab hardware from program definition to launch, with emphasis in the
latter stages shifting from preliminary design to significant design
change.
Formal system or module level PDRswere conducted as the program
evolved complete systems or modular designs. The first formal PDRto be
held was on the OWSin May 1967. From its first formal PDR, subsequent
OWSdesign reviews were conducted as informal incremental reviews. In-
formal incremental design reviews were also conducted on the AM, MDA,
and ATMto monitor their design evolution. The last system PDRto be
conducted was for the EREPin May 1970.
On December2, 1969, a Skylab Cluster SystemDesign Review (CSDR)
was conducted at MSFCas a PDRof all Skylab subsystems/systems and
modules as an integrated spacecraft. Any discrepancies the flight crew
found on any of the Skylab hardware design during the PDRstage were gen-
erally rectified by simple design changes with minimal hardware schedule
impact. In instances where the solution to a crew discrepancy involved
a major system or design change, program impact assessment was performed
to determine the necessary course of action. This type of activity was
held to a minimumbecausemost problems were identified and solved through
the incremental crew reviews held before the CSDR.
c. Crew Station Reviews. Crew Station Reviews used flight or
flight-type hardware (high fidelity mockupsor one-g trainers) in perform-
ing crew reviews of system/module level crew stations and crew working
environments. The reviews were conducted to procedures generated directly
from task analyses performed during the preliminary design. The objec-
tives of the CSRswere to verify an acceptable crew station environment
from the standpoint of accessibility, ease and effectiveness of functional
operations, adequate light, low noise levels, adequate identification and
understandibility of all crew interfaces, and crew safety. Discrepancies
at this point were considered as program changes and required RID action.
Working groups composedof NASAProgram and Technical Representatives
reviewed the RIDs to determine corrective action to be taken. Decisions
were based on a tradeoff betweendesirability of RID objectives and re-
suiting program impact.
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Initial CSRswere held on the OWSin May 1967 and February 1968,
with the final CSRconducted in September1970. A combinedAM/MDACSR
was conducted in July 1970. The initial ATMCSRwas held in August 1969,
with the final conducted in August 1970. The review included both IVA
and EVAcrew station tasks. Following the formal CSRs, progressive or
incremental CSRswere conducted to assure that disposition of RIDs from
the CSRswas accomplished.
d. Critical Design Reviews. The final crew systems verifica-
tion of hardware design was performed during the CDRphase. Each CDR
baselined the module/subsystem design and subsequent changes required CCB
action. The effective use of incremental crew reviews as an ongoing
effort minimized the impact of crew changes on baselined hardware.
The final formal design review before integrated test and checkout
was the Skylab CSDRconducted on July 8, 1971. Any resulting crew inter-
face discrepancies identified during the CDR/CSDRphase were incorporated
if shownto have minimumprogram impact, negotiated as crew-mandatory
changes resulting in moderate program impact, or left open to be investi-
gated during the functional integrated testing after flight hardware de-
livery. Any crew systems changes after CSDRrequired program direction
to modify flight hardware and were subsequently verified during Skylab
systems tests, such as Crew CompartmentFit and Function (C2F2).
Following CDR,the SOCARwere conducted incrementally from January
1972 through June 1972. Crew system participation was included in the
Special Emphasis, EVASystems, and Microbial Control review teams. The
special emphasis review team assessed the waste management,water, illu-
mination, food management,activation/deactivation, inflight maintenance,
and trash managementsystems and activities. The EVAsystems review team
assessed the pre-, during and post-EVA activities as well as EVAsystem
hardware including flight crew equipment. The microbial control review
team assessed the potential internal contamination and the housekeeping,
food handling, and personal hygiene tasks to be performed.
In the EVAarea the SOCARwas extended to cover the period up to
launch by transferring unresolved action items to the EVAoperations plan-
ning committee (EVAOps) with joint MSFC,JSC, and contractor representa-
tion. Monthly meetings by the committee were extremely valuable to the
EVAdiscipline in maintaining liaison between all agencies involved, in
quickly resolving questions as they arose, and in coordinating final
stages of premission activity (training, C2F2, contingency analyses, etc.).
The EVAOps team was then able to perform real-time mission planning and
problem solving after launch. The effort included almost all the support
for planning and conducting the EVAcontingency activities during the
mission.
e. Crew CompartmentStowageReview. The final stage in flight
crew verification of the Skylab hardware design was the CCSR. Using
flight hardware/high fidelity mockupsand one-g trainers, the flight crew
performed fit check, stowage, and inflight use location interface verifi-
cation checks. During these reviews all Skylab FCEwas fit-checked with,
or interfaced with, its stowage and use locations. Also verified during
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these reviews were FCEaccessibility, ease of installation, removal and
stowage, proper identification and nomenclature and, finally, its ulti-
mate safety whenused by the crew in flight. Discrepancies arising as a
result of CCSRswere treated in the samefashion as RIDs resulting from
the CSRsand CDRs. Due to potential program impact every effort was made
to minimize RIDs at CCSRsby informal incremental crew reviews during the
final definition phase. The CCSRswere conducted on the OWSin April
1971 and the combinedAM/MDAin September1971.
4. Simulations. Three types of mockups were used to verify the
adequacy of hardware design. These included mockups to demonstrate one-
g, zero-g and Neutral Buoyance (NB) methods of simulation. The man/sys-
tem simulations requirements defined the simulation method and mockup
fidelity for each task. In addition to prelaunch hardware/procedure
evaluation, all simulation methods were used in EVA systems development
and training. A detailed presentation of the EVA procedures, training,
hardware, and facilities development program is contained in MSFC TMX-
64825-MSFC Skylab Crew Systems Mission Evaluation Report, dated July 1974.
a. One-g Mockups. The one-g mockups for Skylab began as card-
board and plywood gross envelopes. This type of mockup was used to check
dimensions and arrangements of Skylab equipment. The next phase was to
develop engineering mockups and they ranged in fidelity from basic enve-
lope to flight configuration and were used to verify structural design
and crew interface. On completion of the design phase of Skylab, many
of these engineering mockups were refurbished and used as one-g trainers.
Examples of these uses were: MDA, AM, STS, ATM, and SWS trainers. One-
g mockups were also used for special applications and examples are wire
bundles, the CM tunnel section, and the SWS hatch section. The final
stage of the one-g mockup development was mission support mockups. Static
test articles of the ATM, M])A, AM, STS, and SWS were refurbished and used
for mission evaluation. Examples of this type were solar array deploy-
ment, thermal shield operation, rate gyro installation, and addition of
coolant to the heat exchanger. One-g mockups were used by design en-
gineers for evaluation of design and by astronauts for verification of
crew interface. From the crew viewpoint the fidelity of one-g mockups
was extremely important. When the crew was called on to critique a unit
of hardware at a review, i.e., PDR, CDR, the earlier a high fidelity
mockup was available the easier it was to achieve a satisfactory crew
interface. A good example of this principle was the multipurpose elec-
tric furnace for experiment M.518. The experiment was introduced late in
the program, which made the timeline critical. At the PDR a high fidel-
ity mockup was present and the crew worked the usual problems, nomencla-
ture, location of gages and switches on the C&D panel, and hardware oper-
ation. At CDR the crew reviewed the changes and accepted the hardware
with few comments. This was in contrast to other units where no high
fidelity mockups were available until CDR, and the crew changes requested
had an impact on cost and schedule, which could have been avoided by
earlier introduction of high fidelity mockups.
Special task mockups were employed by Skylab in the medical experi-
ments area. The Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT) was a
major example of this type of one-g simulation. The SMEAT mockup was a
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vacuumchamberconfigured to resemble part of the OWScrew quarters and
medical experiments area. The simulation conducted was a 56-day mission
with three membersof the astronaut corps serving as subjects. The facil-
ity duplicated the Skylab atmosphere, crew activities, timeline of events,
and mission support. The objectives of the simulation were to evaluate
the following areas: crew procedures, flight hardware, data handling and
reduction, medical support, and baseline medical data acquisition. Results
of the simulation were useful for changes in medical experiment hardware,
crew diet, crew procedures and medical data handling. Loss of weight in
one crewmanand significant individual crewmanpreference in food resulted
in diet changes, and an ergometer breakdown, urine volume measuring prob-
lems, and blood pressure measuring problems resulted in hardware redesign.
b. Neutral BuoyancyMockups. NBmockupsbegan as gross enve-
lopes of work areas. A mockupof this type was the SWS. The unit was a
shell and was used mostly to represent volume in the cluster. Someof
the NB mockupsof this type were modified during the Skylab development
phase. The MDA,which was outfitted with experiment envelopes, crew
restraint devices, and film vaults, is an example. The MDAwas used for
early evaluation of crew stations. Another type of NBmockupwas a com-
bination of a development article and a trainer. This type of mockup
was the AM-ATMcomplex. The unit was used for developing crew equipment
and procedures in EVAand contingency EVA, boomtransfer operations, boom
replacement, clothesline transfer of ATMequipment, film tree locations,
and work station evaluation. The unit was used for all EVAtraining.
Part task NBmockupswere used for crew evaluations in someexperiment
areas, i.e., the Lower Body Negative Pressure Experiment.
The MSFCNeutral Buoyancy Simulator (NBS) provided a simulated zero-
g environment in which astronauts and engineers performed for extended
periods of time, the various phases of spacecraft operations in order to
gain first-hand knowledge of hardware and total system operational charac-
teristics. Before SL-I launch the NBSwas used primarily for EVAsystems
and procedures development, EVAcrew training, and mission timeline de-
velopment. After the SL-I lost its meteoroid shield, the NBSwas used
extensively to evaluate potential flight fixes via EVA. The contingency
procedures thus developed aided in a successful fix that permitted Skylab
to exceed the originally planned mission.
c. Zero-g Aircraft Mockups. The zero-g aircraft mockupswere
part task mockupsused to evaluate design and verify crew interface.
Selected activities for each module in the cluster were performed. Com-
mandmodule activities included rescue, with five pressure suited subjects
invovled, and data transfer. The MDAactivities included fireman pole
translations, ATMrestraint, ATM-STSwork envelopes, film vault and film
tree operations, I_DApressure suited entry, M_512restraint platform and
work envelope, M512metals melting and sphere forming, fan replacement,
and evaluation of various electrical connectors. AMactivities included
ECScanister changeout, hatch operations, light replacement, umbilical
management,water gas separator replacement verification, AMpressure
suited working volume that included the ATMfilm tree, canister opera-
tions, and clothesline transfer. SWSactivities included the tape
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recorder, food consistency, water squeezer operations, OWSstowage lock-
ers, M508 task board, fecal collector, SALwith Experiments T025 and T027,
MI71 ergometer, MI31 rotating litter chair, sleep restraints, and fire
extinguishers. Skylab-related research and development activities included
pushoff and impact tests, large mass transfers, camera operations, elec-
tric shaver evaluation, whole body shower, tool kit, and mechanical re-
straint. Zero-g aircraft simulations were evaluated by contractor person-
nel, NASAengineers and astronauts. Results of these simulations were
distributed to design engineers. The zero-g tests resulted in both de-
sign changes and verification of current design. Zero-g aircraft devel-
opment mockupswere used in areas where zero-g dynamics (mass, fluid,
gas) were important.
5. Testing. Operations most important to crew systems were the
stowage operations and C2F 2. The C2F 2 consisted of a crewmember(s) re-
placing an installed flight unit with a stowage or replacement itme. The
system was then functioned to verify its operability. The objective of
the test was to verify that inflight maintenance tasks could be performed
and that designated spare units would function when connected to the sys-
tems.
Fit checks of all hardware were accomplished during the tests to
verify that the items would fit in use locations. The fit checks were
signed off on a fit check matrix. All flight hardware that was not
available in St. Louis, Huntington Beach, Denver, and Huntsville received
fit checks at KSC. These were performed by astronauts or their designa-
ted representatives.
Stowage operations involved development of test procedures to stow
the vehicle for launch and to supply the correct vehicle configuration
for the many other tests throughout the Sky lab test program.
a. Orbital Workshop. Postmanufacturing checkout of the 0WS was
accomplished at MDAC-WD in the Vehicle Checkout Laboratory during the per-
iod November 6, 1971 through August 16, 1972. The objective of this ac-
tivity was to provide an OWS that had been checked out and calibrated to
an extent consistent with the ambient one-g environment and provide an
0WS acceptable for planned, integrated cluster system testing at the KSC.
Checkout was performed using flight hardware within the constraints of
hardware availability. Detail test requirements acceptance criteria and
operational constraints were provided in the 0WS-I Test and Checkout Re-
quirements, Specifications and Criteria.
Checkout was initiated with the start of continuity/compatibility
testing and continued through completion of the All Systems Test (AST),
EMC, and residual subsystem retests. During the checkout period, all
subsystems, C2F 2 and the AST, and EMC tests were performed.
The spacecraft was moved from Tower 6 to Tower 2 (KSC) on August 16,
1972. The significant Tower 2 checkout activities included a mercury
certification of the habitation area and calibration of the meteoroid
shield strain gauges. Mercury certification checks were conducted to
demonstrate compliance with program standards.
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Major manufacturing activity in Tower 2 was focused on modification
of the meteoroid shield and clean-up activities associated with final in-
spection. All items associated with open work were noted except for crew
commentsthat did not involve hardware changes.
(i) Crew CompartmentFit and Function. Crew system person-
nel at MDAC-WDperformed mission crew tasks in the subsystem tests to
verify the crew interfaces. The checkout tests performed in the crew
systems area were:
- Food Management
- CrewAccommodations
-Microbial Control Test Sample
- Crew CompartmentFit and Function (C2F2)
- Delta C2F2
No significant problems were encountered during checkout.
The flight crew performed the C2F2 test in two sessions and a final
bench check of the ring stowage contained on August 30, 1972. Fifteen
flight crewmenparticipated during these tests. There were no signifi-
cant problems; however, a numberof test problem reports were transferred
to KSCto be worked off in subsequent delta C2F2s.
(2) Stowage. The OWSstowage subsystems provided for con-
tainment/restraint or loose equipment during the launch/boost and in-
orbit phases. Stowageprovisions consisted of containers, lockers,
cabinets, film vaults, food freezers/chillers, and miscellaneous re-
straint provisions. Checkout for the StowageSubsystemconsisted of a
stowage procedure, plus 18 additional procedures, for experiment and
water subsystem hardware.
All stowage locations were fit-checked during checkout at MDAC-WD
except for 28 locations that were completed at KSCwhen the hardware be-
cameavailable. In addition, 96 locations were unstowed and the hardware
was returned to the suppliers for rework, repair, test, etc., in accord-
ance with contractual direction. Twenty-five ring containers were de-
livered to KSC. Fourteen of the ring containers were fully stowed and
five were partially stowed.
(3) Experiments. The Experiments Subsystemconsisted of
the hardware accommodationsneeded to integrate the experiment equipment
in the OWS. The accommodationsincluded structural attachments, electri-
cal cabling, pressurization, and vacuumplumbing provisions, and storage
restraints.
The experiment/OWSinterface accommodationswere verified through a
series of subsystem tests and the AST. Additional man/machine interface
verifications were accomplished during C2F2 testing. The subsystem test-
ing and C2F2 for experiments covered the period February through August
1972.
No significant problems regarding OWSexperiment accommodationswere
encountered during OWStesting. The significant checkout open items
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remaining were summarizedin the PDTR. Most of these items were open
because the flight hardware was not available for checkout, or the hard-
ware was scheduled for modifications before delivery to KSC.
b. Multiple Docking Adapter
' (i) Crew CompartmentFit and Function. The C2F2 test was
held in December1971 at _iMC. Three flight crewmenand three backup crew-
men participated in the tests. The most significant hardware changes
that evolved from the test were adding captive screws, addition/modifica-
tion of Velcro, stowage relocation of an S056magazine to reduce interfer-
ence, and the extension of inflight stowage straps to ease operational
access. The intent of this test was to have a total C2F2 with items not
accomplished at Denver to be tested in delta C2F2 tests at MDAC-EDand
KSC.
(2) Stowage. As discussed in the preceeding section, a
stowage procedure was used to aid the C2F2 test. The procedure was de-
veloped during earlier crew reviews and vehicle development tests. The
procedure directly supported C2F2test, becausemost C2F2 items were
also MDAstowage items.
c. Airlock Module
(i) Crew CompartmentFit and Function. The C2F2 began in
December1971 and continued after hard mate with the MDA. Most of the
test was accomplished as a combinedAM/MDAC2F2 in June 1972. As with
all C2F2 tests, a bench review was conducted before the test and avail-
able stowage items were displayed on tables for the astronauts to re-
view.
A C2F2 of the _M/MDAwas also accomplished at "altitude" during the
altitude chamber test. This test revealed a potential problem when
Mosites, a closed cell foam, expandedwhen exposed to a partial vacuum.
This resulted in high retention forces on stowed items and in higher
forces being required to close covers on foam-lined containers. Use of
thinner Mosites and careful tolerance control was instrumental in resolv-
ing the Mosites expansion problem.
Other significant changes that evolved from testing at MDAC-EDin-
cluded the securing of washers to bolts designed for inf!ight removal,
changing the mounting hardware for the TV input station and video switch,
adding a 1/16-inch socket head wrench to the MDAtool kit and adding
additional restraints to the miscellaneous stowage container.
(2) Stowage. Procedures for the limited stowage operations
for the AMwere developed during earlier C2F2 and Altitude Chambertests
at MDAC-ED.
d. Apollo Telescope Mount
(I) Crew CompartmentFit and Function. The ATMC2F2 was
successfully completed at MSFCin May 1972.
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the ATM.
(2) Stowage. No permanent stowage locations existed on
e. John F. KennedySpace Center
(i) CrewCompartmentFit and Function. The C2F2 at KSCwas
performed to accomplish the verification of fit check and functional se-
quences not satisfied during the first C2F2 tests at MDAC-WDMMC,Denver,
and FLDAC-ED.Six procedure change requests (PCRs) were written due to
OWSstowage changes. Three bench reviews were conducted with crew par-
ticipation and all componentsor representative samples were reviewed.
There were 1255 deviations written and 231 Interim Discrepancy Reports
generated on OWShardware during the total test run. None of these were
major problems and all were closed or upgraded to Discrepancy Reports.
All test objectives of the OWSsequencewere satisfied.
The final KSCC2F2 was held in April 1973 for the AM/MDA/AE_dpor-
tion. Before the test, all available FCEand experiment hardware avail-
able at KSCwas launch stowed in accordance with MDAstowage procedures.
At the conclusion of the test, 13 discrepancies were recorded.
Three hardware changeswere required and consisted of removing the blue
paint from the ATMhandrail due to chipping, stowage configuration
changes for EREPattenuators, and MDAtool kit launch pip pins.
(2) Experiment AccommodationSystem. Experiment testing
was conducted both off-module and on-module. All test requirements were
satisfied, with four waivers accepting the remaining discrepant items.
(3) Stowage. All stowage hardware was fit checked and
approved for each individual module fit check matrix before vehicle
launch. Crew equipment stowage tests began on March 25, 1973 and were
completed on April 2, 1973. Test objectives were:
(a) To provide instructions for handling and pre-
packaging flight crew equipment in the cleanroom to support subsystem
testing, bench review, crew fit and function test, and flight stowage;
(b) To provide instructions for stowage of FCE in
the spacecraft for C2F2 and flight, and
(c) To create an installation record of stowed FCE
in support of launch operations.
Stowage of the SWSat KSCwas enhancedby the stowage installation
drawings supplied by each module contractor. The installation drawings
were agreed to at an intercenter meeting on April 22, 1972. The drawings
indicated equipment to be installed, mounting details, and all special
installation procedures and requirements. The KSCmadeextensive use of
the drawings as engineering authority in the preparation of stowage Test
and Checkout Procedures (TCPs). All final delta C2F2sand stowage tests
were completed satisfactorily.
11-255
6. Mission Support C2F 2 Tasks. Due to the many "fixes" engineered
to repair or enhance the SWS systems, C2F 2 activity was used through the
launch of SL-4. The following items represent major fit and functional
tasks performed on backup units and development hardware.
a. Orbital Workshop
- Wardroom window drying hose fittings and hose assemblies.
- Lower leg restraint and adapter for waste management com-
partment.
- Adapter IB96363-AN2D-B01 panel to quick disconnect for
Coolanol servicing.
- Waste management compartment restraint.
- Hardware for the thermal shield problem.
b. Multiple Docking Adapter
- Experiment S082 timer cable.
- ATM TV bus redundancy modules and cables.
- Rate gyro six-pack installation.
- High torque screw removal tool.
c. Airlock Module
- Coolant reservicing kit.
- Rate gyro six-pack cabling on truss assembly (EVA).
7. Inflight Maintenance (IFM). Spacecraft design before Skylab
employed highly reliable equipment and redundant systems to insure mis-
sion success. Missions were of relative short duration and payload weight
and volume were critical. Because of these factors, an inflight mainten-
ance capability was neither considered nor required. Early Skylab design
was based on maximum use of proven Apollo and Gemini hardware and excluded
inflight maintenance as a requirement. However, this philosophy gradually
changed throughout the program, evolving from a minimum maintenance con-
cept of one of extensive planning and provisioning of inflight mainten-
ance support.
The initial inflight maintenance planning involved provisioning of
spares and tools for maintenance support of only critical single failure
point items. The scope of inflight maintenance support was later ex-
panded to include all hardware that could affect the crew or mission ob-
jectives if failure occurred. An extensive design and hardware analysis
was initiated to determine the maintenance capability necessary to sup-
port the mission. Because of limited payload weight and volume each
spare and tool was evaluated and the need justified, based on the effects
of failure, before stowage on board Skylab was approved. The result was
a high level of maintenance capability tailored to identifiable hardware
failures with the greatest potential of occurrence. This maintenance
philosophy proved to be a disadvantage during the Skylab missions because
it did not provide a good general maintenance capability. Items such as
a full range of sockets and wrenches, a multimeter, drills, files and a
hacksaw could not be justified because specific needs could not be iden-
fied. As a consequence, many needed tools were not placed on board.
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a. Scheduled IFM. Scheduled IFM activities were held to a
minimumto conserve crew time. Requirements were established only where
periodic cleaning or replacement of consumable, cycle-sensitive or time-
sensitive items were necessary. The requirements were included in the
checklists as part of the normal housekeeping tasks. Performance of the
tasks were controlled by the flight plan and scheduled to accommodate
crew workload. During the mission, the frequency of vacuumcleaning the
ECSfan inlet screens was changed from 7 to 2 days because of the unanti-
cipated large amountof debris that they collected. Scheduled vacuum
cleaning of the OWSHeat Exchanger vanes every 6 days was a task initia-
ted during SL-4 to removewater and particulate material build-up which
reduced the heat exchanger efficiency. Replacement of the Urine Separ-
ator filters was to have been accomplished every 28 days but was found
to be unnecessary and was performed only at the end of each mission when
the Urine Separators were replaced.
b. Unscheduled IFM. Unscheduled IFM capability was provided on
board the SWSfor the purpose of replacing failed components, installing
auxiliary and backup hardware, and equipment servicing and repair. The
capability was provided in the form of spares, tools, and procedures for
performing 160 different unscheduled tasks. Included were replacement
of ECSfans, tape recorders, teleprinter, lights, fire sensors, speaker
intercom assemblies etc. Repair of ECSducts, structural leakage, shoe
indexing cleats etc., and installation of auxiliary hardware such as
contingency power and TV system cables. Experiment S192Attenuator and
S054 Shutter Override Actuator were incorporated in the unscheduled main-
tenance planning. Additional capability was included for contingency
opening of hatches and experiment doors. During the Skylab missions, 33
such tasks were performed and manyof the tasks such as replacement of
the tape recorders were performed a number of times.
c. Contingency IFM. In addition to the capability provided for
scheduled and unscheduled inflight maintenance, tools and materials were
placed on board Skylab to provide somegeneral maintenance capability.
The capability was provided to permit repair of failed equipment for which
no specific inflight maintenance activity was anticipated. Items such as
tape, wire, C-clamps, various types of pliers, a vise, twine, hammers,
and tweezers were included in the Skylab tool inventory for this purpose.
Additional maintenance tools and equipment were launched on board the
three CSMsto provide capability to correct equipment malfunctions that
were unanticipated. Deployment of the Skylab Parasol, the OWSSolar Wing,
and the Twin Pole Solar Sail, repair of the S019 Extension Mechanism,
installation of the Rate Gyro Six Pack and S082BAuxiliary Timer, and
replacement of the ATMTVMonitor were just a few such tasks performed.
These were tasks for which on board maintenance support was inadequate.
Other contingencies such as failure of CBRM15, binding of the ATM
door ramp latches, leakage of the condensate and Coolanol systems and
contamination in the ATMC&Dcoolant loop developed during the missions.
These maintenance actions were performed using the onboard support equip-
ment. Procedures were developed real-time and uplinked to the crew.
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d. Tools and Equipment. The tools and equipment onboard Skylab
were provided to support not only inflight maintenance, but also activa-
tion, operation, and deactivation of the Cluster systems and experiments.
Lubricants, safety wire, twine, tape, Velcro and other like materials were
included for general use throughout the cluster and for contingency main-
tenance. Spare tools were provided in someinstances where justified by
the numberof applications and susceptibility to loss or breakage.
The tool/maintenance equipment complementonboard Skylab was primar-
ily contained in five kits located throughout the SWS. Tool Kits i and 2
located in the OWSstowage lockers, E623 and E624 contained most of the
tools and materials required for maintenance. An Activation/Contingency
Tool Kit located in the MDAlocker M144contained tools and materials
which were required or potentially needed during periods when the tool
kits in the OWSwere not accessible as before OWSactivation and during
EVA. Someduplicate tools were included for use during activation when
the sametool was simultaneously required by two crewmen. The Hatch Tool
Kit located on the forward side of the FIDAAxial Docking Port Hatch con-
tained the tools required to disassemble the hatch in the event that the
latching mechanismbecamejammed. The repair kit located in the OWS
locker E620 contained materials necessary to patch leaks in the habitation
area of the cluster and miscellaneous fastening materials and devices such
as tape, Velcro, and snap assemblies.
Additional special purpose tool kits, tools, materials and equipment
were located at various places in the spacecraft. These included the CSM
Tool Kit, S190 Tools, EMUand PGAMaintenance Kits, Water System Servicing
Equipment, and spare tools plus a numberof miscellaneous tools and main-
tenance equipment items.
The Skylab tool/maintenance equipment inventory was supplemented on
all three missions with items necessary to install auxiliary hardware,
support contingency inflight maintenance, and replace tools that were lost
or broken during previous missions.
A complete and detailed evaluation of the Skylab IFM activities is
included in the MSFCSkylab Crew SystemsMission Evaluation Report (TMX
64825).
8. Conclusions and Recommendations. The role of man throughout the
Skylab program provided the necessary insight to assure that man/system
interfaces were compatible and practical. From the inception of hardware
design concepts, crew system reviews were conducted through all phases of
hardware development, system buildup, testing, and finally during opera-
tions. Many spacecraft man/systems design requirements were produced and
verified during the course of the Skylab program. Throughout the program
several man/system requirements were not implemented on a common basis
and in the vehicle, which resulted in evaluation comparisons and selec-
tion of preferred solutions. A portion of the significant man/system
criteria for future spacecraft includes: interior arrangements based on
gravity orientation; standard foot restraint capability throughout;
simple restraints for covers and onboard equipment; optimized ventilation
for gravity substitution work area; translation and stability aids for
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EVAto encompassthe entire vehicle; initial design of IVA and EVAin-
flight maintenance to include provisions for standard tools, spares and
work area, and from inception through mission support, a high fidelity
crew systems mockupto evaluate crew interfaces, layout, workstations,
and operational procedures.
Recognizing that the Skylab experience leads to improved future
systems, the document "Man/SystemDesign Criteria for MannedOrbiting
Payloads," MSFC-STD-512,is specifically directed to the man/system de-
sign questions that are likely to be asked during the course of future
program development.
The cumulative effect of NASAand contractor crew system personnel
together with the astronaouts' influence contributed significantly to
the Skylab cluster design. Whenthe crew system design changes are con-
sidered individually, it is difficult to conclude that any single change
madean appreciable difference between success or failure of a specific
mission task; however, the cumulative inputs increased the workability
of Skylab, saved time in task performance, and most importantly gave the
astronauts the interior arrangement and man/system interfaces necessary
to mission success. This supports the conclusion that man/system inte-
gration must be an integral part of future mannedprograms from program
inception through mission support.
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M. Thermal Control/Environmental Control System
The thermal and environmental control systems changed considerably
from program inception to the as-flown configuration. The most signifi-
cant, Thermal Control System/Environmental Control System (TCS/ECS) changes
occurred with the change from the Saturn I WWS to the Saturn II DWS config-
uration and corresponding changes to program philosophies. The OWS TCS
originally was to provide a habitable environment for the Habitability/
Crew Quarters Experiment (M487). The OWS was also to have been an opera-
tional S-IVB upper stage fully loaded with liquid oxygen and hydrogen,
which were burned on orbital insertion. After the residual propellants
were vented and the compartments were pressurized, the crew was to carry
in and install fans and other system components in the OWS that were not
compatible with liquid hydrogen. As a result, the initial OWS system had
to be simple, preinstalled before launch, and require a minimum effort for
activation. The design was therefore primarily passively controlled with
suitable insulation and coatings and also had fans with cloth ducts on the
sidewalls for additional temperature control. To meet the early launch
date, all of the vehicles that composed the cluster (including a LM vehi-
cle) had to use essentially off-the-shelf TCS and ECS hardware and each
vehicle was expected to provide its own thermal control. Oxygen and nitro-
gen was provided from the CSM and Carbon Dioxide (C02) and water vapor was
removed by the AM system.
As the launch date was rescheduled, the entire concept was changed to
the Saturn V DWS configuration (without a LM vehicle) in which the workshop
was launched without propellants and all hardware was installed inside be-
fore launch. All the Skylab TCS/ECS systems were allowed to become more
sophisticated at this time because the launch data was extended long enough
to qualify new hardware. Also, the philosophy of each vehicle providing
its own thermal control was dropped and the Skylab TCS/ECS systems were
integrated into one overall system with central control in the AM.
The metabolic heat load was originally based on the assumption that
only two men would be in the cluster for the CSM was always to be manned.
The flight also was originally to have included only two missions. The
first mission was to be flown with the X-axis perpendicular to the orbit
plane with movable solar arrays on the 0WS to maintain the active side
facing the sun. The second mission was to be flown in the solar inertial
attitude. The beta angle was to vary between 0 ! 53.5 degrees. The fol-
lowing paragraphs briefly describe the evolution of the systems resulting
from many changes to these original program requirements and development
problems.
i. Atmospheric Control System
a. Carbon Dioxide Control and Odor Removal. The cluster C02 and
odor removal system was originally supplied by Gemini lithium hydroxide
(Li0H)canisters, which had a 14-day capacity for two men and were to be
replaced in flight (see Figure II.M-I). Some spare cartridges could have
been launched on the AM, but most were resupplied by the CSMs. The mole-
cular sieve was to be carried in the cluster as an experiment. The seive
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originally served as a backup for the Li0H system and later as a prime
system with the Li0H as the backup system for missions longer than 28
days. The Li0H system was eventually dropped and a second molecular
sieve was addedwith both sieves to be installed in the AM. These changes
took place before the establishment of the Saturn V DWSconfiguration when
the C02 partial pressure requirement was 7.6 mmHg. After the DWSwas base-
lined, the C02 partial pressure requirement was reduce@to a value of 5.5
mmHg. To accommodatethe new requirement, the flowrate through the ad-
sorbent canisters was increased from i0 ib/hour to 15.5 ib/hour.
A concern over possible contamination of external optical surfaces
by exhaust gases from the molecular sieves during bed desorpting resulted
in a directive to relocate the molecular sieve overboard exhaust ducts.
As a result, both molecular sieve overboard ducts were combined and relo-
cated to exhaust from a single outlet from the side opposite the optics.
b. Humidity Control. Humidity was originally to be controlled
by one of two condensing heat exchangers with a coolant input temperature
of 40°F; however, the capability to maintain the cluster dewpoint above
the minimum46°F allowable was marginal with a 40°F control valve system
and the problem was aggravated by the required molecular sieve flow in-
crease because more atmospheric moisture was adsorbed and dumpedoverboard
by the molecular sieve. However, this problem was ultimately solved by
increasing the coolant temperature entering the condensing heat exchangers
from 40 to 47°F, thus raising the atmosphere dewpoint by reducing the
amount of moisture condensed in the heat exchangers. The original Gemini
temperature control valves were replaced by 0ff-the-shelf valves of a dif-
ferent design, but modified to control coolant temperature of 47°F. This
change was accomplished simultaneously with that required to reduce cool-
ant temperatures delivered to.the battery modules.
Concern that dumping condensate overboard might interfere with ex-
periments that required external sightings caused condensate system design
changes. Someof these changes are listed below:
(i) Relocated the AMcondensate overboard dumpports on the
side opposite the affected optical surfaces.
(2) Provided the capability to dumpcondensate from the AM
storage tank to the OWSwaste tank, which also was modified to preclude
release of water or ice particles of sufficient size to contaminate the
optics.
(3) Modified the AMdumpports to include restricted out-
lets that would cause a more predictable exhaust plume profile.
(4) Provided capability to transfer condensate directly from
the AMcondensing heat exchangers to an evacuated condensate holding tank
(a modified OWSwaste tank) located in the OWS. The condensate was to be
stored in the holding tank and subsequently dumpedto the OWSwaste tank.
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This change resulted from water freezing at the OWS waste tank dump probe.
Freezing was encountered during tests simulating condensate transfer from
the AM storage tank to the OWS waste tank. The OWS dump probe was also
modified to permit dumping from the AM condensate tank to the OWS waste
tank. However, transfer to the OWS holding tank was retained as the pri-
mary method because the larger volume of the holding tank allowed a longer
period of time between dump operations.
A design requirement change was made relatively late in the program to
provide a positive means for inflight servicing of the condensing heat ex-
changer water separator plates. The change was prompted by the concern
that the plates might dry out during low water generation rate periods of
the mission and by uncertainties associated with the previously baselined
self-wetting method. The new method had the advantage of being a straight-
forward step-by-step process that assured positive plate wetting. Although
the self-wetting approach had proved satisfactory during development test-
ing, and required fewer operational steps, its success inflight would depend
strongly on cluster dewpoint and proper crew attention. The self-wetting
technique was sensitive to both free water carryover to the molecular sieves
and gas carryover to the condensate collection system.
The final configuration of the condensate control system is shown in
Figure II.M-2.
2. Ventilation System. The AM ventilation system originally used
Gemini cabin fans that were later replaced by GFE Apollo Postlanding Venti-
lation (PLV) fans. Advantages of the PLV fans were that (a) they needed no
ac-dc power inverter, (b) required less power, and (c) it standardized fans
throughout the cluster for PLV fans were also used in the MDA and OWS; how-
ever, the PLV fans had undesirable flow/delta P characteristics for use in
conjunction with the cabin heat exchangers. The lack of pressure head from
the PLV fan necessitated the use of low pressure drop screens and ducting.
The inclusion of sound suppression equipment in the fan module designs to
satisfy cluster noise level specifications resulted in additional system
resistances, which also contributed to the marginal fan characteristics.
Alternative fan designs that would provide more desirable flow/delta P
characteristics were pursued but a decision was made to retain the PLV fan.
The fan performed well during the Skylab missions, but problems were en-
countered during flight with dust and other particles passing through the
coarse (low pressure drop) screens at the inlet to the OWS heat exchangers.
The OWS ventilation system was modified with the change from the
Saturn IV WWS to the Saturn V DWS. An additional duct was added to the
existing two-duct system to increase th_ total flow. The diffusers in the
WWS configuration were mounted on the ceiling and the equipment was on the
floor. In the DWS configuration, the diffusers were mounted on the floor
together with various pieces of Sky lab equipment. Additional flow was re-
quired to maintain an average atmosphere velocity of approximately 40 ft/
min because the reversal of the floor and ceiling placed equipment in the
vicinity of the diffusers which disrupted their flow pattern. The result-
ing system performed well.
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3. OWS/AM/M_DA Thermal Control System
a. Orbital Workshop. The ECS/TCS as defined for the Saturn I
WWS provided control by fan circulated gas in eight evenly-spaced ducts.
These ducts were formed by a series of thermal curtains and rails around
the periphery of the habitation area as shown in Figure II.M-3. As the
atmospheric temperature increased, the duct fans would be activated on the
cold side of the vehicle and when it decreased, duct fans would be activa-
ted on the hot side. If required, duct heaters would also be turned on
to increase the temperature. An automatic control system was provided with
manual override to control the fans and heaters. This system gave gas
temperatures in the range of approximately 55 to 105°F. A meteoroid shield
with a black painted external surface (_s/_ = 0.9/0.9) was assumed with a
moderate resistance to heat transfer (no gold) between the meteoroid shield
internal surface and the tank wall. The minimum temperature for safe astro-
naut entry after tank passivation was defined as minus 150°F and no active
heaters were provided for warmup from the initial temperature of minus
400°F after the residual hydrogen was vented.
During the latter part of 1967 and in 1968, studies defined the ad-
vantages of controlling heat leaks in the tank sidewall, tank joint re-
gions, the forward dome and the plenum region, which included the common
bulkhead. These studies led to the gold tape on the tank external surface,
the forward dome high performance insulation system, the thermal shields
on the external joint areas, and foam insulation in the plenum region, the
addition of foam insulation was not implemented, however, until after the
change from a WWS to a DWS.
By mid-1969, the system concept and design had undergone many changes.
Crew comfort was no longer in the category of an experiment but more
stringent requirements were now defined as follows:
Atmospheric Temperature
Mean Radiant Wall Temperature
Humidity
Touch Temperature
Atmospheric Velocity
65 to 75°F
65 to 75°F
0.018 Specific (minimum) and
95 % Relative (maximum)
55 to 105°F
15 to I00 ft/min.
The cloth ducts in the OWS were removed and an "integrated" system was
proposed that took maximum advantage of the AM system. The temperatures
were to be controlled automatically or manually using cooling delivered
from the AM and 750 watts of the I000 watts of heater power available (500
watt capability in each of two ducts with fan clusters). All major sur-
faces were to be between 60 and 80°F, but localized surfaces accessible
to the crew could be as cold as 55°F or as hot as 105°F. Radiant heaters
providing a maximum of i000 watts were to be used for warmup to provide a
0°F mean internal temperature at pressurization initiation and a 40OF
minimum internal temperature by the time tank seal and lighting installa-
tion was completed.
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The WWSrequirements were reassessed with the change to a DWSconfig-
uration in September 1969. The perpendicular-to-orbit plane attitude was
dropped and the missions were to be flown in a solar inertial attitude at
an orbital inclination of 30 degrees (_ = 53.5 degrees). Before completion
of this assessment, change to a 50 degree orbital inclination (_ = 73.5
degrees), was madein early 1970. This meant the design had to consider
the increased heat loads associated with orbits in i00 percent sunlight
whereas the maximumpreviously had been 73 percent sunlight.
OWSperformance requirements were changed to include an expanded com-
comfort box (which was the final specification comfort box). A minimumOWS
waste heat (housekeeping) load of 250 watts and a maximummetabolic (sensi-
ble) load of i000 Btu/hour (293 watts) were defined. Maximumheater power
use for cold conditions was redefined as 825 and 1170 watts for nominal and
two sigma conditions, respectively. The minimumelectrical waste heat re-
moval was specified as between 600 and 1350 watts, depending on beta angle
as well as consideration of nominal and two sigma conditions.
The major design changes that resulted from the preceding requirements
were the addition of white paint on the solar-facing side of the OWSmeteor-
oid shield, the addition of 500 watts of manually controlled heater power
in the third duct, and foam insulation added in the plenum region to alle-
viate potential condensation problems and to minimize the heat leak.
In 1971, heat pipes were installed in the workshop to alleviate poten-
tial condensation problems in the regions near the floor and ceiling sup-
ports, the wall behind the water bottles, the balsa wood forward joint, and
the back of the storage freezer in the forward compartment. Also, in this
period the AMcooling delivered to the workshop was redefined with a resul-
tant 50 watt decrease in the specified minimumelectrical waste heat re-
moval equipment and an increase in the housekeeping load to 400 watts. The
AMcooling was again redefined early in 1972 and the minimumhousekeeping
waste heat load was increased from 400 to 525 watts, which becamethe final
design value. Based on these changes, the white paint pattern on the
meteoroid shield external surfaces was finalized in February 1972. No sig-
nificant design changeswere madebetween this time and SL-I launch.
b. Airlock Module. In going from the WWSto the DWSconfiguration,
the only significant changemade to the AMatmosphere cooling system was
installation of four OWSheat exchangers and associated fans to provide
more sensible cooling to the OWS. This change was actually madejust be-
fore conversion to the Saturn V workshop configuration and the heat ex-
changer fan assemblies were located in the space previously allotted to the
LiOH system in the aft AMcompartment.
The change in orbit inclination angle from 30 to 50 degrees increased
the mission beta angle extremes from _53.5 to _ 73.5 degrees. Combined
with the change to the basic solar inertial attitude for all missions, this
resulted in a more severe hot case external environment design condition.
These factors resulted in a change from a multiple layer "superinsulation"
concept to the thermal curtain insulation design for the AM.
c. Multiple Docking Adapter. The evolution of the thermal con-
trol systems in the MDAinvolved primarily refinements to the insulation
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and heater control systems. A heater system was also developed for the
S190window, which was addedwith the EREPexperiments.
d. Final Cluster Thermal Control System. The final configuration
of the thermal control systems for the cluster is shownin Figures II.M-4
and II.M-5.
4. Gas Supply System. The initial requirements were to store and
supply 02 at sufficient quantities and flowrates for initial pressuriza-
tion, for replenishment of atmospheric leakage, and for metabolic consump-
tion by three crewmen for a 30-day mission and to provide 02 and H2 for
the CSM fuel cell. The cluster atmosphere was to be 5 psia 02 . To store
the required 02 and hydrogen (H2) modified Gemini 02 and H2 cryogenic
tanks were mounted on AM trusses. Thermostatically-controlled calrod
heaters, installed on the lines downstream of the cryogenic tanks, warmed
the gases supplied to the distribution system. Two 120 psig Gemini pres-
sure regulators provided 02 supply and pressure control.
As the WWS design was firmed up, the cryogenic tanks were removed
from the AM. 02 and N 2 were then supplied from the CSM for a two-gas at-
mosphere. The mainline Apollo CSMs carried two cryogenic 02 tanks (changed
to three tanks following the Apollo 13 mission) amounting to a total usable
load of 640 pounds and two cryogenic H2 tanks amounting to a total usable
load of 56 pounds. The tanks were qualified to support mission durations
of up to 14 days, although the cryogens could last for approximately an-
other week. For the planned 28-day and 56-day missions of Skylab, these
tanks would be replaced in the SM by three cryogenic 02 tanks with a total
usable capacity of 3600 pounds, three cryogenic H2 tanks with a total
usable capacity of 225 pounds, and one cryogenic Nitrogen (N2) tank with a
total usable capacity of 850 pounds. These tanks were to be qualified to
support a mission of at least 56 days duration with the capability of
later being qualified to support 90 day missions. The H 2 tanks on both
the Apollo mission CSMs and on the extended duration Skylab CSMs were pro-
vided to supply H 2 for fuel cell operation. Almost all the water in the
original Skylab concepts was to be supplied by fuel cell operation.
In addition to the main cryogenic gas supply on the CSM, two high
pressure gaseous 02 tanks (LM descent tanks, 2250 psia) were carried ex-
ternally on the AM to supply high 02 flow rates for the maneuvering
equipment _xperiments (M509/T020) and for EVAs. After depletion by use
to below i000 psia, these tanks were to serve as accumulators and would be
kept recharged with 02 from the CSM.
The cluster total pressure and 02 partial pressure were initially
maintained by the cabin pressure regulator in the CSM. Figure II.M-6
presents a schematic of the CSM 02/N 2 control system. Two series N 2 solen-
oid valves were used to shut off N2 flowing to the cabin pressure regulator,
each controlled by its own controller. An N2 selector valve was used to
provide N 2 to the two-gas control system, or to the rest of the 02/N 2 sys-
tem. Both 02 and N 2 could be delivered via an umbilical and Quick Discon-
nect (QD) from the CSM to the MDA and back to the rest of the cluster as
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shown in Figure II.M-7. Nitrogen would be supplied for initial pressuri-
zation and then the system would be purged of N 2. Oxygen would be supplied
for EVA/IVA operations and for the mole sieve pneumatics.
Two 02 regulators were located on the AM; a 120 psi regulator for
normal use and a 240 psi regulator for M509/T020 gas use.
In addition to the other 02/N 2 subsystems, there were provisions to
supply 02 to and from the LM. Provisions in the LM were also provided for
independent operation involving EVAs conducted from the LM.
Changeover to the DWS with the Saturn V booster permitted a larger
allowable launch weight. Consequently direction was given to store all 02
and N2 supplies required for the Skylab mission onboard the AM. Storage
of the 02 and N2 as high pressure gases was selected over cryogenic stor-
age because of lower cost, lower development risks, ease of servicing,
and more operational flexibility for the multimission Sk¥1ab program.
The CSM was to remain a baseline Apollo Block II CSM with only a few
changes. Only two cryo 02 tanks were to be carried, instead of the three
as flown on the later Apollo missions. A high-flow EVA/IVA station was
added to permit an IVA or EVA from the CSM using only 02 . A polychoke
orifice was added to the system to allow boil-off of cryogenic 02 to be
added to the cluster atmosphere.
All the gas that had been carried in the extended duration cryogen
tanks in the SM for the cluster was placed in high pressure gaseous 02 and
N 2 tanks on the exterior of the AM. There were initially six 02 tanks and
five N 2 tanks (3000 psia), although a sixth N 2 tank was added later to pro-
vide usable capacities of 4930 pounds 02 and 1320 pounds N2. The main
power source for the Skylab missions was changed from fuel cells to solar
cells. No extra H 2 was carried to run the fuel cells.
Additional changes in design requirements that reflected on the sys-
tem design during this time are listed below:
a. Requirement for both DCS ground command capability and on-
board control of 02 and N 2 flow.
b. Removal of the provisions to transfer 02/N 2 gas via an
umbilical and QD from the CSM to the MDA.
c. Addition of the automatic two-gas atmosphere control system
to the AM including the addition of two 5 psia cabin pressure regulators.
d. Addition of two 150 psig N 2 regulators in the AM to regulate
N 2 coming into the cluster.
e. Requirement for ten OWS water tanks containing a total of
6000 pounds of usable water due to the decision to supply all power for
the cluster from solar cells, not from the CSM fuel cells. Along with
this requirement came the requirement for two 35 psig N2 regulators in
the OWS (supplied from the AM) to pressurize the vellows in the water
tanks.
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f. Requirement for supplying N2 to the OWS for biomedical
experiments.
g. Requirement to supply N2 instead of 02 to the mole sieve
pneumatic valves.
h. Requirement to supply two 5 psia N2 regulators to pressurize
reservoirs in the Suit Umbilical System (SUS) cooling loop and the ATM
C&D cooling loop systems.
i. Conversion of the M509 propulsion gas from 02 to N 2. Addi-
tion of three high-pressure (3000 psia) N2 tanks (containing I0 pounds
each) to the cluster for the M509 experiment. Addition of an N 2 recharge
station in the AM for inflight servicing of the M509 N 2 tanks.
Changes were later required in the controlling range of the two-gas
control system. The 02 partial pressure control range requirement of the
two-gas control system was initially 3.7 _ 0.2 psia. It was determined
by system analyses that this range could not be consistently achieved,
based on the assumption of stacking maximum specification tolerances of
the P02 sensor/amplifier assembly and the maximum specification deadband
tolerances of the 02/N2 controller. In addition, there was the potential
for overlap of the P02 control band and the C&W alarm band, again based
on maximum tolerance stackup. The sensor/amplifier specification toler-
ances were based on extreme ranges of temperature (40 to 90°F) and 02 par-
tial pressure (0 to 6.4 psia) in addition to further allowances for test
instrumentation errors and long term drift effects. Subsequent analyses
using test data applicable to a more realistic temperature range (60 to
90°F) and 02 partial pressure range (2.8 to 3.9 psia) still showed a
potential problem of consistently meeting the 3.7 _ 0.2 psia require-
ment.
A reevaluation of cluster 02 partial pressure limits during this
time, resulted in a system P02 requirement change to 3.6 _ 0.3 psia. It
was determined that this new requirement could be met by limiting the
sensor/amplifier full-scale inaccuracy to _ 3 percent and by readjustment
of the 02/N 2 controller trip points. Accordingly, steps were taken to
improve sensor temperature compensation so that worst case sensor/ampli-
fier inaccuracy was 3 percent or less within the P02 range of 2.8 to 3.9
psia and temperature range of 60 to 90°F. Also, the controllers were
changed by adjusting the lower trip point to minimize control band width
and adjusting the upper trip point to center the band width around a nom-
inal 3.6 psia 02 partial pressure. The final 02/N 2 gas supply system is
shown in Figure II.M-8.
5. Depressurization System
a. Waste Tank Vent. The waste tank concept originated in the
days of the WWS. The original plan was to dispose of urine by dumping it
overboard through a fitting installed by the crew in the side of the fuel
tank. When tests revealed that this would be detrimental to the solar
arrays, it was decided to have the crew punch a hole in the common bulk-
head and install a heated dump probe so that urine could be dumped into
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the liquid oxygen (LOX) tank. The LOX tank was to be vented through the
existing nonpropulsive vent system and a second latching vent valve was
added for redundancy.
In the studies preceding the conversion to the DWS concept, the LOX
tank (now called the waste tank) was found to be a desirable place to
dump numerous types of waste materials. The trash airlock was installed
in the common bulkhead and two additional heated dump probes were added
for flushing and draining various water systems. Also added were fit-
tings for venting waste processor exhaust gases and refrigeration pump
coolant leakage into the waste tank. Because propellants were no longer
being carried, it was possible to pre-install all of this hardware.
In the original OWS LOX tank nonpropulsive vent system, flow passed
through one port in the tank, two parallel valves and two 20-foot long
wraparound ducts to nozzles on opposite sides of the tank. Analytical
studies showed that one of the two wraparound ducts would be subjected
to temperatures well below the freezing point of water so the duct was
likely to become partially or completely blocked, leading to unbalanced
thrust. Because this would have placed a large load on the Skylab con-
trol system, it was decided to redesign the vent system to its present
configuration. The power cost for heating the final i ft long duct to
prevent freezing was an order of magnitude less than would have been re-
quired for the original wraparound ducts. The original waste tank vent
system had a small filter screen covering the vent port. Because of
concern that this screen would become completely blocked with trash bags,
it was replaced by large area screens that separated the waste tank into
compartments. The largest compartment received trash bags from the
trash airlock. Each vent outlet was in a separate screened-off compart-
ment and these two compartments were connected by a duct made of screen
material to assure balanced venting. The liquid dump outlets were sep-
arated by screens from the trash area to prevent trash bags from freez-
ing to the dump probes and possibly blocking them.
The original large screens were coarse (16 mesh) because their
objective was to control migration of the trash bags. It was later
decided to use the screens to prevent overboard venting of any solid
waste that might interfere with optical experiments and the 16-mesh
screens were replaced with Dutch twill woven screens having 2 micron
filtering capability. Extensive developmental tests verified the fil-
tering capability of the new screens but indicated that they could be-
come blocked when urine was dumped on them. A baffle was then added
to prevent direct impingement of the dumped urine on the screens. The
vent valves on the waste tank were eliminated and replaced by vent caps
(once opened, there was no need to close them).
b. Waste Tank Heated Liquid Dump Probe. The original heated
probe was 3.5 inches long and extended only 0.5 inch beyond the waste
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tank bulkhead. A Kapton heater blanket was wrapped around the 0.25 inch
diameter silver tube and held in position with a coil spring. Front and
back heaters were sized at 7.5 watts each.
During qualification testing, the heater blanket overheated and failed
due to poor thermal contact between the blanket and silver tube. Two
attempts to improve the thermal contact (using Eccobond to bond the blan-
ket to the outside diameter of the silver tube and using Nomexyarn woven
over the heater blanket to hold the blanket against the silver tube) were
unsuccessful.
A decision was madeto redesign. The basic objectives were to double
the heater power and to increase the heat flux to the probe tip. The
length of the probe was increased to extend six inches beyond the bulkhead
to reduce ice bridging potential. Redundant heater circuits were main-
tained and each circuit was positioned lengthwise over the entire length
with a watt density of 3 watts/inch at the probe tip and a watt density of
i watt/inch at the upper end of the probe. The orifice at the tip was
angled and located radially to expel liquid parallel to the waste tank
baffle, thereby preventing ice buildup.
c. Habitation Area Vent Valve System. The original WWSconcept
involved fairly elaborate schemesto empty the Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) tank
of all the LH2 and gaseousH2, and to increase the temperature from cryo-
genic H2 temperatures (-423°F) to 70°F. In addition, H2 sensors were pro-
vided in the cluster to sense the H2 that would outgas later. The same
vent valves used on the Apollo program S-IVB were to be used to vent the
LH2 tank. Workshop pressurization lines and pressure sensing lines had to
have burst discs installed in them to prevent cold LH2 from reaching other
parts of the system. After all the LH2 had been dumped, the discs would
be burst and 02 and N2 would be used to pressurize the LH2 tank.
With the change to the DWSconcept, the OWSwould no longer need to
be purged of LH2 and the burst discs and H2 sensors were eliminated. Be-
fore SL-I launch, testing indicated the possibility that an excessive
delta P across the OWScommonbulkhead would occur with the Saturn S-IVB
wraparound duct orifice and a vent sequence that allowed the OWShabita-
tion area and waste tank to vent simultaneously at orbital insertion. The
initial vent sequencewas revised so that the 0WShabitation area would be
vented at 205 seconds after liftoff rather than at orbital insertion and
the orifice diameter decreased from 1.78 to 1.49 inches. These two changes
decreased the commonbulkhead delta P to acceptable levels.
The OWSpneumatic system for the waste tank and habitation area vent
valves was essentially the sameas that used on S-IVB except that the reg-
ulator was removed. This simplification was the result of a shorter oper-
ational life requirement (I hour versus 7 hours on S-IVB) and confidence
in the system's low leakage capability built up during the S-IVB program
that permitted lowering the supply pressure to a level within the opera-
tional range of the actuators.
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d. Solenoid Vent Valve System. The habitation area vent system
on the WWSconsisted of the S-IVB pneumatic vent valves and a crew-operated
valve for venting the residual hydrogen vapor. At the time of wet-to-dry
conversion, it was decided to add capability to vent by ground commandat
any time in the mission. Becauseit was believed to be impractical to
maintain a pneumatic supply throughout the mission, it was decided to re-
place the manual valve with a set of four solenoid-operated vent valves.
As a result of system design review activities during the SOCARin 1972,
a decision was madeto add a vent screen over the entrance to the four
solenoid valves to prevent debris from being blown into the valves. Even
with the screen, someblockage of the solenoid vent valves occurred during
the flight. Without the screen, the effectivity of the solenoid vent valve
system would have been severely limited.
e. M_DAVent Valve System. The initial MDAvent valve design
consisted of two 4 inch vent valves in parallel. These valves were later
installed in series to provide redundancy for the failure modecondition
of one valve not closing when commandedby the IU. The originally planned
ground commandcapability for the valves was also deleted because the com-
mandcapability would be needed only in remote contingency situations.
f. Aft AMVent-to-Vacuum. This vent was used in the WWSto vent
the aft section of the AM to a vacuumduring boost, thereby preventing any
chance of having a higher pressure in the aft AMthan in the OWSwhile the
OWSwas being vented to vacuumto remove all the LH2. The vent could be
manually closed by a crewmanin the airlock and the aft AMcould then be
pressurized. Whenthe DWSconcept was selected, the valve was removed
and two check valves were placed in the OWShatch to prevent and higher
pressure on the aft AMside.
g. Final Configuration. The final configuration of the cluster
depressurization systems is shownin Figure II.M-9.
6. Airlock Module Coolant Loop. Several design changes were made to
the AM Coolant Loop during the program due to revised system requirements
and a few development problems that were encountered. The original con-
cept of the AM coolant loop included a single 40°F thermal control valve
downstream of the radiator as shown in Figure II.M-10. The requirement
for this configuration was to provide a 55°F water inlet temperature to
the Life Support Umbilical interface while absorbing heat loads of 2000
Btu/hour from each of two astronauts. However, a requirement for 45°F
water inlet temperatures resulted in moving one of the heat exchangers
interfacing the water suit cooling loop with the AM coolant loop upstream
of the 40°F control valve. A thermal capacitor was added downstream of
the radiator to accommodate the system loads and maintain adequate temper-
ature control throughout the orbital period. A requirement to provide
cooling to the ATM console and various EREP components resulted in the
addition of the ATM/EREP water cooling loop to interface with the AM cool-
ant loop. The resulting system for the AM coolant loop is shown schemat-
ically in Figure II.M-10. The ATM C&D/EREP loop which was added is shown
in Figure II.M-II. A major perturbation to this design was produced by a
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combination of concerns over the life of the AMbatteries with a resulting
desire to provide lower battery temperatures and over the inability of the
system to maintain cluster dewpoints above the minimumrequirement of 46°F.
The 40°F control valve at the inlet to the condensing heat exchanger was
replaced with a 47°F valve to resolve the dewpoint problem (paragraph ll.M.
l.b) and the 40°F control valve was relocated upstream of the battery module
to provide lower temperatures. A second 47°F control valve was added along
with one additional heat exchanger (in each coolant loop) and the system
flow paths were rerouted to provide the desired automatic control system.
The resulting system is depicted in Figure II.M-12. However, tests con-
ducted to prove the stability of the system showedthat the system was un-
stable.
Because of the short time available to develop a design that would
provide control stability, a test approach was taken. The tests led to
rearrangement of the lines interconnecting the suit cooling heat exchangers,
the addition of a heat exchanger bypass line with bleed orifice, and the
addition of the EVAflow selector valve. The final system configuration is
depicted in Figure II.M-13. The purpose of the above changes was to therm-
ally isolate the hot and cold inlets to the downstreamtemperature control
valve (TCVB). In the baseline design, the hot and cold inlets were therm-
ally coupled through the heat exchangers upstream of the valve to such an
extent that a small temperature differential existed for normal operating
conditions and the thermal inertia of the system produced excessive valve
movement(and instability) when valve movementwas required due to load or
temperature changes. Several configurations that incorporated only the re-
arrangement of lines interconnecting the heat exchangers were tested. Some
improvementwas seen, but, to attain stability over the required range of
heat load and temperature conditions, other changeswere necessary. A by-
pass valve was incorporated for use during non-EVAthat completely bypassed
the suit cooling system and regenerative heat exchanger. A bleed of approx-
imately 30 ib/hour of cold flow was incorporated that, coupled with the re-
routing of lines through the heat exchangers, resulted in stability for EVA
conditions.
A design change was required for the thermal capacitor after the OWS
Refrigeration System (RS) capacitor failed during qualification testing
(The only difference between the AM and RS capacitors was the use of Unde-
cane wax in the RS design rather than Tridecane wax). The container rup-
tured as a result of forces produced by the volume change during melting.
Ullage was available, but the design allowed the ullage to be far removed
from the phase change location. In the original design, the cells within
the capacitor were interconnected and the ullage could be located anywhere
within the capacitor. The final design incorporated a honeycomb cell struc-
ture with ullage in each of the cells. Because requirements associated with
the Z-LV orientation for expanded EREP operations had significantly reduced
the radiator capability for some maneuvers, a second twenty pound capacitor
was also added as part of the redesign to provide additional capability.
The original design of the SUS water loop did not incorporate a liquid/
gas separator. The separator was added due to concern that free gas might
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be present in the loop. In retrospect, a similar separator should have
been added to the ATM C&D/EREP water loop since free gas problems were
encountered in flight. However, the Roccal additive in that loop was not
compatible with the separator and the approach taken was to minimize the
free gas present in the loop. The additives were changed in the SUS loop
and the change resulted in additional problems as discussed in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
Early design of the SUS loops used untreated MMS-606 (deionized)
water as the circulating medium. Vendor pump tests using this fluid dis-
closed starting problems, caused by corrosion on the pump internal parts.
These problems forced a change of the pump vanes, rotor, and linear mater-
ials from the more wear resistant tungsten carbide to a more corrosion re-
sistant carboloy alloy. The materials changes, combined with the addition
of additives to the water for corrosion and bacteria control, resulted in
satisfactory pump performance. These additives were 2 percent by weight
of dipotassium hydrogen phosphate and 0.2 percent by weight of sodium
borate for corrosion control and 500 ppm Roccal for bacteria control. This
fluid composition and pump design was also used in the ATM C&D/EREP coolant
system.
After installation of the liquid/gas separator in the SUS loops, test-
ing indicated that the Roccal additive was incompatible with the separator
performance, causing water carry-over through the gas discharge port. A
concern was also expressed about the presence of the Roccal reducing the
strength properties of the tygon tubing in the LCGs. The Roccal was there-
fore replaced by 20 ppm movidyn, another biocide consisting of a colloidal
silver solution. Subsequent SUS loop operation with this new fluid resulted
again in problems with pump starting. Failure analysis determined that the
pump locked up after dormancy due to deposits formed by interaction of the
dipotassium hydrogen phosphate and ailver in the movidyn with nickel from
the fins of the SUS loop heat exchangers. These deposits formed between
the pump vanes and rotor interfaces, preventing one or more of the vanes
from moving freely in the rotor slots.
At that point in the program, the flight vehicle was undergoing final
tests in preparation for shipment to KSC, so a crash effort was undertaken
to determine a soluation to the problem. The basic approach was to find a
suitable replacement for the water solution. Simultaneously, additional
design analyses and tests were conducted on alternate pumps and heat ex-
changers in the event of failure to find a suitable replacement fluid. An
alternate pump module, using a modified CSM coolant pump, powered by a
transformer and compressor inverter, was designed and tested as a backup
to the existing pump module. Also, a design feasibility study was ini-
tiated to modify the SUS loop heat exchangers to an all stainless steel
configuration.
Neither of the above design changes was required. The final solution
was arrived at by beaker-type materials testing and end-to-end systems
testing on a variety of candidate fluid compositions. These tests estab-
lished SUS loop compatibility with a fluid consisting of MMS-606 water
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containing additivies of 20 ppm movidyn and 500 ppm sodium chromate. The
SUS pumps were also modified by increasing the vane/rotor clearance to
further minimize start-up problems.
The flight vehicle SUS loops were drained, cleaned, and reserviced at
KSC with the new fluid. The modified increased clearance pumps were also
installed. The final system configuration proved to be satisfactory as
evidenced by the fact that no problems with SUS pumps were experienced at
any time during the mission.
The final configuration of the SUS loops is shown in Figure II.M-14.
7. Refrigeration System. The refrigeration system was added to the
OWS when it was changed from the WWS to the DWS configuration. The ori-
ginal RS design included a low temperature proportional mixing thermal
control valve similar to the AM cooling loop thermal control valves. This
valve controlled the flow through the RS radiator such that the mixed
temperature was -17 _ 3°F. The original system is depicted in Figure
II.M-15.
Three development problems were encountered with the thermal control
valve during development:
- A side displacement (squiring) of an internal metal bellows
resulted in drift in the control temperature.
- Outlet temperature instability due to high gain at extremes
of sleeve position.
- Poor quality control of bellows welds which resulted in
failures during tests.
As a result of the above problems, the valve was deleted from the
design. To provide low temperature control of the system, the existing
radiator bypass valve control logic was modified. The temperature sense
points for valve actuation were moved from the capacitor third segment
outlet to the capacitor first segment outlet, and the temperature trip
points were adjusted from -20 and -40°F to -13 and -34°F. When -34°F was
achieved, the bypass valve was commanded to full radiator bypass. When
the sense point warmed to -13°F, the valve returned to full radiator flow.
The final system configuration is depicted in Figure II.M-16.
The RS thermal capacitor was redesigned together with the AM coolant
loop capacitor as discussed in paragraph II.M.6.
8. Conclusions and Recommendations. Performance of the ECS/TCS
systems during the Skylab Missions is reported in TMX 64822, MSFC-Skylab
Thermal and Environmental Control System Mission Evaluation Report. The
conclusions from that report are provided in the following paragraphs.
The Skylab Environmental and Thermal Control Systems provided an
acceptable environment for both crews and experiments. The loss of the
meteoroid shield resulted in an imbalance of the passive thermal control
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system for the OWS which was resolved by deploying improvised solar shields.
Other anomalies occurred which required coordinated crew and ground support
activities in their resolution. The major anomalies, other than loss of
the meteoroid shield, were the sticking of temperature control valves in the
AM cooling loop, leakage of coolant in both the AM cooling loops and failure
of the RS Radiator Bypass Valves (RBPVs).
The following paragraphs provide some conclusions and recommendations
for future designs. The comments are grouped by subsystem. A section is
also included which contains general comments and observations.
a. Atmosphere Control System. The Atmospheric Control System
includes C02 removal, humidity control, odor removal, and contamination
removal. In general this system performed very well. The crews were
basically comfortable and healthy. System discrepancies during the mis-
sion were corrected by designed-in system redundancies or by real-time
workaround procedures. Comments and observations relative to future use
of similar systems are provided in the following paragraphs.
The condensing heat exchangers using frittered glass water separator
plates are an effective, durable and low maintenance means to remove at-
mospheric moisture.
The performance of the molecular sieve system was outstanding. The
system performed C02, odor, and moisture removal functions effectively with
no system hardware anomalies. In fact, the system performed satisfactorily
throughout the 84-day SL-4 mission without a bed bakeout being required
(design was 28 days). This system demonstrated that it should be considered
for future manned programs, especially those of one month or more duration.
The vacuum side of the condensate system had a tendency for random
leaks throughout the mission. The condensate system included many quick
disconnects and it was generally agreed that quick disconnect leakage was
the problem. The use of quick disconnects should be minimized on future
missions in all systems, and especially in vacuum systems. Also braze-
type joints are more desirable in vacuum systems than mechanical type
joints.
The metabolic guidelines which appear to match the flight data are:
Approximate daily average rate = 440 Btu/hour/man
Metabolic 02 usage = 1.84 Ib/man day
Water production = 2.6 - 4.1 ib/man day
C02 production = 2.15 Ib/man day
The odor control system performed very well. The crews reported a
general lack of odor.
b. Cluster Ventilation System. The Cluster Ventilation System
performed well throughout the mission. The crew were comfortable, the gas
velocities were acceptable and the equipment used was reliable.
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The fans used (modified Apollo PLV types) were adequate. No complaints
by the crew of high fan noise levels were made. However, these fans pro-
duced a vary low head and any restrictions in the systems caused flow deg-
radation. It is suggested that future missions utilize fans with higher
heads so that filter or heat exchanger contamination with lint or moisture
will not so seriously effect the cabin gas flow.
Lint is added to the atmosphere on long duration flights in quantities
sufficient to collect on cabin heat exchanges and cause a reduced gas flow.
The susceptibility of fan/heat exchanger units contamination should be an
important consideration in the choice of equipment for future ventilation
systems. Future use of these type componentsshould include finer mesh
protective screens, and increased accessibility for periodic replacement
and cleaning.
Much improvement in the design and installation of cabin gas flow
meters is needed. The heat pulse type flow meters used in the AM systems
consistantly fluctuated through 15-20 percent of the full scale flow.
Single data points were of little meaning and long term averaging afforded
the only meansof determining the flow rate. The vane type flow meters
in the OWSducts were not satisfactory either since two of the three units
failed.
c. OWS/MDA/AMThermal Control System. The OWS/MDA/AMThermal
Control System, outside of the loss of the meteoroid shield, performed
within the specified limits. As shown in TMX-64822,the cluster tempera-
tures stayed within the comfort box except prior to parasol deployment and
during high beta angle periods. A one-to-one comparison of flight versus
design is not possible due to the loss of the meteoroid shield, but enough
data are available to show that the design was adequate.
A considerable numberof telemetry sensors had been installed in the
OWSfor TCSsystem evaluation. These proved to be very valuable and even
more would have been useful in predicting the maximumtemperatures when the
meteoroid shield anomaly occurred.
Whenthe OWSwas hot and the MDAwas cold, it would have been desir-
able to have a flexible cloth duct which could attach to a portable fan
and direct the flow from one compartment to the other. This would require
very little storage volume or weight and would add a considerable amount
of flexibility should a similar anomaly occur in future programs.
The crew comfort criteria appears to be a good criteria as the crew
tended to turn the thermostat up or downwhen approaching the upper and
lower limits of the comfort box. Radiation heat from hot walls was very
noticeable. Jackets and gloves were worn on initial entry into the OWSto
help shield against the heat from the walls.
d. Gas Supply System. The Cluster Gas Supply System performed
well and demonstrated that the design concept as well as most of the com-
ponents should be considered for future flights. With the exception of
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the 150 psig N2 regulator pressure, which drifted low, (but still within
useful range), the gas system was problem free.
The two-gas control system was especially effective in providing
cabin pressures and 02 partial pressures well within the allowable
range. A two-gas system most probably will be used on all future, long-
term mannedspace flights and this type of control is suggested as a can-
@idate.
Cluster 02 and N2 gas usage rates were well below design levels; sig-
nificant quantities of both gases were available at the end of the mission
even though unplanned purge cycles were accomplished and cabin pressures
were maintained at near manned level during the orbital storage period fol-
lowing SL-3. The total vehicle pressure integrity design was therefore
very effective and should be considered in the future.
Even though no damage resulted, the fact that the 02 bottle number
6 went above design/qualification limits four different times during the
mission demonstrates the need for thermovacuum test to backup analyses.
If the tank had been marginally designed, catastropic consequences could
have resulted. A thermovacuum test would probably have revealed this
analysis error.
To help evaluate system performance and metabolic rates and determine
cluster leakage rates, flow rate measurements on gas flow during pressuri-
zation, EVA/IVA and normal cabin pressure regulator flow would have been
useful.
c. Pressurization/Depressurization Systems. The Pressurization
and Depressurization Systems performed nearly as predicted. All valves
were adequately sized for the volumes to be depressurized.
The ice buildup on the AM depressurization valve screen during depres-
surization indicates that attention should be given to this problem in the
future. By having a removable outer screen, such as the one used for SL-3
and SL-4, the hazard of allowing chips of ice to possibly damage the valve
seat is eliminated, but the vent procedure is slightly larger and more
complicated. Heaters should be considered in future designs.
An accessible screen was added to the inlet of the solenoid vent port
as a result of a preflight design review. The crew was required to clean
the screen on several occasions and had the screen not been present, the
vent valve could have been blocked. Screens should be provided for similar
future designs.
Cluster structural leakage was approximately 20 percent of maximum
allowable specification leakage.
f. Airlock Module Coolant Loop. The AM coolant loops, from
a performance stnadpoint were well designed. The electronics were
properly cooled, the crew was maintained comfortable during EVA, and
11-292
in general the heat rejection capabilities were more than adequate. How-
ever, these systems experienced somemechanical failures which, although
they were resolved or worked around, demonstrated a need for higher reli-
ability. The radiator/thermal capacitor performance was good.
Whenone of the AMcoolant loop temperature control valves stuck, the
other, completely separate, loop experienced the samefailure at the same
time. This has been attributed to contamination originating in heat ex-
changers which were identified and processed alike, jamming valves which
were alike and processed alike. This failure was similarily repeated in
the OWSrefrigeration system, where two completely separate and redundant
systems experienced the sameproblem at the same time. Also, although the
locations are not known, both AM coolant loops leaked and neither 0WSre-
frigeration systems leaked. These failures indicate that systems contain-
ing the samegeneric componentsdo not provide the degree of redundancy
obtainable in systems with different generic parts. Although the latter
case is obviously more expensive it definitely has merit, especially where
mission or life critical systems are concerned.
Also, systems should be designed to allow inflight reservicing with
ease and extra fluids should be stowed whenever possible. If Skylab had
been one long continuous flight, the AM coolant systems would have been
lost, terminating the mission early. The number of mechanical fasteners
in fluids systems should be minimized.
Consideration should be given to ultrasonic cleaning of heat exchangers
and other components in systems with contamination sensitive elements.
The EVA/IVA system performed well enough to include somelenghty and
strenuous workshop repair tasks, resulting in expansion of original mis-
sion objectives. All mission objectives were accomplished and at no time
was crew safety compromised. It is recommendedthat the Airlock EVA/IVA
system - design concept, verification procedure, and operational hardware
- be considered on future missions with an EVArequirement.
Somedesign requirements were inconsistent with S_ylab EVAexperience.
- Waste heat load range requirements of -800 to +2000 Btu/hour
manwas too severe. Maximumheat load for all three crewmen
was approximately 2200 Btu/hour and a negative heat load was
not experienced.
- The maximumallowable water delivery temperature of 50°F was
too severe. Temperatures of 58°F provided adequate cooling.
- Total duration of EVAexceeded seven hours, with cooling water
flow exceeding eight hours - system requirements were three and
four hours, respectively.
- The system was designed to support two EVAcrewmenon one loop
with the other crewman(STS) on second loop. During the mission,
a single loop effectively supported all three crewmen.
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Oxygenflow and suit cooling system support was provided as required
for 12 EVA/IVAoperations including, on DOY359, a record EVAhatch open
time exceeding seven hours.
Loss of SUSnumber i cooling fluid occurred due to leakage of LCG/PCU
during an EVA. Reservice, as planned and provided for, was accomplished.
Provisions to allow inflight reservicing of fluid systems should be in-
cluded in all future missions.
Differential pressure instrumentation was deactivated prior to launch
due to a potential of shorting out the 5 volt bus and eliminating all in-
strumentation connected to that bus. Loss of delta P information compli-
cated the determination of loop performance and the isolation of flow
problems.
The ATMC&D/EREPcooling system flow becameerratic late in the SL-3
mission. Successful deaeration of the loop, using the liquid gas separa-
tor, temporarily corrected the flow oscillations. Deaeration devices
should be included in future systems where any point in the system oper-
ates at pressures below cabin or ambient pressures.
g. Refrigeration System. The RSwas used to thermally
control the frozen food and urine samples, the refrigerator and water
chiller and the chilled urine sample pool. The RS performed very well
during the mission with the exceptio_ of the anomalywhich occurred
on DOY173.
In fact, the system was able to ma'intain the specified requirements
even during the abnormally hot internal conditions before the parasol Sun
shield was deployed.
The only serious anomaly to occur in the RSwas the failure of both
the primary and secondary RBPVson DOY173. The failure was attributed to
contamination, which prevented the bypass poppet assembly of both valves
from fully seating or opening, although the radiator port poppets in each
valve were only prevented from seating. The primary RBPVperformance was
improved by cycling the valve from the ground by enabling and disabling
the loop. The improvementwas such that the system was able to essentially
maintain its requirements for the rest of the mission. As mentioned in the
Airlock Module Coolant Loop section (paragraph ll.M.8.f), the samegeneric
components in dual loops did not give the required degree of redundancy.
Furthur, cleaning and filtration requirements must be closely scrutinized
relative to the particulate contamination size which causes valve or com-
ponent failure.
After the initial low performance of the RS radiator following orbital
insertion, the radiator performed as predicted throughout the remaining
missions. The absorbed heat flux on the radiator was nominal and there was
no apparent degradation of the radiator paint (most of the white paint on
other external areas of Skylab showedsignificant degradation as a result
of solar exposure and/or retrorocket plume contamination.
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Thermal capacitor performance following umbilical disconnect at
SL-I launch until radiator activation was as anticipated. Comparison of
thermal capacitor data at various times throughout the mission revealed
no degradation in performance that would have been caused by wax leak-
age.
Flight data revealed no evidence of either pumpdegradation or
coolant leakage in either of the two RScoolant loops.
All RS internal loop segment componentsperformed as expected in-
cluding the Chiller Thermal Control Valve (CTCV)and regenerative Hx.
At not time did flight data indicate the regenerative heater in either
of the two coolant loops to have been activated to aid in the regener-
ative capability of the regenerative Hx.
Crew Complaints with the RSconsisted of:
- Inconvenience of the inner door on the freezer compartments.
- Poor space utilization in the freezers.
Lack of canister restraint in the food chiller.
Ice buildup on the surface between the freezer compartment
doors impaired the latching of the freezer doors to such an
extent that periodic cleaning becamenecessary.
h. Ground Thermal and Fluid Conditioning Systems. The Ground
Cooling Systems provided sufficient cooling to freeze the airlock thermal
capacitors (_ 10°F). This method of using a heat exchanger to transfer
waste heat to a ground system prior to liftoff and a phase changemater-
ial to supply heat removal en-route to orbit seems to be a sound method
and should be considered in the future.
Both the refrigeration ground conditioning system and the OWS
ground TCSperformed as anticipated. No anomalies occurred in either
of these two systems.
i. General Comments. Both the AMcoolant loop and the OWS
RSdemonstrated that when the control valves were stuck in a near opti-
mumposition, the outlet temperature would be acceptable without auto-
matic control. This would suggest that for a reliable long life system
with the manavailable, a backup hand valve maybe desirable in parallel
to the automatic system should it be required.
^+14.6
The nominal standard solar constant of 429.E_14.0 Btu/hour-ft 2
which allows for seasonal variation appears to match the Sky-
lab flight data. The Earth albedo and emitted radiation values versus
latitude and the seasons standard also appear to match the Skylab flight
data. In retrospect, the _ 3= and _ 2_ environmental flux values which
were used for design purposes were probably conservative but should
11-295
still be used in future programs to offset degradation in coatings,
actual conductances, actual heat loads, active system performance
variations and anomalies.
The Z-93 radiator coating whencontinuously exposed to the Sun as
it was in the D024experiment, can degrade from the as launched value
of a/_ = .14/.91 to approximately .34/.91 in 123 equivalent Sundays.
If only one side of a cylinder is exposedas on the AMradiator, the
degradation averaged around the cylinder would be approximately .25/
.91.
All critical systems in a mannedvehicle should have adequate TM,
DCScommandcapabilities, and manual overrides as used in Skylab.
This combination was invaluable in troubleshooting the problems and
in providing system workarounds.
All systems with compatible fluids should have facilities to use
each others fluids, (i.e., 02/N2 could have been used for TACS,AM
coolant could have been refilled by OWSRS).
Critical componentsshould be accessible, and adjustable, (i.e.,
AMcoolant control valves, OWSrefrigeration control valves, etc).
All automatic controls should have manual overrides whenever possi-
ble.
Detailed review/test of tolerances, filters, and cleaning should
be performed. Performance tolerance should be as loose as possible
to allow increased physical tolerances in components.
Simple inflight calibration of sensors is desirable wherever
possible.
Whenreal-time system analysis is required, sensors should be
provided for all possible measureable parameters. Although it is
classically hard to support a need for these sensors preflight, the
Skylab flight demonstrated the value of adequate system instrumen-
tation.
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N. Logistics
i. Log_$_$¢s Plannin_ and Implementation. The logistics support
program for Skylab payload equipment under the design cognizance of
MSFC was conducted in accordance with NASA Headquarters, Skylab Program
Center, and Skylab Project level logistics plans and requirements docu-
ments. These plans are depicted in Figure II.N-I.
The Apollo Applications Logistics Requirements Document, NHB
7500.3, published by the Office of Manned Space Flight, identified the
logistics requirements for the Skylab Program. This document delineated
the objectives, planning, responsibilities, and requirements in the
major logistics functional areas necessary to identify, integrate, and
implement Skylab logistics requirements. The requirements of this docu-
ment were applicable to all Skylab Center Managers and were implemented
by all Manned Space Flight organizations participating in the Skylab
Program. These requirements pertained to all Skylab hardware end items,
experiments, and ground support equipment.
The basic Skylab logistics objectives were to:
- Ensure the timely availability of required material and services;
- Maximize use of existing material, systems, facilities and
services;
- Procure only that additional material, systems, and services
necessary to support Skylab requirements;
The Skylab Program Payload Logistics Plan, MM7500.6, was prepared
and maintained by the MSFC Logistics Manager, PM-SL-GS. This plan
established the guidelines for the objectives, concepts, responsibil-
ities, and general requirements for accomplishing the MSFC payload
logistics functions for the Skylab Program. General concepts, objec-
tives, and policies contained in the OMSF Apollo Applications Require-
ments Document NHB7500.3, and applicable portions of the Logistics
Requirements Plan for MSFC Programs, MM7500.2, were reflected in the
plan. In addition to defining the minimum functions and logistics
tasks required of the Skylab Program Office, Projects Offices, Science
and Engineering organizations, and contractors to implement their
logistics programs, the plan also directed accomplishment and documenta-
tion of the planning and analyses required to satisfy logistics require-
ments, and established the framework within which the resulting logistics
products were scheduled, statused, and made available to support program
activities.
Logistics planning included the support required during postmanu-
facturing checkout, integration and test at MSFC, tests at locations
other than MSFC, and prelaunch and countdown operations at KSC, and was
applicable to the following logistics elements:
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- Maintainability,
- Maintenance Requirements,
- Spare Parts and Supply Support,
- Propellants, Pressurants and Ordnance,
- Base Services and Facilities,
- Logistics Personnel Training,
- Maintenance Instructions,
- Transportation, including Preservation, Packaging, Packing,
Marking, Handling and Shipping,
- Configuration Control of Logistics Products,
Inflight Maintenance.
Because of economic limitations and logistics constraints imposed
by one-of-a-kind systems and experiments, standardization of methods
was not a prime consideration in developing program level integrated
logistics planning. In order to obtain maximumsupport at minimumcost,
emphasiswas placed on use of existing methods, resources, and available
assets. By not specifying precise documentation formats and by relaxing
someof the more stringent requirements normally required for MSFCpro-
grams, the contractors and organizations within MSFCresponsible for
providing logistics support were able to simplify their support pro-
grams. This concept not only proved successful from a support stand-
point, but because major contractors were permitted to use existing
or simplified systems and methods, it proved successful from a cost
standpoint.
The Skylab ProgramLogistics Plan was supplemented by individual
project level logistics plans, which were developed to amplify the
implementation of the logistics programs and identify project peculiar
support concepts, policies, and objectives. The project plans covered
performance of analysis to establish support requirements, implementa-
tion, and furnishing of logistics support and methods for accomplishing
these tasks. Where required by KSCcontract, additional project level
plans were prepared to describe the functions and methods associated
with maintenance, spare inventory management,replenishment, replenish-
ment of spares and sustaining functions performed at KSC.
Logistics support provided for experiments varied. In somecases,
complete logistics support was provided; in other cases, support was
limited. Due to austere funding and the one-of-a-kind concept, there
were no individual experiment logistics plans. The extent of support
provided was based on the maintenance concept and contractual require-
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ments placed on experiment developers by the development centers. In-
flight Maintenance planning and support is discussed in Chapter L of
this report.
2. Support Concepts and Objectives. The prime objective of the
maintainability program was to ensure that the hardware design incorpo-
rated features that minimized and facilitated maintenance, and minimized
costs and problems associated with maintenance and logistics support.
The maintenance concept for the flight and backup modules and ATM
was to perform first level maintenance, normally component (black box)
replacement directly on system installed equipment, at the integration
and test locations. Second and third level maintenance was normally
accomplished at the supplier's facility. The same concept applied to
GSE, except that some second level maintenance was accomplished at the
field sites. Assignment of responsibility to major end item contractors
for performance of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance contributed
to the success of the maintenance program and resulted in the reduction,
and, in some cases, deletion of maintenance procedures, since this
effort was accomplished by contractor trained and certified personnel.
The basic concept for maintenance of experiments was to remove the
flight article and replace it with the backup article. This concept
was modified whenever it was more feasible and economical to accomplish
in-place repair and the necessary maintenance requirements were avail-
able. Instructions for maintenance of experiments were provided by the
experiment developer or development center. These instructions were in
the form of operation, maintenance, and handling procedures, or they
were included in other experiment documents. Instructions for mainten-
ance of the Skylab modules, ATM and associated ground support equipment,
where required, were furnished in various forms using existing systems
and methods. Maintenance documentation furnished by the major suppliers,
along with spares and transportation documentation, are depicted in
Figure II.N-2.
The program and mission time constraints and the fact that the items
being supported were one-of-a-kind and of short operational use, dic-
tated that spare parts supplied in support of maintenance be of assembly
or subsystem level rather than piece-part-type items. Spare parts re-
quired for repair of removed items were kept to a minimum and, in most
cases, held at the supplier's facility. Spares quantity determinations
were based on anticipated usage, issuance, operating times, lead times,
repair time, costs, system down times, allocations, and program sched-
ules. Another factor affecting the selection and provisioning of
spares was the availability of the backup articles. The initial spares
philosophy called for provisioning of only the flight articles and
associated equipment with the backup articles available for cannibali-
zation in a contingency or emergency situation. This philosophy per-
mitted the contractors and other organizations responsible for provid-
ing spares, to provision minimum quantities, and eliminated the need
for provisioning of high-cost/low-probability of failure type items.
Deviations to this philosophy were made when the capability to launch
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the backup article was imposed by the Payload Backup ten-month turn-
around program. Instead of supporting just the flight article from
logistics spares and components from the backup article, spares were
required to support both articles during the same period at two dif-
ferent locations. This resulted in the procurement of those items
not previously provisioned by the major suppliers and the reprovision-
ing of those items where additional quantities were required to support
the added usage.
Spares inventories were initially established at the major end
item supplier's facility for support of test and checkout activities
at the respective locations. These inventories consisted primarily of
those items that could be readily replaced by first level maintenance
on system installed equipment. From these inventories, spares were
allocated to other test locations or shipped on an individual basis
to the test site as required. Inventories were established at KSC by
all major contractors along with appropriate inventory control and
management procedures. Custody of the spares inventories remained
with the contractors throughout the program. This permitted the move-
ment of spare items with a minimum of formality and accelerated the
turnaround of items for repair or modification.
In the interest of avoiding costs associated with identifica-
tion and segregating logistics spares into an additional category as
required for surveillance of Launch Critical Spares, no launch crit-
ical category was established. However, spares shortages and the
program impact of shortages along with appropriate workaround methods
were reported at Launch and Flight Readiness Reviews.
Transportation of Skylab Payload modules and ATM was accomplished
in accordance with the suppliers transportation plans and procedures.
Transportation planning encompassed movement sequence, transportation
mode and route, GSE required, environmental and contamination control,
loading and off-loading, and preparation for receipt and inspection.
The basic objective was to ensure equipment was transported by the
most economical and practical means that would ensure its arrival at
the proper location at the designated time free of damage. Figure
II.N-2 identifies the special transportation planning developed
by the major suppliers for the flight articles. Additional plans were
prepared for the backup, trainer, prototypes, etc., where required.
Transportation of experiments, when transported separately, was accom-
plished with instructions provided in Operations, Maintenance, and
Handling Procedures and other data provided by the experiment developer.
3. Logistics Management and Status. The Skylab Program Office
within MSFC Program Management Directorate was responsible for manage-
ment of the Skylab logistics effort. This responsibility was admin-
istered by the Skylab Logistics Manager who reviewed and approved lo-
gistics planning, monitored logistics program activities to ensure a
consolidated logistics program, and coordinated inter- and intra-Center
logistics activity.
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Logistics managementstatus visibility was maintained through
constant contact with the project offices, module contractors, experi-
ment offices and suppliers by visits, telephone briefings, meetings,
and formal and informal correspondence. A complete summaryof the
logistics requirements for Skylab Payload equipment, including experi-
ments, was maintained to enable logistics managementpersonnel to re-
view, monitor and evaluate the current logistics support posture.
Transportation and appropriate procedures of program critical hardware
was closely coordinated and monitored to preclude in-transit damage
and ensure prompt delivery. Funding and scheduling of all special
transportation (NASABarge, Point Barrow, and GuppyAircraft) for Sky-
lab outsized cargo was provided by the logistics managementoffice.
4. Conclusions and Recommentations. The Skylab Logistics Pro-
gram provided support of the test, checkout, and launch activities
without schedule impact, and a major objective of using available sys-
tems and resources where possible was satisfactorily attained.
Future logistics support programs could be managed more effec-
tively if support contracts contained provisions for reporting logis-
tics status. This would be especially advantageous when logistics
data was nondeliverable, which was the case with some Skylab contracts.
Inflight maintenance planning was not considered to be a logistics
function for the MSFC Skylab program. Planning for inflight mainten-
ance was not started during the advanced studies, definition, or design/
final definition phases, but during the development/operations phase,
which was too late to incorporate design features that would have
expanded inflight maintenance capability.
It is recommended that inflight maintenance planning of future
MSFC manned flight programs be initiated during the advanced studies
phase of the program, and be conducted as part of the overall logistics
planning activities.
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O. Experiment Development and Integration
The evolution of the Skylab Program and corollary experiment payload
development and integration are described in the "MSFC Skylab Corollary
Experiments Final Technical Report," NASA TM X-64809. The procedures
employed by MSFC and contributing contractors to bring these experiments
from their initial selection through launch and mission support are dis-
cussed. The MSFC had development responsibility for 59 experiments and
integration responsibility for 88 of 94 total program experiments of
which 60 were treated as corollary experiments.
The experiment payload selection was guided by the program objec-
tives, which were (in order of priority):(1) biomedical and behaviorial
performance, (2) man-machine relationships, (3) long-duration systems
operations, and (4) experiments (solar astronomy, scientific, engineer-
ing, technology, and other corollary experiments). The final complement
of experiments was also influenced by major NASA decisions to employ the
cluster concept and the DWS, and to incorporate Earth Resources experi-
ments. Three groups of experiments were added in the two years before
launch. These included additional materials processing experiments,
student experiments, and space environment experiments. Finally, two
investigations were conceived and added during the mission: the Comet
Kohoutek viewing program, and the science demonstrations. The Skylab
flight experiments are identified in Table II.0-i.
i. Design Evolution. The initiation Of an experiment varied,
but basically the PI submitted a proposal to one of the Sponsoring Pro-
gram Offices (SP0s), or responded to an Announcement of Flight Opportun-
its (AF0) prepared by one of the SP0s. The proposal was presented by
the SP0 to the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB), which
recommended to the Skylab Program Director that it be considered for
assignment to the Skylab Program. Experiments approved for considera-
tion were assigned an Experiment Development Center (EDC) and Experiment
Integration Center (EIC). The EDC role was assigned to the appropriate
NASA center, depending on the nature of the experiment. The MSFC or JSC
acted as proxy Development Center (see Table II.0-I) for some Skylab
experiments developed by other NASA centers or Government agencies that
had not established major Skylab organizations. The EIC was usually
MSFC, unless the experiment was planned to be operated entirely in the
CSM, in which case it was JSC. The EIC functions for the MSFC Skylab
Program Office were performed by the Experiment Development and Payload
Evaluation Project Office (SL-DP), with the exception that ATM experi-
ments were integrated by the ATM Project Office (SL-SE-ATM).
An Experiment Implementation Plan (EIP) was prepared by the EDC,
with support from the PI, and coordinated with the EIC, the Launch Oper-
ations Center at KSC and the Mission Operations Center at JSC. The EIP
contained an experiment summary, experiment description information,
and sections on the development approach, integration approach, and pro-
grammatic information. The experiment descriptive information was
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y extracted from the Pl's original proposal, but updated to
the current status. The EIP was preliminary in nature, and
to determine program impact in each discipline. The document
ared for one-time use only and was not updated after the exper-
s approved for flight. The EIP provided initial requirements
in the experiment compatibility assessment.
compatibility assessmentwas conducted by SL-DP to determine
uld be feasible to fly the experiment on Skylab. The assess-
nined the following experiment requirements to determine com-
ty with Skylab capabilities and impact on Skylab subsystems:
Mechanical
Weight and stowage
Consumables
Electrical
I&C
Environments
Materials
Contamination
Photography
Experiment and cluster pointing
Safety
Systems test
GSE, facilities
Flight plans
Crew interfaces
tibility assessment also maderecommendations for the experi-
age and operational locations, preliminary interface defini-
acts to timelines, etc. It was necessary in somecases to
e EIP as a result of the compatibility assessment. Such changes
dinated with the PI before presentation to the MSFEB. In other
, minor modifications to the vehicle were recommendedto accom-
e experiment.
compatibility assessment and the EIP were jointly presented to
at NASAHeadquarters for approval. Once the MSFEBand the
irector approved the experiment for flight, the EDCproceeded
selection of an experiment developer (ED) and initiated prepar-
preliminary Experiment Requirements Document(ERD).
_RDdefined the experiment requirements to be met by the Sky-
_m, including an experiment description and mission assignment,
data, flight vehicle systems, pointing, postacceptance test-
_supply requirements. The preliminary ERDused the EIP and
ity assessment, as modified by MSFEB,for initial information.
_ation was expandedthrough coordination with Pls, EDs, and
is in the various subsystems affected to provide a single,
source of experiment requirements.
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The ED's design concepts and the preliminary ERDwere reviewed at
the PRR. At completion, approval was given to begin the experiment
hardware design, contingent on the closure of applicable RID. The ERD
was baselined by the intercenter Level II CCBafter all ERDRIDs had
been closed.
The PRDwas the first formal design review for the experiment hard-
ware. At this review, the ED presented the preliminary hardware design
approach to meet the experiment requirements approved at PRR. Each PDR
resulted in either approval of the design approach or the generation of
RIDs against the design. Review participation was provided by all af-
fected NASAcenters, NASAHeadquarters, and affected contractors. The
PDRend result, after successfully completing all actions, was NASAs
approval to proceed with detailed hardware design.
A CDRwas held when detailed hardware design documentation and
development testing were essentially complete. The CDRwas the last
formal design review, ultimately approving and baselining the detailed
design for hardware fabrication. The CDRwas conducted in the same
manner as the PDR.
After baselining (and throughout subsequent program phases when
applicable), any necessary hardware design or documentation changes
were assessed for total program impact and a complete change package
submitted to the appropriate CCBfor approval. Wheremultilevel or
intercenter CCBaction was involved, the actions were pre-coordinated
to provide the necessary sequential or concurrent CCBdirections and
approvals.
2. Fabrication, Design Verification, and Acceptance. The ED
fabricated experiment hardware normally included mockups, prototype
hardware, a qualification unit, a flight unit, a flight backup unit,
and training hardware. Mockups were used for PDR and CDR. Prototype
hardware was used, as required, for development testing.
After successful completion of the CDR, the ED fabricated and
tested a qualification unit, using the same design, materials, and pro-
cesses as for the flight unit. In many cases qualification test results
necessitated hardware redesign or modification to meet the test require-
ments. Where experiment hardware could not readily be modified to meet
qualification test requirements (e.g., electromagnetic interference,
touch temperatures, etc), waivers were submitted for review by the EDC.
Each waiver was evaluated individually and approval was usually granted
where workarounds or corrective actions could not readily be accomplished
within cost or schedule limitations, providing safety was not affected.
When qualification test results were approved by NASA, a Certification
of Qualification was issued, certifying the hardware design for Skylab
use.
The flight and flight backup units were usually fabricated in par-
allel with the qualification unit. The qualification unit, in some
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series of formal Postacceptance Test Requirements and Specifications
(PATRS)meetings. The meeting results were formalized in the Experi-
ment Integration Test Requirements and Specifications (EITRS) document.
The module contractors used the EITRSas inputs to the TCRSDsthat
governed the experiment test activities at their facilities. Each mod-
ule contractor developed test and checkout procedures based on require-
ments defined in the TCRSDs. Experiment tests at the module contrac-
tors' facilities were monitored and supported by SL-DP.
The flight experiment hardware was shipped to KSCin one of several
ways: on module, removedfrom the module and shipped separately, re-
turned to ED(for further testing, repair, calibration, upgrading, etc.)
and then shipped, or sent to another module contractor for fit checks
before being delivered to KSC. Upon arrival at KSCit underwent receiv-
ing and inspection before any testing. KSCtest plans and procedures
were reviewed by SL-DPto assure compliance with the TCRSDs. The actual
tests were monitored and support provided in tracking and closing out of
Discrepancy Reports.
b. Systems/Operations Compatibility AssessmentReview. The
SOCARwas conducted in the time period of February through June 1972 to
assess
(i) the Skylab systems design, integration, and perform-
ance characteristics, based on updated engineering analyses, simula-
tions, and actual hardware test experience, and
(2) the operational readiness of Skylab through a de-
tailed review of the mission plans, procedures and documentation to be
used by the operations team for the conduct of the mission.
An MSFCcorollary experiments team, under SL-DPdirection, participated
in direct coordination with the JSCcorollary experiment flight control
team.
c. Design Certification Review. The MSFCcorollary experi-
ment DCRwas conducted, as required by Skylab Program Directive lla, to
examine the experiment hardware design and design verification program
to assess and certify that the experiment hardware could accomplish the
planned Skylab missions. Specific objectives of the review were to:
(i) Certify the experiment hardware design for manned
flight safety.
(2) Certify the experiment hardware design for flight
worthiness.
The DCRwas conducted in 5 phases during the period April 1972
through October 1972, culminating in a final report and an oral presen-
tation to NASAmanagementfor each experiment.
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Several experiments were approved late in the Skylab Program and
were not covered during the formal MSFCs corollary experiments DCR.
These included the Student Project experiments; the Multipurpose Elec-
tric Furnace Experiments; Experiment $228, Trans-Uranic Cosmic Rays; and
experiment $230, Magnetospheric Partical Composition. The same DCR
activities and certification were accomplished for these experiments,
except that formal oral presentations to NASA management were not made.
d. Flight Readiness Review. The MSFC corollary experiment
FRR was part of the overall Skylab Program FRR as required by Skylab
Program Directive 59. The FRR assessed the operational readiness and
safety of all the experiment flight hardware and adequacy of documen-
tation. There were three FRRs conducted; SL-I/2 on April 19, 1973,
SL-3 on July 19, 1973 and SL-4 on October 18, 1973.
4. Mission Support. The corollary experiment mission support
group was responsible for all activities associated with the evaluation
of MSFC corollary experiment operations, the assessment of experiment
hardware performance, and the integration assessment of experiment sup-
port systems. All activities were performed in support of the MSFC
corollary experiment manager in the Flight Operations Management Room
(FOMR) at JSC. This interface was maintained through the HOSC.
The MSFC mission support activities were centralized at the HOSC.
The HOSC provided a monitoring and evaluation function for all MSFC-
managed spacecraft systems and associated anomaly resolution. The HOSC
served as the central organization through which all JSC requests for
assistance were received and processed.
Support personnel (experiment teams) monitored all operational data
and information affecting experiment performances. The activity includ-
ed: daily reviewing of flight plans and Pre-Advisory Data (PAD) to en-
sure experiment requirement compliance; monitoring flight director and
air-to-ground voice loops to anticipate anomalous situations; constantly
reviewing vehicle systems status for possible experiment impact; and
assessing all real-time change paper to ensure experiment compatibility.
The experiment accomplishment status was maintained throughout the
mission and flight planning recommendations were prepared twice weekly
for use by the SL-DP Manager at the semi-weekly Science Planning Con-
ferences at JSC.
Experiment team requirements for real-time telemetry measurement
data were satisfied by HOSC support personnel who obtained printouts
from the MOPS computer network. The telemetry data was required to
assist the experiment teams in assessing hardware performance, inter-
face verifications, and constraint compliance.
The experiment teams generated daily experiment operation inputs
to the HOSC report, which was submitted to the FOMR for review and
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incorporation into the JSCdaily report. The experiment teams provided
inputs to other MSFCreports and summariesin which corollary experi-
ments were involved.
The experiment teams continually assessed mission operations for
potential or real problems. Whena problem was identified, the team
investigated the circumstances and generated appropriate recommenda-
tions for anomaly resolution.
Experiment teams responded to JSCor HOSCqueries whenassessment
of hardware operation, malfunction procedures or operational workarounds
were being considered. Investigations and/or special studies were con-
ducted as required, and formal responses to the queries were processed
through the MSGLand the HOSC.
Scientific impact problems were evaluated with the PI. These prob-
lems were typically those involving changes in time allotted to an ex-
periment, or any problem that might affect the quality of the scientific
results.
5. Data Analysis and Reporting. A majority of the experiment
scientific data have already been disseminated to the Pls at this writ-
ing, and their data analyses are in process. Generally, the Pls are
obligated to publish interim and final reports of their experiment re-
suits - the final output being either a formal NASA report or a paper
in an appropriate scientific journal. The PI participation in the var-
ious symposia and seminars being sponsored by Government agencies and
the scientific community is encouraged by SL-DP, which is coordinating
all these reporting activities with the Pls.
The NASA EDCs are concurrently preparing Mission Evaluation Reports,
covering the hardware performance of their experiments and the degree of
compliance with operational constraints and systems interface require-
ments during the mission.
An integrated set of hard bound books reporting Skylab results is
being prepared by MSFC and JSC for publication by the Government Print-
ing Office as NASA Special Publications.
11-314
P. Ground Support System
J
The Ground Support System for the Skylab Program consisted of all
the GSE necessary to support systems tests and prelaunch activities of
the SWS and its hardware. The concept of GSE provisioning was complex
in nature due to the wide variety of requirements that had to be satis-
fied and the large number of contractors involved. Many requirements
were peculiar to individual flight hardware (experiment and module) and
of necessity required unique provisioning. Other requirements, primar-
ily flight systems testing, economically dictated the use of common GSE
designed to satisfy the worst case SWS configuration. The integration
of total SWS requirements necessitated the consideration of individual
module and experiment requirements, geographical locations and associa-
ted SWS configurations, availability of GSE at any given time, and log-
ical assignment of GSE build responsibility to minimize impact on the
test programs. Management of this integration effort was controlled
to assure that all SWS requirements were satisfactorily met and within
a compatible timeframe. The following paragraphs discuss in more de-
tail the significant efforts involved, a summary of their effectiveness,
and recommendations considered necessary for application on future pro-
grams.
i. Design Requirements. The development of design requirements
for the Ground Support System for SWS elements involved extensive re-
view analysis, and coordination of requirements identified in CEI spec-
ifications and TCRSDs. No formal CEIs were used to define contractually
GSE required to support SWS requirements. Instead, identification of
GSE was contained in descriptive documents provided by the various mod-
ule contractors and by MSFC for experiment GSE. These documents essen-
tially contained functional descriptions, illustrations, and site use
effectivities for respective GSE and are identified as follows:
- OWS GSE - GSE Summary, Orbital Workshop
- MDA GSE - MDA GSE Description Document, ED-2002-2002
- Airlock GSE - AM GSE Index, 61E000001
- ATM GSE - ATM GSE Requirements, 50M04954
- Experiment GSE - Sky lab Experiments GSE Allocation Plan,
68M00005
The effort to identify specific design requirements for the Ground
Support System was essentially a building block process and can be
broken into pre- and postacceptance phases of the flight hardware in-
volved. The individual contractor provisioned GSE required to support
preacceptance activities on a unique basis as testing experience evolved
and use beyond this phase was limited to those flight hardware require-
ments that remained peculiar through SWS build-up.
The postacceptance phase presented a more complex problem for hard-
ware was scheduled to flow from geographical location to geographical
location and test requirements changed as various flight hardware elements
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becameintegrated in single configurations during SWSbuildup. Indivi-
dual requirements such as test and checkout, storage, handling, and
transportation, as imposed on the Ground Support System, were also more
complex and demanded that these requirements be integrated to the extent
that individual contractor responsibilities were explicity defined and
maximum use of GSE was obtained.
It was recognized early in the program the need to identify and
consolidate experiment requirements to establish facility and GSE de-
sign requirements for the total Skylab program. An integration task
team(s) was organized to perform the necessary analysis for each exper-
iment to determine functional support requirements at all applicable
test locations. Individual meetings identified as PATRS meetings were
scheduled as required for each experiment and ultimately resulted in
the specific identification of the facility and GSE design requirements.
These requirements were then integrated into the Skylab Experiment
GSE Allocation Drawing. The experiment analysis effort in combination
with module level analysis provided decision making criteria as follows:
- GSE functional requirements
- Facility storage and environmental requirements
- Design parameters for handling, transportation,
and environmental GSE
- Site effectivities by requirement and SWS configuration
With the above criteria established, the assignment of contractual
responsibilities was accomplished on a more logical and economically
feasible basis and minimized the possibility for duplication of GSE
and/or the overlooking of a valid requirement.
2. Interface Requirements. The requirement to document GSE inter-
faces, both functionally and physically, was recognized early in the
Skylab program. During 1969, tasks were contractually assigned to Martin
Marietta Aerospace and General Electric Company to prepare and maintain
the necessary Interface Control Documents to define total fluid, mechan-
ical, and electrical requirements for the MSFC Ground Support System at
KSC. This documentation included MSFC/KSC, MSFC/SWS, and MSFC/JSC inter-
face definition. Resultant interface documents were contractually imple-
mented between the NASA centers involved and subsequent changes were
controlled through formal Interface Revision Notices (IRNs) on a contrac-
tual basis.
The development of interface definition initially required the
formulation of basic system level ICDs to assure overall functional com-
patibility between the facility, GSE, and SWS modules. Identification
of functional requirements essentially involved the following:
- System configuration (block diagram and hardware identi-
fication)
- Commodity specifications (pressure, flow rate, power levels,
etc .)
11-316
Hardware criteria (materials, construction, etc.)
The second phase of ICD development required a specific identifica-
tion of physical and unique requirements at the GSEend item level
and basically consisted of the following information:
- Physical interface hardware identification, location, and
responsibilities.
- Footprint, access, and installation requirements for indi-
vidual items of GSE.
- Environmental and storage requirements.
The implementation of interface requirements was complex in nature
due to the variety of requirements and the large numberof contractors
involved and it necessitated a disciplined plan to achieve a contrac-
tual baseline on a timely basis.
The implementation plan consisted of three essential phases as
outlined below:
a. Phase I. Developmentof Requirements
(I) Research documents, drawings, or other data necessary
for preparing ICDs.
(2) Prepare sketches and/or layouts as required to deter-
mine space, access and handling requirements.
(3) Perform liaison with the appropriate MSFC/JSC/KSC
agency and module/experiment contractors.
(4) Attend meetings with subpanels, working groups,
design reviews, etc., to identify impact on interface requirements.
(5) Review and evaluate ECPs, ECRsand CRs.
b. Phase II. ICD Preparation
(i) Prepare ICDs
(2) Contractually implement ICDs
c. Phase III. ICD Maintenance
(i) Prepare and process emergencyand routine IRNs.
(2) Contractually implement IRNs.
No formal GSEinterface documentation was imposed on participating
contractors involved in activities at St. Louis, Huntington Beach,
Huntville, Denver, etc. Informal documentation was prepared in some
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instances where interfaces were complicated and a working baseline was
required.
3. Compatibilit Y Analyses. The SWS requirements for fluid and
pneumatic servicing and checkout at KSC involved an extensive amount of
GSE to provide a Ground Support System of sufficient capability and ver-
satility to meet these requirements. Basic GSE provisioning involved
equipment elements that were used as a system for the first time during
the KSC Verification Program.
The integration of the overall Ground Support System to insure that
both system capability and compatibility existed with the SWS and its
elements prompted the center to authorize a technical evaluation task
at the end item level. The total fluid and pneumatic systems were re-
viewed to identify critical items of GSE in the systems and analyses
efforts were conducted as follows:
a. System design requirements versus hardware.
b. System design capabilities including:
- Media
- Flow Rate
- Pressure or Vacuum
- Temperatures
Data sheets on selected critical end items were prepared and in-
cluded analyses results along with appropriate recommendations for any
noted incompatibilities. Emphasis was placed on minimizing impact on
flight hardware.
The results of this integration effort proved fruitful because
some incompatibilities were discovered and appropriate disposition of
these problems was accommodated within a time frame compatible with
program schedules.
4. Safety Criteria. Individual items of GSE required to provide
a total Ground Support System at KSC were basically derived as new GSE,
modified GSE, or existing GSE, which included Government Furnished
Equipment. Experience from previous programs dictated the need to pro-
vide a method of assessing this GSE in terms of design features as re-
lated to systems failure, equipment damage, and personal injury. The
effort was initiated to provide the safety assessment means that included
essentially a three phase operation.
The initial phase involved the assessment of program level require-
ments and GSE design criteria to develop a safety criteria in checklist
format. The checklist criteria was organized into three checklist sec-
tions; namely, liquids and gases, electrical/electronics, and handling
and transportation. This information was published as the Skylab System
Safety Checklist, SA-003-O01-2H, dated July 1971.
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Phase II of the safety assessment program required that individual
contractors assess each item of this GSE to be used at KSC against the
three checklist criteria and indicate compliance, noncompliance, or not
applicable. Completed checklists with appropriate signature approval
sheets were then processed on a periodic basis.
Because the System Safety Checklist document did not impose require-
ments on GSE but merely provided for an assessment, the third phase of
the total effort required processing of all contractors inputs by MSFC
as part of a systematic safety assessment program. The evaluation of
this information provided the center with the necessary information to
identify safety conditions and implement corrective action.
5. Contingency Operations. The original intent of the KSC Verif-
ication Program evolved around a "green light" philosophy using the con-
cept of flight hardware replacement at the black-box level. Addition-
ally, once SWS closeout was accomplished in the Vertical Assembly Build-
ing (VAB), there was no consideration for reentering the SWS at the
launch pad on a contingency basis.
As the complexity of flight hardware and the SWS configuration in-
creased, the need to provide certain capabilities on a contingency basis
was recognized. Basic analysis efforts at the module contractor and
center level were initiated to assure that minimum impact on the launch
schedule was imposed if contingencies should arise.
Basic ground rules on contingency analyses were established as
follows:
a. Provide the necessary GSE to remove and replace flight
hardware on a contingency basis during operations in the O&C building
and VAB. These analyses efforts and the associated implementation of
GSE requirements were essentially accomplished at the module contrac-
tor level. The primary consideration that paced analyses efforts was
to assure that for a given item of flight hardware to be removed the
following evaluation criteria and GSE provisioning was satisfied:
(i) Evaluation Criteria
- Criteria for removal versus in-place maintenance.
- Clearances
- Weight
- Personnel and equipment safety
- Contingency procedures
- Timeline
(2) GSE Provisioning
- Access - platforms, handrails, etc.
- Handling - attachments, lifting, safety covers, etc.
- Transportation - dollies, track assemblies, etc.
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Contractor study results were reviewed to determine compatibility of
recommendationswith program guidelines on flight hardware replacement.
In many instances, GSEwas provisioned as the result of this review for
strictly contingency use.
b. Perform an analysis to define all requirements for access
in the event a program decision was madeto enter the SWSat the launch
pad on a contingency basis. The results of this analysis were documented
as "Access Operations Data - Launch Pad39", (SA-001-006-2H) dated Novem-
ber 1970. This study did not attempt to define the reasons for access,
but limited itself to the basic mechanics of how to achieve such entry
in the most expeditious manner. Basic considerations were as follows:
- Access routes
Environmental considerations
Personnel safety
GSEand facility requirements
Facility configuration
- Timeline
- Sequenceof activities
The recommendations as a result of this effort presented primary and
alternate access routes on the basis of dividing the SWS into physical
zones.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations. The effectiveness of the
above efforts to provide a Ground System that satisfied total program
requirements is considered on a general basis to be satisfactory. Major
program milestones were supported and the ultimate success of the SWS
during mission operations directly reflects the success of Ground Systems.
No program, however, is completely free of problems and lessons
learned should be identified as a means to aid future programs. Speci-
fically, recommendations considered to be of significant importance for
future applications and associated rationale are identified below:
a. Recommendation. Provide Contract End Item Specifications
at the contractor level for Ground Support System elements.
Rationale. The development of design requirements involved
extensive coordination and analysis efforts to achieve a design baseline.
The lack of formal contractual baselines for GSE design requirements re-
suited in certain costly requirements such as contingency removal and
replacement of flight hardware being identified late in the program and
thus required expedited implementation. The consideration of GSE CEI
specifications would lead to a more realistic review of requirements
early in the program and would significantly reduce costs because pro-
gram management visibility across many contractors would be increased
in a more practical time frame. Standardization of design requirements
and maximum utilization of equipment to satisfy common requirements are
obvious benefits.
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b. Recommendation. Impose the requirement to develop contrac-
tual ICDs (GSEto GSE) for each site where major verification programs
involving two or more contractors exist.
Rationale. The only contractual interface baseline for
GSEon the Skylab programwas at KSC. Although KSCinvolved NASAcenter
to center interfaces and numerouscontractors, the essential purpose of
a contractual interface agreement evolves around establishing both re-
quirements and responsibilities and subsequent agreement. This primar-
ily applies to contractors and is independent of NASAcenter-to-center
relationships.
11-321

III. Integrated Test Program

SECTION III. INTEGRATED TEST PROGRAM
A. Introduction
i. Purpose. This section of the Final Report will discuss, in
general terms, the integrated test program from concept through launch.
Philosophy, as well as the finalized test program, will be covered.
The last section will offer conclusions and recommendations based on
results of the total integrated test program.
2. Scope. The majority of coverage will be a discussion of the
actual tests as they were performed, starting with design verification
development/qualification tests, pure qualification testing, proceeding
with flight hardware verification, and concluding with the KSC test
program through launch. Actual test details will not be included, but
references to test reports, where applicable, will be made. Conclu-
sions and recommendations will be found in the final paragraph of this
section.
3. Summary. The Skylab program demonstrated the feasibility of
developing separate space station modules, at different locations, for
assembly and integrated design verification testing at the launch site
or other central location. To accomplish this the test program was de-
signed to verify performance requirements through a progressive build-
ing block technique which included the following:
- Component/experiment bench test,
- Subassembly tests,
- Experiment integration tests,
- Individual systems tests,
- Combined module systems tests,
- Multimodule integrated systems tests,
- Cluster i_tegrated systems tests,
- Spacecraft to launch vehicle tests.
To assure the verification activity was adequate and economically
realistic, it was developed, controlled, and continuously evaluated on
a total system basis. Systematic analyses of design requirements and
subsystem designs were made to identify only those tests essential for
verification.
The verification program was identified and defined in module test
plans and other lower level test plans. Detail TCRSDs were developed
for the module level acceptance test program and for module and integra-
ted testing at KSC. These TCRSDs formed the basis for the preparation
of formal approved test procedures.
Test compliance was established on the module and cluster system
levels. Final cluster systems acceptance was accomplished by means of
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the Skylab Intercenter Test Results Review held at KSCjust before Flight
Readiness Review.
Conclusions and recommendationsare presented in the following gen-
eral categories:
- Test planning,
- Test requirements,
- Test procedures
- Test teams,
- Test scheduling,
- Test program evaluation,
- Mission support testing.
B. Verification Program Philosophy
i. General. The Skylab Verification program was designed to pro-
vide complete verification and establish a high level of confidence in
the cluster hardware flight readiness at minimum program cost. The Sky-
lab program design and performance requirements, as defined in the Cluster
Requirements Specification, the module Contract End Item Specifications,
and the individual experiment Contract End Item Specifications, were sat-
isifed by the verification method of test and/or assessment. The prin-
ciples of system engineering analysis were used to translate these design
and performance requirements into verification requirements.
The general ground rules and guidelines for development of the Sky-
lab test program were:
- All system malfunctions corrected or satisfactorily explained
and accepted to certify flight readiness;
- Equipment performance to be uncompromised by functional tests;
Equipment removal for tests minimized;
- Duplication of testing minimized;
- Equipment test time minimized and time/cycle data recorded
for time/cycle critical components;
- Appropriate reverification required if equipment or overall
configuration was changed after test.
The test program for the Skylab flight hardware was designed to
verify performance requirements through a progressive building block
technique which included the following:
- Component/experiment bench level acceptance test;
- Testing of selected subassemblies consisting of several
functional components/experiments;
- Experiment integration tests to verify experiment to module
system compatibility;
- Individual system testing using mating module simulators;
- Combined module systems testing using mating module simula-
tors;
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- Multimodule integrated systems testing
(AM/MDAand CSM-AM/MDA);
- Cluster level integrated system testing;
- Prelaunch checkout with launch vehicle.
During each phase of testing, any problems encountered were re-
solved and retested before proceeding to the next phase of testing.
unique problems existed where this was not possible, then acceptable
workaround plans were developed and executed to ensure system confi-
dence.
If
Simulators were used to a large degree in the early stages of test.
Thesewere designed to simulate inputs and responses of those Skylab
modules not present for the test activity. As the test program pro-
gressed, the use of simulators decreased. These simulators allowed
full systems checkout with a high degree of realism, and served to pro-
vide confidence in complete systems performance during the launch site
activity.
The simulators used were not of the level one type, i.e., nearly
exact reproductions of those systems they simulated. However, the
level of simulation was adequate for the objective of obtaining confi-
dence in orbital vehicle systems performance.
The Skylab program was unique in that there was a significant
amount of first-time testing being accomplished at KSC. There were no
flight-type prototypes available to verify the many functional inter-
faces between the various modules. As a result, a comprehensive module
and multimodule test program was required at KSC.
In addition to the first-time testing at KSC, there were many
functions that were never verified end-to-end during the flight hard-
ware test program, because of the complexity of the facilities required
for the testing or the impracticality of performing the test on the
ground. A combination of analysis, nonflight hardware testing, and
flight hardware testing with interface simulators was used to verify
the particular function and ensure total system verification at a mini-
mumcost. Someof the more significant first time-on-orbit operations
for flight hardware follow.
Deployment and Separation Systems
- ATM Rigidizing and deployment
- ATM Solar Array deployment
- 0WS Solar Array deployment
- Payload shroud jettison
- 0WS Radiator plume shield jettison
Electrical Power System
- Parallel Operations
- Single Point Ground and power transfer
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Instrumentation/Communication System
- Audio system end-to-end
- Television end-to-end
Guidance
- Orbital maneuvers
2. Verification Program Definition and Control. To assure the
verification activity was adequate and economically realistic, it was
developed, controlled, and continuously evaluated on a total system
basis. Systematic analyses of design requirements and subsystem designs
were made to identify only those tests essential for verification. This
effort included:
- Criticality Assessment. It was imperative that critical hard-
ware and critical interfaces be identified early by failure
modes and effects analyses and related design assessments to
focus test program requirements on the mission critical and
crew safety aspects, and to assure proper concentration of
program resources.
- Optimum Test Articles. Strong systems management concepts
and detailed analyses were imposed in order to reduce the
number of test articles built specifically for development
and qualification. Qualification at the highest practical
assembly level was considered.
- Optimum Test Flow. Systems management concepts were also
imposed to emphasize the cradle-to-grave approach. This
approach was necessary to minimize redundant tests at all
levels.
The verification program was identified and defined in module and other
lower level test plans. As the verification program progressed, the top
level plans were updated to incorporate the latest program direction.
During the course of the verification program definition, consid-
erable Intercenter data coordination and interchange was required. In
support of the KSC prelaunch and launch operations, the MSFC-Skylab
Program furnished documentation for development of KSC test plans and
procedures and establishment support required for Skylab launch opera-
tions.
This documentation included TCRSDs, ERDs, ICDs and Acceptance Data
Package (ADP) per module. This documentation established the minimum
test requirements as identified by MSFC to be satisfied at KSC.
3. Test Requirements and Specifications
a. General. The Skylab Program TCRSDs were developed in the
building block concept. The TCRSD was developed for the modules to
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verify system operation in accordance with the module end-item specifi-
cation. Additionally, experiment checkout requirements for on-module
testing were included. These TCRSDswere the basis for checkout proce-
dures and factory acceptance testing. Such documentswere invaluable
in establishing contractual compliance.
An integrated cluster systems TCRSDwas developed to define test
and checkout requirements for the integrated Skylab cluster systems at
the launch facility. This was accomplished by the formation of cluster
systems test requirements review teams composedof technical experts
from the NASAdesign organizations, systems engineering organizations,
program offices, KSCtest offices, and contractors. Upon technical
agreement by each of the system teams, the integrated TCRSDand the mod-
ule TCRSDswere baselined and controlled by the Level II Configuration
Control Board. These baselined TCRSDsprovided the technical basis for
the final test and checkout plans and procedures at KSC.
Upon delivery of modules from the factory to KSC, representatives
from each of the system teams (both NASAand contractor) were assigned
to KSCto maintain the TCRSDs. Required changes to the TCRSDswere im-
plemented and controlled by the test change notice system, which was
controlled and approved by the Level II CCBat KSC. These teams and
the TCNboard were responsive to the KSCtest schedules.
b. Module Level General Test Requirements. The general test
requirements for the module level test program follow
(i) Post-manufacturing checkout will be performed to ver-
ify that the end-item hardware conforms to the applicable specifications
for the performance and configuration as a basis for module acceptance;
(2) Post-manufacturing checkout will be successfully com-
pleted before assembly into higher hardware generation level at another
contractors plant or NASAinstallation site.
(3) Include testing in environments other than ambient
when analysis is insufficient to verify performance of the hardware.
(4) Verify functional operation of primary and redundant
components/systems. Special emphasiswill be given to Category i and 2
primary and redundant (when possible) components/systems.
(5) Verify that the end-item meets the performance/design
requirements of the CEI Specification, including physical and functional
mating compatibility with flight and ground support equipment, as applic-
able.
(6) Experiments will be installed in flight modules at
the module build facility and will be functionally verified to the ex-
tent necessary to verify module to experiment interfaces and operational
compatibility.
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(7) Post-manufacturing test will be conducted by the con-
tractor with Center-approved applicable test requirements.
c. Multimodule General Test Requirements. The general test
requirements for the multimodule level test program follow
(i) Multimodule tests will be used for acceptance at higher
levels of assembled hardware and will verify that all flight systems meet
performance requirements as an integrated "system" and are physically,
functionally, and operationally compatible with mating hardware systems,
and ground support systems.
(2) Testing previously conducted at a lower hardware level
will not be duplicated unnecessarily by multimodule tests.
(3) Multimodule tests will validate interface performance/
design requirements that cannot be verified at the level of the indivi-
dual end-item.
(4) Electromagnetic Compatibility. The performance of
integrated modules will not be degraded by electromagnetic incompatibil-
ity during any ground test.
(5) Man-machinetests will be conducted to verify proce-
dures and crew ability to perform mission objectives.
(6) Verify compatibility of all cluster systems to oper-
ate simultaneously as required by mission usage.
(7) Verify all planned primary and backup operation modes
only.
d. Cluster SystemGeneral Test Requirements. The general test
requirements for the cluster level integrated systems testing and pre-
launch checkout follow
(I) Checkout tests will verify that the SWSwill meet
countdown, launch, and orbital performance requirements as a totally
integrated system, and that the SWSis physically, functionally, and
operationally compatible with SL-I launch vehicle, GSE, and launch fa-
cilities.
(2) Perform complete visual receiving inspection to ensure
satisfactory physical condition of the hardware before assembly and test.
(3) Verify module interface compatibility to assure inter-
actions between modules are within specification limits.
(4) Perform functional checkout of the SWS,launch vehicle
to SWSinterfaces, GSE,and facilities.
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(5) Perform tests that exercise systems sequentially in
normal operating and selected contingency modes for periods sufficient
to verify mission capabilities. Tests will include parallel operation
of the A_I_/AMelectrical power systems.
(6) Perform electromagnetic interference test to verify
compatibility of assembledmodules per applicable sections of specifi-
cation MIL-E-6051.
(7) The dimensional fit of interconnecting mechanical and
electrical module interfaces will be demonstrated during the stacking
operations of the SWSmodules.
(8) Perform verification, to the maximumextent practical,
of functional operation of all redundant subsystems and their elements
before launch. The verification will be limited to flight hardware and
mission-essential GSE. Special emphasiswill be given to criticality
Categories I and II items.
4. Test Implementation. All system level acceptance test require-
ments were performed in accordance with formal approved test procedures.
The names and format of the procedures varied based on the contractor
and/or test location, but all served the same purpose; that of formally
documenting detail test operations based on approved test requirements
and specifications. Formal procedure change control systems were used
in revising or updating the procedures that conformed to the standard
practice of the issuing organization.
5. Test Compliance
a. Module Acceptance. Each module contractor had his own
method of verifying test compliance. At the time of module turnover
reviews, Section 4 of the Module CEIs were reviewed and compliance ver-
ified and agreed upon. This included verification that tests were com-
pleted or carried forward to the next test location and also concurrence
with the rationale for design and performance requirements being verified
by analysis.
b. Cluster Systems Acceptance. The Skylab Program initiated a
series of reviews that were handled by cluster system. These reviews
started with the SOCAR and continued through DCR and FRR. The verifica-
tion program, both test and assessment, was under continuous review dur-
ing the working groups and formal presentations of these reviews. Final
systems acceptance was accomplished by means of the Skylab Intercenter
Test Results Review.
c. Skylab Intercenter Test Results Review. The Skylab test
results review was conducted during March 26-30 1973, at KSC to provide
a formal detailed final review of the KSC test program and test results.
This review assisted in assessing the flight readiness of the Skylab
Cluster System and experiments for launch. Teams were formed on a system
111-7
basis with representation from the test and design organization from
each Center and the prime contractor to accomplish the following:
(I) Verify KSCtesting compliance with TCRSDrequirements;
(2) Verify adequacy of KSCmodkit validations including
systems retesting;
(3) Verify adequacy of componentchangeout validations
including systems retesting;
(4) Assess test results against systems specifications
and criteria.
t ion s.
points.
(5) Assess disposition of IDRs, DRs, waivers, and devia-
Validate successful testing of all hardware single failure
Deficiencies were documentedby MSFCvia a "RID" form to KSCfor
disposition.
A Pre-Board Meeting was held on March 30, chaired by MSFC/MSC/KSC,
to dispose of the RIDs and makerecommendations to the Program Manager
Intercenter Meeting held on April 2 and 3, 1973. The Intercenter Pro-
gram Managersmeeting disposed of the RIDs from the Pre-Board and re-
ceived an overall briefing on the results of KSCtesting. This was an
important input for the FRR. Figure IILB-I outlines the KSCtest review
process.
6. Backup Hardware Testing. The module backup hardware was sub-
jected to a module level test program similar to the flight hardware
test program. The backup hardware test program was planned so that if
there were a catastrophic failure of the SL-I hardware, the backup hard-
ware would be ready to launch within ten months of the failure. The
only multimodule testing was the AM/MDA testing at St. Louis.
For details of the module backup hardware test programs, refer to
the following MSFC reports:
AM TMX-64810
MDA TMX-64812
OWS TMX-64813
ATMTMX-64811
At the conclusion of the module level acceptance testing (includ-
ing AM/MDA), the backup hardware was maintained during the mission for
mission support testing.
7. Mission Support Testing. Mission support testing consisted of
many facets and included module backup hardware testing, cluster system
breadboard/simulator testing, crew systems testing (NB, One-G, Zero G).
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Details of the mission support testing are found in the module level
reports.
8. Post-Mission Engineering Tests. The Skylab spacecraft was sub-
jected to a series of engineering tests (after splashdown of SL-4) to
evaluate the reliability of some redundant systems, and to verify and/or
troubleshoot previous failures. Following is a list of the post-mission
test objectives.
- Attempt to spin-up CMG No. i.
- Determine capabity of PCG batteries.
Activate secondary refrigeration subsystem.
- Troubleshoot secondary coolant loop.
- CBRM power sharing test.
- Switch to redundant ATM TLM equipment.
- Attain gravity gradient attitude.
- ATM command receiver test.
- Load ATMDC No. i via MLU.
C. Design Verification
Design verification was performed to provide data to be used in
support of the design of a specific component, subsystem, or system.
Tests were also performed on prototype and production hardware to ver-
ify that flight hardware meets design specification requirements for
operational suitability at ancitipated environments deriving their use
cycle.
The design verification test requirements for the Skylab Program
were divided into two categories: development and qualification. De-
velopment tests will be identified as those tests performed to select
parts and components, investigate the adequacy and optimization of the
preliminary design, determine significant failure modes and effects,
evaluate effects of varied stress levels, and select materials or de-
termine compatibility. Qualification tests will be identified as those
tests conducted as a formal demonstration of the design and performance
adequacy of the production flight hardware design. Development test
hardware was representative of flight hardware insofar as possible, but
not necessarily identical to flight hardware. Qualification tests were
performed using flight-type hardware that is identical in performance,
configuration, and fabrication to the space vehicle flight hardware.
i. Ma_or Cluster System or Module Development/Qualification Tests.
This section identifies the major development/qualification tests accom-
plished on the Skylab Program, and includes the test objectives and a
brief description of the test results. If _he reader requires more de-
tailed test results, the specific test report for each test is identi-
fied. Figure III.C-I identifies the general span time of the major devel-
opment tests listed herein.
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a. Payload Assembly Vibroacoustic Test
(i) Test Location. JSC
(2) Test Objectives. The objectives of the test on Pay-
load Assembly hardware follow and were as shown in Figures III.C-2 and
III.C-3.
Verify the dynamic design and test criteria for com-
ponents and subassemblies;
Verify the structural integrity of bracketry and
secondary structure;
- Qualify selected flight hardware components.
The following test conditions were imposed on the hardware:
- Acoustics
Liftoff environment
Boundary layer environment
Special component tests
- Low Frequency Vibration (vehicle dynamics)
(3) Test Results. The acoustic and vehicle dynamics test
of the payload assembly were completed with no failures of flight-type
structure, either primary or secondary. Sufficient data were acquired
to evaluate component qualification test criteria. Evaluation of these
data resulted in the requirement to requalify a number of components.
Two special component tests were run as a result of previously con-
ducted acoustic tests. The IU Flight Control Computer and the ATM Con-
trol Moment Gyro received separate special acoustic qualification tests.
Detail test results are contained in MSFC Report S&E-ASTN-ADD-72-
29, dated January 1972.
b. Skylab Modal Survey Tests
(i) Test Location. JSC
(2) Test Objectives. The objectives of the tests on the
Skylab hardware follow and were as shown in Figures III.C-4 and III.C-5.
- Determine the modal characteristics of the Skylab
hardware in both launch and orbital configurations.
- Determine the dynamic characteristics of specific
components and subassemblies in both launch and
orbital configurations.
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Figure III.C-2 Payload Assembly Vibration Test Configurations
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(3) Test Results. Launch and orbital configuration corre-
lation analysis exposed modeling errors that were corrected. In addi-
tion, there were structural differences between the test and flight hard-
ware that were corrected. Detail test results are contained in MMC Re-
ports ED-2002-1494 and ED-2002-1546 for launch configuration, and ED-
2002-1522 and ED-2002-1551 for orbital configuration.
c. OWS Vibroacoustic Test
(i) Test Location. JSC
(2) Test Objective
- Verify acoustically induced vibration design and
test criteria previously selected for components
and subsystems.
- Demonstrate structural integrity of bracketry and
secondary structure exposed to launch acoustic and
vibration environments and transient loads during
staging.
- Verify analytical models used for dynamic load
analyses.
The following test conditions were imposed on the hardware:
- Acoustics
Liftoff environment
Boost environment
- Low frequency vibration
(3) Test Results. No failures of basic tank structure
or component attachments occurred. Sufficient data were obtained to
verify or revise the dynamic design and test criteria for tank-mounted
components, and to verify analytical dynamic models used to calculate
dynamic loads for the OWS during launch, boost, and staging events.
Detail test results are contained in MDAC-W Report MDCG2445, dated
October 1971.
d. ATM Vibration Unit Vibration Test
(I) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objective
- Provide data that will be coupled with dynamic
analyses to evaluate the ATM structural math models.
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- Investigate the effects of complex localized vibra-
tion response induced through the ATMprimary struc-
ture.
(3) Test Results. The excessive canister lateral response
to low frequency longitudinal (flight axis) vibrations that occurred was
corrected by revising the SIC engine cutoff sequence. This was confirmed
during the Payload Assembly vibroacoustic test program.
e. ATMPrototype Unit Vibration Test
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives.
- Further verify analysis and criteria assumptions.
- Determine the effects of local vibration response
induced through the ATM primary structure, compon-
ents, and experiments.
- Verify ATM integrity after being subjected to vi-
bration sources (module level qualification).
(3) Test Results. Tests completed with no significant
problems. Detail test results are contained in MSFC Report S&E-ASTN-
ADV (72-69) dated July 1972.
f. AM Static Load Test
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives. To demonstrate the structural cap-
ability of the combined AM/MDA vehicle and their interfaces to sustain
ultimate loads associated with the critical design conditions. Test
conditions included:
- Internal pressurization and leakage
- Critical liftoff conditions
- Maximum acceleration conditions
(3) Test Results. The testing on the AM Structural Test
Article was successful and supplemental strength analysis verified the
structural adequacy of the flight article. Test results are contained
in MSFC Report IN-ASTN-TMS-71-7, dated May 1971.
g. MDA Static Load Test
(i) Test Location. MSFC
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(2) Test Objectives. To verify structural integrity of
the MDAstructure to the critical loadings encountered in boost, flight,
and docking/latching. Tests were also used to verify analytical techni-
ques used to predict stress levels and deflections. Test conditions in-
cluded:
- Local loading conditions (3 tests)
- Combinations of pressure and docking loads (6 tests)
(3) Test Results. The MDAStatic Test Article verified
the structural integrity of the MDAshell while subjected to the criti-
cal loading conditions. Test results are contained in MMCReport ED-
2002-1264, dated May 1971.
h. OWSStatic Load Test
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives. To verify the structural integrity
of the S-IVB LH2 tank for all OWSmodifications for on-pad and flight
conditions. Test conditions included:
- Ground wind loadings with side access panel instal-
led and removed.
- Maximumvehicle loadings during launch and ascent.
- Maximumdesign differential pressure.
(3) Test Results. All test requirements were successfully
met; no failures or detrimental yielding of tank structure occurred.
i. ATMRack Static Load Test
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives
- To verify the structural integrity of the ATMrack
structure for the ATMmission.
- To determine deflections at the maximumloading con-
ditions and to determine the amount of permanent set
(after removal of loads) at mounting points of vari-
ous instruments for which very accurate alignment is
imperative.
- To verify the analytical methods used to predict
stress levels and deflections.
(3) Test Results. The test was completed satisfactorily
with no anomalies. Test results are contained in MSFCReport 50M02485,
dated I September 1972.
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(1)
(2)
ATM Spar and Canister Static Load Test
Test Location. MSFC
Test Objectives
- To verify the structural integrity of the spar and
the spar/canister assembly.
- To determine deflections and stresses under maximum
loading conditions, and the amount of permanent set,
if any, after removing loads.
- To verify analytical methods used to predict stress
levels and deflections.
(3) Test Results. The test was completed satisfactorily
with no anomalies. Test results are contained in MSFC Report 50M02490,
dated I September 1972.
k. Payload Shroud Jettison Test at Altitude
(i) Test Location. Plum Brook
(2) Test Objectives.
- Verify structural integrity due to separation loads
and separation dynamics.
- Verify noncontaminating design.
(3) Test Results. Three full-scale separation tests were
accomplished at the Plum Brook Altitude Chamber. Minor problems, en-
countered during the first two tests, were corrected and the separation
system and noncontamination design were verified.
i. A_I_ TSU Thermal Vacuum Test
(1)
(2)
Test Location. JSC
Test Objectives
- Verification of thermal design and operation of the
ATM when exposed to maximum and minimum thermal
vacuum environmental conditions.
- Collection of test data for verification of the
analytical techniques used to construct the ATM
thermal models.
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- Determination of any significant thermal problems
that could adversely affect the success of the ATM
program in subsequent testing and flight.
- Development of shipping, handling, and testing
techniques for prototype and flight hardware.
(3) Test Results. Testing resulted in thermal redesign
of several components to provide the required temperature control. Re-
designs were subsequently verified on the ATMPrototype and Flight
Article thermal vacuumtests. Detail test results are contained in
Report ED-2002-I174-I dated January 1971.
m. ATMPrototype Thermal VacuumTest
(i) Test Location. JSC
(2) Test Objectives
- Verification of proper operation of the ATMsystems
in a simulated orbital thermal vacuumenvironment.
- Determination of any significant thermal problems
that could adversely affect the success of the ATM
program in subsequent testing and flight.
- Provide test data for verification of the analytical
techniques used to construct the ATMthermal math
models.
(3) Test Results. Prototype thermal vacuum testing veri-
fied "fixes" resulting from TSUtesting, and in someadditional redesign
for the flight ATM. These changes were subsequently verified in the
flight ATMthermal vacuumtesting. Detail test results are contained
in Report ED-2002-1434-2dated April 1972.
n. Cluster Electrical Power SystemBreadboard
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives. The overall purpose of this testing
was to verify proper operation of the Cluster EPSsystems in their par-
allel modesof operation before mating of the actual flight systems. To
accomplish this purpose, a Skylab Cluster Power Simulator was developed
at MSFC. The specific primary objectives of the testing were to:
- Demonstrate the capability of the AM and ATM power
systems to operate in parallel, and to verify stable
operation of the two systems when subjected to the
flight power profile.
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- Demonstrate that flight circuit wiring is adequate
for proper load sharing by the power systems.
- Analyze the effects of the single-point-ground sys-
tem concept with the cluster power systems in its
various configurations.
- Demonstrate and analyze power system failures and
contingency modesof operation.
- Determine short-term and long-term effects of simu-
lated orbital operation on the systems and particu-
larly on their batteries.
(3) Test Results. Testing on the EPSbreadboard was very
successful. Testing was initiated early enough so that any problems
could have been solved without affecting launch schedules. However, no
problems were encountered with the parallel operations of the Cluster
EPSsystems. The testing verified the compatibility of the AMand ATM
power systems and their capability to interface with the simulated CSM
power system. Flight procedures associated with the EPSsystems were
verified on the breadboard. Contingency procedures to overcomesimula-
ted system malfunctions were also verified by breadboard testing. De-
tail test results are contained in MSFCReport TMX-64818dated June
1974.
o. Attitude and Pointing Control System Integration Tests
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives
- To evaluate overall system performance with primary
emphasis on system stability, pointing accuracy, and
dynamic response.
- To verify system hardware compatibility.
- To verify flight software for the workshop computer.
Testing was performed under ambient lab conditions starting with
CMG/TACSand EPCbuildup, CMG/TACSand EPCsubsystems simulation, and
progressed into a complete integrated APCScontrol system simulation.
The major tests included:
- CMG/TACSubsystemTests. Establish the system cap-
ability to provide cluster attitude control during
various flight modes.
- EPCSubsystemTests. Determine the system capabil-
ity to provide accurate pointing and control during
the experiment pointing operational mode.
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- CMGand EPCSubsystemsIntegration Tests. Verify
operation readiness of the combined subsystems
and establish overall system capability to perform
mission requirements.
- APCS/C&DIntegration Tests. To test applicable C&D
functions during a simulation orbital mission.
(3) Test Results. Three independent simulators were used
in performing hardware simulation and software verification. The Sys-
tem 360 Model 75, located at IBM in Huntsville, is an all digital soft-
ware simulator that modeled both the vehicle and the AT_iDC. The System
360 Model 44, located at IBM in Huntsville, incorporated a flight-type
ATMDCwith software models of the WCIUand the vehicle. The Hardware
Simulation Laboratory (HSL), located at MSFC,is an all-hardware simu-
lation with the exception of software equations for vehicle body dynam-
ics and software simulation of the OWSTACS. The HSLalso had the cap-
ability of substituting software models for all sensors and actuators
with the exception of the ATMDC. The functions performed by the simu-
lators were Software Verification, System Integration, and DynamicRe-
sponses. These functions were investigated for the following opera-
tional periods:
- Activation periods investigated and verified were
ATMdeployment and CMG/TACSactivation.
- Normal periods investigated and verified were ren-
dezvous and docking, maneuvers, experiment opera-
tion, navigation, timing, and attitude control.
- Contingency situations investigated and evaluated
included redundancy management(CMG,rate gyro,
and acquisition) and sun sensor, ATMDCself test
and switchover, 8K program, and randomreacquisi-
tion.
Detail test results are contained in M_FCReport 50M78002,dated
January 1973.
p. Audio Center and Voice System Compatibility Test
(I) Test Location. MDAC-E
(2) Test Objectives
- To verify proper operation of the SL communication
system whenmarried to the CSM(simulated) audio
centers.
- To verify proper transmission and reception of voice
using the (simulated) CSMS-Band transmitter.
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(3) Test Results. The SL communications system worked
well with the audio centers and test results were nominal.
Transmission and reception were adequate for communication purposes.
Details can be found in the MDAC-EReport No. 061-063.19 dated 15 March
1972.
q. Audio System/Caution and Warning System Compatibility Test
(i) Test Location. M_DAC-E
(2) Test Objectives
- To verify operating compatibility between the (full
up) audio system and the C&Wsystem.
- To verify proper isolation exists between redundant
systems.
- To verify emergencywarning signals are adequately
isolated from other audio signals.
(3) Test Results. Test results were nominal in all areas
so compatibility was verified and isolation was deemedadequate. De-
tails can be found in MDAC-EReport No. 061-063.18 dated i April 1972.
r. STU/STDNCompatibility Tests
(i) Test Location. MDAC-E
(2) Test Objectives
- To evaluate compatibility betweena typical STDN
ground station and a Skylab test unit that simula-
ted the cluster I&C system.
- To support real-time AM/MDAtesting during the
planned test flow.
- To provide real-time mission support as an I&C
breadboard.
(3) Test Results. Tests in all modes proved to be succes-
sful. Incompatibilities were not detected and both local and mission
support testing performed as expected. A final test report was not
issued since CCP171 did not require a report.
s. EREPIntegrated Systems Bench Test
(i) Test Location. MMC
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(2) Test Objectives
Verify by subsystem and system the compatibility of
the EREPsensors and experiment support equipment.
- Refine test methods and test data analysis techni-
ques before starting module level testing.
(3) Test Results. Based on the analysis of the EREP Sys-
tems Bench Test tapes and the resultant hardware corrections made during
the test, it was concluded that the electrical, functional, and data
interfaces for each experiment were verified. The hardware corrections
made and software developed as a result of the bench test simplified
future testing and test data analysis. The analysis of the bench test
data also verified the value of the bench tests as a necessary step in
establishing confidence in the EREP System. Detail test results are
contained in JSC Report MSC-03173, dated 31 January 1972.
t. Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT)
(i) Test Location. JSC
(2) Test Objectives. The objective of the SMEAT was to
provide a nearly full-scale simulation of a 56-day Skylab mission.
Detail objectives were:
- Obtain and evaluate baseline medical data for up to
56 days for those medical experiments that might be
affected by the Skylab environment (except weight-
lessness).
- Evaluate selected experiments hardware, systems,
and ancillary equipment.
- Evaluate data reduction and data handling procedures
in a mission duration time frame (all mission con-
straints imposed).
- Evaluate preflight and postflight medical support
operations, procedures, and equipment.
- Evaluate medical inflight experiment operating pro-
cedures and crew checklists.
- Train Skylab medical operations team for participa-
tion during the flight.
(3) Test Results. The SMEAT Program lasted for the full
scheduled 56-day period. No major problems were encountered that
threatened its success. A number of problems did develop that required
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correction before launch of Skylab. Detail test results are contained
in JSCReport NASATMX-58115,dated October 1973.
u. Biomedical System Integrated SystemsTest
(i) Test Location. MSFC
(2) Test Objectives. The Biomedical System Integrated
Test conducted at MSFCwas the first attempt at operating the various
elements of the Biomed system together. Design Verification Test Units
(DVTUs)were used for the test. Specific test objectives were:
- To verify componentinterfaces within each experi-
ment and interfaces between the Experiment Support
System (ESS) and its modules (e.g., ESSto Blood
Pressure Measuring SystemModule).
- To prove the electrical and mechanical interfaces
between experiments M092, M093, and MI71; the ESS;
and the Experiment Checkout Equipment (ECE) are
compatible.
- To verify the functional operation and electromag-
netic compatibility of each experiment.
- To verify that the experiments are safe to operate
with humantest subjects and demonstrate system cap-
ability to provide required physiological data.
- To operate the experiments as an integrated system
to evaluate mission timelines and to demonstrate
design performance and compatibility.
(3) Test Results. The testing pointed out manyproblems
that were subsequently eliminated or reduced by redesign of the hard-
ware. These redesigns were_verified on the DVTUintegrated testing,
and during the integrated testing using the flight hardware. A final
test report was not issued for this test.
v. Crew Systems Testing.
(i) Test Location. Module Contractors, MSFC,JSC
(2) Test Objectives. Crew systems testing is defined as
all One-G, Zero-G, and neutral buoyancy tests. The objectives of this
testing were to:
- Assist designer in verifying adequacy of hardware
design,
- Develop procedures,
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- Prove compatibility of manand machine relation-
ships,
- Evaluate astronaut assigned tasks, and
- Determine proper sequence for task performance.
(3) Test Results. The AM, MDA,OWS,ATM, and experiments
all performed extensive testing in the crew systems area. This testing
is discussed in somedetail in Section II of this report.
2. Qualification Test Program
a. General. Qualification tests were required to be performed
on all flight hardware in Criticality I category to verify that Skylab
production hardware met the design specification and long-life require-
ments necessary for operational suitability. Flight hardware components
in Criticality 2 and 3 categories were qualified at the highest practi-
cal level by one or a combination of the following methods:
Test
- Similarity
- High assembly
- Prior test, flight, or usage experience
- Analysis
- Requalification
Refer to Table III.C-I for a definition of Criticality Categories.
Table III.C-I. Flight Hardware Criticality Category
CATEGORY
1
IS
2A
2B
3
3A
POTENTIAL EFFECT OF FAILURE
Loss of life or crewmember(s) (ground or flight)
Applies to Safety and Hazard Monitoring System. When re-
quired to function because of failure in the related pri-
mary operational system(s), potential effect of failure is
loss of, or risk to, life of crewmember(s).
Immediate mission flight termination or unscheduled termin-
ation at the next planned earth landing area. (For SL, in-
cludes loss of primary mission objectives).
Launch scrub.
Launch delay (for SL, includes loss of secondary mission
obj ec rive) .
Degradation of primary mission objectives resulting from a
component failure that impacts two or more related experi-
ments.
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b. ProgramDefinition. The componentqualification test pro-
gramwas established and defined by the applicable moduleQualification
• Test Plan:
AM F767
MDAED-2002-I005 VolumeII
OWSDAC-56697
ATM50M02408
The plans defined the requirements for qualification by test for
all CFEcomponents, and a system for verification of qualification cert-
ification for GFEcomponents.
All componentswere analyzed and qualification testing performed
when the analysis indicated that insufficient information was available
to verify the design and performance requirements. This testing was
performed on flight-type hardware to formally demonstrate that the de-
veloped design would perform according to specification under conditions
that simulated the most severe mission conditions predicted plus a mar-
gin. All qualification test units were subjected to and successfully
passed all performance/environmental acceptance test requirements be-
fore entering the qualification test program.
c. Testing. The testing was conducted in accordance with
approved test procedures that implemented the Qualification Test Plan.
All performance environmental and testing had surveillance by NASArep-
resentatives. MSFCprogram offices had final approval for the final
test reports. Inhouse MSFCreview of the test procedures and test re-
ports was provided by S&E-ASTR,ASTN,and QUALLaboratories.
d. ProgramReviews. Acceptability reviews were held by NASA
teams to provide an in-depth review of each of the contractors components.
For those componentssupplied by the governmentan internal review was
held by S&E-QUALpersonnel with inputs provided to the applicable pro-
gram office. As an addedmanagementool, beginning approximately one
and one-half years before launch, a qualification test status board,
that was updated weekly, was maintained in the Skylab ManagementCenter.
e. Certification. Qualification certification was obtained
on all components. This certification was the final requirement of the
componentqualification program.
D. Flight Hardware Verification
I. General. This section discusses in general terms the module
verification program at the contractor facilities. No attempt has been
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made to include the Crew Compartment Fit and Functional (C F ) tests in
this section. These are covered in detail in Section II, SWS Systems,
of this report. Reference is made to the module reports if additional
information is required. The significant open items in the test program
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at the time of shipment of the hardware to KSCare included. Figure
III.D-I identifies the general span time of the flight hardware module
and integrated test program.
2. OWS Test Program. The OWS module went through a series of sub-
system and system tests and experiment integration tests at Huntington
Beach to verify system operation at the module level. All Systems Tests
were then accomplished to assure that all equipment and subsystems satis-
fy design and mission objectives when operated independently and collec-
tively, and to determine if any undesirable interactions existed between
the flight OWS and/or experiments.
Details of the OWS module test program are contained in MSFC Report
TMX-64813, dated May 1974.
3. A_M Test Program. The ATM module went through a series of
systems and experiment tests at MSFC to verify system performance before
initiation of the ATMAII Systems Test. The All Systems Test involved
the complete ATM, which was powered in a launch-orbit sequence, and the
system operated to simulate an actual mission. This test functionally
verified the systems operational compatibility. Two All Systems Tests
were performed:
(i) Primarily concerned with EMC verification;
(2) Verified the integrity of the ATM after removal of the
EMC breakout.
The ATM was then subjected to vibration tests to provide assurance
the flight system would withstand mission performance following the
boost phase of the vehicle flight.
Following the vibration test, the ATM was shipped to JSC for post-
vibration alignment verification and thermal vacuum testing. There a
series of functional tests were performed on the ATM in a thermal
vacuum environment to verify mission operation under a simulated space
condition.
For details of the AT_ module test program, refer to MSFC Report
TMX-64811, dated June 1974.
4. PS Test Program. The PS module went through electrical systems
tests and mechanical fit checks at Huntington Beach to verify systems
acceptance. After weight and balance checks, the PS was stored until the
hardware was required at KSC.
There were no significant open items in the PS test program at the
time of shipment to KSC.
5. M_DA Test Program. The MDA module went through a series of
subsystem and system tests and experiment integration tests at Denver and
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St. Louis to verify system operation at the module level. The AM and
CSM functional interfaces were simulated during this testing. No attempt
was made to accomplish an all systems type test on the MDA alone. This
testing was performed during the AM/MDA Simulated Flight and Altitude
tests at St. Louis.
Details of the MDA module test program are contained in MSFC report
TMX-64812, dated April 1974.
For significant open items in the MDA test program at the time of
shipment to KSC, refer to Section III.D.7.
6. AM Test Program. The AM module went through a series of sub-
system and system tests at St. Louis to verify systems performance at
the module level. MNA, OWS, ATM, and CSM simulators were used during
these tests. An all systems test or integrated systems test was accom-
plished after the AM and MDA were mated.
Details of the AM module test program are contained in MSFC Report
TMX-64810, dated May 1974.
7. AM/MDA Test Program. Upon completion of the initial AM testing,
the MDA was shipped from the Martin Marietta Denver facility to MDAC-E
by Super Guppy aircraft. The MDA was mated with the AM twice, the first
mate being for the purpose of mechanical interface and clearance checks.
During this mate, the AM/MDA was mated to the FAS. The ATM DA was then
assembled and the MDA was then permanently mated to the AM.
The MDA was delivered to MI_AC-E with several pieces of hardware
either not installed and/or tested. The principal components were the
five EREP and the A_i C&D console. This hardware was installed and
tested at MDAC-E before delivery of the AM/M/)A to the launch site.
Testing during this period included the systems assurance test of
each system of the mated AM/MDA; CZF 2 p=rformance of a simulated flight
test wherein systems were operated in the expected flight sequences;
the Manned Altitude Chamber Test; completion of EREP and ATM C&D panel
installation and test; and additional C2F 2 and simulated flight tests
to validate the late hardware. During this period, the Astronauts
participated principally in the C2F 2 simulated flight test, and alti-
tude chamber tests. The crewmen for the altitude chamber test consis-
ted of the prime crew for SL-2. The mated AM/MDA, the FAS, and the DA
were then prepared for individual delivery to KSC by means of Super
Guppy aircraft.
Details of the MIIA and AM test programs are contained in MSFC re-
ports TMX-64812, dated April 1974, and TMX-64810, dated May 1974, re-
spectively.
Significant open items in the AM/MDA test program at the time of
shipment to KSC were retest S190 window latching mechanism, ILCA light-
ing test, TV system test, C2F 2 testing, and EREP sensor retests.
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E. KSCTest Program
I. General. At KSC, the prelaunch test program consisted of mod-
ule reverification, testing to demonstrate each module ready for multi-
module testing, multimodule interface verification, end-to-end system
test, and a mission simulation test. This verification program culmin-
ated in countdown demonstration, and the final countdown with a success-
ful launch on May 14, 1973.
During the prelaunch test program, several first time verifications
were made, i.e., electrical bonding resistance, AM/ATM power systems par-
alleling, single-point-ground transfer between CSM and AM, AM/MDA audio
with CSM audio center, OWS measurements using the AM PCM system, etc.
These first time verifications were conducted without major incident.
It was MSFC philosophy that the first time mating and testing at KSC was
an essential part of design verification.
This report will discuss the multimodule interface verification,
end-to-end system test, and the mission simulation test.
2. AM/M_DA-CSM Electrical Interface and Docking Simulated Mission
Test. On December 4, preparations were initiated for the AM/MDA-CSM
Electrical Interface and Docked Simulated Mission Tests. The tests func-
tionally verified the AM/M_DA-CSM electrical interface compatibility of
the power, C&W, TV and communications systems, and the atmosphere inter-
changing duct, and determined the operational compatibility of the ve-
hicles during a mission simulation. The test also included the actual
docking of the AM/_iDA-CSM; tests during docking that verified the mech-
anical compatibility of the AM/MDA, docking target alignment, tunnel
leakage rates, and the electrical bonding characteristics of the mated
AM/MDA-CSM. The test was successfully completed on December 18 and the
modules undocked on December 20.
Several significant first time verifications were successfully con-
ducted during the AM/MDA-CSM test. They were:
- Probe-retract (compressive manual load),
- Probe capture latch(es) engagement/release and interface
fit tolerance,
Probe droge removal/installation and stowage capability,
- Docking ring latch(es) verification,
- CSM-AM/MDA transfer tunnel pneumatic verification,
- Air interchange duct and electrical connector mate/demate,
- Electrical bonding resistance CSM-AM/MDA,
- Docking target alignment,
- C&W interface CSM-AM/MDA-fire sensor and power bus,
- Intermodule voltages and commands CSM-AM/MDA,
- SWS single-point-ground bi-directional transfer between
CSM and AM,
- AM/MDA TV transmission to STDN via CSM S-band transmission,
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- AM/MDAaudio with CSMaudio center,
- AM/MDAaudio to STDNvia CSMS-band transmitter, and
- AMDCScontrol of CSMS-band OMNIantenna.
3. AM/MDA/OWS Leak Test. The AM/MDA/OWS Leak Test, which ascer-
tained the leakage rates of the various systems aboard the AM, MDA and
OWS and verified the integrity of the interface, was successfully com-
pleted February ii, 1973. First time verification of the AM/OWS inter-
face seal leakage and leak and flow of fluid lines were successfully
completed during this test.
4. SWS End-to-End Systems Test and Experiment Test. The SWS End-
to-End Systems Test and Experiment Test was the first time the flight
systems were operated end-to-end. Portions of the SWS End-to-End Sys-
tems Test and Experiments Test began on February 8, 1973. Problems with
the refrigeration subsystem GSE were the pacing items during this test.
A GSE quick disconnect was leaking and required replacing. The Coolanol
had an unexplained yellow color; however, after an evaluation by MSFC it
was decided to use the Coolanol as-is. The SWS End-to-End Systems Test
and Experiments Test continued through February 25, 1973, testing vari-
ous control circuits, waste management, C&W system, lights, all ordnance
circuits, I&C systems, as well as EREP and certain experiments checkout.
Significant first time verification successfully conducted during
this test were:
Intermodule voltages and commands,
- Bus characteristics during maximum power transfer and largest
anticipated mission power sharing between modules,
- AM and ATM power system paralleling,
Payload shroud jettison ordnance circuitry,
- Entire SWS TV system connected together (except CSM),
- OWS audio system using AM audio load compensator,
- OWS measurements using the AM PCM and tape recorders
for transmission,
- OWS digital display unit being used by the AM timing refer-
ence system,
- AM DCS sending commands to the ATM,
- AM sending commands to the OWS, and
- OWS control of aft AM heat exchangers.
5. Interface Test. In parallel with the SWS End-to-End Systems
Test and Experiments Test, the IU Interface Test was conducted on Febru-
ary 23, 1973. This test verified the OWS switch selector interfaces and
ensured that other systems operating during this test did not transmit
false commands to the switch selector. First time verifications during
this test included:
- OWS switch selectors receiving commands from the IU, and
- 0WS switch selectors stimulating AM/ATM functions.
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6. IU/ATM/OWS TACS Test. The IU/ATM/OWS TACS Test started March
6, 1973 to verify the capability of the IU and ATM to provide necessary
signals to the TACS and to accomplish the required attitude control func-
tions, and to verify the proper TACS response to these controls. The
TACS test was completed on March 9, 1973 and all spacecraft modules went
into a pre-FRT inspection and work period. An open-item review revealed
a large number of constraints to the start of the SV OAT and SWS Mission
Simulation/FRT. During the next ten day period, maximum effort was put
forth to work off all constraints.
7. Space Vehicle Overall Test and the SWS Mission Simulation/Flisht
Readiness Test. The Space Vehicle Overall Test and the SWS Mission Simu-
lation Flight Readiness Test was successfully completed on March 25, 1973.
This test verified the IU/SWS interface compatibility in the flight mode,
demonstrated electromagnetic compatibility between the individual SWS
systems and between SWS system and associated experiments, and accomp-
lished an open-loop VILF ranging test to the CSM on the adjacent pad.
Mission simulation activity included spacecraft activation, orbital
operations, and deactivation. This sequence of tests was based on mis-
sion profile sequencing, but did not attempt to duplicate nor verify
the actual profile. AM/MDA flight batteries were used for the first
time during this test.
8. Flight Systems Redundancy Test/Software Integration Test. The
last multimodule test before movement to the pad was the Flight Systems
Redundancy Test/Software Integration Test which was successfully com-
pleted on March 28, 1973. This test verified ATM/LV interface in the
guidance system, demonstrated the compatibility of the space vehicle
with the command network and the suitability of the Operational Handbooks
for the conduct of the mission, and verified operation of the backup com-
mand modes.
9. Intercenter KSC Test Review. An intercenter KSC Test Review
was held during the week of March 26-30, 1973. Results of this review
assisted in determining the flight readiness of the SWS systems, and
readiness to roll-out from the VAB to the pad. Discrepancies were doc-
umented for review by the Review Pre-Board on March 30, 1973. All were
disposed of by the Pre-Board except for two problems that required ac-
tion by the Review Board on April 2-3, 1973:
- DC/DC converter no. 1 five volt output dropped from 5.022
volts (nominal) to 4.64 volts for approximately 1.2 seconds,
and was out of regulation for approximately 3.0 seconds.
- Video output of flight TV camera (S/N 3002) degraded during
KS-O009 test. (Problem repeated off module, video output
quality unacceptable. Problem was isolated to EMI inter-
nal to camera).
Neither problem impacted the roll-out ot the pad and both problems
were resolved before liftoff.
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i0. Countdown Demonstration Test. SL-I was transferred to Pad A
on April 16, 1973 with the only test planned to be the Countdown Demon-
stration Test (CDDT). SL-I CDDT started at T-123 hours at 1900 EDT on
April 26, 1973. Final stowage of the ATM cameras and film in the MDA
stowage locker and flight closeout of the MI)A was completed on April 27,
1973. Final closeout of the AM/MDA was completed on May i, 1973 and the
EVA hatch was secured for flight. The space vehicle successfully com-
pleted CDDT Wet at 1330 EDT on May 2, 1973 with no anomalies encountered.
ii. Lightning Retest. Launch countdown began of 0200 EDT on May
9, 1973. A small amount of water fell in the ATM area during a thunder-
storm on May 9, but affected areas were temporarily covered. High winds
prevented further weather-proofing of the payload shroud nose cap until
May i0, 1973. The Mobile Launcher 2 lightning mast was struck by light-
ning at 1257 EDT on May 9, 1973. The following lightning retest actions
were taken to ensure the integrity of the space vehicle systems.
a. A full retest was performed on the launch vehicle - part
under the Lightning Retest Plan and the remainder during the Launch
Countdown.
b. An abbreviated retest was conducted on the spacecraft (SWS)
that included a memory check of the ATM computer, a functional test of
the PCG, a DCS functional check, and a TM functional test. No anomalies
attributed to the lightning were noted.
F. Verification Documentation
Figure III.F-I depicts the top level test planning and requirements
documentation developed and implemented during the Skylab verification
program. The Apollo Applications Requirements Document, NHB8080.3, was
used as a guideline in establishing the Skylab Payload Verification Pro-
gram.
The content, format, and number of documents required to identify
KSC requirements was established by intercenter management agreement and
was in general accordance with SLPD No. 26.
G. Conclusions and Recommendations
The following discussion presents conclusions and recommendations
regarding the Integrated Test Program. No attempt is made to present
module level recommendations as these are included in the individual
module reports. Recommendations presented should be considered as can-
didates for future programs that may involve hardware and test programs
approaching the sophistication of Skylab.
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i. Test Planning
a. Conclusions. A Master Verification Plan was prepared by
S&E-CSE to interpret the Cluster system requirements into program veri-
fication plans. It provided management visibility of the overall test
program and a means by which the affected elements of Science and Engine-
ering could assure that system verification activities were adequate and
responsive to program requirements.
b. Recommendations. A top-level verification plan should be
prepared early in the program and updated periodically to provide man-
agement visibility of the overall verification program. The plan should
be used as the single source document for establishing and evaluating
lower level test plans against overall verification objectives. The up-
dates should be continued until the flight hardware/module test program
has started.
2. Test Requirements
a. Conclusions. Formal TCRSDs were prepared for all module
acceptance testing (except for AM testing at St. Louis), and for all
module and integrated testing at KSC. The TCRSDs included experiment
checkout requirements for on-module testing.
TCRSDs were the basis for preparation of the procedures used dur-
ing acceptance testing of the modules and for the KSC test activities.
These documents were invaluable in establishing program verification
compliance.
b. Recommendations. TCRSDs should be prepared for all module
level acceptance testing and for any multimodule or integrated systems
testing. The formation of Cluster systems test requirements review
teams proved to be a successful approach and should be used for future
programs.
For the development of experiment integration test requirements,
the method used for the Skylab experiments should be considered. A
series of PATRSS meetings were held to review preliminary experiment
test requirements. The attendees included the Module Contractor; Exper-
iment Developer; Experiment Development Center; and the Module, GSE, and
Experiment Projects offices from MSFC. The output of the meetings was a
coordinated Experiment Integration Test Requirements and Specification
(EITRS) document that eventually was incorporated into the applicable
Module TCRSD.
3. Test Procedures
a. Conclusions. The procedures used for module checkout at
KSC were, for the most part, unique to the KSC operations (with the ex-
ception of the ATM procedures). It would lead to a more efficient oper-
ation if standardized test procedures for manufacturing acceptance through
launch could be developed.
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Plans for crew participation in factory checkout or other tests
should be madein time for procedures to be developed which are accept-
able for crew use. This required a learning period for an organization
not experienced in writing such procedures.
b. Recommendations. Develop and use launch site procedures
as muchas possible for factory checkout. This will require early par-
ticipation by launch and operations personnel in planning requirements.
Identify crew participation requirements well in advance so the
proper attention can be given to the preparation of crew-oriented pro-
cedures.
4. Test Teams
a. Conclusions. The program benefitted greatly from the
"traveling test team" concept. Each module was followed by a dedicated
NASA-industry test team from factory checkout through launch. The
readily available experience thus accumulated was invaluable in trouble-
shooting and implementing changes.
b. Recommendations. Use a similar concept for future programs.
5. Test Scheduling
a. Conclusions. The KSC planned test schedule was overly op-
timistic for a test program of the magnitude of Skylab. There was a
significant amount of first time testing that was scheduled for KSC,
as well as open testing that was originally scheduled for the factory
but not accomplished. The planned test schedule went from 8 hour shifts
five days a week, to around-the-clock six days a week.
b. Recommendations. Ensure that a realistic test planning
schedule is defined for the amount of testing that is to be accomplish-
ed at KSC.
6. Test Program Evaluation
a. Conclusions. For a program of the complexity of Skylab it
is essential that the verification program be developed, controlled, and
continuously evaluated on a total system basis as well as by individual
module. On Sky lab this was accomplished by a comprehensive system of
intercenter reviews starting with the SOCAR and continuing through the
DCR and the FRR.
b. Recommendations. Evaluate the verification program on a
Cluster system basis as well as by individual module or experiment.
Identify the major intermodule or Cluster system verification require-
ments (both test and analysis) early in the program, document the status
with periodic updates, and ensure adequate follow-up for problem areas.
The evaluation process should continue through the KSC prelaunch test
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program. Intercenter reviews should be held periodically to review
the status of the verification program with emphasis placed on the prob-
lem areas.
7. Mission Support Testing
a. Conclusions. The value of maintaining the module backup
hardware, Cluster system breadboards/simulators, and the crew systems
hardware in readiness to support the Skylab mission was evidenced by
the many tests accomplished on this hardware. These tests measureably
contributed solving real and contingency on-orbit problems.
b. Recommendations. Use backup hardware and functional flight
type simulators for mission support testing.
8. Prototype Units
a. Conclusions. The Skylab flight hardware test program en-
countered many delays that could have been eliminated had there been
prototype hardware available in advance of the flight hardware.
b. Recommendations. Include an all-systems prototype in the
program so design, procedure, or facility problems can be identified with
adequate lead time for correction. This unit can be refurbished for
flight or real-time mission support.
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IV. Mission Operations

SECTION IV. MISSION OPERATIONS
A. Introduction
i. Purpose. This report documents the objectives and methods
_ed by MSFC mission operations in preparing for and supporting the
_ylab mission.
2. Scope. The time frame covered is from conceptual phase AAP-
$S through SL-4 splashdown and post-mission data distribution.
3. Historical Summary. To effectively support prelaunch and
unch operations for which KSC had responsibility and the flight oper-
ions for which JSC was responsible, the MSFC operations task was to
fine, plan, and implement engineering support capability for Sky lab,
ile retaining support capability for Saturn V and IB launch vehicles.
turn support facilities existed and precedents were established for
e Saturn support roles; however, a number of significant factors
ded other dimensions to Skylab support as follows:
- Skylab support was longer duration (months vs days);
- Simultaneous support of two launch vehicles and the OA
was required;
- Science data requirement quantities and types for handling
and processing were vastly expanded.
_ssons Learned" are discussed specifically in the following sections,
applicable. In general, certain functions should have been initiated
lier in the program with other aspects of these functions receiving
e emphasis; however, mission support concepts were very successful
meeting mission objectives.
a. Historical Systems Operations Analysis Summary. A MSFC
rations team was located at JSC for the Saturn launch vehicles to
vide Booster Systems Engineer (BSE) flight control console manning
associated staff support functions. Communications and data links
the HOSC at MSFC were maintained for engineering and management
:tions for the Saturn program.
The prelaunch and launch support roles for HOSC were well estab-
led with facilities and data links from KSC for systems integrated
:, flight readiness test, countdown demonstration test, and count-
i.
Intercenter design discipline panels were established by subsys-
to provide for interchange of engineering data with operations
onnel. The panel members participated in design reviews and SOCAR
nsure that operational documentation reflected actual systems de-
s. This allowed operations documentation to be started while design
engineering problems were worked.
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The rapport developed in someof these technical discipline groups
during SOCARprovided impetus to a decision for MSFCsupport to the Sky-
lab Missions by use of MSGs.The following groups were formed:
- Support Teamfor Attitude Control
- Electrical Power System
- I&C System
- Environmental Controls System
- Apollo Telescope Mount Thermal Control System
- Contamination
- Structures and Mechanical
- Crew Systems
- Apollo Telescope Mount Experiments
- Corollary Experiments
These personnel provided in-depth analysis of engineering problems
in support of the JSCMission Control Center (MCC)console positions
and their Staff Support Room(SSR) activities through the FOMR. Off-
line computer models at MSFCand support contractors would be used for
predictions and contingency analyses, as required.
The mission managementfunction for Skylab was provided by the
FOMR,which involved both MSFCand JSC personnel.
The MSFCflight operations support team at JSCwas charged with
responsibility for providing console engineers and support for activa-
tion of the OA in addition to Saturn support for the unmanned SL-I and
manned SL-2, -3, and -4 Saturn BSE functions. These personnel, who
had technical responsibilities for Skylab hardware, participated in
training and simulations. Simulations conducted at MSFC were succes-
sful in exercising procedures, communications systems, operations
support staff, and MSGs. An end-to-end data flow test was never com-
pleted, which further reduced simulation fidelity.
Future programs should provide for early simulation planning and
software development, be phased to allow test and checkout of the data
flow system (end-to-end), and provide time for problem solution.
Management attention was focused upon delivery and launch readi-
ness of flight hardware, and as a result, the simulation exercises re-
ceived a lower priority. Future programs should provide management
emphasis, manpower, facilities (hardware and software), and adequate
planning time to provide for realistic data to support the simulations.
b. Historical Data Management Summary. A data management
plan was developed to establish the approach for building the data man-
agement system. Center responsibilities and roles were established for
acquisition, processing, statusing, coordination, and dissemination of
the many types of Skylab data.
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The Program Support Requirements Document (PSRD) was the medium
used for requirements levied at Headquarters level upon all NASA cen-
ters and support agencies. The requirements emphasized were those
having a long lead time for sizing intercenter support teams, hardware,
and facilities.
The DRF was developed for detailed data requests by MSFC and JSC
data users.
A Data Support Organization (DS0) was established to provide for
overall management of data acquisitions, data processing, data dissem-
ination, data display, and overall facility operation.
The data processing and handling capability was based upon the
quantity of data necessary to perform anticipated support for scienti-
fic and engineering data. Mission Operations and Computation Laboratory
Planning Meetings were held and tradeoffs were conducted for methods of
handling the unprecedented quantity of data using existing center cap=
abilities where possible.
Data priority procedures were established if overloading of the
data systems should occur. In the event of technical problems (compu-
ter, etc), power failures or other anamolles, contingency plans for
receipt and processing of high priority data were established.
Contingency priorities for engineering data were implemented early
in the mission, which resulted in low output of scientific data proces-
sing. In this area, the job was underestimated resulting in delays in
obtaining and processing scientific data. Cost was a limiting factor.
A lesson learned from this would be separation of these data systems
to prevent this conflict in the future. Further, end-to-end data flow
demonstrations were not completed pre-mlsslon. This illustrates that
management attention must be given to ground data support problems and
readiness schedules at the same level that flight software and hard-
ware problems now receive.
c. Historical Support Facility Development Summary. As dis-
cussed in the Systems Operations Summary IV.A.I, the support facilities
for Saturn at FLSFC existed. Expansion of these facilities to support
Skylab while retaining, or increasing, the Saturn support capability was
necessary. Operations Support Planning Meetings were held to determine
methods to be used to provide expanded support while using existing
facilities and capability.
Facilities at HOSC included console systems, Support Action Cen-
ters, Management Rooms, Wind Room, Trajectory Analysis Room; communi-
cations and data lines to KSC and JSC existed to support activities
discussed in the previous paragraphs. The Computation Laboratory at
NSFC, located in the same building with the HOSt, was made available
for expansion to accommodate the increased requirements_ with the Slidell
computer facilities available for overflow data processing.
\
\
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Expanded physical plant capability at MSFC included additional
computer capability and rearrangement of the floor plan at HOSC to
accommodate additional MSG support personnel. The number of consoles
was increased, conference work areas were established, additional com-
munication capability (internal MSFC, and to JSC) was provided, and
additional digital TV displays with switching matrix capability were
provided within HOSC and selected remote locations on the MSFC complex.
B. Operations Support Objectives
The Mission Operations objectives of MSFC, as an integration center
with hardware development responsibilities, were to:
- Provide engineering technical support to prelaunch, launch, and
flight operations activities,
- Plan and develop a data management system to enhance technical
support and to supply science data to users, and
- Provide adequate facilities (hardware and software) for mission
support.
C. Operations Support Preparation
The activities discussed in this section are those used to prepare
for mission support and fall within the following major categories:
- Analyze instrumentation and control for onboard systems monitor-
ing and management during the mission,
- Develop mission support requirements and perform data management
planning and implementation, and
- Provide necessary facilities (hardware/software) at MSFC to sup-
port these functions.
i. Systems Operations Analysis. Analyses were performed to ensure
that monitor and control capability of onboard systems was compatible
with mission operational modes, activation sequences, network coverage,
mission planning and experiment scheduling.
a. Operational Instrumentation Analyses. These analyses were
performed by identification of tasks required to be performed by ground
or flight crews in the areas of systems and experiments activation, man-
agement for normal operations, contingency procedures, deactivation, and
alternative means of accomplishment of mission objectives.
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(i) Monitor and Control for Mission Support Tasks. Oper-
ations support tasks were identified, and required onboard measurements
and controls were analyzed to ensure capability existed to perform
identified tasks. Processing and display of the parameters was addressed
in a general way to assist in sizing the facilities. Further analyses
were performed on adequacy of specific onboard instrumentation and com-
mandcapabilities to perform the support tasks defined. As a result,
recommendedchanges in instrumentation and controls were made, and in
somecases these changeswere implemented. Membershipof Mission Oper-
ations personnel on intercenter discipline panels were used to relay
results of this activity to other centers and the MSFCdiscipline design
organizations. For future programs to decrease costs, reduce design im-
pacts, simplify operation and reduce schedule impacts, this effort should
be started earlier in the program planning with vigorous schedule and
milestone implementation by ManagementProgramReviews.
(2) Malfunction Detection and WorkaroundAnalysis. The
follow-on phase of analysis of instrumentation and controls for mission
support was a top-down functional malfunction analysis. Emphaseswas
placed on methods of detection and corrective actions available, with
consideration given to redlines, constraints, and preliminary rules.
The functional approach was chosen to provide operational visibility
and a cross-tie with failure modeand effects analysis. This activity
was provided to the SOCARsfor the major disciplines by the Module Con-
tractors and mission operations representatives. At the time of MSG
formation, formal documentation of the analyses ceased and MSGsphased
into the activity, generating the MSFCinputs to Mission Rules.
b. Operations Constraints and Mission Rules. This activity
involved early identification of those constraints and limitations in-
herent in the design that would impact planning or methods of operation.
Generally, these limitations and constraints were divided into those
affecting prelaunch test and launch commit, or those affecting flight
operations and planning.
(i) Mission Constraints and SystemsLimitations. In con-
junction with the instrumentation and control adequacy analysis, mission
constraints, and systems limitations were identified. The constraints
were separated into Prelaunch Operational Constraints and Mission Con-
straints, which were retained to provide inputs and assist in review of
Mission Rules and Flight Plans. A concurrent activity, Commit-to-Launch
criteria identification, was supported.
(2) LaunchMission Rule Inputs. MSFClaunch mission rules
were formally documentedin the "Launch Mission Rule Input Document"
which contained the rationale for the rules, redline data, and other
background information. This activity evolved from the initial prelaunch
constraints activity and was the official MSFCmethod for inputs to the
KSCLaunch Mission Rule Document. During countdown demonstration and
actual countdown, mission rule coordinators were provided at HOSC to
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monitor the launch operations communication loops at KSC for redline
violations, or other problems, for Saturn launch vehicle and Skylab.
(3) Flight Mission Rule Inputs. The flight mission rule
input and review preparation by MSFC was begun using the Malfunction
Analyses Mission Operations Design Support approach as a basis for en-
suring that flight rules were prepared for malfunction impacting subsys-
tems, subsystem and vehicle interfaces, and major mission objectives.
Mission Operations personnel were active on intercenter discipline
panels, in design reviews and crew station reviews.
A planned flight Mission Rule Input Document was abandoned in
favor of a Flight Mission Rule Change Package, which was developed by
discipline areas using the MSG concept, and the more important of the
rule items were covered in manned management criteria during the mis-
sion.
c. Operational Performance Data Assessment and Validation.
Operational parametric data was gathered and provided to the Operations
Data Group (ODG), consisting of all hardware development centers, for
incorporation into the Operations Data Book (ODB). A statusing function
of CCB actions was used to ensure that the lag between the ODB data and
actual configuration was minimized, and final configuration and test
data was available and documented.
2. Data Management. The data management function accomplished by
the DSO, required interfacing with other centers and coordination of
activities related to development, documentation, and implementation of
all data requirements. Statusing, coordination, acquisition, and dis-
semination of data to users were general responsibilities addressed in
development of the data management system.
a. Data Management Planning. Initially, a plan was developed
to establish the approach to be taken in data management. The Skylab
presented an unprecedented quantity of data with a multiplicity of data
users and data types. Roles of the various NASA Centers and their sup-
po_ting contractors were addressed in general terms to determine data
flow, priorities, and processing facility requirements. Mission Opera-
tions and Computation Laboratory meetings were held to develop plans
and criteria to increase the data handling capability, and obtain maxi-
mum use of the existing facilities.
b. Program Support Requirements. Program requirements levied
at NASA Headquarters upon all NASA Centers and support agencies were
documented in the PSRD. The initial inputs to the PSRD were baseline
intercenter support requirements involving long lead time or program
impacts. These requirements were refined as more definite program in-
formation was developed.
c. Data Requirements. A DRF was developed as a standardized
method of requesting data for all MSFC/JSC data users. The DRF system
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was jointly agreed upon by MSFC and JSC for levying data requirements be-
tween the two centers; however, program/mission level support requirements
(i.e., communications, data lines, TV, etc.) were documented in the PSRD.
The DRF requirements were put into a computerized data base, called
the Automated Data Requirements System (ADRS), which was developed for
statusing and control of all MSFC DRFs.
The ADRS is a computer programmed system that used the Univac 1108
computer. The programming, as established, provided remote access to
the 1108 computer through a remote DCT 500 terminal located in the HOSC
Data Management Room for mission support. The ADRS allowed the Data
Requirements Group the flexibility to query the data base for data re-
quirements for processing, requirements flow, requestor status, and data
completeness.
The DRF specifications for processing ADDT data were put on the
ADRS tapes; then the ADDT data were processed using the ADRS tapes to
output the DRF requirements.
d. Data Support Organization. The DSO was developed to pro-
vide overall MSFC management for all Skylab data related functions. The
DSO was subdivided into the following groups:
- Data Processing Group
- Data Requirements Group
- Data Acquisition and Scheduling Group
- Data Dissemination Group
- Facilities Group
- MOPS Group
(i) The Data Processing Group was composed of
- Processing Manager,
- Production,
- Scheduling,
- Operations, and
- Real-Time Support Coordinators.
The processing manager position was staffed around the clock by a repre-
sentative from the computation laboratory. The group responsibilities
include planning, implementation, operation and assessment of Skylab
data operations functions.
(2) The Data Requirements Group consists of the Data Re-
quirements Manager (DRM), the Data Requirements Coordinator (DRC) and
the Data Requirements Processor (DRP). The group's responsibilities
included receipt, assessment, coordination, and processing of all data
requests. In addition, the DRM had overall responsibility for the Data
Management Room (DMR) operations for requirements tracking and statusing,
data acquisition tracking and flow, and the dissemination of all Skylab
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data. The requirements group positions were manned 24 hours per day
during pre-mission simulations and for the duration of Skylab missions.
(3) Data Acqusition and Scheduling Group consisted of
tracking of data from the remote sites through GSFC to JSC and the even-
tual scheduling of shipment of this data to the MSFC either by electron-
ic data transmission or shipped in a hard form. Data Acquisition con-
sisted of manning two data acquisition positions 24 hours per day for
seven days a week.
(4) The Data Dissemination Group consisted of a dissem-
ination clerk and his assistants. This under the direction of the DRM
was responsible for receiving, sorting, and delivering MSFC responsible
data during all mission phases on a 24 hour per day basis.
(5) The Facilities group consisted of the Facility Mana-
ger (FM) and a Display Specialist (DS). This group was responsible for
the implementation, control, and maintenance coordination of the HOSC
real-time data, display, communications, and facility systems. The FM
was specifically responsible for ascertaining and evaluating the prob-
lems associated with the various systems, and for coordinating solutions
to the problems. The DS was specifically responsible for assisting in
implementation of the display system requirements to satisfy needs of
the Console Engineers (CEs) for the Operations Support Room (OSR) and
for supporting the CEs, with regard to technical problems, throughout
the mission. The FM position was manned around the clock with two FMs
required at launches. The DS position was manned on the first shift
seven days a week with around-the-clock coverage from launch through
rendezvous.
(6) The MOPS Group consisted of a Controller and four
operators. This group was responsible for acquiring planning and
telemetry data in a near real-time environment. Data requests were
primarily of a one time nature, with secondary emphasis on recurring
requests. Contingency operation was implemented in the event of the
loss of real-time data display capability. The MOPS controller was
responsible for receiving requests and subsequent assignment to term-
inal operator, and notification of the requestor upon completion of
their data request. Logs were kept, noting the operational status of
the computer applications and terminal hardware, as well as the data
requests.
The MOPS controller and operator positions were manned around the
clock during manned Skylab phases and on an "as required" basis during
unmanned phases.
e. Onboard Systems/STDN Compatibility Analysis. Analyses
were performed to assess operational means of retrieving scientific
data using the defined onboard system design by determining required
ground tasks to be performed. Onboard measurement sample rates, and
the frequency and duration of the STDN site contacts were compared to
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the identified ground tasks to surface any network constraints for
planning purposes. The onboard tape recorder capabilities were of par-
ticular concern for those orbits having long durations with no STDN con-
tacts. A computerized RF analysis and procedural tool (COCOA) was
adapted to operations usage to determine which antenna should be chosen
for various vehicle altitudes, maneuvers and tape dump management.
Other results of these analyses were recommendations for use of
Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft (ARIA) and reactivation of the
Newfoundland site to provide compatible ground station coverage for the
missions.
f. Data and Communications Systems. Provisions were made for
the following types of communications and data to be provided:
(i) Communications Systems. Voice communications loops
were available between JSC and MSFC to provide mission status, resolu-
tion of technical problems, and coordination of data transmissions.
Mission activity was monitored via the Flight Director (FDIR) and
air-to-ground crew voice, Ground Operational Support System (GOSS) loops.
These loops were extended to several remote MSFC locations and contrac-
tor facilities.
The resolution of technical problems, as well as conferencing cap-
ability, was provided by seven JSC-MSFC long lines, HOSC Conference
(HOSC-C), ATM Experiments (ATM EX), Flight Operations Management Repre-
sentative, Propulsion (PROP), and Networks (NTWK), which provided the
HOSC direct communications with the FOMR at JSC. In conjunction with
speaker phone equipment, these long lines provided the capability for
MSFC MSG leaders and MCC Flight Controller personnel to resolve many
problems requiring quick reaction solutions.
Coordination of data transmission was accomplished over five JSC-
MSFC long lines: Skylab Terminal System Conference (STS CON-F), Mission
Control Center Configuration Supervisor Conference (MCS CONF), Mission
Data Retrieval System Conference (MDRS CONF), Data Coordination (DATA
COORD), and Data Manager (DATA MGMT).
The DATA COORD and DATA MGMT lines were primarily used for real-
time scheduling and problem solving, while the other three were primar-
ily used to coordinate stored data requirements (including MOPS). Sev-
eral voice loops were provided within the HOSC for internal conferencing
capability. Internal (INT) was extended to all call director instruments
to provide a "general call" capability within the HOSC. The Display Loop
(DISP) was used primarily by Computation Laboratory personnel for coor-
dination of real-time data display. The Operations Director (OD) loop
provided an open line between the OD and key operations support person-
nel. In addition, three general conference loops were provided for ex-
tended conversations between HOSC personnel, CONF A, CONF B, and CONF
C.
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Station to station communication within the HOSC and to selected
remote MSFC sites was provided by the Private Automatic Branch Exchange
(PABX) system. This system, installed specifically for Skylab Mission
Support, consists of three digit extensions available at every work
station within the HOSC, and provided access to MSFC Centrex System,
local Federal Telecommunication System (FTS), and Huntsville exchanges.
During the launch/insertion phases of the Skylab Mission, long-line
communications were provided from KSC to MSFC; Operational Intercom Sys-
tem (OIS-I through 01S-8) were used for monitoring of the countdown/launch
phase; Data Core Coordination Line (DCCL) for real-time data coordination;
and Marshall Skylab Representative (MSLR), and Saturn Launch Vehicle Rep-
resentative (SLVR) provided direct communications for problem resolutions
and conferences.
In addition, the Launch Information Exchange Facility (LIEF) tele-
phone system, available to most work stations within the HOSC, provided
long distance communications. The LIEF system was retained from the
Apollo/Saturn Program and served MSFC in general as well as in support
of the Skylab mission.
(2) Real-Time Data System. HOSC received real-time data
from Skylab during the entire mission. The Mission Operations Computer
(MOC) at JSC received and reformatted the data from the remote sites,
buffered and transmitted it to the HOSC at an average rate of one sam-
ple/sec. This rate varied as a result of data line loading by very
active parameters. In order to reduce line loading, the RSDP incorpor-
ated a software algorithm that tested each parameter before transmission
to the MOC, compared the data change to a preset value (PCM count change),
and transmitted or discarded redundant data in real time. This preset
value established a corridor which the counts had to exceed before the
measurement value would be transmitted. This corridor could be updated
(widened or narrowed) by a decision of the Flight Controller. The data
to MSFC depended on the corridors chosen. JSC had the capability to
see every sample of the measurements transmitted; however, the HOSC
could only see the data approximately once per second.
The real-time data was used by the MSFC computers to drive various
displays. One computer (Consoles Program) was used to drive the event
lights, analog meters, strip charts and decimal indicators while a sec-
ond computer, Digital to Television Program (D/TV), was used to drive
the digital television equipment. If the main Central Processing Unit
(CPU) for the D/TV malfunctioned, a third computer was brought on-line
as a backup; however, it reduced the D/TV capability from 20 to 8 chan-
nels because of the reduced memory availability. Display format, as
well as other display requirements were developed and documented in the
HOSC Display Plan and the Data Users Handbook. When the CSM was acti-
vated, the MOC was not able to deliver display data to the MOCR and sim-
ultaneously transmit all the data MSFC required. During these times a
MOPS contingency plan was implemented to supply data to the MSGs. In
addition, the TV microwave channel was used to provide MOCR displays in
the HOSC. These displays were controlled by the OSM. The D/TV and
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other pertinent data was disseminated to the MSGs via the video matrix.
The matrix had 80 outputs which could select i of 59 inputs. The out-
puts were TV monitors located in the consoles of the OSR, in each Con-
ference Work Area (CWA), the Problem Resolving Room (WAR) and other
remote areas of supporting activity. Most areas that had an output
monitor had a matrix selector switch that allowed selection of its in-
puts. The Master Matrix Panel in the Information Control Room (ICR)
allowed complete control over all inputs and all outputs. An auxiliary
control panel located in the OMR allowed switching of the matrix inputs
to the remote areas and the OMR.
Other video data included items such as site acquisition and loss
times, Mission Status Generator, downlink TV from the spacecraft, Net-
work Video; American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting
Company (CBS), National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and Public Affairs
Office (PAO) news and press conferences from other NASA Centers.
(3) All Digital Data Tape System. The ADDT system was
used to transmit downlinked data from the remote site to JSC and from
JSC to MSFC. The ADDT data were received at MSFC either by electronic
transmission or by air transportation.
At MSFC, the ADDT data were processed to output:
- Engineering Data Books,
- User Tapes (9 and 7 track)-Fixed and Compressed,
- Inputs to Special Analysis Programs
(Engineering and Scientific),
- Autoscan Outputs.
The initial plan for electronic transmission was to transmit four six-
hour blocks for each day from the JSC data base. This was done from
computer to computer.
The JSC ADDT computers were loaded down, especially when the site
input and MSFC output were occurring simultaneously. Therefore, two
batches were transmitted by electronic transmission, and the remaining
two batches were sent by air transportation. In the second manned mis-
sion, the computer to computer electronic transmission was terminated;
all the batches were sent by air transportation.
In the first part of the third manned mission, ADDT was received
by tape to tape electronic transmission. Thus, the tapes were trans-
mitted independent of the JSC ADDT system without loading it down.
This system proved adequate to bring in data for on-going mission re-
quirements.
(4) Mission Operations Planning System. Four MOPS ter-
minals were provided at the HOSC for data retrieval from the JSC com-
puters. Each of the terminals was manned on a 24-hour daily basis dur-
ing the manned mission periods, and reduced manning schedules were
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employed during unmannedperiods. The primary MOPSuse involved
accessing the MCCMDRSfor the fulfillment of specific data requests
(by time interval) selected from a fixed format library of discipline-
oriented tabular and graphic displays. The MDRSdata bases were loaded
in alternate sequence, so when the current data base reached 90 to 95
percent of its capabity, the static data base was purged to becomethe
new current data base. The former current data was then closed to in-
puts. This assured a file of chronologically-sequenced data for the
latest 18 to 36 hours of telemetry from Skylab. As MSGpersonnel be-
camemore familiar with the data requirements for their particular fields
of interest, special format reconfigurations were used to output only
those parameters of interest, rather than relying on fixed formats.
The Activity Scheduling Program (ASP) was used primarily to secure
daily flight plans for review of planned activities; as-flown flight
plans for evaluation of completed activities; sunrise/sunset tables and
predicted site acquisition tables to be used in experiment planning and
real-time support scheduling; and trajectory print displays to establish
revolution start times, equator crossings, beta angles, flight path
angles and geodetic coordinates to be used in maintaining status board
entries, experiment scheduling, and various other functions associated
with review of mission requirements. Periodic requests for such outputs
as camera/film use and general pointing information were generated to
fill specific needs of MSGmembers.
Additional access was provided to the Data Acquisition Statusing
System (DASS), Crew Procedures Data System (CPDS), and the MDRS Trajec-
tory application on a limited basis. The Online Math Processor (OMP)
was also available.
Near real-time data output from MOPS served to bridge the time in-
terval between the HOSC real time displays and the availability of data
locally via ADDT. In addition, contingency procedures were developed
to provide non-real time data in lieu of real-time displays occasioned
by loss of display capability. The contingency mode was entered upon
the loss of real-time displays for two consecutive station passes, and
continued until such time as displays were restored. Contingency data
distribution was accomplished via the Administrative Support Center
(ASC).
(5) Voice Transcripts. Quicklook Voice Transcripts (Q/L)
consisted of real-time and dump crew voice and were electronically trans-
mitted in near real time to MSFC via long-line from JSC. The voice data
were not technically edited or accurately time annotated and was output
in a time frame that enabled their use for quick trend analysis. The
transcripts were received at MSFC on the Magnetic Tape Selectric Type-
writer (MT/ST), which was located in the data room of the HOSC. Two
shifts of MT/ST operators were required to man the MT/ST system during
the manned phase of each mission. When approximately two hours of voice
data had been received, the MT/ST operator assigned a batch number to
the data. The batch was then taken to the ASC, which reproduced the
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quick turnaround copies for advance distribution to the Mission Require-
ments ReviewRoom(MRR)and the OSM. At the end of second shift when
all transcripts for the day had been received, the MT/SToperator assem-
bled the real time and dumptranscripts into one package. The data were
then submitted to the repository for final reproduction. Reproduction
of the transcripts was done on the midnight shift and returned to the
data roomwhere it was placed in proper data bins, and the transcript
copies were available for recipients by 0800 AMeach day. The original
transcripts were submitted to the DRMwho placed them in the Master Q/L
Transcript File maintained in the DMR.
Edited Voice Transcripts were technically edited and accurately
time-annotated transcripts compiled from the Q/L voice data at JSC.
The transcripts ran approximately two weeks behind real time and were
primarily design for postmission analysis where more accuracy is required.
The method of delivery for these voice data to MSFCwas via air mail from
JSC. On receipt of the transcripts at the HOSCData Room, the Data Dis-
semination Clerk (DDC) sent the data to the repository for reproduction
and then returned them to the data roomwhere they were placed in the
proper data bins for pickup by requestors.
(6) Facsimile. Transmittal of written material between
MSFCand FOMRat JSCwas necessary due to the technical content and
procedural nature of the data interchange. Therefore, the planned Mag-
nafax and a high speed Long Distance Exchange (LDX) machine were used
for action requests, responses, flight plan changes, commentsto flight
plan, procedural changes, etc., by MSGsand the ODs. Facsimile trans-
mission was also provided betweenMSFCand prime contractors.
(7) Photographic Data. A requirement was established
with JSC to receive reproducible masters of all flight film returned by
the astronauts at the end of each mannedmission. The master was re-
ceived at MSFCand submitted to the Photographic Laboratory for proces-
sing to satisfy MSFCphotographic requirements. The photographic plan
developed for the Skylab Program defined the flow, tracking, and coor-
dination of all Skylab flight film. Photographic requirements levied
on MSFCby the various technical disciplines were greater than antici-
pated for SL-I/2 due to extensive photography taken during flyarounds
and EVAs, which were used for analysis of anomalies experienced during
the launch of SL-I. The MSFCphotographic requirements for SL-4 were
also greater than expected due to an extension of the SL-4 mission.
(8) Video Data. A requirement was levied on JSC(before
SL-I) for a copy of all flight video from the Skylab Program. The
video copies were merged (real time and dump) on two-inch video tapes
and shipped (via commercial air) to MSFCevery two or three days.
These were knownas Master Merged Video Tapes, and were used by the com-
munications facility to produce 16mmkinescopes and video cassettes.
The 16mmkinescope copy was sent to the MSFCPhotographic Laboratory
where copies were madeat Mission Operations request to satisfy video
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requirements. Copies of the video cassettes were provided to satisfy
video requests when specifically requested.
3. Operations Support Facilities _ Training, and Manning
a. Operstions Support Planning and Procedures. The method
used for providing hardware and software facilities was to adapt the
HOSC and Computation Laboratory for use with Skylab and to interface
with contractor facilities for mission support on an as-requested basis,
and at the same time retain Saturn vehicle support capability. Inter-
face with the LIEF and Slidell Computer Facility was also available to
provide mission support. A manning plan was generated and used in siz-
ing the facility. A HOSC Facilities Plan was generated and facilities
were provided on a 24-hour basis in which MSG personnel, operations
staff, console engineers, administrative personnel, data support, data
dissemination, and module representatives were located. The develop-
ment of the functions and their interfaces were defined in the "Opera-
tions Coordination Procedures" that defined the positions and duties
of support personnel, and their documentation, communication proce-
dures, etc. These were streamlined through their use in simulations
and subsequent mission activities. The HOSC floor plans showing loca-
tions of the various functional activities are shown in Figures IV.C-I
and IV.C-2.
b. Training and Simulations. A training plan was developed
to prepare for mission support. The JSC simulation support and KSC
test support schedules were used in scheduling HOSC activities. Due
to time limitations and hardware problems only one "paper" simulation
involving only MSFC was scheduled in preparation for simulations and
mission support.
(i) Classroom Training. Video-taped familiarization lec-
tures for onboard systems were required in varying degrees for the MSFC
personnel involved in mission support. Additionally, lectures on the
use of HOSC facilities and communications were presented. Specialized
training for HOSC Console Engineers and MOPS terminal operators was
conducted. Training was also provided for MSFC mission support person-
nel engaged in FOMR and Mission Evaluation Room (MER) activities at JSC.
(2) On-the-Job Training. Activities requiring on-the-job
training included FOMR, PIER, and HOSC Communications, Console Engineers,
and MOPS operators. Some on-the-job training was combined with early
simulation exercises.
(3) Simulations. Simulations for the Skylab program in-
volved numerous growth levels. Initially, the exercises involved only
the Operations Staff, and provided familiarization with Operations Coor-
dination Procedures and Communications. A paper simulation that in-
volved two MSGs at once, was the next step. The simulation provided a
simulations staff for problem generation, data support, and simulation
of FOMR and JSC voice inputs. The paper simulation exercised interfaces
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in MSFC, but did not involve any other center. Further simulation pre-
paration in JSC paper simulations of various segments of the Skylab
mission (e.g., liftoff and ascent, SWS activation, first day activities,
etc). The next step was to support "full-up" simulations with data flow
from JSC. A full data flow test and simulation was not available pre-
mission 4ue to problems in the data management software.
c. Mission Support. Software, hardware, and personnel require-
ments were tailored to support combined Saturn and Skylab activities.
Launch support for SL-I, -2, -3, and -4 launch vehicles was concurrent
with the SWS support and required additional facilities for support teams.
The MSFC personnel at JSC manned the BSE position in the MOCR at MCC as
they had done for Apollo launch vehicle support. Additional responsibil-
ity was given to these personnel for activation of SWS systems. Support
Action Centers (SAC) were provided at HOSC for OA and Launch Vehicle
team activities. De-orbit areas for the S-II and S-IVB stages, Engine,
Stage, Wind, and Trajectory Analysis were functional rooms manned for
launch vehicle support. The rooms at the HOSC were converted to support
the OA experiments after launch phases. Launch vehicle prime contractors'
facilities were tied to the communications and data links for technical
and analytical support.
(i) Administrative and Engineering Support. Numerous ad-
ministrative and engineering functions were required for mission support.
Included were an Administrative Support Staff, an Operations Staff, Facil-
ities Management, and a Data Management Staff.
(a) Administrative Support Staff. The group was re-
sponsible for operation of the ASC with the HOSC. Skylab Operations
Library maintenance, receipt and logging of Facsimile data, typing, re-
production, and distribution of action requests and responses, were the
major responsibilities that were required on a 24-hour seven day week
basis during manned and unmanned phases.
4. Management Staff. The management staff at HOSC consisted of a
Senior Operations Director, an Operations Director, an Operations Support
Manager and an Assistant Operations Support Manager. Their function was
to provide a management focal point at MSFC for mission support activi-
ties, assign problems to MSGs, and establish/arbitrate priorities.
The FOMR Staff positions filled by MSFC personnel were the Senior
Program Representative, the ATM Experiment Engineer, the Corollary Exper-
iment Engineer, and appropriate systems engineers.
5. Support Coordination Staff. The group consisted of a Support
Coordinator, a Support Coordinator Assistant, a Personnel Locator, a
Report Coordinator, a Mission Status Engineer, and a Staff Systems En-
gineer. Generally, their function was to locate key personnel; status,
track, and coordinate responses; provide mission status, prepare daily
and weekly reports; maintain communications with MSFC Center Management
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and FOMR,and assure smoothoperation by insuring responses were properly
logged and submitted whendue.
6. Data and Facilities Management Staff. The group included a
Facilities Manager, Data Support Manager, a DRM, a Data Processing Man-
ager, a Data Acquisition Specialist, and a Data Dissemination Clerk.
Their functions included acquiring data, establishing data priorities,
manning MOPS, processing data, and statusing, tracking and disseminating
processed data. Data types included microfilm, user tapes, strip charts,
data book printouts, film data, and voice transcripts. The Facilities
Manager position was staffed 24-hours a day to insure the physical plant
functions were maintained in operational configuration. _ Interfaces with
other center and base operations were maintained.
7. Mission Action Requests and Problem Reportin$. The methods used
in assigning problems at the HOSC involved Mission Action Requests (MARs)
generated at the FOMR and Action Requests (ARs) generated at HOSC. These
forms and their disposal are discussed in detail in the Operations Coor-
dination Procedures. All action requests were included in a weekly re-
port and required formal anomaly closeout.
The number of MARs handled by MSFC was 1994 for the total Skylab
mission. Table IV.C-I categorizes the types of actions and is tabulated
by areas of assignment. The number of ARs generated by MSFC was 2347 for
the total Skylab mission. These are tabulated by category and area of
assignment in Table IV.C-2. The combined total of action traffic is sim-
ilarily illustrated in Table IV.C-3.
To illustrate the rate of accumulation of MARs and ARs as the mis-
sion progressed, Figures IV.C-3 and IV.C-4, respectively, plot the number
of requests against mission time.
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D. Conclusions and Recommendations
i. Conclusions. Premission planning was changed significantly in
three specific areas after the mission began. The areas were as follows:
a. Operations Management. Two staff positions were established
after the mission began. One was the Senior Operations Director who was
in charge of MSFC support activities at the FOMR and at the HOSC. The
second position was that of the Operations Director was was the Senior
Official per shift and was responsible for HOSC support by pursuing on-
going problems and establishing priorities.
b. Work Schedules. Original plans were to staff the HOSC 24-
hours per day and require a MSG work force 40 hours per week, or as re-
quired for problems. As a result of the many problems, a seven day week,
24-hour day schedule was initiated for most MSGs. This required the
addition of almost three times as many persons as were originally planned
in some areas.
c. Data Flow. The ADDT transmission was not satisfactory until
late in the mission. End-to-end data flow testing was not completed sat-
isfactorily before the mission.
2. Recommendations.
a. Staffing should allow for contingency. It is easier to cut
down on staffing than it is to build a staff after problems occur.
b. Initiate early planning for end-to-end data flow testing by
exercising all involved elements and allowing adequate time for software
changes and validation that inevitably result from early testing.
c. Operations (Facilities, Software, Plans, etc.) should be
subjected to the same rigid design review system to which flight hard-
ware is exposed.
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V. Program Assurance

V. PROGRAM ASSURANCE
A. Planning and Scheduling
I. Background Summary. The official release of the first launch
schedule (ML-4) by NASA Headquarters on March 23, 1966, marked conclu-
sion of the preliminary planning development phase of the AAP (Skylab)
program, and introduced the need for a project oriented management
structure within the individual center authority to implement the pro-
grams necessary for a firm mission commitment. A new type of program
control organization was necessary to identify and assess the current
status of program elements and focus management attention on potential
program impact to the ML-4 schedule.
2. MSFC Management Participation. The MSFC Skylab Program Manager
established an organization consisting of project managers from major
module elements of the program: Orbital Workshop, Multiple Docking Adap-
ter, Airlock Module, Payload Shroud, Apollo Telescope Mount, and Experi-
ments. Additional organizations were established for the major disci-
pline activities of Test Reliability, Quality Assurance and Safety; En-
gineering Integration; and Program Control. This MSFC Program Management
Team was delegated specific responsibilities for every end item and sup-
port function required for successful accomplishment of the development
and integration assigned to MSFC by NASA Headquarters. Each Project
Manager, in addition to controlling and monitoring his assigned project/
discipline duties, was assigned responsibility for developing and main-
taining project schedule requirements in the subsystem level of detail
necessary for successful program management. Included in these schedules
were project level intermediate milestones, subsystem status, mockups,
trainers, test articles, ground support equipment, flight articles, sig-
nificant problems, special studies, technical and management interfaces
affecting the project. These schedules were furnished to a central plan-
ning organization for compatibility, summary analysis and subsequent in-
corporation into the Skylab Management Center and the intercenter sched-
ule publication knows as "SARP" (Schedules and Resources Summary).
a. Skylab Management Center. The need for a Skylab Management
Center or Control Room was established early in the program by the MSFC
Skylab Program Manager. The Program Control Office was assigned the
responsibility for developing an information display system to be used
within the center. This information system was to have the capability of
presenting detailed elements of the program in the level or levels neces-
sary for effective program assessment, rapidly and in systematic order.
Initial efforts produced a number of hardware-oriented displays adequate
for identification of major program elements, but as new disciplines de-
veloped and integrated program requirements were defined (experiment pay-
loads, configuration management, quality assurance, and Level i report-
ing), new and increased demands were placed on the reporting system. New
techniques such as SARP, tabular matrix,
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and modified PERTwere employed to effectively deal with the increased
display requirements.
b. Schedules and Resources Summary. A comprehensiveand
efficient managementplanning and reporting technique was implemented
in January 1969, and proved effective throughout the tenure of the
program. This Schedules and Resources SummaryPlan, initiated by a
NASAHeadquarters memo,identified specific program elements, control
milestones, and requirements established by Headquarters management
and extended through each assigned center's responsibility. A monthly
cycle was established for the preparation and submittal of each center
ProgramManager's input to the NASAHeadquarters. Figure V.A-I con-
tains a specific listing of the MSFCresponsible items.
General SARPRequirements. Each Center Skylab SARPbook was
organized into subject category sections containing all levels per-
taining to that subject as follows:
- Center SummarySection. All three Centers.
Project Sections. Eachproject section for MSFCand JSC
contained all project, module, system schedules, and
resource charts for Levels 2, 3, and 4.
- Experiment Section. For MSFCand JSC included all experi-
ment development schedules for resource charts.
- Mission SummarySections. For KSC, each mission included
all charts pertaining to that mission for all levels.
Center SummaryLevel SARPRequirements.
Current MonthAccomplishments Versus Planned. Reflected
significant activities against planned for the current
reporting month.
Next Month Planned Accomplishments. Reflected plans for
significant activities during the succeeding reporting
period.
- Tabulation of Controlled Milestones and Dates.
- Center Skylab Resources Summary. Reflected total center
level cost and obligation, including total for all years.
Project Level 2 SARPRequirements.
ProgramManager's Evaluation. A narrative summaryfor high-
lighting all significant activities, problems, and brief
status for each project. Identified present or probable
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significant deviations from plans (particularly cost,
schedule, manpower, or technical content) and action
being taken.
Major Problems. Program Manager's evaluation of sig-
nificant problem reports included identification or
definition of the problem; potential impact on overall
cost, schedule, or technical performance; recommended
solutions; and required actions by Centers and Head-
quarters.
Project Overall Development Schedules. Overall develop-
ment covered all phases of planning, management actions,
key documentation, development, testing, fabrication,
assembly, and checkout of ground and flight articles up
to and including delivery to KSC.
Project Resources Summary - Current Fiscal Year (FY).
Curves for the current FY reflecting actual versus
planned obligations and costs. Included an authority
curve. Included monthly obligations and costs, planned
and actual, in tabular form. Summary columns included
prior years and totaled all years.
Module Level 3 SARP Requirements.
Module Overall Development Schedules. Same require-
ments applied as defined for Project Overall Development
Schedules in the previous paragraph.
Module Schedule Trend. Two lines reflected the baseline
plan and the management assessment. Begin with October
1968 (the first month ML-15 was issued in Level I SARP)
and reflected delivery needs for the module as related
to ML-15 schedule. Included a properly coded Manager's
assessment of delivery. Included reasons for changes to
plans or assessment.
Module Resource Summary (Current FY). Same requirements
applied as defined for Project Resource Summary in
Project Level 2 SARP Requirements paragraph.
Module Resource Summary (All FY). This tabulation in-
cluded monthly planned and current estimates for obliga-
tions, cost, cost rate, and direct manpower for the
current fiscal year and the succeeding FY.
Module Cost Trend. Two lines reflected the current
approved run-out cost and the management assessment,
plotted against time beginning with October 1968.
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- Module Planned Versus Actual Drawing Releases. For each
module (flight hardware) included a cumulative curve (S-
curve) of percent of final drawing release completed (as
related to CDR), including all drawing changes, against
time for planned and actual releases.
Module Planned Versus Actual Verification Program. For
each module (flight hardware) included a cumulative curve
(S-curve) plotted against time for planned versus actual
tests starts, and for planned versus actual test comple-
tions. Tabulations below the curves included numerical
data supporting the curves.
ModuleVerification Program Status by Systems. This was
a schedule chart broken downby system reflecting total
numberof tests required for each system test program and
cumulative numbersof actual completions as of the report-
ing date.
Systems Level 4 SARPRequirements.
Experiment or SystemDevelopment Schedules. For system
schedules, each center Managerselected significant sys-
tems to report against.
Experiment Cost and Obligation Tabulation. For each experi-
ment for which a center had development responsibilities,
tabulation of total cost and obligations for prior years,
current year by month, and total cost and obligation esti-
to run-out.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations. Implementation of a central-
ized planning and control authority, complimented by continual project
level management participation in regular program review and reporting
activities, provided an extremely effective information and control
system.
Use of SARP techniques and Control Room displays provided a compre-
hensive method of presentation whereby emphasis could be focused from
one program element to another as Skylab progressed through the various
phases of change and development. The ability of this method to identify
affected elements and potential impacts was successfully demonstrated
repeatedly throughout the Skylab Program.
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B. Reliability Program
i. Objective and Methods
a. Purpose. The SWS reliability program was established to
influence SWS design and thereby achieve a safe environment for the
crew and a secure operational capability for satisfying primary mis-
sion objectives.
b. Summary. Reliability program requirements applicable to
the SWS are contained in the Cluster Requirements Specification. The
following program elements were the basis for achieving desired reli-
ability for the Skylab missions:
(i) Design Goals. Components were designed to be fail-
safe. It was a design goal that no single point failures should ad-
versely affect crew safety or prevent the attainment of primary mission
objectives. The design should not be made dependent upon the develop-
ment of new components or techniques when performance and reliability
requirements could be met by the use of established technology. Com-
ponents that were in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
inventory and were procured to Specification NHB5300.6, Parts and
Material plan, were given priority consideration in the design and
selection process for the Cluster System and its subsystems. Existing
test data was used to the maximum extent practicable to demonstrate
that such components were capable of meeting mission requirements.
(2) Reliability Analyses. Reliability analyses, which
consisted basically of failure mode and effect analyses, were conduc-
ted to identify the effect of component failure on mission objectives
and to categorize failure modes by criticality. All components whose
failure would adversely affect crew safety or result in not achieving
a primary mission objective were identified. Retention of these fail-
ure modes was rigorously justified.
Two types of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were con-
ducted to evaluate the effects of failure on equipment operation, mis-
sion objectives, and crew safety. Equipment level FMEAs were conducted
to identify equipment failure modes and the consequences of failure in
these modes on the performance of subsystems that were comprised of
these equipments. A Mission Level FMEA was conducted to define those
critical functions and related hardware that could lead to the compro-
mise of specific mission objectives or crew/personnel safety. The
Mission Level FMEA used a top-down approach and bridged the gap between
equipment and mission by singling out only the critical hardware items
that were truly single failure points for the mission being examined.
Both analytical techniques led to the identification and base-
lining of critical items through the Skylab Level II CCB. Each par-
ticipating contractor prepared a retention rationale for critical
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items in his equipment and developed special controls and test programs
to minimize the risk of failure.
c. Methods
(l) Approach
(a) Equipment Level FMEACritical Items List (CIL).
EquipmentLevel FMEAswere prepared for Skylab modules and experiments.
In general, these analyses beganwith reliability logic diagrams based
on established techniques. These diagrams provided a visible tie be-
tween hardware design and analyses and displayed functional relation-
ships amonghardware elements. Both series and redundant elements were
included in the diagrams. Transition between the diagrams and the FMEA
was accomplished through coding systems that assigned unique numbers
progressively from subsystems down through components. The FMEAswere
performed on componentsidentified in the logic diagrams in general
accordance with the established format requirements. Failure modes
were analyzed for their effect on the system, mission, and crew safety
in each applicable mission phase. Failure detection cues available to
the flight and ground crews were evaluated and failure reaction time
was estimated. Recommendationswere madefor the resolution of criti-
cal failure effects.
A critical items list was prepared by each module contractor sum-
marizing the results of the failure modeand effect analysis. The
Single Failure Point (SFP) Summarycontained a description, failure
consequence, and a rationale for retention or corrective action for
each SFP in Categories i and 2A. The Launch Critical ComponentSummary
contained a description, failure consequence, and recommendedcorrec-
tive action for each componentwhose failure before launch would result
in a launch scrub. The Critical Redundant/BackupComponentsSummary
identified primary and backup componentsand described failure modes
in the primary componentand compensation provided by the backup com-
ponent. The module CILs were maintained through SL-I Flight Readiness
Review (FRR).
(b) Mission Level FMEA/CIL. The Skylab program was
divided in two phases for the purpose of defining FMEAactivity, mis-
sion definition, and module and experiment design. The Mission Level
FMEAwas begun during the mission definition phase.
A top-down mission Functional Failure Effect Analysis (FFEA) was
conducted using mission description documents to identify the sequence
of major mission events. The events were subdivided in functions and
subfunctions so that analysis and identification of their purpose in
the mission was evident. The types of module failures that occur were
identified and their effects on the mission and crew were evaluated.
The identification of functions that were critical to mission success
or crew safety becamethe baseline for a detailed analysis of hardware
required to perform these functions in the Mission Level FMEA.
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The Mission Level FMEAproceeded by collecting critical subfunc-
tions from the FFEAinto related or similar effect groups. In turn,
these subfunctions were matched with the hardware elements necessary
to perform the function. Failure modesidentified in equipment contrac-
tors FMEAswere reviewed for Skylab mission implications and additional
analysis was performed to assure that all critical failure modeswere
covered. The resulting failures were then related to commonmission
effects by mission phase, with particular attention given to failures
that propagate across functional or hardware interfaces.
A Mission Level CIL was prepared which included Skylab flight com-
ponents that were identified as mission or crew critical by the Mission
Level FMEA. Componentsincluded in this list were limited to those
items not included in the Module CILs that had been baselined by Level
II CCBapproval. The list was maintained through SL-I FRRand contained
detailed information on all candidate componentsthat required to be
disposed of and provided status of actions taken on items submitted in
previous revisions of the list.
(2) Definitions
(a) The mission effect of each failure was assigned
a criticality category in accordance with the following definitions:
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION
IS
ZA
2B
3
3A
Loss of life (or serious injury) of crewmember(s)
(ground or flight).
Applies to Safety and Hazard Monitoring Systems (C&W
system). When required to function because of fail-
ure in the related primary operations system(s) poten-
tial effect of failure is loss of life of crewmember(s).
Immediate mission flight termination or unscheduled
termination at the next planned earth landing area.
(For Skylab includes loss of primary mission objectives.)
Launch scrub.
Launch delay (also includes loss of secondary mission
objectives for Skylab).
Degradation of primary mission objectives resulting
from a component failure that impacts two or more
group related experiments.
(b) Critical items were classified in accordance
with the following definitions:
CRITICAL ITEM CATEGORY DESCRIPTION
Critical Single Failure
Point
A single item of hardware, at the com-
ponent level, the failure of which will
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CRITICAL ITEM CATEGORY DESCRIPTION
lead directly to a condition described
by failure categories I,IS,2A, or 2B.
Critical Redundant/
Backup Component
(CRBC)
A redundant component (in the same sys-
tem) whose next failure would result in
a condition described by failure cate-
gories i, IS, or 2A.
Launch Critical Compon-
ent (LCC)
An item with failure modes that can re-
sult in launch scrub. Criticality cat-
egory 2B, i.e., a launch delay long
enough to require retanking of propel-
lants or rescheduling the launch to a
later date.
Ordnance Components All pyrotechnic and explosive devices.
(c) The criticality of failure effects was based on
_rew safety and mission objectives. For hardware development the mis-
sion objectives were treated as criticality category 2. Individual
_TM, Earth Resources, and Medical Experiments were considered category
_. Scientific, Engineering, Technology, and Department of Defense
_xperiments were classified in category 3 or 4, as specified by the
_evelopment centers. Individual critical elements within an experiment
_ere classified category i or 2 as appropriate.
(3) Experiment Level FMEAs. Equipment Level FMEAs on
_odules and experiments were prepared in accordance with contractor-
repared/NASA-approved reliability program plans. The plans controlled
he scope, format, and submittal schedules for individual FM_EAs. Module
MEAs were scheduled to be available at major program milestones and
ere used extensively for assessment of design concepts and features
uring inhouse reviews, formal design, and program reviews. Formal
eviews began with PRR and CDRs and extended through FRK. Module FMEAs
ncluded the following:
MODULE AGENCY
ATM MMC/Bendix
OWS MDAC -W
AM MDAC -E
MDA MMC
Module FMEAs were maintained throughout the program with major
iphasis placed upon elimination of critical failure modes. Component
_design, workarounds, and contingency plans and procedures were the
incipal methods by which this was accomplished. By FRK, critical
_ilure modes associated with each module were reduced to the quanti-
es identified below:
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CRITICALFAILUREMODES
MODULE CATEGORY I CATEGORY 2A
OWS i0 52
_LDA 2 6
AM 3 28
ATM 0 28
TOTAL 15 114
The majority of critical failure modes affecting crew safety fell
into three categories: fire hazard, rupture of stored energy device,
and loss of SWS pressure integrity. These components included:
MODULE COMPONENT FAILURE MODE
OWS TACS Storage Spheres Rupture
OWS TACS Manifold Rupture
OWS MI31 Pressure Vessel Rupture
OWS M509/T020 Pressure Vessel Rupture
OWS SAL Window Structural Failure
OWS MI31 Rotating Litter Chair Structural Failure
_A S190 Window Structural Failure
MDA S192 Window Structural Failure
AM Coolant Loop Leakage/Fire Hazard
AM N 2 Tanks Structural Failure
AM 02 Tanks Structural Failure
d. Design Evaluation
(i) Mission Level FMEA. The top-down FFEA, was published
in November 1970. The definition of the mission by functions or events,
and the analysis of these functions and all supporting functions for
impact on mission and crew were contained in the FFEA. Loss of each
function or subfunction was analyzed for its effect on vehicle, crew,
and mission. Known redundant or backup modes were noted in the FFEA.
Given that a failure had occurred, the probability of the loss affect-
ing vehicle, crew, or mission was given in terms of possible loss (i-
10%), probable loss (10-90%), and actual loss (90-100%).
The FFEA was limited to considerations of single function losses
and their effects on mission and crew. Multiple function losses or
interaction effects were not analyzed. There may be several ways a
function can fail but the effect on the vehicle, mission, and crew re-
flected the "worst case" only.
A summary of critical functions identified with each Skylab mis-
sion is as follows:
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
MISSION CATEGORY i CATEGORY 2A
SL-I/2 87 251
SL-3 84 225
SL-4 77 129
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The SL-I/2 mission was the most critical with a total of 87 poten-
tial functional failures that resulted in crew hazard and 251 that re-
suited in loss of primary mission objectives. The SL-3 mission was
second and SL-4 mission was third. The SL-I/2 mission included func-
tions for initial activation of the SWS,i.e., deployment of ATMand
OWSsolar arrays, which was not required in subsequent missions.
The most critical part of each mission from the standpoint of crew
safety was the OAactivation phase. The major contributing factor to
crew safety in this phasewas loss of electric power from power genera-
tion and distribution systems primarily in the OWS,and to a lesser de-
gree, the power systems in the ATM.
The phase that produced most of the failures with a resulting loss
of primary mission objectives was the on-orbit activity phase. The
greatest single contributor to loss of mission objectives in SL-I/2,
SL-3, or SL-4 was the inability to perform or complete the ATMexperi-
ments.
The importance of the FFEAin the system integration process was
to highlight those mission functions whose failure would prevent suc-
cessful completion of mission objectives or affect crew safety. The
FFEAwas a prerequisite to the Mission Level FMEAby defining the cri-
tical functions on which to perform further in-depth analysis at the
hardware level.
The Mission Level FMEAwas prepared and published in November1971
and maintained through March 1973. The documentconsisted of a summary
volume and nine appendices; electrical power, mechanical and fluid
equipment, instrumentation and communications, guidance and control,
C&W,medical experiments, EILEPexperiments, ATMexperiments, and
corollary experiments.
The Mission Level FMEAidentified 139 componentswith one or more
failure modesthat resulted in one or more critical effects. Grouping
the critical effects against four major time/activity phases of the
mission indicated that 60 related to SWSactivation, 45 related to
mannedoperations-SWS systems, 71 related to mannedoperations-experi-
ments, and I0 related to deactivation and storage. Successful comple-
tion of the nonrepeating functions in the first premannedoperations
phase (SL-I) removed53 critical effects from consideration in subse-
quent missions. Critical effects (Category I and 2) contributed to
the mission phase totals as follows:
MISSIONPHASE
CRITICALEFFECTS
SWSActivation
MannedOperations-SWSSystems
MannedOperations-Experiments
Deactivation and Storage
COne or More Critical Effect per SFP) PHASE
TOTAL
CATEGORY i CATEGORY 2 TOTAL
n
0 60 60
9 36 45
14 57 71
0 i0 i0
23 163 186
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Recommendations were made for potential contingency or alternate
operation studies for the following conditions that resulted from one
or more SFPs.
- Off-nominal orbit perigee.
- No OWS Solar Array or Meteoroid Shield deployment due
to loss of both deploy buses.
- Partial or total loss of ATM T/M output.
SWS atmosphere contamination due to coolanol leakage.
- Loss of active cooling for ATM canister.
- Failure of PS to jettison.
Unpredictable PS jettison trajectory.
- Damage/contamination to ATM and FLDA due to failures
in the shroud separation system.
- ATM fails to fully deploy or lock.
- Partial or no ATM Solar Array deployment.
- Loss of OWS Solar Array power.
- Failure to deploy OWS meteoroid bumper.
- Failure to vent OWS waste tank.
- Failure to close OWS habitation area vent valves.
- Open or short in TACS thruster command line during IU
operation.
- Inability to dock or undock due to probe/droge failures.
- Failure to open any one of five in-line hatches during
activation (CM, MDA, AM, OWS).
- Leakage in ATM C&D/EREP coolant system.
- Failure of Trash Disposal Airlock.
- Loss of ATM Experiment fine pointing due to launch lock
failure.
- Loss of OA pressurization.
(2) Critical Items List
(a) Equipment Level CILs. The process of baselining
Skylab critical items was implemented in accordance with the MSFC Sky-
lab Configuration Management Manual, MM8040.10A, and MSFC Program Di-
rective - Skylab Critical Items Control, MPD 8020.4. Project Office
(AM/_A, ATM, OWS, GSE) were assigned primary responsibility for initi-
ating necessary actions that resulted in five baselined module CILs.
The actions included an MSFC inhouse review, a preboard review, and a
joint Level II CCB reviews. The MSFC Central Systems Engineering was
assigned responsibility for conducting an in-depth review of each cri-
tical item to validate the accuracy and adequacy of the relevent analy-
sis methods and the retention rationale for acceptance of the design
containing the critical item. The module CILs were available, in pre-
liminary form, at module CDRs (conducted between May and September 1970)
and baselined as indicated below.
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MODULE CIL BASELINE
MODULE AGENCY CIL BASELINE
ATM MSFC September 1971
OWS _IDAC-W June 1971
AM MDAC-E April 1971
MDA MMC May 1971
The baselined critical items were given continuing attention
_hrough the major program reviews including SOCAR, DCR, and FRR. At
_ach review, the retention rationale for each SFP was reassessed and
_he potential for eliminating SFPs was reevaluated. Consideration was
_iso given to operational workarounds and constraints, and development
_f launch and mission rules.
(b) Mission Level CIL. The Mission Level CIL in-
luded items overlooked by the baselined module CILs (including exper-
ments) items that could not be identified without analysis peculiar
o the Mission Level FMEA, and items identified in the Module Level
MEAs but whose criticality to i, IS, 2A, or 2B as determined by mis-
ion level analysis. The Mission Level CIL was initially published in
ay 1971 and maintained through five revisions with the final release
ublished in February 1973.
A total of 97 critical item candidates were identified, including
2 Single Failure Points (SFP), five Launch Critical Components (LCC),
nd 20 Critical Redundant/Backup Components (CR/BC). _ All items approved
MSFC were either eliminated by redesign, proposed for addition to
le various Module CILs, or added to baselined CILs by Level II CCB
_tion. A summary of critical item candidate submittals and how they
_re disposed of is presented in Table V.B-I.
Table V.B-I. Critical Item Summary
DEPOSITION
.ITICAL ITEM ITEMS WITHDRAWN/ ELIMINATED BASELINED
CATEGORY SUBMITTED DISAPPROVED BY REDESIGN VIA CCB
SFPs 72 25 6 41
CR/BCs 20 ii 0 9
LCGs 5 1 0 4
The majority of the 25 SFP candidates in Table V.B-I were with-
awn on the basis of MSFC guidelines regarding identification of SFPs
structures and reassessment of failure effects on primary mission
iectives. Eleven CR/BC candidates were withdrawn on the basis of
FC supplemental guidelines for baselining CR/BCs.
Procedures for baselining critical item candidates contained in
Mission Level CIL were comparable to those established for baselining
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Module CILs. Each critical item candidate was reviewed by MSFC
Central Systems Engineering and an ECR was prepared to either
(i) redesign and eliminate the critical item, or
(2) accept the risk associated with the critical
item but initiate action to minimize it.
In the latter situation, the ECR was written to incorporate the criti-
cal item in the baselined Module CIL.
(c) Utilization of FMEAs/CILs. The process of identify-
ing, baselining, and controlling critical items precipitated a variety
of program activities with the objective of minimizing the risk of
failure occurrence. Although emphasis was placed on elimination of
SFPs during the design and development phase, such action was not often
feasible or practical. After initial baselining of critical items,
program attention was given to the development of rigorous justifica-
tion for retaining SFPs. A parallel effort was begun to provide work-
arounds and mitigate the potential effect of failure. For example,
studies were undertaken to evaluate the pressurized SWS and critical
components that could cause mission termination or present a hazard to
the crew if penetrated by a meteoroid. The meteoroid vulnerability
analysis considered both component criticality and location.
Validation of safety margins through test programs became the
basis for retention rationale for the majority of critical items. Such
tests on SWS windows included pressure tests with induced cracks, flow
growth, and differential pressure tests to safety factors as high as 20.
Pressure vessels were subjected to cycle, notch, and burst tests during
development and qualification testing.
Contingency analyses were undertaken to define a preplanned course
of action to be taken in the event of a critical failure. The Mission
Level FMEA provided candidates for which contingency action was consi-
dered feasible. In a typical case, the Mission Level FMEA identified
critical items that could result in inability to deploy the ATM. Sub-
sequently, Skylab Program Contingency Analysis developed procedures and
identified tools for manual deployment of the ATM.
Each critical item was evaluated as a potential candidate for in-
flight maintenance. Where feasible and practical, spares and tools
were provided for real-time in-orbit maintenance of the SWS. For ex-
ample, tools were provided to open jammed hatches in the MDA and AM.
Critical Item Lists were used as inputs to the Mission and Launch
Rule Documents. Studies were undertaken to develop launch commit/launch
scrub criteria for countdown failures of components in redundant sys-
tems. These criteria were based on component criticality and the ex-
tent of available redundancy.
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As a final validation of SFPs, specific test requirements were
incorporated in the integrated system TCRSDs applicable to the conduct
of test operations at KSC. Where practical, the integrity of each cri-
tical component was demonstrated before launch to provide confidence
that the SWS was failure-free at launch.
2. Conclusions and Recommendations. The complexity and multi-
plicity of Skylab equipment interfaces led to a program requirement for
two complementary approaches to failure modes effect analysis. These
included the mission-level FMEA and the equipment-level FMEA. Primary
mission objectives were defined for Skylab and became mission success
criteria for the SWS. With the exception of module FMEAs, the typical
equipment contractor (i.e., experiment contractor) was not in a posi-
tion to assess the mission effects of failure in his equipment. The
analyses were often limited to evaluation of failure effects of terms
of effect on equipment performance up to a physical or functional inter-
face. In addition, mitigating circumstances often existed in the system
design such that block or functional redundancy lessened the effect of
failure as measured by mission success criteria. At the module level,
contractor visibility of the relationship between equipment and mission
objectives improved significantly. With the exception of failure modes
with effects at module interfaces, the mission and crew effects of most
failures could be assessed directly by the module contractor. For
these reasons, a requirement existed for a mission-level FM_ that would
evaluate the system implications of each failure mode and determine the
ultimate effect of failure on crew safety and mission objectives.
The mission-level FMEA, therefore, concentrated on evaluation of
failure propagation across equipment interfaces, experiments, as well
as modules. Failure effects were examined for impact on the integrity
of the SWS, both as a platform for the conduct of experiments and as a
habitable environment for the crew.
Both the mission-level FMEA and equipment-level FMEA served a com-
mon purpose; i.e., identification and control of Skylab critical items.
The following recommendations are appropriate to future manned
space programs:
Functional Failure Effect Analysis should be time-
phased to provide criticality classifications for equipment before con-
tract award. This is particularly significant to component procurement
where the criticality category determines the scope of the component
reliability and safety programs.
Initial baselining of critical items at all equipment
levels should occur at CDR to provide program visibility and implementa-
tion of controls early in the development phase. In particular, SFPs
should be given attention in development test programs to demonstrate
safety margins and provide a basis for retention rationale.
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Numerical reliability requirements and quantitative
reliability assessmentswere de-emphasized in Skylab. Probability
assessmentswere limited to trade studies, comparative analysis and
risk assessments on critical SFPs. The FMEA/CILwas the focal point
for the Skylab reliability program and should be emphasizedas a cost-
effective foundation for future reliability programs on large-scale
systems.
The philosophy of baselining critical items through
a Level II CCBshould be continued into future programs. The process
of risk assessment followed by decision to accept an SFPon direct re-
design is beneficial.
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C. Safety
i. Introduction. The MSFC Skylab safety program evolved from
preliminary studies initiated during the AAP. The basic purpose of
the studies was to identify safety requirements and to plan a pro-
gram for their implementation. The studies were classified in three
interrelated categories, as follows:
Program integration, i.e., overall program objectives, policy,
program management requirements, and methods for hazard iden-
tification and elimination or control.
- Systems integration, i.e., technical criteria and requirements
for flight and ground hardware design and operations.
Implementation assurance, i.e., checkpoints, reviews, surveys,
audits, and similar activities applicable to both program and
system integration.
These preliminary studies were performed in recognition that a
variety of aerospace organizations, both Government and contractors,
were involved in the planning and development of the first orbital
space station. The retention and application of diversified experience
that had been gained by these organizations including methods and tech-
niques that had been developed during prior programs was highly desir-
able. Furthermore, the cost and time required to impose new methods
on organizations that had demonstrated success on previous programs
might have been prohibitive and may not have served the ultimate
safety objectives of the program. However, the predominant factors
that were prevalent during these preliminary planning activities and
greatly influenced the acceptance or rejection of prior program methods
were (i) cost and (2) the requirements to make maximum use of existing
hardware and documentation. The studies encompassed all aspects and
connotations of the word safety as described in documentation developed
by NASA, DOD agencies, and aerospace contractors. Safety was refer-
red to in terms of a state or condition of hardware, individuals, or
groups responsible for identifying and preventing unsafe conditions,
an engineering discipline applied to the achievement of a safe condi-
tion, and a variety of others. The results of these studies led to
the further development of the MSFC Sky lab System Safety Program,
which ultimately encompassed all of these aspects of safety.
2. Definition. The MSFC Skylab System Safety Program was
that activity by which the combined efforts of management and all
technical organizations were coordinated to provide timely identifica-
tion and correction of the conditions or events that could contribute
to unsafe systems failure, equipment damage, or personnel injury. This
activity was effected through the total systems engineering and manage-
ment process throughout all phases of the Skylab program.
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3. Basic Obiectives. The basic objectives of the Skylab System
Safety Program were the assurance that:
- F_ximum safety would be designed in the flight systems con-
sistent with mission requirements.
Adequate controls over identified hazards, inherent to ground
support systems, equipment, and facilities, would be
established by design for the protection of flight systems,
GSE, and personnel.
Minimum risk would be involved in the acceptance and use
of new or hazardous materials.
Hazards associated with manufacturing, including fabrication
and assembly of flight systems, subsystems and associated
GSE, would be identified and eliminated or controlled.
Hazards associated with flight and ground system and subsystem
testing, including such tests as those conducted for and in,
altitude chambers, hyperbaric chambers, and neutral buoyancy
facilities, would be identified and eliminated or controlled.
All organizations involved in Skylab would be aware of and
participate in a unified safety program. The basis for this
objective was an underlying need to develop a systems approach
to the management of safety related activities, and to increase
the effectiveness of existing safety personnel through all
organizations responsible for hardware development.
4. Policy. The basic policy in the MSFC Skylab Program was
that system safety is an inherent function of the line disciplines,
i.e., engineering, test, manufacturing, and operations, and cannot
be separated from these disciplines. There was also a recognized need
for separate and distinct system safety organizational elements in the
MSFC Skylab Program Office, the MSFC S&E Directorate (in support
of the MSFC inhouse activities), and major contractor organiza-
tions.
The role of these system safety elements was as follows:
a. To establish system safety requirements applicable to
their functional area or project responsibility, i.e., overall program,
project, contractor, or S&E Laboratory levels for such areas as system
engineering and integration, OWS, AM, MDA, ATM, or experiments, as
applicable.
b. To ensure compliance with established system safety re-
quirements by means of formal reviews or audit of the line discipline
activities.
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c. To participate in special efforts such as (i) materials
testing, selection, and control to reduce flammability and toxicity
hazards to the crew, (2) materials testing, selection, and control to
reduce contamination hazards effecting the achievement of primary
mission objectives, (3) special studies and test programs to ensure
the integrity of the pressurized spacecraft shell, (4) sneak circuit
Studies, (5) studies and tests to determine potential shock hazards
to the crew, (6) studies of such areas as the biomedical experiments
and related data systems to ensure that Criticality 3 failures could
not have Criticality 2 effects (see Section V.B for definition of
criticality categories).
d. To perform design safety analyses, operations hazard
analyses, and other analytical efforts that were specified in contractor
safety plans or by supplemental contract tasks whereby the primary
responsibility for task implementation rested specifically with system
safety specialists.
e. To perform reviews of test and operating procedures
including those required for ground handling, transportation, service,
maintenance, or storage of flight or flight type hardware. Formal
concurrence was required for procedures which involved inherently
hazardous tests or other operations which could have resulted in damage
to hardware or injury to personnel.
f. To perform tracking and statusing functions as related
to the disposition of major safety problems as identified in the
various engineering analyses, mockupreviews, procedural reviews,
milestone reviews, program baseline reviews, CCBproceedings, and
similar activities.
5. Organization and Responsibility. The MSFC Skylab System
Safety Organization is shown in Figure V.C-I. The basic responsibil-
ities for implementing the MSFC Skylab System Safety Program were as
follows:
a. The Manager of the Test, Reliability, Quality Assurance,
and Safety Office (SL-T0) acted as the official point of contact for
all matters pertaining to the MSFC Skylab system safety function, and
through his office provided the overall planning and direction for
implementation of the MSFC Skylab safety effort. In addition, he
managed special tasks, such as the Mission Level FMEA, and the
System Safety Definition, Status, and Evaluation task.
b. The MSFC Skylab Project Managers for major modules,
experiments, and GSE were responsible for ensuring that the Skylab
system safety program was implemented by their contractors or the
responsible MSFC S&E organizations, as appropriate.
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L.
c. The Manager of the Systems Engineering and Integration
Office (SL-EI) provided engineering support to SL-TQ and the Skylab
project offices, as required, in the implementation of the Skylab
system safety effort.
d. MSFC S&E provided technical support to the Skylab
Program Office, as required, in the implementation of the Skylab system
safety effort. This effort included technical monitoring and assess-
ments in such areas as surveys and audits, the technical review of
equipment and mission level FMEAs, and the technical review of safety
analyses of GSE and associated ground operations involving Skylab hard-
ware.
6. Management and Implementation Approach. Safety representa-
tives were assigned as focal points for coordinating all system safety
activities within each project throughout the Skylab Program Office.
Project offices responsible for multiple hardware systems and equip-
ment, such as the Experiments and GSE projects, provided safety person-
nel in addition to contractor system safety specialists who were
assigned to perform special safety tasks. All major contractors
provided full-time system safety personnel as points of contact for
overall safety efforts. In addition, safety specialists were assign-
ed to such groups as engineering, reliability, and quality to imple-
ment special safety efforts specified in formal safety plans and
other contractual documentation.
Similarly MSFC S&E organizations identified points of contact for
safety matters in such areas as overall systems engineering and systems
verification and test, including GSE. The number of personnel assigned
fluctuated according to the scope and complexity of effort, and the
degree of depth determined to be necessary to achieve the safety objec-
tives or task requirements. As an example, S&E full-time safety per-
sonnel, supported by additional system safety personnel from both the
integration contractor and the principal ESE contractor, were assigned
to the AIM flight hardware test team, which remained with the hardware
from shipment through the completion of launch operations at KSC.
This organizational approach, within the framework of the previously
stated policy and responsibilities, provided effective management for
the achievement of overall MSFC Skylab system safety program objec-
tives. Specifically, this approach resulted in the following:
Provided up-to-date visibility of safety-related activities
through each system safety representative who was organization-
ally associated with his specific program, project, and techni-
cal area of responsibility.
Provided effective in=egration of overall program safety
activities between project offices, MSFC S&E organizations,
and contractors.
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- Minimized duplication of effort through a centralized program
safety organization, with specific elements identifiable with
other technical disciplines, under a single system safety
manager.
Provided a central point of contact between MSFCSkylab
organizations and MSFCtop management,other NASAcenters,
and NASAHeadquarters.
- Provided multidiscipline experienced personnel in support of
system specialists.
- Minimized the development of large program peculiar safety
organizations.
Provided greater awareness and understanding of the functions
and activities of safety personnel by the various engineering,
production, and operations personnel at all organizational
levels.
- Improved the effectiveness of limited numberof safety personnel
in achieving their specific tasks and responsibilities.
7. Hazard Reduction Criteria. Criteria for actions to eliminate
or control identified hazards were, in order of precedence, as follows:
a. Design for Minimum Hazards. Inherent safety in product
design was an ultimate goal. The major effort throughout the design
phases was to assure inherent safety through the selection of appropri-
ate design features, such as redundancy and increased safety factors,
to minimize risk in case of material deficiencies in the assembled
product of human error during manufacturing.
b. Incorporate Fail-Safe Features and Safety Devices.
Known hazards inherent to the design or operational environment, which
could not be eliminated through design selection, were precluded or
controlled through the use of appropriate fail-safe features and safe-
ty devices as part of the system, subsystem, or equipment. The purpose
of these criteria was to minimize the effects of potentially unsafe
conditions in the event of a failure or the occurrence of undesired
events due to environment, improper equipment use, or human error dur-
ing flight and ground operations.
c. Incorporate Hazard Detection, Warning, and Corrective
Action Features. These criteria were applied when it was not possible
to preclude the existence of a known hazard or whenever a potential
hazard was identified that could have been caused by an out-of-limit
condition or failure, which could have adversely affected the safety
of flight or ground hardware or personnel. Devices were employed for
the timely detection of a hazardous condition to warn of an impending
or out-of-tolerance condition, and to provide means to limit or control
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the effects. Caution and warning signals and their application were
designed to minimize the probability of incorrect signals or of im-
proper personnel reaction to the signals. Hazards determined to be
potentially catastrophic or sufficiently critical to require automatic
corrective action features included manual or alternate backup capa-
bility.
d. Develop Special Operating Instructions. Precautionary
instructions, notes, or warnings within procedures were developed to
identify hazards associated with improper or out-of-sequence operations.
Procedures were prepared in such a way as to counter identified poten-
tially hazardous conditions for enhancementof flight and ground sys-
tems, equipment, and personnel safety. This criterion was applicable
to all procedures associated with equipment fabrication and assembly(such as manufacturing processes and assembly instructions), testing,
repair, maintenance, servicing, handling, transportation, packaging,
and storage. Precautionary notations were included in procedures in
accordance with the following general guidelines:
- Notes - information, techniques, etc., that should be emphasized.
- Caution - information, techniques, etc., that if not followed
could result in damageto equipment.
- Warning - information, techniques, etc., that if not followed
could result in injury or loss of life.
e. Provide Training and Certification of Personnel. These
criteria were applicable to assembly, test, inspection, and operating
personnel to ensure their awareness of identified residual hazards.
This training was developed to familiarize personnel with design or
procedural controls that had been established to minimize risk.
8. System Safety Program Implementation. The following paragraphs
summarize the highlights of the overall MSFC Skylab Safety Program.
a. Safety Plans. System safety plans were prepared by all
project offices or contractors, as appropriate, who were responsible
for major modules and overall support equipment. Each plan, although
tailored to the specific hardware and functional responsibilities of
the project, contained a description of the basic requirements, respon-
sibilities, and activities considered necessary to effecively manage
the system safety program. Each plan was generally developed or updated
to reflect the integrated effort within the total project and was in
conformance with the basic MSFC Skylab program objecives, policy, and
guidelines outlined by SL-TQ. Table V.C-I is a composite list of
elements, by subject title, that were used in developing Skylab system
safety requirements. Each plan was prepared, updated, and approved
through a review process as follows:
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Concurrent with initial planning efforts by project and module
contractor organizations, preliminary studies and planning
activities were performed by the integration contractor in
support of SL-TQ. Overall planning activities performed by
SL-TQresulted in a composite summaryof preliminary safety
program requirements and guidelines. The principal require-
ments documentsused as source data included NASAHeadquarters
Safety Program Directive No. i, Apollo Applications Program
Directive No. 31, NASAManagementInstructions (NMI), Marshall
ManagementInstructions (l_iMl), KennedyManagementInstructions
(_MI), and the Air Force Eastern Test RangeSafetY Manual
(AFETR_I127-1). Numerousother technical documentswere
studied for applicability such as ASFCDH1-6, System Safety
Design Handbook, and the Johnson Space Center developed Manned
Spacecraft Criteria and Standards (MSCM8080). These prelimi-
nary system safety program requirements and guidelines were
updated and implemented, as appropriate, throughout the Skylab
program as new revisions to NMIs, MMIs, and similar documents
that directly applied to Skylab were issued.
Table V.C-I. Skylab System Safety Program Elements
System Safety Plans
Managementand Control
- Policy and Procedures
- Responsibility
- Organization
- Safety Interface with other Program Functions
- Integration
Safety Documentation
- Standards
- Policy and Procedures
- Specifications and Manuals
Safety Hazard Analyses
- Equipmentand Mission Level FMEAs
- Flight SystemsDesign
- Ground Support Equipmentand Facilities Design
- Crewand Mission Operations
- Ground Operations and Tests
Hazard Elimination and Control
Safety Design Criteria and Requirements
Hazard Data, Collection, Analysis, and Corrective Action
Safety Milestones and Schedule
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Table V.C-I. Skylab SystemSafety Program Elements (cont'd)
Safety Input and Participation in Major ProgramMilestone
Reviews
Test ProgramSafety Requirements and Constraints
Special Safety Tests
Review of Changes
- Design
- Plans and Schedules
- Procedures
Review and Status of Deviation and Waivers
Training Program
- Training
- Certification
- Flight Crews (Hardware, Data and other Support to JSC)
- Mission Support Crews
- Test and Ground Operations Crews
Industrial and Public Safety
Accident and Mishap Investigation and Reporting
Failure and Anomaly Reporting and Corrective Action
Safety Monitoring and Surveillance
Safety Surveys and Audit
HumanEngineering
Rangeand Pad Safety
Handling, Transportation and Storage
- Equipment
- Operations
Hazardous Materials and Commodities
Safety During Manufacturing and Assembly
Selection and Procurement of Parts and Materials
Safety Reviewsand Inputs to Procedures
- Tests and Hazardous Operations
- Maintenance
- Handling, Transportation and Storage
V-25
Table V.C-I. Skylab SystemSafety Program Elements (cont'd)
Contingency and EmergencyPlans and Procedures
- Mission and Flight CrewOperations
- Emergencyand EquipmentSafing Procedures during Tests
Requirements to Provide
- Critical ComponentsLists
- Single Failure Points Lists
- Potentially Hazardous Items and Operations Lists
Emergencyand Warning Systems
- Flight (Caution and Warning)
- Ground (Hazard Detection and DamageControl)
Safety Awarenessand Motivation
Uponcompletion of project and contractor formal planning
activities a series of reviews, surveys, and coordination
visits were conducted. This activity, initiated by SL-TQ,
included representatives from SL-TQ, the integration con-
tractor, and the respective module project and contractor
organizations. The meetings resulted in an assessment of
module level planning activities, a better understanding by
all organizations involved as to the scope and depth of plan-
ning required by the MSFCSkylab ProgramOffice, and an under-
standing of the differences between the various organizations
and methods for implementing the safety program. Subsequently,
contractor preliminary safety plans were updated, efforts to
further develop safety program plans were initiated within
MSFCfor inhouse work, and the composite list of system safety
program elements was updated, baselined, and used as guidelines
for overall managementof the Skylab system safety effort. As
an example, this composite list, the scope of which varied be-
tween projects, was used for subsequent status reviews through
the issuance of a status matrix by SL-TQto each project for
completion and return (self assessment technique), and for the
development of a combined Reliability, Quality Assurance, and
System Safety Survey Checklist. The latter effort was performed
jointly by the MSFCS&EQuality Laboratory and SL-TQ. The sys-
tem safety input to this checklist documentwas developed by
the integration contractor, and the overall documentwas review-
ed and approved for Skylab application by SL-TQ. Subsequently,
using these checklists, MSFCS&Eperformed formal surveys and
audits of Skylab organizations and their activities.
b. Experiment Project. Because of the varying numbersand
complexity of experiments, and the dual responsibility of MSFCfor over-
all payload integration of experiments in addition to prime responsi-
bility for the development of selected experiment hardware, a separate
approach was taken for planning and implementing the system safety
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program, and is outlined as follows:
(i) A safety review teamwas established consisting
of membersof SL-TQ, the integration contractor system safety group,
the MSFCexperiments project office, MSFCS&E, and support contractor
safety representatives.
(2) An assessmentwas madeof each experiment for
which MSFChad prime development responsibility. The assessment was
made to determine the necessary analyses and other safety-related
activities that would be required to meet the overall safety program
objectives. The criteria applied were the sameas for the major mod-
ules. The nature (active or passive), operating environment (preflight,
postflight, and flight, including module location), and complexity of
each experiment were considered. Materials compatibility, contamina-
tion of other experiments or equipment because of outgassing or vent-
ing, crew operating conditions, and similar aspects were considered.
As a result of these assessments specific efforts were performed for
MSFCresponsible experiments. These efforts are described within the
appropriate paragraphs throughout this document. For this reason,
specific MSFCexperiment efforts are not treated in detail within this
paragraph.
(3) An assessmentwas madeof all other experiments
for which other NASAcenters and Governmentagencies had prime develop-
ment responsibility. The assessment initially consisted of a review
to determine whether an FMEA,hazard analysis, or other assessment had
been performed. On completion of this review a determination was made
as to which experiments required additional safety reviews, FMEAs,or
analyses. The safety review of the status of activities performed by
other centers and Governmentagencies included representatives of these
organizations.
(4) In addition to the preceding activities described,
an overall experiments systems engineering and integration compatibil-
ity assessment was performed as a separate effort by the integration
contractor in support of the MSFCExperiments Project Office. Safety
was a specific subject treated in monthly status reports. This acti-
vity was coordinated between the integration contractor organizations
performing both the Mission Level FMEAand the overall System Safety
Definition, Status, and Evaluation task in support of MSFCSL-TQ.
(5) The major program design reviews were also used
to address potential problems which required additional attention.
Review Item Discrepancies were submitted for potential problems and re-
quired formal review and disposition.
(6) Module contractors also performed a variety of
assessments for experiments to be performed, stored, or service within
the major modules for which they were responsible. As an example, JSC
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was responsible for development of the M509 Astronaut Maneuvering Unit.
The equipment was stored and flown within the OWS, for which MSFC had
development responsibility. The inflight servicing of the 3000-psi
nitrogen bottles used for M509 propulsion was performed in the AM,
which was also an MSFC responsibility. Typical activities that were
performed for the M509 were as follows:
Fracture mechanics design criteria were applied
to the 3000-psi pressure vessels used for pro-
pulsion.
- Design safety analysis of the overall M509 as
a system was performed under the prime con-
tract with JSC.
- Studies were performed to determine OWS equip-
ment susceptible to impact by the M509 during
flight operations.
- FMEAs were performed for the M509 system.
- M509 velocity studies were performed to deter-
mine potential damage to equipment susceptible
to impact during flight operations and in con-
sideration of failure modes identified by FMEAs.
- Safety assessments were performed by MSFC or-
ganizations and contractors for the various
FMEAs, safety studies, velocity studies, OWS
equipment impact susceptibility studies, and
potential problems identified.
- An onsite inspection and review of high fidel-
ity trainer at JSC was performed by integration
contractor system safety personnel in support
of SL-TQ. The effort was performed as a final
assessment after review of data resulting from
the first six items above and in preparation
for the DCR. The effort was performed in con-
junction with a status review and assessment of
a number of other experiments, and was coordin-
ated between JSC safety personnel and the MSFC
Experiments Project Office, MSFC S&E, and their
support contractor safety personnel.
(7) Other experiment safety assessment activities,
which were the primary development responsibility of JSC, and which were
similarly coordinated by MSFC and its contractors, include:
M092 Inflight Lower Body Negative Pressure
- M093 Vectorcardiogram
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- M133Sleep Monitoring
- MI71 Metabolic Activity
- M509Astronaut Maneuvering Unit Simulations
- S063Ultraviolet Airglow Horizon Photography
- T025 Coronagraph Contamination Measurement
- Operational Biological Instrumentation System
Earth Resources Experiment Package
c. Hazard Analysis and Related Hazard Identification Efforts.
Initially, the fundamental analytical tools of the MSFCSkylab System
Safety Programwere the equipment FMEAs(including major modules) and
the Mission Level FMEA(MLFMEA). Periodic managementreviews, mile-
stone reviews, and other assessment activities that were progressively
performed indicated that manyaspects or activities of the Skylab pro-
gramwould not be adequately covered by the FMEAs. Therefore, special
efforts were implemented to assess such aspects or activities satisfac-
torily. Someof the more significant of these special efforts are de-
scribed in the following paragraphs as well as a brief discussion of
the MLFM_EArelative to the system safety objectives and organizational
involvement.
(i) Mission and EquipmentLevel FMEAsand SFPControl.
Mission level and equipment level FMEAswere performed for all Skylab
flight and flight support equipment in accordance with the requirements
of Apollo Applications Program Directive No. 13. The SFP information
provided by these efforts was included in each major Skylab milestone
review. All SFPswere carefully analyzed for their impact on crew
safety and the accomplishment of primary mission objectives. ALL SFPs
were analyzed for possible elimination and where elimination was not
possible or practical, a rationale for retention was developed. Cri-
tical Items Lists were developed, baselined, and controlled in accord-
ance with MSFCMPD8020.4. In addition, all critical SFPs(Categories
i and 2) required increased emphasis on test, quality, inspection, and
tracking activities.
The MLFMEAassessed the various module and equipment level FMEAs
in addition to identifying and assessing failure modesaffecting other
modules and the overall cluster (See Section V.B for details). Inte-
gration contractor personnel from systems engineering, reliability,
humanfactors, and system safety organizations were selected and organ-
ized in single, integrated MLFMEAteam assigned to perform the analysis.
Systems level groups, such as electrical power, structural and mechani-
cal, thermal and environmental control, and experiments, were established.
Each of these groups consisted of a multidiscipline team having appro-
priate technical backgrounds and experience in the fields of reliability,
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system safety, etc. The team concept, the safety methods, and special-
ized techniques developed during previous programs were all in evidence
in the planning and implementation of the MLFMEA. Thus, the MSFC sys-
tem safety objectives, policy, and organizational approach for imple-
menting the overall system safety program were maintained. The MSFC
Test, Reliability, Quality Assurance, and Safety Office (SL-TQ) was
responsible for overall management of the MLFMEA.
(2) Design Safety Analyses and Assessments. Preliminary
and detail design safety analyses or assessments were performed for
selected systems, subsystems, and GSE that were determined inherently
hazardous or considered critical to the achievement of primary mission
objectives. Various methods were employed in the performance of these
analyses and assessments according to the degree of complexity, exist-
ing methods most familiar to the organization responsible for perform-
ing the analysis, judgments as to the degree of risk based on preliminary
reviews, and similar factors. In all cases the analyses and assessments
were reviewed by the responsible contractor organizations, the appropriate
MSFC module, experiments, or GSE project offices, and SL-EI or SL-TQ, or
both. Examples of such efforts are as follows:
- Multiple Docking Adapter Design Safety Analysis.
- M512 Hazards Analysis (Materials Processing in Space Facility).
Multiple Docking Adapter Test and Operations Hazards Analysis
(KSC prelaunch test and checkout and AM/MDA St. Louis opera-
tions, including Altitude Chamber Tests).
- M518 Safety Analysis and Assessment (Multipurpose Electric
Furnace used with M512).
- $230 Magnetospheric Particle Composition Experiment Safety
Assessment.
- T027 Contamination Measurement Sample Array and Photometer
Safety Assessment.
- Airlock Module Hazard Identification (Hazard Identification
Summary).
- Caution and Warning System Integration and Analysis.
- ATM Hazards Analysis of Ground Support Equipment, Facilities,
Ground Operations, and Tests.
The preceding examples were specifically performed by full-time
system safety personnel. In addition, numerous safety-related studies
and analyses were performed by the responsible design organizations.
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(3) Sneak Circuit Analysis. This effort was initiated
in early 1971 and continued through final preparations for the FRR.
This computer-aided special analysis was performed to identify, docu-
ment, and resolve all electrical circuit latent paths that could have
caused an undesired function, or inhibited a desired function, without
regard to componentfailure. The sneak circuit analysis task is de-
scribed in greater detail in Section II.F of this report.
(4) Materials Compatibility, Flammability, and Toxicity
Control. The basic criteria governing material use in all crew volumes
of MSFCSkylab moduleswere defined in MSFC-SPEC-101A.Compliance
visibility and assessmentswere generally provided by the following
methods.
- Materials lists were submitted by hardware development organiza-
tions.
- A Materials Application Evaluation Board (F_EB) was established
to provide formal control of deviation requests. The MAEBcon-
sisted of representatives from MSFCSkylab program management,
MSFC-S&Etechnical organizations, and, as required, other tech-
nical support organizations.
The MAEBnotified the design elements and appropriate MSFC
project managersof approval or disapproval of deviation re-
quests, including rationale and substantiating data, or re-
quirements for further assessments. The MSFCor contractor
design elements could appeal any disapproved deviation request
through the appropriate MSFCSkylab project manager.
- MAEBactivities included an active exchangeof information with
JSCand other sources. The information exchange included (i)
maintenance and use of microfilm records of JSCmaterials and
configuration test data, (2) daily contact with JSCand White
Sands Test Facility (WSTF)materials experts, (3) MSFCcol-
laborating with JSCon review of experiments, and (4) the ex-
change of approved deviation requests between MSFCand JSC.
(5) Fire H_zard Control. Through the extensive mate-
rials selection, review, and control process, the potential for fire
was extremely low. Nevertheless, special significance was placed on
ensuring adequate meansfor the timely detection, identification, and
control of fire in the event of its occurrence. All potentially flam-
mable materials stored or used in Skylab, including film, documents,
similar paper products, and other combustible materials were protected
by stowage provisions. Special studies and analyses were performed to
identify and mapthe location of combustible materials. Special design
features minimized the potential for propagation of fire in the event of
electrical component failure, overheating due to mechanical failures
(including friction), and similar potential ignition sources.
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Ultraviolet detectors, as part of the C&Wsystem, provided detec-
tion capability throughout all habitable areas of Skylab. Automatic
alarms having special tones to indicate an emergencyclassification
requiring immediate crew response were included. Fire suppression was
provided by hand-held extinguishers having greater capacity than
those previously used on Apollo. Extinguishers were located along
escape routes for all anticipated operating conditions. Additional
suppression capability was provided by the installation of a fire
hose for use with reserve water supply tanks. Special safety studies
and tests were performed to verify the various designs. These studies
and tests considered the reaction with fire of pressurant used within
extinguishers, type of nozzles used and area of coverage provided by
extinguishing methods in zero-g toxicity controls for the protection
of the crew, and manyother factors.
(6) Meteoroid Vulnerability Analysis - The effort was
performed to determine the probability of meteoroid penetration for
all modulesand components, such as, module pressure shells and ATM
experiments, and to insure that protective shields would prevent
meteoroid penetration. The evaluation of all cluster modules was
performed using the sameparameters and assumptions for each module.
The general approach taken was as follows:
A series of computer programs were developed and used to assess
the meteoroid vulnerability of Skylab. Considerations were
given to such factors as the geometric shape of the structure,
material and thickness, shielding of adjacent modules, and
type of shield used to protect the basic shell.
The analysis considered the path of rays from space to the
module pressure shells through adjacent protective shields by
using inputs for the standard meteoroid environment defined
in F_FC-TMX-53957.
- All SFPsoutside the pressure shells that could have caused
mission termination or create a crew hazard were identified
and analyzed. Vulnerable componentswere tested to deter-
mine actual vulnerability when analysis indicated possible
problems. Additional localized shielding was used, if
necessary, to solve these problems.
(7) Electromagnetic Compatibility. A formal program
was developed to insure that no adverse electromagnetic interactions
would occur between Skylab systems, subsystems, and experiments. Re-
quirements were defined in the CRSand _MCcontrol and test plans
were developed. EMCrequirements and controls were inherent in the
achievement of overall reliability and system safety requirements and
objectives. The system safety aspects of EMCrequirements and con-
trois included protection against system degradation, unintentional
initiation of circuit functions, false indications and similar poten-
tially hazardous conditions. Electromagnetic interactions (along
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wiring or radiated through space) were also closely associated with
other special efforts in the areas of fault current protection,
lightning, and electroshock protection.
Requirements implementation and assurance activities were keyed
to Skylab hardware development and test phases. EMC was a subject
during design reviews, and was considered during the development of
systems specifications and drawings. Circuit development tests in-
cluded preliminary interference and susceptibility checks. Overall
design development tests and evaluations included considerations
for shielding, wire routing, bonding, and component location. EMC
was considered during qualification testing at the black box and sub-
system levels. Electrical and electronic EMC testing was performed
at the systems, module, and multimodule levels. Interface verifica-
tions and EMC-integrated systems tests were performed at KSC.
An EMC review board was established in 1971 to progressively
review the results of EMC testing in each module. This review board
was comprised of members from MSFC, JSC, and all major module con-
tractors.
EMC critical circuit reviews were performed for circuits sus-
ceptible to electromagnetic interference that could cause loss of
life, mission abort, or loss of primary mission objectives. The
reviews included the IU and the CSM interface circuits with Skylab.
Selection of such circuits was based on module tests of critical
equipment. Insensitive circuits (relays and switches) and redun-
dant circuits were excluded. The selection of circuits was
approved and included in module test plans and controlled by the
EMC Control Plan.
(8) Fault Current and Circuit Protection. The Sky-
lab circuit protection philosophy was that all positive polarity
lines of the dc distribution wiring be protected by circuit breakers
or fuses. Physical protection was the method for preventing faults
from occurring between the power source and first line protection.
In June 1970 an electrical intercenter panel completed a special
study to determine cluster fault current design requirements. Sub-
sequently, the intercenter panel performed reviews that included (i)
the effects of opening one circuit protection device in parallel with
others, (2) the adequacy of circuit protection devices relative to
current, temperature, and time delay, and (3) wire size and insula-
tion versus protective devices.
An intercenter fault current review team was also established
to ensure that sufficient protection existed. The reviews included
representatives from MSFC, JSC, all major contractors, and several
major subcontractors. The series of surveys and reviews, including
site inspections of hardware, continued through the middle of 1972.
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These surveys and reviews included (a) routing of wiring, bus potting,
protective coverings, insulation, clamping, bend radius, tension
on cables, connectors, and terminations, (b) design and manufacturing
techniques, processes, installation, and test procedures, (c) poten-
tial cable cross-connection, and (d) existence of physical protection
from abrasion and chafing from sharp edges.
Additional reviews were performed as part of the Skylab System
Safety Checklist Program, which is described in V.C.9. These evaluated
branch circuit protection, circuit breaker and fuse sizing, current-
time relationships between primary bus breakers and secondary devices.
Also evaluated were (a) wire routing for protection against sharp cor-
ners and edges, (b) support, clamping, shielding, and enclosures for
protection against abrasion, chafing, heat, and cold, and (c) twisting
rather than bending across points of relative motion.
(9) Lightning Protection. A special review was initiated
in August 1971 to (a) identify and assess the requirements that were
used to implement lightning protection for all modules and experiments,
(b) assess methods and techniques used to implement applicable require-
ments, and (c) define module and experiment retest requirements to ver-
ify vulnerable components, check electronic systems, and establish com-
plete system confidence in the event of a lightning strike on the mated
configuration of Skylab and its launch vehicle during roll-out and pad
operations.
Requirements specified in MIL-B-5087B (Bonding, Electrical, and
Lightning Protection, for Aerospace Systems) were used as criteria as
specified in EMC control plans. Data from Apollo experience were co-
ordinated between MSFC and JSC, and all module review reports from MSFC
were forwarded to JSC in February 1972. The reviews included an assess-
ment of module interfaces, protrusions, attachment points, truss assem-
blies, doors, covers, panels, electrical raceways, and GSE. The findings
concluded that bonding requirements implemented on Skylab met or exceeded
those specified in MIL-B-5087B (Class L-Lightning Protection). Additional
protection for the modules was provided by the PS, which was considered a
homogeneous counterpoise or ground plane of negligible impedance by de-
sign, thus, permitting lightning to be distributed over the entire skin
surface. Further, and in addition to, conductive treatment of the PS
and FAS, four aluminum bonding straps were used between the PS and FAS.
The cross-sectional area of the straps was equivalent to twelve No. i0
American Wire Gauge (AWG) aluminum wires (6 times greater than required by
MIL-B-5C87B). The GSE was protected by being housed within the framework
of the Launch Umbilical Tower. The OWS was a modified S-IVB stage and was
capable of withstanding a direct lightning strike without structural dam-
age other than surface burning. All additional OWS equipment (meteoroid
shield, solar array fairing, wire tunnels, etc.) was bonded and tested.
Skylab components were vulnerable to induced currents as a result
of current flow through the structure. The size of the strike, point of
the strike, and duration were influencing factors. For these potential
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conditions, retest requirements were defined and incorporated into the
TCRSD. Sky lab sustained multiple strikes at KSC. Retests revealed no
significant adverse effects.
(i0) Electroshock Protection. A special review was ini-
tiated in August 1971 to (a) determine the adequacy of protection avail-
able to the flight crew from hazards associated with electrical shock
from powered equipment, including fault current producing failures, and
static charge buildup, (b) identify design criteria and requirements
imposed and implemented for modules and experiments, and (c) review MSFC
and contractor efforts to ensure implementation of applicable require-
ments for shock protection and static buildup.
Systems safety checklist efforts for flight systems, experiments,
and GSE included an assessment of electrical equipment design for pro-
tection against shock and static changes during equipment operation,
maintenance, and servicing, and is described in V.C.9.
Electrical shock and static buildup was a special subject re-
viewed during electrical segments of the SOCAR.
Bonding requirements were specified in the CRS, module CEI speci-
fications, and module EMC control plans. Bonding requirements for pro-
tection against shock hazards (Class H), for exposed conductive frames
or for parts of electrical or electronic equipment, specified that re-
sistance to structure be less than 0.I ohm. Class C bonding (static
charge) requirements, for internal or external isolated conductive items
(except antennas), which were subject to frictional charging, specified
that resistance to structure be less than 1.0 ohm. Bonding methods were
as follows:
- Class H bonding (shock protection) was achieved by (a) chem-
ically treated metal-to-metal faying surfaces between equip-
ment cases and structure, (b) installation of metal bonding
straps between equipment cases and structure, (c) installa-
tion of ground wires between equipment cases and structure
brought out through individual connector pins, and (d) in-
herent bonding through welds or rivets.
- Class C bonding (static charge) protection was achieved by
metal-to-metal contact unless development tests (resistance
measurements)indicated that additional bonding was required.
Processes specified preparations of surfaces.
Compliance verification of all bonding was achieved by (a) review
of installation dr6wings and detail electrical schematics, (b) hardware
inspection by quality assurance personnel to ensure conformance with
drawings, process specifications, and installation instructions, (c)
physical hardware inspections through the use of system safety check-
lists, and (d) bonding acceptance tests. Through these methods, dis-
crepancies were identified and corrected.
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(Ii) Corona Survey and Analysis. The effort was performed
to determine which systems and experiment hardware were susceptible to
arcing due to ionization of gas between conductors. Considerations were
given to (a) peak and sustained operating voltages, pressures, and at-
mospheres, (b) outgassing port areas, outgassing products, and residual
and contaminating atmospheres, both within and near each item investi-
gated, and (c) spacing between conductors and conductive surfaces. The
approach taken was as follows:
- All low voltage (less than 150 volts peak) equipment was re-
viewed to verify existence of at least 0.010 inch of insula-
tion to ensure no voltage breakdown would occur.
- Above 150 volts peak, insulation was evaluated for operating
life with respect to dielectric strength, temperature, homo-
geneity, and field stresses induced by surge, static, peak,
normal, and abnormal voltage between conductors and between
a conductor and a ground plane.
- Susceptible hardware was qualified by several methods, in-
cluding previous flight experience, special analysis, and
laboratory tests.
Reviews began in early 1971 and involved representatives of MSFC, NASA
Headquarters, JSC, the integration contractor, and a number of hardware
and support contractor organizations. Over 435 items of equipment were
reviewed for corona susceptibility. Fifty items were found to be sus-
ceptible, six of which were duplicate pieces of equipment. Three hard-
ware changes were made.
(12) Radiation. A series of surveys, analyses, and re-
views was performed to determine the effects of the total radiation
environment on Sky lab components, materials, sensors, measurements, and
the crew. Radiation dose limits were established for the crew by JSC
Medical Operations. A radiation hazard analysis, based on the planned
mission, was performed by the integration contractor. This analysis
included (a) use of the GSFC (Dr. Vette) proton and electron environ-
ment models (February 1970), and (b) a 56-day mission, including con-
sideration for planned EVA excursions (3 hours each) and the maximum
number of encounters with the electron and proton belts. The analysis
concluded that the maximum expected total radiation dose for the crew
was well within JSC-established limits.
An analysis was also performed to determine effects on equipment
(included onboard sources). The analysis considered classes of compon-
ents and specific components for a 240-day period, including photographic
film, optical glass, solar cells, TV camera, magnetic tapes, semiconduc-
tor devices, quartz crystal, organic materials, photomultiplier tubes,
and infrared detectors. The effort initially concluded that space
radiation sources might affect organic materials outside Skylab, and that
photomultiplier tubes and infrared detectors of experiments T027/S073,
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T003, SIOI, and S192, might be affected by radiation-induced noise.
After additional analysis and tests, actions were completed that included
installation of film vaults, removable shields over external windows used
by experiments, and addition of appropriate procedural controls. It was
concluded that potential residual effects would be negligible.
Detailed procedures for the safe control and handling of radioactive
materials in compliance with NASA safety requirements were developed by
MSFC and each of the responsible Skylab contractors. MSFC conducted a
continuing survey of all radiation sources on Skylab flight and GSE hard-
ware for which MSFC was responsible. For each radiation source, the sur-
vey identified the isotope involved and the level of radiation. With this
information together with similar data compiled by JSC for their hardware,
a composite listing of all radiation sources for Skylab flight hardware
was assembled by JSC. The composite listing was included in the Operational
Data Book and was submitted to NASA Headquarters.
(13) Microbial Control. A Skylab microbial contamination
control intercenter working group was established in late 1970. The
membership represented both scientific (medicine, microbiology, chemis-
try) and engineering (systems, materials) disciplines as well as the
program offices and astronaut office. Their purpose was to perform the
following:
- Identify all sources of microbial contaminants.
- Determine specific microbial (both bacterial and fungal)
contaminants that would occur in the habitat.
- Determine acceptable levels after a 28-day mission.
- Establish control methods and techniques.
- Establish test specifications for all microbial testing; re-
view test plans and monitor tests as necessary. Flight qual-
ifications of shower, and urine centrifugal separator, are
examples.
- Collect data, specify tests, and act as necessary to select
and qualify cleansing agents.
- Ensure that proper housekeeping measures were included in
the flight plan.
Define sampling intervals and procedures.
- Serve as consultants for microbial contamination problems.
Microbial testing was performed on all pertinent hardware. Control
methods were derived for all microbial problems identified. Betadine
was selected as the biocide and packaging methods were defined. House-
keeping procedures were developed. The working group coordinated the
location of onboard microbial sampling sites, supported the Systems/
Operations Compatibility Review and SMEAT activities at JSC, and pro-
vided continuous monitoring of all activities which may have affected
microbial control. Table V.C-2 is a summary of Skylab onboard control
measures.
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Table V.C-2. OnboardControl Measures
WATER
lodine injection as required - sampling by crew.
Sampleand reagent solution emptied into waste sample container.
FOOD
Housekeeping procedures.
Microbiological inspections madeon food supply.
Crushed waste food cans (manual crusher) and beverage dispensers
put in waste cans - dumpeddaily through trash airlock.
Contingency stowage in empty freezer if trash airlock disabled.
Eating utensils and serving trays cleaned with disinfectant pads,
(Zephrin milder than Betadine) and dried with utility wipe.
WASTE
Effluent air carried through system containing microbial impinge-
ment surfaces.
Hydrophobic membranesin fecal bag, urine separator, and
fecal collector filter.
- Chiller in urine drawer inhibits growth of micro-organisms.
Water content removedfrom feces and vomitus in processor to in-
activate (suspend) microorganisms.
Contingency procedures for maintenance and provision for spare
subassemblies.
THERMAL AND VENTILATION
Debris on screens vacuum cleaned every 7 days.
Charcoal filter replaced every 28 days.
GENERAL HOUSEKEEPING
General housekeeping for spillage or contamination due to contin-
gencies, or malfunctions.
Inside of trash airlock surfaces cleaned with Biocide (Betadine)
pads.
Biocide pads (prepackaged with proper amount of Betadine) used for
surface cleaning.
PERSONAL HYGIENE
Washcloth squeezer surfaces silver plated to minimize bacterial
growth.
Squeezer solutions dumped from condensate bag into dump line every
48 hours.
- Condensate dump line contained Biocide (Roccal)
- Wash water dump system filter changed every 28 days.
Whole Body Shower
- Vacuum body and enclosure to pick up excess water before
lowering curtain.
- Final drying with towel (body and enclosure)
- Collection bag removed and disposed through trash airlock
- Hydrophobic filter checked and replaced each week (more
often if required)
- Betadine decontamination of suction head, hose, filter, etc.
- Air drying of curtain before stowage.
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Table V.C-2. (continued)
SUIT DRYING
Moisture removed (minimum 90% removed).
Suit stowed in closed condition with dessicants (maintain maximum
relative humidity of 55%).
(14) Protection of Glass and Other Shatterable Material. An
An analysis was made of all glass in windows and experiments. The JSC data,
including data obtained from the National Bureau of Standards, was used.
Proof test requirements were reviewed, and in some cases adjusted and
thermal cycling, pressure, and impact tests were performed. Analyses
and tests also were performed for mounting frames, mechanical shock pro-
visions, seals, and similar components both individually and as complete
assemblies.
Contractors and S&E laboratories performed a glass survey in late
1971 that included a JSC request to determine the existence of any struc-
tural problems. The MSFC materials division also included in the mater-
ials review program, glass and similar material subject to fragmenta-
tion.
Concurrent with the meter glass survey, system safety checklist
assessments were being performed by all contractors, and for certain ex-
periments and ATM hardware, by elements of MSFC S&E. All items, includ-
ing view ports, cathode ray tubes, lighting fixtures, camera lenses, and
similar components, were assessed. Discrepancies were found in LM type
meters and similar previous flight qualified glass components and in some
items peculiar to Skylab. Many were covered with clear pressure sensi-
tive Teflon material.
Subsequently, and as part of the special reviews described herein,
items that were still open were reaccessed. A general approach was taken
to cover all remaining items susceptible to breakage with pressure sensi-
tive transparent type material unless optical quality was a significant
factor. In these cases other precautions were taken or a thorough re-
view and justification was provided for risk acceptance. As an example,
the camera port on the M512 (Materials Processing in Space) facility
chamber was identified as a potential hazard through system safety check-
list efforts. During the MSFC Activation Sequence/Critical Mechanisms
Review a supplemental analysis was performed of the M512 chamber versus
the operational conditions that would exist during the performance of
all planned experiments that required the use of the chamber. Figure V.C-2
summarizes the experiments and operational conditions. Some of the other
factors that were considered are summarized as follows:
- Camera port glass was not protected.
- M512 chamber was to be unattended for long periods of time.
- Break could have resulted in rapid decompression of Skylab
under certain experiments operations (greatest risks were
M552, M555, and M518).
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- Vent valves were to be in OPEN or VENT position during
experiment operations requiring vacuum.
Decompression rate through valves would have been suffi-
cient to trigger the emergency alarm (Cluster C&W System,
Rapid Differential Pressure Sensor).
- Camera port was a SFP (single panel).
- Inadvertent break during launch could have contaminated the
cabin atmosphere (crew hazard).
- A cover might prevent loss of many experiments in the event
of glass breakage (equipment hazard - many required vacuum
and no camera).
The following actions were then taken after MSFC S&E and Program Office
reviews: (a) a specially designed metal cover was provided by S&E to
protect and seal the camera port when the camera was not in use, (b)
procedures were changed to require the cover be used when the camera
was not in use, (c) procedures were changed to require that the cover
be installed before launch, and (d) stowage provisions were included to
ensure that the cover was immediately available at the M512 work station
during orbital operations.
(15) Battery Studies and Protection. A survey was per-
formed to identify and assess the hazards associated with Skylab bat-
teries. The effort was coordinated between MSFC, JSC, and major con-
tractors. All batteries, both within and outside habitable areas of the
spacecraft, were assessed for adequacy of protection against explosion,
flammability, toxicity, and contamination (outgassing, leakage, etc.).
All anticipated environments and operational conditions were considered,
such as vehicle attitudes, the effects of zero-g on the type of electro-
lyte, and temperatures at various operational locations (including stow-
age of replaceable type batteries). These efforts resulted in the de-
velopment of special design features and the performance of special
tests to verify the adequacy of the designs. Examples are (a) relief
protection for individual cells and outer containers, (b) burst tests
of cell cases and containers, (c) special features to prevent the es-
cape of liquid electrolyte through vents or relief devices in zero-g,
(d) circuit protection in the event of short circuits, (e) automatic
warning signals in the event of elevated temperatures and automatic
disconnect of battery circuits as a backup in event of continued rise
in temperature, and (f) automatic termination of charging action in
event of further pressure buildup.
(16) Pressure Vessels and Fracture Mechanics Analysis. A
survey was performed to identify all pressure vessles for which MSFC was
responsible, including those of experiments. A review was performed to
identify each vessel, defined as a container for compressed fluid that
could release more than the equivalent of 0.01 pound of Tri-nitro Toluene
(TNT) based on the adiabatic expansion of a perfect gas to ambient con-
ditions. A listing of all vessels, along with appropriate configuration,
analysis, and test data was compiled. The MSFC and its contractors per-
formed a fracture mechanics analysis of all such vessels identified.
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Additional testing was performed to obtain unavailable data when required.
In the interest of crew safety the results were submitted to JSC for in-
clusion in a single listing of all hazardous pressure vessels.
9. Implementation Assurance. Periodic surveys and audits, including
joint MSFC and prime contractor surveys and audits of subcontractors,
vendors, and suppliers, were performed. In addition to these and other
activities briefly discussed in preceding paragraphs, a number of special
assurance reviews and assessments were performed. Some of these efforts
were performed during preparations for major program milestone reviews,
and others were performed as independent efforts, the results of which
were summarized at subsequent milestone reviews. Some of the more sig-
nificant of these efforts are described in the following paragraphs.
a. Major Program Design and Certification Reviews. System
safety milestone reviews were an integral part of each major Skylab Pro-
gram review. Each of the basic project and overall program milestone
reviews, such as the PDR, CDR, and DCR, included (i) safety as a part of
the various system and subsystem reviews and (2) separate safety review
segments in the individual module and overall cluster systems reviews.
System safety representatives from SL-TQ, including integration
contractor system safety personnel, participated in all design reviews
in addition to the safety representatives from the respective MSFC Sky-
lab project offices, contractor, and MSFC S&E organizations. The prim-
ary method for identifying and resolving potential problems was through
the submittal of RIDs. The RID system, which included a formal review
and disposition by special teams and final approval by the project and
program manager, was a supplement to the overall configuration manage-
ment system. The process of bringing potential problems to the atten-
tion of management was primarily used through the CDR phase of the pro-
gram. At the CDR alone, over 500 safety-related RIDs were submitted
for the major modules and experiments. The various safety offices sub-
mitted 140 of these. At the time of the DCR, all CDR RIDs were closed.
(I) Supplemental Reviews. The basic milestone reviews
and certifications have become more or less standard procedure in all
large NASA programs. In addition, a number of supplemental reviews
progressively performed throughout the Skylab program treated system
safety as an integral element. Examples of these supplemental reviews
(and inspections) are as follows:
- Sky lab Cluster Systems Review
- Skylab Subsystems Reviews (includes NASA
Headquarters Baseline Reviews)
- Progressive Crew Station Reviews (module level series)
- Crew Compartment Storage Reviews
Cluster Systems/Operations Compatibility Review
Configuration Inspections
- Crew Compartment Fit and Function (reviews, tests,
and demonstrations).
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(2) Special Reviews and Assessments. A number of special
reviews were conducted throughout the program that increased confidence
in the safety of Skylab design and operations. The reviews are as fol-
lows:
(a) OrdnanceSystems and Critical MechanismsReview.
The review was initiated by an MSFCDirector request that an intensive
review be performed of critical mechanical Skylab items and all ord-
nance systems. An interdisciplinary team was established, co-chaired
by SL-TQand SL-EI, which included representatives from various S&E
organizations. The broad collective background of this team included
mechanical, electrical, ordnance, propulsion, I&C, testing, quality
engineering, and system safety disciplines. A detailed design and hard-
ware review was performed that included such items as (i) the AMdis-
cone antenna deployment, (2) the ATMDA, (3) ATMand OWSSAS, (4) ATM
launch locks and aperture doors, (5) OWSwaste tank vents, radiator
shield, trash airlock, and SALs, and (6) the M])AS190window cover
mechanismand MDAhatch assembly. Approximately 50 recommendations
for changes were madeaffecting hardware, procedures, tests, and re-
verification of conclusions derived from analyses and tests. In
addition, over i0 requirements were initiated for the performance of
new analyses.
(b) Engineering Walkaround Inspections. An inspec-
tion team consisting of senior managementrepresentatives from both
MSFCand JSCwas established. Teamrepresentatives were included from
engineering, materials, quality, and safety organizations from both
Centers. The MSFCco-chairman was SL-TQ. The purpose of these inspec-
tions was to identify potential problems and obvious deficiencies (sys-
tems were not functioned). Primary recommendationswere in areas of
improved housekeeping and control of nonflight items.
(c) Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Reviews. A
series of independent reviews were performed at major contractor facil-
ities and NASACenters. These reviews encompassedall aspects of manage-
ment methods, technical requirements, analytical efforts, and their
application to design and operations relative to personnel and equipment
safety and the achievement of primary mission objectives.
(d) Skylab Activation Sequence/Critical Mechanisms
Review. The effort was performed to (i) assess the Skylab activation
sequence (SL-I) and associated critical functions and mechanismsto
ensure that proper attention had been applied to areas of design, ver-
ification, and operations, and (2) penetrate potentially delinquent areas.
Criticality I and II mechanismsthat were activated subsequent to the
initial activation phase (SL-I) were also included. The effort was pri-
marily performed by MSFCS&Eorganizations with integration contractor
support assigned by SL-EI (electrical and sneak circuit analysis person-
nel) and by SL-TQ(system safety personnel). Potential problem areas
were coordinated with hardware contractors for supporting analysis or
corrective actions. Progressive status and results were provided
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to SL-EI and SL-TQ by S&E review team co-chairman. The review of acti-
vation sequence functions included power paths, pyrotechnic paths, sig-
nal paths (commands), redundancy, timing and seq_lencing, interlocks,
backup modes (contingency analysis), and KSC verification (systems.)
The review of critical mechanisms included the reverification of (I)
materials surveys and assessments, (2) vibration analysis, (3) dynamic
loads, (4) strength analysis, (5) qualification tests, assessments, and
results including functional, environmental, life cycle, vendor changes,
and process specification changes, and (6) KSC verification. Continu-
ous coordination between the activation sequence review team and the
critical mechanisms review team was provided. This review resulted in
a number of corrective actions for items considered to be risks.
In the area of critical mechanisms alone, 62 assemblies were re-
viewed in each of ii categories, resulting in 682 individual assessments
covering 22 subsystems. Most categories were reviewed by more than one
S&E organization. A supplemental visual inspection was made using the
one-g trainer at JSC. Fifteen areas required further investigation,
eight of which required special emphasis anc additional analysis.
(e) Skylab Activation Sequence Hardware Integrity
Review. The review was initiated subsequent to the activation sequence/
critical mechanisms review. The review involved all MSFC and major con-
tractor organizations responsible for the design and development of Sky-
lab hardware (SL-I). The purpose was to extensively re-examine all ac-
tivation sequence hardware by means of an analysis of the hardware
qualification requirements; a reassessment of qualification test results;
a review of hardware changes subsequent to qualification; a reassessment
of hardware failures and nonconformances experienced since qualification;
a comparison of the configuration and building processes of both the
qualification and flight hardware; and an analysis of the quality con-
trols and tests performed on the hardware. The review covered all hard-
ware associated with the 53 Skylab activation sequence functions.
Before completion of this review, an "MSFC Blue Ribbon Audit Commit-
tee" was established by the MSFC Director. The committee, consisting of
members at the S&E Laboratory directory level, the MSFC Director of Safety
and Awareness, and representatives from SL-EI and SL-TQ, was established
to ensure that the integrity of all hardware related to Sky lab activation
sequences had been revalidated by the major contractors and MSFC. Sample
hardware was selected from the 53 activation sequences for examination in
depth. The basis for selection of each sample was that it be representa-
tive of other electrical, structural, and mechanical hardware in the var-
ious activation sequences; representative of prime contractor, subcon-
tractor, and government furnished hardware; representative of different
Skylab environments; representative of hardware qualified by tests, sim-
ilarity, and analysis; representative of hardware from previous programs
that were used on Skylab as well as new hardware specifically designed
for Skylab and representative of hardware wiShin all criticality cate-
gories. Typical documents reviewed in depth for hardware sampled in-
cluded (i) FMEA and CIL, (2) fabrication and assembly shop orders, (3)
V-44
ders, (4) waivers and deviations, (5) discrepancy re-
ure reports, (6) welding specification, (7) configura-
ol manuals, (8) wiring and cabling specifications and
(9) qualification and acceptance test data, including
and test reports. A numberof potential problems requir-
Langeswere identified by MSFCand contractors as a result
Others were identified and corrected as a result of
s and tests subsequent to the audit.
ylab System Safety Checklist Program. Concurrent with,
to, all activities previously described in which system
i were directly or indirectly involved, a wide variety
emsafety studies were performed. These studies were
ii three categories identified in V.C.I, and were per-
_e scope of overall program planning, definition, status,
efforts provided by SL-TQ. The system safety policy,
_, mangement,and implementation approach previously
_ed in effective communications, total program involve-
led visibility to system safety personnel of problems
affected the basic system safety objectives. Special
performed for the purpose of identifying solutions to
_tions, had a significant influence on overall manage-
One of these studies resulted in the development and
,f the Skylab System Safety Checklist Program.
Basic System Safety Checklist ProgramObjectives. As
iminary planning activities and the review of documenta-
us programs, studies were conducted to develop improved
rea of hazard identification and corrective action.
line documents, hazard catalogs, and accident-incident
een developed and are all valuable indicators of past
_ever, a review of this documentedexperience during
_mclearly indicates that certain types of hazards
unsafe failures, accidents, and incidents repeatedly
_am. Evenwith increased emphasis on the performance
Logic Anglyses, SneakCircuit Analyses, and manyother
Inalysis, a remaining managementconcern existed in the
_econtrol of proven accident causes. Thus, an improved
application of safety-related experience was sought
hermore, as a result of action items from the Skylab
, a safety review of the entire Skylab Cluster and an
adequacy of protection for flight systems from GSE
ed as part of a Systems/Operations Compatibility Review.
es of the checklist technique developed were as follows:
ermine the actual status of Skylab design features or
_onal conditions that could result in systems failure,
ent damage,or personnel injury.
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To establish a systematic hazard identification and assess-
ment program to supplement existing analytical efforts such
as FMEAs, sneak circuit analyses, and hazard analyses.
- To develop an approach to assess Skylab designs and opera-
tional conditions, using a broad combination of safety-
related experience from the aerospace industry as criteria.
- To provide a method to ensure effective implementation and
visibility to management of results.
(2) Checklist Development. Four System Safety Checklists
were developed using a broad combination of documents such as those in
Table V.C-3.
Table V.C-3. Typical Source Data for Checklist Development
SKYLAB SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST PROGRAM
m
Manned Space Programs Accident/Incident
Summaries
System Safety Accident/Incident Summary
Air Force Eastern Test Range Safety
Manual, Volume I
Minutes, System Safety Network Technical
Interchange Meetings
Space Flight Hazards Catalog
Management Manual Technical Information
Bulletins
Space Flight Hardware Accident Exper-
ience Report
Apollo 14 Safety Assessment
Air Force Systems Command Design
Handbook, Series i-0
Report of Apollo 204 Review Board ...
All Appendixes
Report of Apollo 13 Review Board ...
All Appendixes
Manned Spacecraft Criteria and
Standards
NASA, Dim of Safety, March 1970
NAR, Space Div. July 1967
AFETRM 127-1, January I, 1969
MSC 00134, Rev A. January 1970
MSC-M8081. January 1970
MSFC. October 14, 1966
MSC-SN-I-174-10. December 2,
1970
DH 1-6. July 20, 1968
Rev. July 20, 1970
April 5, 1967
June 16, 1970
MSCM 8080, April 26, 1971
Accident-incident data were converted to positive design criteria state-
ments and specifically tailored to assess the hardware systems and equip-
ment indicated by the following general titles:
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- Ground Support Equipment Design (SA-003-001-2H, July 1971)
- Flight Systems Design (SA-003-002-2H, November1971)
- Experiment Systems Design (SA-003-002-2H, November1971)
- Experiment Ground Support Equipment Design (SA-003-OO4-2H,
November1971)
(3) Implementation Approach. The approach selected for
checklist implementation was to allow Skylab design organizations to assess
the hardware for which they were responsible at the time the checklist was
issued. This approach permitted the most rapid and accurate safety assess-
ment of the Skylab hardware by using the personnel most knowledgeable of
the design details - the design engineers. In addition, a system for
receipt, review, evaluation, followup with design organizations, status-
ing, tracking of potential problems, and actions taken was developed
concurrently with checklist development and issuance.
The checklist format, as shown in Figure V.C-3 with sample criteria
statements applicable to GSEdesign, was unique in both the manner in
which it was written and the manner in which it was intended to be used.
The intent was to provide actual status of design features. Therefore,
such commonterms as "critical", "high pressure", "low pressure", "high
voltage", and "shall be avoided" were not used. Words of this type
could have led to ambiguity and might have been subject to differences
of opinion. The format was designed to accommodatea specific procedure
for completion and standardized processing of the checklists at MSFC.
The procedure was developed to attain the stated checklist program ob-
jectives. The basic procedure for completion and return is outlined as
follows:
- Checklists were intended for use by the lowest organizational
design element having responsibility for an end item or sub-
system.
- Columns were to be marked based on actual conditions of
design, regardless of what may have been required in the
design specification.
"Noncompliance" or "Not Applicable" responses required a state-
ment on a supplemental status form describing and justifying
the existing conditions, or describing the alternative method
by which the intent of the stated criterion had been met.
The checklist statements were meant to be taken literally,
i.e., compliance with the intent was not cause for marking
the compliance column.
- Completed checklists were to be signed and returned to the
issuing organization for review, evaluation, and statusing.
(4) Ground Rules for Program Implementation. Ground rules
for contractual action control, approval cycles, release procedures,
tracking of problem-action summaries, etc., were as follows:
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SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST
TITLE:
SECTION/TITLE:
_1 DATE:
_I SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM:
ORGANIZATION:
Adjacent or incompatible system connectors or flanged
connections shall be keyed or sized so it is physically
impossible to connect an incompatible pressure unit,
commodity, or pressure level.
Pressurerelief valves and relief vent lines shall be
sized to exceed the maximum flow capacity of the up-
stream pressure regulating device.
Shutoff valves shall not be installed in series with
relief valves unless a burst disc or other positive
relief device is installed in parallel.
-- I
I
I
.I
J
All adjacent connectors shall be shaped or restrained
so that it is physically impossible to mismate.
Connectors with unkeyed symmetrical pin arrangements
shall not be used.
Overload protection devices shall be sized (or set) so
that the combination of current and time at which the
device operates will not cause the operation of upstream
protective devices.
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Figure V.C-3 Typical Format and Sample Criteria - Ground Support
Equipment Design
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- Checklists would neither impose requirements on the designs
nor, in themselves, authorize or recommend design changes.
Checklists would be released by appropriate project offices.
- Upon receipt of returned checklists by project offices, copies
would be submitted to SL-TQ for review, evaluation, and status-
ing.
- Processing by SL-TQ would include the preparation of problem-
action summaries that would be submitted to appropriate man-
agement for further investigation or corrective action. A
special task team was established by the Skylab Program
Office to assist in uniform problem verification, followup
with design organizations, and to recommend or initiate cor-
rective actions as appropriate.
- Problem-action summaries would be tracked until closed by
MSFC or contractor action. In other words, tracked until a
design change was approved and incorporated or the disposi-
tion and rationale for risk acceptance was approved by pro-
gram management.
- Constraint inputs to plans, procedures, and operations (flight
and ground, to include tests, handling, transportation and
storage) would be developed based on hazards identified and
residual risks that management deemed acceptable.
(5) Benefits to Skylab. This do-it-yourself checklist
technique and the broad-based systematic application of checklists, in
combination with the evaluation and corrective action system, resulted
in the following:
(a) Demonstration that if experience retention inform-
ation is brought to the attention of the designer in a direct manner, he
will apply it. Oversights in new designs and in converting equipment
from previous programs to new uses on Skylab were identified and corrected.
Many of these actions were initiated by the responsible design groups dur-
ing checklist completion before return of the checklist to MSFC. "Noncom-
pliance" columns were marked and the actions that were in process to cor-
rect deficiencies were stated in the supplemental rationale.
(b) Provided a method for coordinating the efforts of
many Government and contractor organizations from a systems safety point
of view. Detailed reviews of managerial controls, processes, and oper-
ating procedures resulted from questions brought out by evaluation efforts.
The reviews considered such factors as controls to prevent installation of
components in reverse, controls to ensure application of proper torque
values, verification of pressure regulator and flow control device set-
tings, verification of cleanliness levels of GSE before use with flight
hardware, and inspection of connectors for bent pins, foreign objects, or
contamination before mating.
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(c) Extended the capability of a small group of sys-
tem safety specialists to permit a program-wide safety assessment through
engineering organizations responsible for hardwsre development. Names
and department numbersof individual engineers who had completed each
checklist section were submitted to MSFCwith each checklist. Rapid re-
sponsewas provided by telephone to questions arising during the evalua-
tion process. Copies of detailed drawings or procedures were submitted
upon request as required to process potential problem-action summaries.
The use of existing design groups minimized the development and contin-
uous maintenance (changes) of detail design schematics at the component,
subassembly, or subsystem level by the system safety evaluation group.
Design changesoccurring after initial checklist submittal were reviewed
against checklist criteria by the design group responsible for the change.
Supplemental status sheets were submitted to the safety evaluation group
for changed items. This supplemental status was reviewed for impact
against previously baselined safety checklist status for the equipment.
(d) Provided managementwith visibility of results.
Centralized processing of completed checklists and a coordinated cor-
rective action system provided a focal point for overall checklist
program status. Comparisons betweenchecklists for flight and ground
equipment used in combination resulted in the identification and reso-
lution of potential hazards not recognized at the individual equipment
level. Significant risks were immediately brought to the attention of
the responsible design organization for confirmation and corrective
action recommendations. Potential problems were resolved through CCB
action. Skylab system safety checklist program status reviews were
included as part of periodic MSFCSkylab ProgramManagementReviews.
In addition, checklist status was included as a special subject within
Reliability and Safety portions of the DCR,both at the individual prime
contractor level and at the overall Skylab level.
(6) Summaryof Results. Over 600 checklists were com-
pleted. More than 80 actions were taken to eliminate or significantly
reduce the potential for failure or accident. Examplesof actions
taken are as follows:
(a) A single failure could have resulted in multiple
loss of detection capability in orbit. The 3.6 Ampfuses in 12 separ-
ate Fire Sensor Control Panels associated with 22 separate sensors were
changed to 1.0 Ampfuses. The characteristics of the 3.6 Ampfuses were
essentially the sameas the "trip" characteristics of the circuit breaker
for all fire sensors associated with a particular bus. Therefore, if a
short circuit or overload condition were to develop a single sensor or
its associated wiring, it would have been possible to lose all fire sen-
sors powered from the affected bus (last statement, Figure V.C-3). The
action was initiated by the prime contractor, who was responsible for
the Skylab C&Wsystem, on detection of a deficiency during initial
checklist completion. The action was implemented by all three prime
contractors responsible for the three modules that constituded the hab-
itable areas of the Skylab.
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(b) A single failure could have resulted in a launch
delay because of flight or ground hardware damage. Three separate re-
lief valves were changed within a console to provide relief flow capac-
ity greater than that of the upstream pressure regulators in the event
of regulator failure. The console incorporated parallel multistage
pressure regulation to ensure reliability. A change to increase console
operating pressure and flow rate subsequent to the original design re-
suited in an oversight to reverify the orifice size of the relief valves.
The action to correct this condition was initiated during the evaluation
process. A retest of the new configuration was performed on a prototype
console (qualification unit) under simulated failure conditions. The
modification was then made to the console that was used during flight
hardware tests at KSC.
A System Safety Checklist, Skylab Program Report, TMX-64850, has
since been developed and issued by the MSFC Sky lab Program Office for
the benefit of future programs. The single volume document contains
over 500 criteria statements applicable to flight systems, experiments,
other payloads, associated GSE, and facility support systems. The doc-
ument contains updated criteria statements from all four Skylab check-
lists and reflects additional experience gained during the Skylab pro-
gram. The document contains suggestions for progressive application
of checklist criteria beginning with the preliminary development of
design requirements and specifications.
V-51
D. Quality Assurance Program
i. Objectives and Methodolog Y . Provision for quality control
of Skylab hardware, from initial design through final testing and
acceptance, was instituted early in the program with the establishment
of a Reliability and Quality Assurance Program. Quality Assurance is
a planned and systematic pattern of all actions necessary to provide
adequate confidence that the end items will perform satisfactorily in
actual operations. The NASA _aality Assurance program was defined and
established in the '_pollo Applications Reliability and Quality Assur-
ance Plan" (NHB 5300.5) dated May 1967, "Quality Program Provisions
for Aeronautical and Space Systems Contractors" (NHB 5300.4 (IB))
dated April 1969, and "Inspection System Provisions for Suppliers of
Space Materials, Parts, Components and Services," (NPC 200-3) dated
April 1962. Additional quality requirements are established in the
Cluster Requirements Specification (RS003M00003). The quality require-
ments of the above listed documents were imposed on the various hard-
ware contractors through the Contract Statements of Work. Quality pro-
visions were also included in the Contract End Item (CEI) specification
documents for each contractor.
Subject to the above listed documents, each contractor prepared a
quality plan detailing the operation of the respective Quality Programs.
The objectives of the contractor plans are:
Development and manufacture, from the initial phase to delivery,
of missile and space systems that meet the quality requirements
of NASA (and the contractor).
- Timely emphasis and planning toward the solution of potential
problem areas related to quality in all program activity areas.
- Documented provisions for the accurate evaluation and evidence
of status and progress in accomplishing program quality goals.
MSFC had the prerogative of disapproving these plans, partially or
entirely, if in its implementation it failed to achieve the desired
objective of the contract. Additionally, the contractors were subject
to continuous evaluation, review, and inspection by MSFC or its desig-
nated representatives.
2. l_plementation and Management Control.
a. Design and Development
(I) Drawing and Specification Review. In early program
phases, Quality Assurance manifested itself in the area of documentation.
As design, development, procurement, and specification documents became
available for release, they were reviewed to ensure adequate requirements
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for determining and controlling product quality. Drawing review included
consideration of the following quality criteria:
Standardization of drafting and design practices relative to
parts, identification_ characteristic definition, tolerances,
and test requirements;
Application of qualified and approved/preferred parts;
- Adequate dimensioning for manufacture and inspection;
- Proper surface finish;
- Proper specification callouts;
- Adequate general notations to permit Manufacturing and Relia-
bility Assurance to fabricate and inspect all aspects of the
design pertinent to form, fit, and function;
- Standard processing, manufacturing, and tooling callouts (tool-
ing holes) as applicable;
- Adherence to standard design in tube bend radii, minimummachine
radii, hole tolerances, hole runout allowance, sheet metal bend
radii, and other standard contractor drafting and manufacturing
practices;
- Adequate identification of article;
- Reference to applicable technical documents, including test
requirement callout;
- Acceptance parameters and conformance limits for all character-
istics that influence quality, as applicable;
- Qualification test requirements in drawings released for procure-
ment, as applicable.
(2) Test Program. As early hardware for development and
qualification testing becameavailable and testing was initiated, Quality
Assurance provided support and surveillance for the tests. Primary
emphasis during the testing was to ensure that instrumentation and meas-
uring devices were within calibration time limits. For qualification
testing, Quality verified the test article to be of the proper produc-
tion configuration and functionally acceptable for conduct of the qual-
ification test.
b. Traceability. Each contractor developed a Quality Assur-
ance documentation system to provide for and control the identification
of piece parts, materials, and articles to which procurements, fabrication,
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inspection, test, and operating records were related and all aspects of
the program which affected the quality of the product. All pertinent
information relative to materials, processes, test data, and performance
were documentedand verified on the completed planning paper. It was
required that flight and backup hardware componentsbe traceable to the
"lot" level. Quality data considered essential to the program or de-
veloped by the contractor as objective evidence of compliance to quality
requirements were madeavailable to the NASArepresentative for review
as required.
c. Procurement Control. The Quality organization had primary
responsibility for ensuring the quality of procured articles. Procure-
ment quality activities were performed to assure that:
- Suitable suppliers were selected.
- The quality of incoming materials met contractual, engineering
and program specifications.
- Procurement documentscontained Quality and Reliability require-
ments.
Materials were controlled during the manufacturing process by
ensuring that they were properly identified, handled, and adequate
records of test and inspections performed were available.
- The supplier met the appropriate requirements.
(i) Source Selection. The selection of procurement
sources was based upon the supplier's historical records or survey
reports. Reliability Assurance reviewed and provided commentson the
adequacy of all procurement sources. Selection procedures included
consideration of the following:
- Does supplier have a record of supplying high quality articles
of the type being procured?
Surveys and audits were conducted on the supplier's facilities
and Quality Control systems for the capability of supplying
items that meet all quality requirements. Results of these
surveys and audits were documentedand madeavailable to MSFC
or its designated representative upon request.
- Reviewand approval of written supplier quality plans.
Additionally, Quality verified that the necessary failure history
reviews were performed before purchase order approval to ensure that
parts required by design did not exhibit unsatisfactory trends. As
the procurement phase continued, supplier performance trends were used
as a basis for disapproval where unsatisfactory conditions occured.
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(2) Procurement Documentation. Quality reviewed purchase
orders before contract commitmentto ensure that quality standards and
all pertinent requirements, including reliability specifications, were
documentedin the contract with the supplier.
Drawings and specifications pertinent to the procurement, includ-
ing supplier drawings that formed part of the basic contractor drawings/
specification, were reviewed in accordance with criteria established by
the contractor quality plan.
Purchase orders were submitted to the Resident GovernmentQuality
Representative for review and comment.
Purchase orders were reviewed to verify the inclusion of the follow-
ing information, as applicable:
- Basic technical requirements;
- Intended application;
- Detailed Quality requirements;
- Changecontrol procedures;
- Rawmaterial test analysis;
- Preservation, packaging, packing and shipping;
- Age control and life limiting requirements;
- Identification requirements;
- Inspection and test requirements;
- Handling of inspection and test records;
- Resubmission of rejected articles;
- GovernmentSource Inspection (GSI) requirements;
- Source inspection; and
- Data package requirements.
(3) Receiving Inspection. Uponreceipt of procured
articles in the receiving inspection area, evidence of supplier inspec-
tion in accordance with terms of the purchase order, and source control
requirements were satisfied before initial acceptance was made. Con-
tingent on results of the initial inspection, articles were routed for
completion of the receiving inspection process in accordance with a
Receiving Acceptance Procedure. This included, but was not necessarily
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limited to, a physical examination, identification, and tests; disassembly
was accomplished as appropriate. Articles subject to age deterioration
were examined for proper marking and verified to have sufficient remain-
ing life. Records were maintained and updated if life or cycle use occur-
red during receiving inspection activities.
Whennecessary, chemical analysis and physical tests to verify
material quality were conducted on test specimens submitted with purchased
articles. Verification of raw materials conformance to specification was
periodically conducted on samples randomly selected to determine accuracy
of supplier test reports.
(4) GovernmentFurnished Equipment (GFE). The Contractor
was responsible for receiving GFEand reviewing data and documentation to
determine that the hardware was acceptable for the intended Contractor
use. Quality reviewed inspection records and hardware to determine if
shortages, damage,or unacceptable conditions existed. Functional test-
ing was not required. The Contractor was to notify the customer repre-
sentative of any GFEreceived that was unsuitable for its intended use.
Contractor maintained records of GFEthat included the identifica-
tion of the property, dates, types, and results of Contractor inspections,
and other significant events.
d. Fabrication Control
(i) Cleanliness Control. Procedures were established
to control contamination levels during required stages of fabrication,
assembly, test, and packaging operations. Quality monitored all envi-
ronmentally controlled work areas, and inspected all controlled articles
and commodities for compliance with the CEI specification cleanliness
requirements.
(2) Material Control. Materials were stored in controlled
storage areas. Whenmaterial was issued against a manufacturing process,
Quality would verify the material issued by stamping the material block
of the process plan. Quality also verified that the issued material was
identified by material type and lot number. The issued material would
be stampedby Quality, and the identification and lot information entered
in the process plan. Nonconformingmaterial was identified and withheld
from production flow.
Materials subject to limited shelf life were identified and controlled
to prevent use beyond the life expiration date. Time-cycle data was
accumulated on sensitive equipment to assure that adequate life remained
for subsequent end usage. Log books reflected remaining useful life of
all limited life and time/cycle sensitive articles.
(3) Process Control. Manufacturing processes were re-
viewed and approved by Quality before use. Control included initial
facility approval and operational adherence to the intent of the design
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and manufacturing requirements, as well as the stated requirements of
applicable specifications. Inspection personnel ensured compliance with
process requirements, that the process had been approved by Quality, and
that no unauthorized or outdated processes were in use.
(4) Fabrication Inspection. Inspection monitored fabri-
cation operations, inspected all completed items, and performed in-
process inspections as required to assure the proper level of workman-
ship and quality of the end item. The results of these inspections
were documentedand the parts identified to provide objective evidence
of Quality acceptance.
Discrepancies found during fabrication or before acceptance were
documentedand the discrepant item returned to Manufacturing for rework
to drawing. Items that could not be reworked to drawing were identified
"withheld" and processed to Material ReviewBoard (MRB).
e. Inspection and Test
(I) Planning. The control of Contractor-fabricated
articles consisted of a planned program of inspections and reviews
conducted to ensure compliance to contract requirements during all
phases of contract performance. These reviews were conducted by Qual-
ity and encompassedall the technical documentsused to fabricate and
test the end items. In addition to establishing inspection requirements,
these reviews provided assurance that the items could be built, inspected
and tested, and that the Engineering and Contract requirements would be
met.
All inspections performed on the end item, its components, or raw
materials, were planned and documentedto provide a complete record of
the inspection, by whom,and the date it was performed. The planning
assured that inspections were performed in a logical sequence, at con-
venient points within the fabrication and test cycle, and allowed these
operations to proceed consistent with good control practices.
(2) Operation. Installations and assemblies were fab-
ricated in accordance with Quality-approved Assembly Process Plans.
3efore installing components, mounting holes, and bracket dimensions
_ere inspected for correct dimensions and locations per drawings.
_uality verified acceptable completion of componentinspection and
!unctional test before installation of componentsand equipment into
he carrier. All items in the process plan requiring quality buy-off
_adto be accomplished before proceeding to end item testing. To the
xtent practicable, each fabrication and assembly inspection and test
peration was traceable to the individual responsible for its accom-
lishment.
Quality controlled the validation of official test procedures,
erified proper procedure configuration, and maintained status of all
cocedures, completed, in work, or unaccomplished. Quality reviewed
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records and witnessed acceptance tests. All variations, anomalies, or
failures were documentedin the procedure history sheet.
At the completion of end item testing, and before pack and ship
operations, a final inspection of the completed articles was conducted
by Quality. Results of final inspection were documentedin process
plans and in quality check sheets prepared by Quality to assure that
all inspection requirements were met. Quality would review equipment
log books for completeness and accuracy. A review of limited life
componentsdata would be performed to assure that remaining life was
sufficient to accomplish the mission. Uponcompletion of final in-
spection and resolution of all open items, Quality would initiate COFW
endorsement to indicate that all Quality requirements have been sat-
isfied, and presented the COFWto NASA. Integrity control was main-
tained on accepted articles. Any repairs, modification, or replace-
ments accomplished after final inspection and test, necessitated rein-
spection and retest to the extent determined necessary by the Contractor,
subject to the approval of NASA.
Quality conducted Incremental SummaryReviews (ISR) for the equip-
ment at fabrication milestones as mutually agreed to by the Contractor
and NASA. ISR data for these fabrication milestones was prepared by
Quality for resident NASAreview and approval. The COFWwas presented
to resident NASAfor sign-off at these milestones, before transmittal
to NASAMSFC.
(3) Documentation. Quality maintained records of inspec-
tions and tes_performed throughout the entire procurement, fabrication,
and assembly processes. The records provided evidence that required
inspections and tests had been performed on raw materials, procured
parts, fabricated details, and completed articles. All quality data
was accumulated and maintained in retention and included vendor data,
laboratory analyses, calibration records, nonconformancehistory, re-
ceiving inspection reports, fabrication, and assembly records.
Historical logs were prepared and maintained for all major airborne
components, subsystems, and systems. Each log, identified to the equip-
ment to which it pertained, was maintained in chronological order and
accounted for all periods of time and any movementsof the item, thereby,
documenting its history. Historical logs consisted of data derived from
componentdata packages, certification logs, and other test and inspec-
tion data necessary to comply with quality and contract requirements.
The contractors prepared an Acceptance Data Packagefor each con-
tract end item of hardware in accordance with the Configuration Manage-
ment Plan. This packagewas presented to NASAMSFCor its delegated
representative at the time of acceptance.
f. NonconformingMaterial. Quality Assurance was responsible
for detection and reporting of nonconforming materials. Upondetection,
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all nonconforming material was removed promptly from the manufacturing
system and compounded, if practical, for disposition and for comple-
tion of the nonconformance report.
(i) Material Review Board (MRB). The MRB was a formal
contractor/Government Board established to determine the disposition of
minor nonconforming material and recommend disposition of major non-
conforming material.
Items that could not be acted upon routinely were presented to
the MRB for disposition. The MRB consisted of an authorized Quality
representative, an authorized representative of the Engineering organiza-
tion, and a customer representative.
The Contractor representatives were specifically authorized to act
on material covered by this contract. Contractor personnel were cer-
tified to participate in board activities.
The Contractor MRB members coordinated and recommended disposition
before submittal to the customer representative. The MRB disposition
required the concurrence of all three members. Disposition could be
one of the following:
- Use "as is";
- Repair-Nonconforming material that could be made acceptable
by repair;
- Scrap-When nonconforming material could not be used "as is"
nor satisfactorily repaired.
When the MRB disposition was "repair" and a nonconformance existed
fter completion of the repair, that could effect safety, reliability,
urability, performance, interchangeability, weight, or the basic
bjectives of the contract, the Contractor submitted a written re-
uest to the contracting officer for approval of that condition.
(2) Identification and Routine Disposition. Hardware
_termined to be nonconforming was identified and segregated, the
:itial identification being made by Quality personnel. A Withheld
_g was attached to the discrepant item to denote pending disposition
_en required by procedure. Reacceptance in the form of stamp applica-
on occurred when the disposition was completely satisfied, including
i retest and pertinent data review.
Disposition of defective articles could be made without MP_B
tion. The dispositions that could be given follow.
Complete to Drawing - Items that were incomplete or could be
restored to the original configuration were corrected in
accordance with drawings and specifications;
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- RecommendScrap, Refer to Material Review - Items obviously
unfit for use or uneconomical to repair;
- Refer to Materials ReviewBoard - If other than above applies.
"Complete to Drawing" disposition could be authorized only when
written procedures defined the rework involved. Any material under-
going work would be completely reinspected to ensure that the material
meets the required drawings and specifications. Detail rework manu-
facturing plans were approved by the Quality representative of the MRB
before issuance of work folder.
(3) Corrective Action. Action had to be taken to cor-
rect conditions that contributed to, and were inherent in, nonconform-
ance (including flight readiness action and recurrence control action).
Failure reports were considered open by the Contractor until corrective
action was implemented. In all cases a positive statement of corrective
action or rationale as to why action was not required, was necessary
to close out a failure report.
Quality personnel classified failures and notified the resident
Governmentrepresentative of all category No. I, and IS, 2A, 2B and
3 failures within 24 hours. Quality personnel prepared compilation
of problem history sheets into a Corrective Action Problem Summary,
which was submitted as part of the Quality Status Report to the Cus-
tomer. Subsequently, a revised sheet would be included for problems
where the status had changed. The final history sheet on an individual
problem defined the closure action taken.
g. Preservation, Packaging, Handling, Storage and Shipping.
Design and performance criteria for the preservation, packaging, pack-
ing, and transportation by the Contractor for the delivery of equipment,
was developed to achieve the following objectives:
- Efficient, economical protection from damageduring handling,
storage and shipment;
- Prevention of product deterioration;
- Proper identification and marking ensuring efficient receipt,
storage, inventory, and issuance;
- Uniform protection of similar items;
- Economyby the use of packageand containers of minimumweight
and volume;
- Maintenance of required environments and provisions of indica-
tions for critical environment where necessary.
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Quality Assurance reviewed the instructions for these items to
ensure incorporation of quality requirements. This included providing,
as necessary, inspection instructions in the manufacturing work author-
ities.
(i) Preservation and Packaging. Packaging drawings and
processing instructions were prepared and released for use by Manufac-
turing in establishing preservation and packaging methods. The preserva-
tion and packaging methods conformed to all applicable requirements.
Packaging data were developed for each item shipped in accordance with
the packaging plans and process instructions. Quality Assurance accom-
plished inspection of the unit, intermediate and final packaging, and
crating. Whenmaintenance of specific internal or external environments
were necessary, these were included in the packaging and necessary spe-
cial instructions provided on the exterior of the package for monitoring
by Quality Assurance.
(2) Handling and Storage. Special carts, containers,
and transportation vehicles to be used were prescribed in handling and
storage process instructions to prevent damagedue to handling during
fabrication and processing.
(3) Shipping. Quality Assurance inspected and controlled
articles shipped from the Contractor to assure that:
Articles had been subjected to, and satisfactorily passed,
applicable inspections and tests. Emphasiswas given to the
physical segregation of conforming articles from those await-
ing test results or final disposition.
- Articles were complete and fully assembled as required, or
necessary waivers had been obtained.
- Articles had been preserved and packaged in accordance with
applicable procedures and process instructions.
- Packagedarticles were identified and marked in accordance
with applicable procedures and process instructions.
In the absence of packing and marking requirements in the
contract or subcontract, packing and marking of articles com-
plied with Interstate CommerceCommissionrules and regula-
tions and commercial practice. The articles were packaged
to ensure safe arrival and ready identification at destina-
tion.
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